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ATHENIAN ATIMIA AND LEGISLATION AGAINST TYRANNY AND SUBVERSION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2015

Sviatoslav Dmitriev
Sviatoslav Dmitriev*
Affiliation:
Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana
*
[email protected]
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Extract

Following the idea first expressed by Heinrich Swoboda, there is a general perception that the meaning of ἀτιμία in Athens eventually evolved from the original ‘outlawry’, when an ἄτιμος was liable to being deprived of his property and slayed with impunity if he returned to the land from which he had been banished, into a certain limitation on civic status, which has often been rendered as a ‘disfranchisement’. Specific outcomes of this later form of ἀτιμία varied depending on the dating and circumstances of individual cases, thereby giving rise to theories of a so-called full – or ‘total’ – and partial ἀτιμία. Still, whether it was viewed as ‘full’ or ‘partial’, this ἀτιμία did not inflict the death penalty. The precise dating of the transformation of ἀτιμία has also been debated, with opinions ranging from pre-Solonian times (L'Homme-Wéry) to the late sixth (Swoboda, Hansen, Manville) or the late fifth century (Scafuro). While the exact dating is unknown, this transformation was definitely over in the fifth century, when inscriptions and literary texts mentioned punishment by ἀτιμία alongside the death penalty and the confiscation of property. Thus, according to Raphael Sealey, ἀτιμία evolved ‘from a more severe to a milder sense’, and Alick R.W. Harrison pointed to the evidence that, by the fourth century, any willing Athenian could seize an ἄτιμος who happened to be in Athenian territory and surrender him to the θεσμοθέται, instead of killing him.

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Research Article
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The Classical Quarterly , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , May 2015 , pp. 35 - 50
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Copyright © The Classical Association 2015 

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References

1 Swoboda, H., ‘Arthmios von Zeleia’, Archaeologisch-epigraphische Mittheilungen 16 (1983): 49–68Google Scholar, further elaborated in his Beiträge zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte (Weimar, 1905), 1–42Google Scholar. See also e.g. Ostwald, M., ‘The Athenian legislation against tyranny and subversion’, TAPhA 86 (1955), 106–7Google Scholar, 114; Hansen, M.H., Apagoge, Endeixis, and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi, and Pheugontes (Odense, 1976), 75–90Google Scholar; Rhodes, P.J., A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford and New York, 1981), 158Google Scholar, 221–2; Manville, B., The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens (Princeton, 1990), 147Google Scholar; Humphreys, S., ‘A historical approach to Drakon's law on homicide’, in Symposion 1990 (1991), 33–5Google Scholar; Hunter, V.J., Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420–320 b.c. (Princeton, 1994), 63Google Scholar; id., ‘Status distinctions in Athenian law’, in Hunter, V.J. and Edmondson, J.C. (edd.), Law and Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford and New York, 2000), 18Google Scholar; Patterson, C., ‘Athenian Citizenship Law’, in Gagarin, M. and Cohen, D. (edd.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge and New York, 2005), 274Google Scholar; Liddel, P., Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (Oxford and New York, 2007), 186–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Carawan, E.M., ‘Tyranny and outlawry: Athenian politeia 16.10’, in Rosen, R.M. and Farrell, J. (edd.), Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of M. Ostwald (Ann Arbor, 1993), 311Google Scholar; Lanni, A., Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge and New York, 2006), 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kamen, D., Status in Classical Athens (Princeton and Oxford, 2013), 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the history of this idea (and further bibliography), see Manville, B., ‘Solon's law of stasis and atimia in archaic Athens’, TAPhA 110 (1980), 213 with n.Google Scholar 1 and Van, P.E. ‘t Wout, ‘Neglected evidence for the nature of atimia: Agora P 17615 and DTA 107’, ZPE 176 (2011), 126Google Scholar with notes. Against this idea: Schmitz, W., Nachbarschaft und Dorfgemeinschaft im archaischen und klassischen Griechenland (Berlin, 2004), 405 nCrossRefGoogle Scholar. 11, who, however, did not elaborate any further.

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3 L'Homme-Wéry, L.-M., ‘Le rôle de la loi dans la pensée politique de Solon’, in Sineux, P. (ed.), Le législateur et la loi dans l'Antiquité: hommage à F. Ruzé (Caen, 2005), 182Google Scholar; Swoboda (n. 1), 60; Hansen (n. 1), 75–8; Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 220; Scafuro (n. 2), 923. Cf. e.g. IG 13 40.73–4 (446–445 b.c.); [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.4; Lys. 31.29 and n. 13 below.

