Our systems are now restored following recent technical disruption, and we’re working hard to catch up on publishing. We apologise for the inconvenience caused. Find out more: https://www.cambridge.org/universitypress/about-us/news-and-blogs/cambridge-university-press-publishing-update-following-technical-disruption
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2014
Cicero's level of success within the senate fluctuated throughout the period of his Philippic orations. These fluctuations reflect the very divisive nature of the conflict with Marcus Antonius, and the ever-changing circumstances that Cicero confronted. The orations themselves record Cicero's improvisational responses to these developments and allow us to study Cicero's range of persuasive techniques over a period of eight months, from September 44, when Cicero delivered his first Philippic, through to April 43, when he delivered his last. There has been a growing body of scholarship dealing with the Philippics, but there remains work to be done on the ad hoc nature of senatorial debate. Manuwald's recent study of praise and blame within the Philippics has provided a starting point, since she identifies strategic elements within the collection as a whole and how these elements functioned in terms of persuasion. She notes the short term use of praise and blame for the purpose of urging the senate to a particular course of action, but her avowed aims were not to isolate strategies within the speeches. And while Frisch provides full coverage of the historical context, he is less concerned with persuasive strategies within and between the speeches themselves. In this regard Philippics 10 and 11 provide an insight into the malleable and ad hoc nature of Roman oratory in the context of senatorial debate. We are able to follow Cicero's shifts in rhetorical strategies as he attempts to meet the exigencies of each situation. Philippics 10 and 11 have ostensibly similar rhetorical aims: to persuade the senate to appoint Marcus Brutus and Caius Cassius to powerful military commands in the eastern provinces, and yet the rhetorical strategies that Cicero employs differ in various ways. My aim is to examine what factors influenced his choice of strategy in the delivery of the two speeches.
1 Manuwald, G., ‘The function of praise and blame in Cicero's Philippics’, in Smith, C. and Covino, R. (edd.), Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric (Swansea, 2011), 199–214Google Scholar. See also ead., Cicero, Philippics 3–9 (Berlin, 2007), 90–127.Google Scholar
2 Frisch, H., tr. Haislund, N., Cicero's Fight for the Republic: The Historical Background of Cicero's Philippics (Copenhagen, 1946)Google Scholar. His excellent study remains relevant.
3 Manuwald (n. 1 [2007]), 85; Frisch (n. 2), 212–36; Hall, J., ‘The Philippics’, in May, J.M. (ed.), Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric (Boston, 2002), 273–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 274–9; see Drum, M., ‘Cicero's Tenth and Eleventh Philippics: the Republican advance in the East’, in Stevenson, T. and Wilson, M. (edd.), Cicero's Philippics: History, Rhetoric, Ideology (Auckland, 2008), 82–94Google Scholar, at 88–92, for Drum's reference to the Republican advance in the east. Wooten, C.W., Cicero's Philippics and their Demosthenic Model (Chapel Hill, 1983), 111–53Google Scholar, provided an alternative model in which he grouped Philippics 8, 9, 10 and 11 together, and justified their unity by referring to a ‘narrative technique’ that characterized his selection. His approach is valuable, but his subdivision of the speeches depends on an almost arbitrary partition, because he never really justified the grouping. Rather, he made observations regarding a narrative technique that applied to the Philippics in general, but drew illustration exclusively from the range of his selection.
4 Various dates have been advocated for the delivery of the orations, although given the paucity of evidence none have found general consensus. Philippic 10 was delivered sometime after February 3 and no later than February 14: so Willcock, M.M., Cicero: The Letters of January to April 43 BC (Warminster, 1995)Google Scholar, 95; see also Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977)Google Scholar, 1.504; while Philippic 11 cannot be placed after around March 7. See Shackleton Bailey (this note), 1.506; Frisch (n. 2), 225–36; cf. Ad Brut. 4.2. On the speed with which the Philippics were published see Kelly, D., ‘Publishing the Philippics, 44–43 BC’, in Stevenson, T. and Wilson, M. (edd.), Cicero's Philippics: History, Rhetoric, Ideology (Auckland, 2008), 22–38Google Scholar; Manuwald (n. 1 [2007]), 54–90.
