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Anaxagoras' Theory of Matter—II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

F. M. Cornford
F. M. Cornford
Affiliation:
Trinity CollegeCambridge.
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Extract

The earlier part of this paper yielded the result that the assertion ‘A portion of everything in everything’ has no place or function in the explanation of any sort of apparent ‘becoming’ or change. This conclusion is important because, ever since Aristotle, it has been assumed that the assertion was made in order to explain away becoming and change. But if (as I have shown), according to the best evidence, becoming and such sorts of change as Anaxagoras considered can be explained away without using the assertion at all, it follows that the motive for it must be sought, not in the processes of apparent becoming and change, but in the permanent constitution of the ungenerated and unchanging things which figure as elements in the system. A visible mass of gold or of flesh is formed by the aggregation of smaller particles of gold or of flesh, and it is infinitely divisible into parts, every one of which is gold or flesh. But what is the constitution of a piece of gold of whatever size, and how does it differ from the constitution of a piece of flesh? The proposition we have so far successfully excluded comes in here as part of the answer to this question.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , April 1930 , pp. 83 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1930

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References

page 83 note 1 C.Q., January, 1930.

page 84 note 1 Hippocrates, (Anc. Med. 15)Google Scholar describes such a thing as ‘a something that is just hot by itself and associated with no other form’ (αὐτό τι ἐϕ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμόν … μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἴδει κοινωνέον). He himself holds that ἔνι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἁλμυρόν καὶ πικρὸν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ ὀξὺ … καὶ ἄλλα μύρια παντοίας δυναμίας ἔχοντα πλῆθός τε καὶ ἰσχύν. These do no harm so long as they are ‘mixed and compounded,’ ὅταν δέ τι τούτων ἀποκριθῇ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐϕ' ἑωυτοῦ γένηται, τότε καὶ ϕανερόν ἐστι καὶ λυπεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. As he claims to be the champion of traditional medicine against Empedoclean innovations, the view he maintains may be as old as Anaxagoras, whose principle of the inseparability of the Opposites might be directed against this theory that any one of them can be ‘separated apart and be by itself.’ Cf. Frag. 6 ούκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι οὐδ' ἂν ἐϕ' ἑωυτοῦ γενέσθαι. See below, pp. 88, 94.

page 84 note 2 Ar. Phys. 187a 20 ἐκ τοῦ ὲνὸς ὰνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὤσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός ϕησιν, repeated by Simplic. ad loc., who adds: ἐναντιότητες δέ εἰσι θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ξηρότ, ὑγρόυ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Simplic. Phys. 24, 24, quotes Theophrastus' paraphrase of Aristotle's statement: ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐνανὶων. Burnet, , E.G.P. 3, p. 57Google Scholar, note 1, misrepresents this evidence.

page 85 note 1 μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρὶνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δέ πᾶς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν έστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενὶ, ἀλλ' ὅτων (ὅτω MSS.) πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἔν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

page 87 note 1 Phys. 203a 23 ἁτιοῦν τῶν μορίων εἶναι μεῖγμα ἁμοίως τῷ παντί. Simplic. ad loc. 460, 9 καὶ ἑκάστην ὁμοιομέρειαν ὁμοίως τῷ ὅλῳ πάντα ἔχουσαν ἐνυπάρχοντα.

page 87 note 2 The phrase μοῖραν μετέχειν in Frag. 6 justifies the translation of μοῖρα by ‘share.’

page 88 note 1 Cf. Simplic. de caelo 606, 5 σάρκα μέν γὰρ τὴν αἰσθητὴν καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ποιεῖν … ἐπικρατοῦντος τοῦ πλήθους ἐν τῷ μίγματι τῶν ἀναισθήτων διὰ μικρότητα σαρκίων χρυσίων.

page 88 note 2 Not merely all contained in the one Mixture, as the Opposites were in the Ἄπειρον of Anaximander.

page 89 note 1 187b 1. διό ϕασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς έώρων γινόμενον' ϕαίνεσθαι δέ διαϕέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθ' ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὕτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν ϕύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.

page 89 note 2 Probably Aristotle is thinking of ‘white,’ etc., as existing qualities, and taxes Anax. with implying that such qualities were distinct ingredients in his Mixture. For at 327b 20 he assumes that the ‘all things’ which were combined in the original Mixture must include πάθη, and calls this a blemish, on the ground that only selsubsisting things can ‘combine,’ and πάθη are merely adjectival. Cf. Phys. 188a 5 sqq.

page 89 note 3 The illustration is faulty, for water is not a homoeomerous substance, but a πανσπερμία. Flesh might come out of water, but water cannot come out of flesh. But this does not vitiate the argument.