4 Sealey (n. 2), 99–100; id., The Justice of the Greeks (Ann Arbor, 1994)Google Scholar, 13; Harrison (n. 2), 2.169–70.

5 Hansen (n. 1), 60–1; Maffi, A., ‘Ἀτιμάζειν e φεύγειν nei poemi omerici’, in Symposion 1979 (1983), 251–60Google Scholar.

6 Poddighe, E., ‘L’ἀτιμία nel διάγραμμα di Cirene: la definizione della cittadinanza tra morale e diritto alla fine del IV secolo a.c.’, Aevum 75 (2001), 38Google Scholar; van ᾿t Wout, P.E., ‘From oath-swearing to entrenchment clause: the introduction of atimia-terminology in legal inscriptions’, in Lardinois, A.P.M.H. and Blok, J. (edd.), Sacred words: orality, literacy, and religion (Leiden and Boston, 2011), 144–5Google Scholar. Cf. a similar view in Kamen (n. 1), 78: ‘The very word atimos, meaning both “deprived of civic offices” (a + timai) and “deprived of honor” (a + time), encapsulates both the degraded political status and the degraded social status of such individuals’, who, thus, approached these two meanings of the word ἄτιμος not in their development but synchronously.

7 Swoboda (n. 1), 64–5; Humphreys (n. 1), 33–5; Youni (n. 2), 124–6. See Humphreys (n. 1), 34 (‘in origin these were informal sanctions, imposed by public opinion’, ‘but those in power in early Greek cities appropriated the sanction and began to proclaim men atimos by decree’, so that this evolution ‘contributed to the development of the concept of citizenship’) and 35 (on connecting the change in the meaning of ἄτιμος with the development of citizenship); Youni (n. 2), 125 (‘as late as Aeschylus our texts never use the word atimos as a legal term’, ‘it is only in classical times and mainly in the orators that atimia is used in a solid legal sense’) and 126 (contrasting this later understanding with the ‘original meaning of the word’). Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 216–17 and 220, respectively; for a similar connection between ἀτιμία and the development of Athenian citizenship, see also Murray, O., ‘The Solonian law of hubris’, in Cartledge, P., Millett, P. and Todd, S.C. (edd.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society (Cambridge and New York, 1990), 140Google Scholar. For limiting the punishment by ἀτιμία to only citizens, see also e.g. Hall, M. Debrunner, in Foxhall, L. and Lewis, A.D.E. (edd.), Greek Law in its Political Setting (Oxford and New York, 1996), 80Google Scholar; Karabélias, É., Études d'histoire juridique et sociale de la Grèce ancienne: recueil d'études (Athens, 2005), 236Google Scholar, 279–80.

8 E.g. Harrison (n. 2), 2.169–71; Rhodes (n. 1), 158 and (n. 2), 199; Carawan (n. 1), 311–12.

9 The three main surviving accounts about this story (Hdt. 9.4–5, Lycurg. 1.122 and Dem. 18.204) vary on details and disagree on the name (Demosthenes referred to him as Cyrsilus, while Lycurgus gave no name at all), but agree on the plot. For further evidence and discussions, see Verrall, A.W., ‘The death of Cyrsilus, alias Lycides: a problem in authorities’, CR 23 (1909), 38–40Google Scholar; Habicht, C., ‘Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege’, Hermes 89 (1961), 18–19Google Scholar, 24; Rosivach, V.J., ‘Execution by stoning in Attica’, ClAnt 6 (1987), 237–41Google Scholar.

10 [Plut.] X orat. 1 (Antiphon), 834ab. This traditional explanation has been questioned by Edwards, M.J., ‘Antiphon the revolutionary’, in Cairns, D.L. and Knox, R.A. (edd.), Law, Rhetoric, and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in Honour of D. M. MacDowell (Swansea, 2004), 82–3Google Scholar, speaking only of Antiphon and arguing solely on the basis that some other members of the Four Hundred, such as Theramenes and Andron, were not subjected to this punishment.

11 Aristophanes: Lys. 19.7–8; cf. Harp. 10.15. See also e.g. Lycurg. 1.141; Din. 1.60, 2.4, 3.5; Lys. 27.7–8; Dem. 19.275–7. Fines as punishments for such crimes: e.g. [Dem.] 57.70, suggesting that this was a typical, if not a standard, penalty. Cf. Din. 1.60 and 3.5 (either death or a fine ten times as great as the original bribe), and Andoc. 1.74 on bribe-takers as ἄτιμοι. Plut. Phoc. 33.2–34.3.