5 Att. 15.9.1; 15.10; 15.11.1–2; 15.12.1; App. B Civ. 3.6.20.
6 Phil. 2.31; 2.97; Att. 15.5.2; Plut. Ant. 14.3; Brut. 19.5; App. B Civ. 3.8.29; 3.12.42; 3.16.58.
7 Plut. Brut. 24; Cic. Att. 14.19.1; 14.18.4; Fam. 11.3.3; Holmes, T. Rice, The Architect of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1928), 45–6.Google Scholar
8 Macedonia had, in fact, been allocated to C. Antonius on November 28, 44 (Phil. 3.25), and, although the senate had annulled M. Antonius' legislation regarding provincial allocation in December 44, C. Antonius was insistent upon his provincial claim (Att. 14.9.3; 14.14.4; Phil. 1.19; Dio Cass. 43.25.3; 47.1; App. B Civ. 3.8; Frisch [n. 2], 103–4).
9 Fam. 12.5; Dio Cass. 47.22.1.
10 On the approval of the command see Frisch (n. 2), 222; Rice-Holmes (n. 5), 45 n. 5; Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939)Google Scholar, 172; more tentatively, Hall (n. 3), 278. And on the extent of the command, see Grant, M., From Imperium to Auctoritas: A Historical Study of Aes Coinage in the Roman Empire 49 B.C. – A.D. 14 (Cambridge, 1946), 33–6Google Scholar; 411–23; Last, H., ‘Imperium maius: a note’, JRS 37 (1947), 157–64Google Scholar, at 162; Ehrenberg, V., ‘Imperium maius in the Roman Republic’, AJPh 74 (1953), 113–36Google Scholar. We do not know to what degree a proposal reflected the final resolution of the senate. For an argument against the appointment of Brutus at this time see Woodman, A.J., Velleius Paterculus: The Caesarian and Augustan Narrative (2.41–93) (Cambridge, 1983)Google Scholar, 133.
11 Brutus' actions elicited opposition from within the senate. Cicero is not explicit regarding its source. Rather, he points to an unnamed body (Phil. 10.6): ‘for I see what they are saying; nor do they do this secretly’ (sed iam video quae loquantur; neque enim id occulte faciunt). Both Brutus and Cassius had been allocated a commission for the security of the grain supply at the beginning of June 44 (Att. 15.9), and a short time later (perhaps 1 August) they were allocated the provinces of Crete and Cyrene. For the grain commission see Ramsey, J.T., Philippics I–II (Cambridge, 2003)Google Scholar, 304; on the allocation of provinces to Brutus and Cassius see MRR 2.320, 321–2; Rice Holmes (n. 7), 196–7. That is to say, Brutus was not granted the province of Greece and Macedonia.
12 Reiterated at Phil. 10.17.
13 Calenus was an avowed moderate, but clearly inclined to favour and support Antonius' position. See Ryan, F.X., Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate (Stuttgart, 1998), 328–32Google Scholar. Calenus played upon Brutus' role in the assassination of Caesar, by arguing that Caesar's legions would be unwilling to follow an assassin of Caesar, to which Cicero alludes at Phil. 10.18; 10.38; and again at Phil. 11.37–9.
14 Phil. 3.38; Fam. 12.22a; App. B Civ. 3.49.
15 Phil. 10.7.
16 The argument for an essentially constant character is typical of forensic oratory but applicable to the current context. See Hands, A.R., ‘Postremo suo tantum ingenio utebatur’, CQ 24 (1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 314.
17 Brutus was drawing attention to his ancestry as early as 59 (Att. 2.24.3). He advertised his connections to the tyrannicides L. Iunius Brutus and C. Servilius Ahala in 54 when he was a moneyer at Rome, and was consequently linked with a perceived movement against Pompey in 54: see Crawford, M.H., Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge, 1974)Google Scholar, 455.
18 Phil. 10.7.5; cf. 11.35.6. Reference to the liberty of the Roman people and its aversion to slavery is repeated throughout the oration (Phil. 10.16; 10.18–19; 10.20).
19 Plut. Brut. 29; Ant. 22.
20 A similar emphasis is evident in Cicero's praise of D. Brutus where emphasis is again on the family continuum (Phil. 3.8): ‘O citizen born for the republic, mindful of his name and a mirror of his ancestors’ (O civem natum rei publicae, memorem sui nominis imitatoremque maiorum). Emphasis on family continuity need not always be positive; Cicero could accuse Antonius of failing to live up to the exemplum of his grandfather (M. Antonius the orator): Phil. 3.15. For the use of familial exempla see H. van der Blom, ‘Historical exempla as tools of praise and blame in Ciceronian oratory’, in Smith and Covino (n. 1), 49–67.