page 90 note 1 ὁτιοῦν τῶν μορίων εἶναι μίγμα ὁμοίως τῷ παντὶ, δι τὸ ὁρᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν γιγνόμενον· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ ὁμοῦ ποτὲ πάντα χρήματα ϕάναι εἶναι …

page 90 note 2 Simpl. Phys. 174, 19 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἁπλῶς ἔοικεν ἐκκρίνειν ὁ Ἀναξ., κἂν ‘ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματ;α’ λέγῃ εἶναι. σαϕῶς γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκκρίσει τὰ ἐναντία ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ τυχὸντα ὲκκρίνεσθαι λέγει ἐν οἶς ϕησιν ‘ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὀ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοϕεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν,’ ὥστε οὐ τὰ τυχόντα ἀπὸ τῶν τυχόντων, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σὰρξ ἢ ἐγκέϕαλος. καὶ οὕτως πάντα τὰ ἐπαχθέντα ἐγκλήματα διαϕεύξεται ὸνξ. Cf. 176, 27, Anaxagoras speaks of this ἀπὸκρισις (in Frag. 12) ὡς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης οὐ πάντων (οὐ γὰρ γραμμὴν εἶπεν ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι) ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων.

page 91 note 1 The suggestion that the portions are combined in a union closer than mechanical juxtaposition and more like our chemical fusion (see Mr. Bailey, Greek Atomists, App. I.) will not help matters. The notion of chemical fusion of elements to form compound substances cannot be invoked to explain the differences between the elements themselves on pain of an infinite regress. It serves to explain how a very large number of compounds can be obtained from combinations of a few elements, and how one compound can be converted into another, provided that the elements are free to leave one combination for another. But in Mr. Bailey's scheme the factors are as numerous as the compounds, and they are not free to recombine.

page 91 note 2 Philoponus, , Phys. 100, 28Google Scholar, urges the infinite regress as showing the absurdity of Anaxagoras' doctrine as he (following Aristotle) understood it. Simplicius' phrase (Phys. 460, 10) οὐδὲ ἄπειρα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπειράκις ἄπειρα belongs to this reductio ad absurdum (itself based on Ar. Phys. 188a 2–5) and cannot be quoted as evidence for what Anaxagoras thought or wrote. Cf. Themist, . Phys. 16, 17 sqqGoogle Scholar.

page 92 note 1 Cf. Themist, . Phys. 3, 1Google Scholar.

page 92 note 2 Sextus, , Pyrrh. III. 33Google Scholar, contrasts Democritus, whose atoms are ἄποια, with τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξ., πᾶσαν αὶσθητὴν ποιότητα περὶ ταῖς ὁμοιομερείαις ἀπολείπουσιν. Cf. Adv. math. X. 318.

page 93 note 1 MrBailey, (op. tit., p. 542)Google Scholar founds an objection on Frag. 4, Seeds of all things having all kinds of shapes and colours and tastes: ‘Here then are qualities, and so far from all the “Seeds” having all of them, each “Seed” has its own peculiar qualities distinct from others’ This objection confuses (1) the peculiar qualities of Seeds of different kinds, e.g. the infinite variety of shades of colour by which one kind is distinguished from another, with (2) the single pair of Opposites, Bright and Dark (or Black and White?), which are mixed in various proportions to yield that variety of shades. It is, of course, only the pair of Opposites that is represented in every Seed.

page 93 note 2 So, too, Parmenides, (frag. 16)Google Scholar had made our sensations depend on the mixture in our organs of Opposites (e.g. hot and cold, Theophr, . desens. I. 3Google Scholar); only be made like perceive like.

page 94 note 1 Schol. in Gregor. (Vors. Frag. 10) οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χρωμάτων ταῦτα κατηγόρει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεῖναι τῷ λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τέ μὲλανι.

page 94 note 2 Aristotle, , Phys. 187b 5Google Scholar, εἰλικρινῶς γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ … οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν ϕύσιν τοῦ πράγμα;τος.

page 94 note 3 Vors. A. 97. Mr. Bailey's objection (op. cit. 540) that, on the view we are supporting, white snow coulud never be produced by congealing water which consits entirely of black Seeds, assumes that water is homoeomerous. But if water is composed of Seeds of all kinds, as we saw (p. 17), this partucular change from water to snow can be explained by rearrangement. The possibility of melting snow back into water proves the presence of dark seeds in the snow. All changes of colour in a piece of any homoeomerous substance must be explained by the accession of particles of some other substance. The colour of gold can be changed only by the admixture of alloy or the addition of tarnish.

page 94 note 4 Quoted above, p. 84.

page 94 note 5 Even Plato spoke of individual things as ‘sharing’ in a single ‘Form’ in a way that (as the Parmenides points out) might suggest that bits of the Form were distributed among the things that share in it.