12 E.g. IG 5.2 357 = StV 3.567 = Thür, G. and Taeuber, H., Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der Griechischen Poleis: Arkadien [IPArk] (Vienna, 1994)Google Scholar, no. 17.113: the one who steals or robs from the house is to be put to death as an ἄτιμος: [ἀ]π̣ο̣θ̣ανέτω ἄτιμος (c. 303–300 b.c.).

13 Dem. 9.42–5, with Cary, M., ‘Arthmius of Zeleia’, CQ 29 (1935): 177–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See esp. Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 215–16 n. 11: ‘whatever the fate of Arthmius of Zeleia, it is clear that Demosthenes expected his audience in the fourth century to know a distinction between killing without blood guilt and loss of Athenian rights’, with a collection of evidence from the fifth and fourth centuries where ἀτιμία is contrasted with or cited in addition to penalties of death and loss of property. Here and below, English translations come, with occasional modification, from the Oratory of Classical Greece and the Loeb Classical Library, unless noted.

14 Habicht (n. 9), 18–19, 24, 27. Habicht's view has been rejected by Meiggs, R., The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1972), 508–12Google Scholar and Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 220–1 (see also n. 18 below).

15 The reference to Arthmius as ἄτιμος καὶ πολέμιος (Dem. 9.42–5) has been interpreted as reflecting that ἀτιμία had already lost its original meaning of ‘outlawry’: e.g. Swoboda (n. 1), 58; Hansen (n. 1), 75–6.

16 Thus, when the speaker in Against Neaira quoted the original decree about the Athenian grant to the Plataeans, after their city was finally taken by the Spartans in 427, he used the ethnic (‘let the Plataeans be Athenians’), whereas when he provided his own description of those events, he applied the word πολιτεία and its cognates, which emerged only later: [Dem.] 59.104–6. Likewise, Dem. 23.205 talked about Cimon's punishment for subverting the ‘ancestral constitution’ (τὴν πάτριον μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν), with Piccirilli, L., Temistocle, Aristide, Cimone, Tucidide di Melesia fra politica e propaganda (Genoa, 1987), 139–40Google Scholar, although this concept became a part of the Athenian political vocabulary only in the late fifth century: see e.g. Fuks, A., The Ancestral Constitution: Four Studies in Athenian Party Politics at the End of the Fifth Century b.c. (London, 1953), 103Google Scholar, 107.

17 So e.g. Habicht (n. 9), 22 (about the decree concerning Lycides as Lycurgus' own invention [‘a product of his own time’] on the basis of information provided by Herodotus, followed by Rosivach [n. 9], 237–9) and 27 (about the decree concerning Arthmius of Zelea) (see n. 14 above).

18 Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 220 (after the late sixth century ‘atimia was not invoked against foreigners and metics’), 221 (‘after Arthmius atimia was reserved for Athenians’); Scafuro (n. 2), 923.

19 IG 13 21.27 (Miletus, 450–449 b.c.) and 40.33–4 (Chalcis, 446–445 b.c.). Taurosthenes: Din. 1.44. Euthycrates: the Suda, Π 2539.

20 Hansen (n. 1), 118; see also pp. 61–6, 75–80.

21 Ibid. 58, see also 118; Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 221; cf. p. 215: ‘Though slaying and confiscation perhaps lurked as a possibility for all atimoi, such ultimate punishment was not normally suffered’; Carawan (n. 1), 315–16.

22 Rhodes, P.J., ‘Bastards as Athenian citizens’, CQ 28 (1978), 90CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Parker, R., Miasma: Pollution and Purification in early Greek Religion (Oxford, 1983), 204Google Scholar (‘It is in connection with subversive offences that the inherited punishment is specifically attested’) and Forsdyke, S., Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece (Princeton and Oxford, 2005), 10Google Scholar (‘Ἀτιμία in the stronger sense “outlawry” continued to exist as a penalty for certain serious crimes such as establishing a tyranny or overthrowing the democracy’).

23 Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.10. This attribution: e.g. Martina, A., Solone: testimonianze sulla vita e l'opera (Rome, 1968), 208Google Scholar; Ruschenbusch, E., Solonos Nomoi: Die Fragmente des Solonischen Gesetzeswerkes mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 1983), 81Google Scholar.

