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Athenian Foreign Policy and the Peace-Conference at Sparta in 371 B.C.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

T. T. B. Ryder
T. T. B. Ryder
Affiliation:
University of Hull
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Extract

The purpose of this article is to discuss at greater length two problems raised by Mr. D. J. Mosley towards the end of his discussion of the Athenian Embassy to Sparta in 371 published in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society N.s. viii (1962), 41 ff. The first of these problems concerns the policy pursued by Callistratus at this peace-conference, the second the effect on their audience of the divergent speeches of three of the Athenian ambassadors, Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus, which Xenophon reports.

Type
Articles
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , December 1963 , pp. 237 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1963

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References

page 237 note 1 I am most grateful to Mr. Mosley for allowing me to read his article before publication and for useful discussions of these problems.

page 237 note 2 Hell. 6. 3. 4–17.Google Scholar

page 237 note 3 Xen, . Hell. 5. 4. 14Google Scholar (inaction during Cleombrotus' invasion of Boeotia) and ig (trial of the two generals who had helped the rheban revolutionaries); even if Diodorus' report of an alliance between Athenians and rhebans before Sphodrias' raid (15. 28. 5) a accepted (as by Burnett, , Historia xii [1962], 15–16)Google Scholar, this alliance must be after the irial of the generals (cf. Burnett, , loc. cit.) and vas certainly followed by further misgivings.Google Scholar

page 237 note 4 Xen, . Hell. 5. 4. 34, Diod. 15. 29. 7 etc.Google Scholar

page 237 note 5 Cf. Tod no. 123, lines 9–10.

page 237 note 6 Cf. Isocr. 14. 6 and 29, Dem. 16. 14.

page 237 note 7 See the guarantees in Tod no. 123, lines 20–24.

page 237 note 8 Isocr. 14. 37; on Athenian mistrust of the Thebans at this time cf. Xen, . Hell. 6. 2. 1Google Scholar; on Athenian obligations to Thebes, cf. Momigliano, , Athenaeum N.S. xiv (1936), 12.Google Scholar

page 237 note 9 The Thebans remained members of the Confederacy (cf. Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 2 and 19; I.G.ii.2 1607, etc.) and Isocrates in the Plataicus talks of the Thebans and the Plataeans as both being included in the peace. Diodorus' account of the exclusion of the Thebans (15. 38. 3) is probably due to a confusion of what did happen in 371 and the Adienian threat now to exclude them from the confederacy.Google Scholar

page 238 note 1 Stipulation about garrisons—Diod. 15. 38. 2, Isocr. 8. 16; withdrawal from Boeotian cities7mdash;Isocr. 15. no and cf. Beloch, , III2 i. 160Google Scholar; from Phocis—Hatzfeld, R.E.A. xxxvi (1934) 447 ff.Google Scholar and Sealey, R., Phoenix xi (1957), 95 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, have argued that the Spartan army remained in Phocis throughout the next four years, until ordered to advance into Boeotia in 371 (Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 1)Google Scholar, but the Thebans were evidently attacking Phocis with some success before the peace-conference in 371 (Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 1) and a Spartan army was more probably sent over then in response to a fresh appeal.Google Scholar

page 238 note 2 Especially § 33.

page 238 note 3 Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 3.Google Scholar

page 238 note 4 p. 46.

page 238 note 5 p. 45. Mosley adds the Persians and is inclined to accept Persian intervention at this time. But Diodorus' account of Persian initiative (15. 50. 4) seems to be a doublet of his account of the previous peace (15. 38. 1)—cf. Lauffer, , Historia viii (1959), 321–330—whenGoogle Scholar the Persians did take part; and Callistratus is made by Xenophon to answer allegations that the Athenians seek peace through fear of Persian intervention in the future (Hell. 6. 3. 12).Google Scholar

page 238 note 6 Hell. 6. 3. 1.Google Scholar

page 239 note 1 Cf. p. 238 n. 1.

page 239 note 2 Plut, . Ages. 28Google Scholar; Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 19.Google Scholar

page 239 note 3 Xen, . Hell. 5. 1. 32–33.Google Scholar

page 239 note 4 The Athenian public evidently ex-pected a Spartan victory (Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 20Google Scholar) and were not alarmed at the prospect; what was not expected at all was a Theban victory (ibid. 6. 4. 20), but even then the Adienians were able to sponsor a new treaty which drew Sparta's Peloponnesian allies nearer to them-selves (Xen, . Hell. 6. 5. 2Google Scholar, cf. Sordi, , R.I.F.C. lxxix [1951], 34 ff.Google Scholar

page 239 note 5 Plut, . Ages. 28.Google Scholar

page 239 note 6 Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 18.Google Scholar On the connexion between this clause and Athenian desire for neutrality cf. esp. Hampl, , Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts, p. 105Google Scholar, though it was recognized long ago by Underhill, , Commentary on Xenophon's Hellenica, ad loc. The treaty did apparently include a provision for the withdrawal of harmosts from cities; harmosts were Spartan governors of allied cities, and these must have been stationed in Peloponnesian cities, and so the provision was a definite concession to Sparta's allies; perhaps the Athenians thought it politic to demand some such concession to impress their own allies and the Spartans allowed it to satisfy grumblers.Google Scholar

page 240 note 1 Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 5.Google Scholar

page 240 note 2 Ibid. 7–9.

page 240 note 3 Ibid. 10–17.

page 240 note 4 For a different interpretation of this speech cf. Cloché, , La politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338, pp. 88 ff., who thinks that C. was recommending a division of hegemony and that the terms of the treaty matched his views.Google Scholar

page 240 note 5 Xenophon had defects as an historian, especially in his failure, as here, to present a clear picture, but he did not wilfully invent falsehoods; and in diis case, being resident in the Peloponnese, was in a good position to discover the truth (cf. Mosley, , p. 41Google Scholar, and Cloche, , op. cit., p. 87).Google Scholar

page 240 note 6 Xen, . Hell. 6. 3. 2–3 and 19.Google Scholar

page 241 note 1 p. 46.

page 241 note 2 There were some: the Spartans did apparently extend their power to some islands (Diod. 15. 30. 5) and Tod no. 123 shows fear of the Spartans to have been a motive force in the founding of the confederacy.

page 241 note 3 Cf. Xenophon's own comments, (Hell. 6. 3. 10 beginning).Google Scholar

page 241 note 4 Cf. Mosley's useful prosopographical notes (pp. 44 f).