24 IG 12 10.32–4: ἐὰν δ(έ τ)ις ἁ(λ)ῶ[ι προδιδ]οὺς … τοῖς τυράννοις τὴμ (πόλι)[ν] (τὴν) Ἐρυθραίων, καὶ [αὐτ]ὸς [νηπο](ινε)ὶ τεθνάτω [κ](αὶ) [οἱ] παῖδε(ς h)οι ἐχς ἐ(κ)είν(ου). However, David Lewis (IG 13 14) preferred neither to accept this restoration nor to offer his own; cf. IG 13 46.27 (see n. 59 below).

25 The authenticity of the text as presented in the speech of Andocides has been recently rejected (Canevaro, M. and Harris, E.M., in CQ 62 [2012], 119–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and defended: Sommerstein, A.H., in Sommerstein, A.H. and Bayliss, A.J. (edd.), Oath and State in Ancient Greece (Berlin and Boston, 2013), 74–5Google Scholar with n. 54. On the basis of their analysis of its terminological content, Canevaro and Harris ([above], 125) concluded that the text adduced as the decree of Demophantus in Andoc. 1.96–8 was probably passed in 400–399. It can be suggested that, like on several other occasions, which will be mentioned below, we see a later modification of earlier regulations.

26 SEG 12.87 = Meritt, B.D., ‘Greek inscriptions’, Hesperia 21 (1952), 355–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar, no. 5 = IG 23 320.7–21 (trans. Meritt, slightly modified), with Rainer, J.M., ‘Über die Atimie in den griechischen Inschriften’, ZPE 64 (1986), 168–9Google Scholar, no. 5 and Wallace, R.W., The Areopagos Council to 307 b.c. (Baltimore, 1989), 179–84Google Scholar.

27 Gagarin, M., ‘The Thesmothetai and the earliest Athenian tyranny law’, TAPhA 111 (1981), 72Google Scholar (the legislation against tyranny and subversion was established even ‘before Draco by the Thesmothetai and … Solon later incorporated it as part of his revised tyranny law’). Ostwald (n. 1), 103, 108; Gallia, A.B., ‘The republication of Draco's law on homicide’, CQ 54 (2004), 458–9Google Scholar; cf. Bourriot, F., Recherches sur la nature du genos (Paris, 1976), 310–1Google Scholar, who dated its origins to as early as at least the Cylonian conspiracy. Meritt (n. 26), 358 n. 36. Cf. Forsdyke (n. 22), 179 n. 160 (on the law in Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.10 as ‘dating back at least to the time of Solon’).

28 He later assumed a much more cautious stance, though without abandoning this theory: Gagarin, M., Early Greek Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), 56Google Scholar (an ‘admittedly speculative reconstruction’); Gagarin, M., Writing Greek Law (Cambridge and New York, 2008), 115–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘all this is speculation’).

29 Plut. Sol. 19.3, with Ostwald (n. 1), 105; Gallia (n. 27), 458–9. For the historical validity of this law, see e.g. Gagarin, M., Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law (New Haven, 1981), 129–30Google Scholar; Sealey, R., The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law? (University Park, PA, 1987), 114Google Scholar; Wallace (n. 26), 7; Welwei, K.-W., Athen: Vom neolitischen Siedlungsplatz zur archaischen Grosspolis (Darmstadt, 1992), 137Google Scholar; de Bruyn (n. 2), 24–5; Bringmann, K., in Ruschenbusch, E., Solon: Das Gesetzeswerk-Fragmente. Übersetzung und Kommentar, ed. Bringmann, K. (Stuttgart, 2010), 136–7Google Scholar.

30 Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.10: Ostwald (n. 1), 106 (‘an early law which, in its original form, may go back to pre-Solonian times’), 107 (with reference to Swoboda's theory of ἀτιμία), 108–9 (on philological and procedural grounds). The decree of Demophantus: Ostwald (n. 1), 103–14 (tracing its content to Draco's legislation).

31 Rhodes (n. 1), 221; Van, P.E. ‘t Wout, ‘Solon's law on stasis: promoting active neutrality’, CQ 60 (2010), 300Google Scholar.

32 E.g. Carawan (n. 1), 307 and Gallia (n. 27), 459.

33 Ostwald (n. 1), 107; Carawan (n. 1), 307–8; Youni (n. 2), 130; Gallia (n. 27), 459.

34 Gagarin (n. 27), 73 and (n. 29), 21 n. 31.

35 IG 13 104 (409–408 b.c.); Dem. 23.51; Arist. Ath. Pol. 7.1 (on Draco's homicide law as only a surviving part of his overall legislation), and further evidence: e.g. Ael. VH 8.10; Plut. Sol. 17.1 with general overviews by Busolt, G., Griechische Staatskunde, vol. 2 (Munich, 1926 3), 807 nGoogle Scholar. 1; Miller, J., ‘Drakon (8)’, in RE 10 (1905): 1649–58Google Scholar; Stroud, R.S., Drakon's Law on Homicide (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 54–6Google Scholar, 61–4; Harrison (n. 2), 2.37–8; Gagarin (n. 29), 21–9; Rhodes (n. 1), 109–12; Humphreys, S.C., ‘The evolution of legal process in ancient Attica’, in Gabba, E. (ed.), Tria corda: Scritti in onore di A. Momigliano (Como, 1983), 233Google Scholar, 236 n. 13; Develin, R., in Athenaeum 62 (1984), 300Google Scholar; Wallace, R.W., ‘The date of Solon's reforms’, AJAH 8 (1988): 81–95Google Scholar; Sickinger, J.P., Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), 15Google Scholar, 24; Humphreys (n. 1), 18; Hölkeskamp, K.-J., ‘Drakon’, in Der Neue Pauly 3 (1997), 810–1Google Scholar; Gallia (n. 27), 452; Tsigarida, I., Solon – Begründer der Demokratie? Eine Untersuchung der sogenannten Mischverfassung Solons von Athen und deren ‘demokratischer’ Bestandteile (Berlin and New York, 2006), 24 nGoogle Scholar. 8, with a brief summary of both views in D.M. MacDowell, ‘Draco’, in OCD 4, 477. Cf. Westbrook, R., ‘Drakon's homicide law’, in Symposion 2007 (2008), 11–15Google Scholar, arguing that Draco's legislation was of a comprehensive nature, but that the ἀναγραφεῖς extracted all relevant rules on homicide and excluded any connected rules on other subjects. However, this task of the ἀναγραφεῖς does not follow from the text of IG 13 104.

36 It is hard to follow Gallia (n. 27), 459–60 when he says that the republication of Draco's homicide law was intended to provide a ‘legal jurisdiction for what the assassins of Phrynichus had done and what Demophantus’ decree enjoined future generations to do as well'. Cf. Shear, J.L., Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens (Cambridge and New York, 2011), 71Google Scholar on the issuing of the decree of Demophantus and the republication of laws as the Athenians' response to oligarchs.

37 E.g. Stroud (n. 35), 51, 60–4; Gagarin (n. 29), 21; Sickinger (n. 35), 18–19; Koerner, R., Inschriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechischen Polis: Aus dem Nachlass von R. Koerner, ed. Hallof, K. (Cologne, 1993), 30 nCrossRefGoogle Scholar. 4 and 38 (with n. 45).

38 Carawan (n. 1), 309. Scafuro, A.C., ‘Identifying Solonian laws’, in Blok, J.H. and Lardinois, A.P.M.H. (edd.), Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches (Leiden and Boston, 2006), 175Google Scholar, 190–5, followed by J.H. Blok, ‘Solon's funerary laws: questions of authenticity and fiction’, ibid., 210–13 and P.J. Rhodes, ‘The reforms and laws of Solon: an optimistic view’, ibid., 257.

39 Lycides and his family: Lycurg. 1.122 (ψήφισμα); Arthmius: Dem. 9.41 (γράμματα); Decelea: Lycurg. 1.120 (ψήφισμα); [Plut.] X orat. 1 (Antiphon), 834a (δόγμα); the decree of Demophantus: Andoc. 1.95–97 (ψήφισμα); Thrasybulus: IG 13 102 (410–409 b.c.) and Lycurg. 1.112–114 (ψήφισμα); Taurosthenes: Din. 1.44 (νόμοι); Euthycrates: the Suda, Π 2539 (ψήφισμα); Phocion: Plut. Phoc. 33.4, 34.5; Chaeronea: Lycurg. 1.52–53 (ψήφισμα).

40 See Hansen, M.H., in GRBS 19 (1978): 315–30Google Scholar and 20 (1979): 27–53, repr. in Hansen, M.H., The Athenian Ecclesia, vol. 1 (Copenhagen, 1983), 161–76Google Scholar and 179–206, respectively, and Rhodes, P.J., in JHS 111 (1991), 97 nGoogle Scholar. 45; Sickinger, J.P., ‘Literacy, orality, and legislative procedure in classical Athens’, in Worthington, I. and Foley, J.M. (edd.), Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece (Leiden and Boston, 2002), 148Google Scholar (for the fifth and fourth centuries); cf. a distinction between ψηφίσματα as passed by the popular assembly and laws as passed by the νομοθέται, see Hansen, , in GRBS 19 (1978), 315–30Google Scholar = Hansen, , The Athenian Ecclesia (Copenhagen, 1983), 161–76Google Scholar, who dated its origin to the turn of the fourth century.

41 See e.g. Shear, J.L., ‘The oath of Demophantos and the politics of Athenian identity’, in Sommerstein, A.H. and Fletcher, J. (edd.), Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society (Bristol, 2007), 150–1Google Scholar.

42 E.g. MacDowell, D.M., Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester, 1963), 79Google Scholar: ‘From its wording it is clear that this law is based on the two earlier ones’ and Sickinger (n. 40), 156: ‘The anti-tyranny law of 337/6 includes no reference to earlier legislation, but its text is clearly modeled on older laws regarding tyranny and subversion of the democracy.’

43 For the practice of retrospectively naming additional and modified laws after the original lawgiver, see e.g. Clinton, K., ‘The nature of the late fifth-century revision of the Athenian law code’, in Studies in Attic epigraphy, history, and topography presented to E. Vanderpool. Hesperia, suppl. 19 (Princeton, 1982), 30Google Scholar; Sealey (n. 29), 116; Figueira, T.J., Excursions in Epichoric History (Lanham, 1993), 237–8Google Scholar; Thomas, R., ‘Writing, law, and written law’, in Gagarin, M. and Cohen, D. (edd.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge and New York, 2005), 41Google Scholar; Flament, Chr., ‘Que nous reste-t-il de Solon? Essai de déconstruction de l'image du père de la πάτριος πολιτεία’, Les Études Classiques 75 (2007), 301Google Scholar.

44 E.g. Isoc. 7.16 and 15.231–2; Dem. 22.31 and Schol. Dem. 22.30 (Dilts); Plut. Sol. 18.2; Diog. Laert. 1.66–7.

45 Plut. Sol. 19.3 (see n. 29 above). See Flament (n. 43), 293–300.

46 This point has only been noted in brief: e.g. Hansen (n. 1), 71–2. For the meaning of γένος in the phrase αὐτὸς καὶ γένος in such cases, see Bourriot (n. 27), 315–23, who suggested that γένος essentially meant a household, οἰκία, in the classical period. He inferred, however, that the circle of the people who had to suffer the same punishment could have originally included a much wider group of relatives: pp. 316–17 with n. 185.

47 E.g. Verrall (n. 9), 36 with n. 1; Rosivach (n. 9), 237 (‘mob violence’); Kuhrt, A., The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period, vol. 1 (Milton Park and New York, 2007), 278 n. 4Google Scholar; Hamel, D., Reading Herodotus (Baltimore, 2012), 271–2Google Scholar (‘mob mentality’).

48 Habicht (n. 9), 31 (‘Rechtsbruch’); cf. 22 (on the murder of Lycides as ‘lynching’); cf. e.g. Verrall (n. 9), 36 (‘a mere act of popular vengeance and without formal justification').

49 Habicht (n. 9), 31 (‘es zugleich beispielhaft und gesetzlos war … man die betreffenden Gewaltakte durch förmliche Beschlüsse sanktionierte, von denen zur Zeit der Ereignisse nicht die Rede gewesen war’), followed by Rosivach (n. 9), 237–8.

50 Archeptolemus and Antiphon: [Plut.] X orat. 1 (Antiphon), 834ab (see n. 10 above); Arthmius: Dem. 9.42–5 (see n. 13 above) and Plut. Them. 6.2 (τοῦτον εἰς τοὺς ἀτίμους καὶ παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένος ἐνέγραψαν).

51 FGrHist 338 (Idomeneus), F 1. Isoc. 5.108, 8.113.

52 Polyb. 4.33.6. IG 12 10.32–4 (see n. 24 above) and Syll.3 58 = ML 43.3 (c. 470–440 b.c.), with Youni (n. 2), 122–3, who put such cases together as evidence for the ‘legislation of outlawry’. SEG 9.3 = ML 5 = Dobias-Lalou, C., ‘SEG IX, 3: un document composite ou incassable’, Verbum 17 (1994), 246Google Scholar, lines 46–9 (370–360 b.c.).

53 Cf. Parker (n. 22), 204: ‘it is clear that the children's loss of rights is a continuation in mitigated form of the earlier practice … by which they shared their father's atimia in the sense of outlawry and were liable to be killed with him if caught’.

54 Dem. 22.34 (κληρονόμον γάρ σε καθίστησαν ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀτιμίας τῆς τοῦ πατρός) and 24.201, respectively. See also e.g. [Dem.] 59.6 and Lys. 20, 21.25. This evidence contradicts the view on ἄτιμος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος advanced by Carawan (n. 1), 316–9, who rejected its traditional interpretation as ‘hereditary outlawry’ and held it as ‘without legal recourse either in his own right or in respect of his genos’. What was meant was certainly a change in the status of both the person who was responsible for ἀτιμία, and his γένος.

55 Lys. 20.34–5; see also Lys. 21.25; Antiph. 5.11.

56 This idea: Glotz, G., La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce (Paris, 1904), 505Google Scholar, who dated this change to the archonship of Eucleides (403–402), i.e. in connection with the fall of the Thirty. The view presented by Glotz has been challenged on the basis of inscriptional evidence by Rainer (n. 26), 172.

57 Antiph. 5.11 (see n. 55 above). Cf. the advice of the ἐξηγηταί in [Dem.] 47.70–1: if someone takes an oath and accuses someone else by name as a murderer and then the accusation goes wrong, he and his entire household (οἰκία) will be accursed, with references to a situation in which the name of the killer was unknown; see Arist. Ath. Pol. 57.4 and Dem. 23.76.

58 Dem. 23.62, with Ruschenbusch (n. 23), F 22 and Bringmann (n. 29), 52, who ascribed this law to Solon; for its authenticity, see Canevaro, M., The Documents in the Attic Orators: Laws and Decrees in the Public Speeches of the Demosthenic Corpus (Oxford and New York, 2013), 71–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See Rainer (n. 26), 167, no. 4: the honorific decree for Thersippus from Nasos (IG 12.2 645 = OGI 4 = SEG 27.4.102–4: late fourth cent. b.c.) and 169, no. 6: the anti-tyranny law from Ilium (OGI 218 = I.Ilion 25: early third cent. b.c.), and also SEG 31.985.A.8–10, B.10–12, C.3–4 (Teos, 480–450 b.c.) with texts of public imprecations from Teos in Arnaoutoglou, I. (ed. and trans.), Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook (London and New York, 1998), 84–6Google Scholar (with further references and bibliography), and IG 12.9 191.29–33: the initiator of the annulment of a contract will suffer the punishment of ἀτιμία and the confiscation of property, himself and his γένος (Eretria, late fourth cent. b.c.).

59 IG 13 46 (= Rainer [n. 26], 167, no. 3).27 (c. 445 b.c.) and IG 9.12.3 609 = ML 13.9–14 (525–500 b.c.?, with a detailed discussion). See Vatin, C., ‘Le bronze Pappadakis, étude d'une loi coloniale’, BCH 87 (1963), 13–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar (with several parallels from other places in Greece); Link, S., ‘Das Siedlungsgesetz aus Westlokris’, ZPE 87 (1991), 65–77Google Scholar (a general context for similar practices at that time); and, in general, Zunino, M.L., ‘Decidera in guerra – pensare alla pace’, ZPE 161 (2007), 157–69Google Scholar.

60 Pritchard, J.B. (ed.), Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, trans. Meek, T.J. (Princeton, 1969 3), 180Google Scholar.

61 Pritchard (n. 60), 205: ‘may these gods of the oath destroy Duppi-Tessub together with his person, his wife, his son, his grandson, his house, his land and together with everything that he owns’ (trans. A. Goetze) and 532: ‘whoever transgresses these agreements, Adad, […] and Shamash etc. [will make disappear] his name and (his) descendants from the lands’, etc. (trans. E. Reiner), respectively. See West, M., ‘Ancestral curses’, in Griffin, J. (ed.), Sophocles Revisited: Essays presented to Sir H. Lloyd-Jones (Oxford and New York, 1999), 35Google Scholar: ‘such provisions are typical of Near Eastern treaty oaths … the extension of the curses to cover the oath-taker's descendants is matched in the Greek oath κατ’ ἐξώλειαν’.

62 Parpola, S. and Watanabe, K. (edd.), Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths (Helsinki, 1988), 41Google Scholar (§ 26: ‘If anyone makes rebellion or insurrection against Esarhaddon … destroy his name and his seed from the land’) and 50 (§ 57: ‘May all the gods mentioned by name hold us, our seed and our seed's seed accountable’).

63 Driver, G.R. and Miles, J.C. (edd., with trans. and comm.), The Babylonian Laws, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1955), 107Google Scholar (‘curse that [man], his seed, his land’, etc.) and 304 (with commentary and parallel references).

64 Thuc. 1.126.11 (καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων).

65 See e.g. Glotz (n. 56), 341 (with n. 1); Harrison (n. 2), 1.5; Ogden, D., Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods (Oxford and New York, 1997), 37Google Scholar; Patterson, C.B., The Family in Greek History (Cambridge, MA and London, 1998), 109Google Scholar (‘a traditional, perhaps Solonian, law that defined legitimate children’); Lape, S., ‘Solon and the institution of the “democratic” family form’, CJ 98 (2002/3), 124Google Scholar (on ‘Solon's transformation of bastardy and legitimacy into formal legal statuses’), and commentaries by Bringmann (n. 29), 88–94. This is not the place to raise and examine the very complicated problem of the authenticity of laws that were ascribed to Solon by later generations. For a positive view, see e.g. Manville (n. 1 [1990]), 124 n. 1; Rhodes (n. 38), 256.

66 [Dem.] 44.49, 46.18 (= Martina [n. 23], F 440 = Ruschenbusch [n. 23], F 48b), and Hyp. 5.16 (Jensen), respectively. The attribution of this law to Solon: e.g. Harrison (n. 2), 1.5; Modrzejewski, J., ‘La structure juridique du mariage grec’, in Symposion 1979 (1981), 49–53Google Scholar (repr. in Modrzejewski, J., Statut personnel et liens de famille dans les droits de l'Antiquité [Aldershot and Brookfield, 1993]Google Scholar, V); Ogden (n. 65), 37. See also Dem. 20.102–3; [Dem.] 46.14; cf. similar language in [Dem.] 48.56 and Arist. Ath. Pol. 35.2.

67 Ar. Av. 1660–6 (= Martina [n. 23], F 426 = Ruschenbusch [n. 23], F 50a) with Busolt (n. 35), 834 (and n. 3 with other sources and bibliography).

68 Ogden (n. 65), 35–6; id., ‘Bastardy and fatherlessness in ancient Greece’, in Hübner, S.R. and Ratzan, D.M. (edd.), Growing Up Fatherless in Antiquity (Cambridge and New York, 2009), 108CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Carawan, E.M., ‘Pericles the Younger and the citizenship law’, CJ 103 (2008), 397Google Scholar.

69 For Solon as the one who laid down the foundation of Athenian citizenship: e.g. Manville (n. 1 [1990]), 69, 154–6 and 185–6; Manville, P.B. and Ober, J., A Company of Citizens (Boston, 2003), 20Google ScholarPubMed, 80; Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 217; Frost, F.J., ‘The Athenian military before Cleisthenes’, Historia 33 (1984), 283Google Scholar and ‘Aspects’, 50; Patterson (n. 1), 270, 273; Ober, J., ‘The Athenian revolution of 508/7 b.c.e.’, in Dougherty, C. and Kurke, L. (edd.), Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece (Cambridge and New York, 1993), 218Google Scholar; Tsigarida (n. 35), 66; Farrar, C., ‘Power to the people’, in Raaflaub, K.A., Ober, J. and Wallace, R.W. (edd.), Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2007), 186–7Google Scholar; Patterson, C.B., ‘Citizenship and gender in the ancient world: the experience of Athens and Rome’, in Benhabib, S. and Resnik, J. (edd.), Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender (New York, 2009), 53Google Scholar.

70 Humphreys (n. 1), 33. The emergence of this concept likely resulted from the association of earlier punishment for supporters of tyranny as ἄτιμοι with the punishment of enemies of democracy as ‘public enemies’.

71 The ἀτιμία of bastards has been one of the three arguments used in support of this theory: see e.g. MacDowell, D.M., ‘Bastards as Athenian citizens’, CQ 26 (1976), 89CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘this clearly implies that illegitimate descendants of Athenians normally have citizenship’, with reference to the ἀτιμία of Archeptolemus and Antiphon, and their illegitimate and legitimate descendants); Patterson, C.B., ‘Those Athenian bastards’, ClAnt 9 (1990), 46Google ScholarPubMed (about ‘the logical impossibility of making atimos someone who was not a citizen’). Cf. Manville (n. 1 [1980]), 221 (see n. 18 above), who appeared to share this view.

72 A similar conclusion has been reached by Wout (n. 1), 127, 133–4, who spoke about the ‘continuity between legal and non-legal uses of the word atimia and its cognates’ (p. 127). This conclusion, however, requires adjustments in the sense that the legal and extra-legal forms of ἀτιμία could co-exist during the classical period, and that even the narrow legal perception of ἀτιμία could take more than one form.