21 De or. 2.345; Quint. Inst. 3.7.14.
22 This was partly motivated by a lack of intelligence regarding Brutus' activities in the east. Cicero's knowledge of the Liberators' movements and intentions was fragmentary at best; a condition imposed by the winter months (Fam. 12.5.1), and by what must have been some reluctance to publicize the details of their movements. Asinius Pollio, writing from Spain, noted that dispatches were being intercepted (Fam. 10.31.1), which made it unsafe for the Liberators to confide plans via written communication. Antonius' control of the Adriatic and its landing points left the most direct routes impracticable.
23 Plut. Brut. 15.
24 For praise of D. Brutus and Octavian, see below (n. 27). Praise is similarly expressed of the Martian and Fourth Legions for their part in resisting Antonius at Phil. 3.6–7.
25 Phil. 3.8–11; 3.27; 3.31; 4.2–5; 4.7–8; 5.35–7; 5.42–51; 6.7–9; 7.10–11.
26 Phil. 10.23; Cicero illustrates Octavian's initiative in repulsing the designs of Antonius (Phil. 10.23): ‘his private initiative and action concerning the republic’ (privatum de re publica consilium et factum). D. Brutus too was honoured by the senate for taking action on his own initiative (Phil. 5.37.9): ‘with your authority not yet asserted, he acted on his own initiative and judgment’ (nondum interposita auctoritate vestra, suo consilio atque iudicio).
27 For praise of D. Brutus see Phil. 3.8–12; 3.34; 4.7–8; 5.35–7; 6.7–9. For praise of Octavian see Phil. 3.3–5; 3.27; 3.34; 4.2–5; 5.42–51; 6.7–9; 7.10; 13.19; 14.25.
28 From 146 Achaia was governed through the Macedonian governors, while some cities retained their free status. For a discussion see Lintott, A., Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration (London and New York, 1993)Google Scholar, 24; Gruen, E., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley, 1984)Google Scholar, 434. In 46, Achaia and Macedonia were demarcated as separate provinces; the former had been governed by the Macedonian governor until the province of Achaia was established, coinciding with Caesar's veteran resettlement programme and the refounding of Corinth as its administrative centre. In 46, Ser. Sulpicius was appointed (probably) proconsul of Achaia by Caesar's designation (Fam. 6.6.10; 4.4.2; MRR 2.299) and was replaced by M. Acilius Caninus until after 45 (Fam. 7.30.3; MRR 2.326). The distinction between the two provinces fell into neglect after Caesar's death, and the province of Achaia was not reorganized again until 27. See Engles, D., Roman Corinth (Chicago, 1990), 19–24.Google Scholar
29 Antonius would claim that Trebonius was justifiably killed for his involvement in the assassination of Caesar: Phil. 13.22.
30 For Trebonius' death see Phil. 11.1–3; and for the declaration of Dolabella as a public enemy see Phil. 11.15.1; 11.29.2; 13.23.
31 Phil. 13.26–8; 13.46. Cicero is careful to play down any Pompeian associations, since Antonius was making mileage out of them. For Antonius' strategy of countering Cicero's advocacy of Brutus and Cassius by emphasizing the resurgence of a Pompeian party see Welch, K.E., ‘Both sides of the coin: Sextus Pompeius and the so-called Pompeiani’, in Powell, A. and Welch, K.E. (edd.), Sextus Pompeius (London, 2002), 1–30Google Scholar; cf. Harries, J., Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State (London, 2006), 222–3Google Scholar. This has been underplayed by modern scholarship which tends to view this period as one without stable political allegiance.
32 Notably, he was not invited to take part in the conspiracy although he would later be involved in the planning of the conspirators in the aftermath of the assassination (Att. 15.11; 16.1). The connection between Brutus and Cicero was well enough known that Antonius could implicate Cicero in the assassination by claiming that Brutus, with his assassin's dagger held high, had called upon Cicero by name (Phil. 2.12); see Horsfall, N., ‘The Ides of March: some new problems’, G&R 21 (1974), 191–9Google Scholar. It was a connection to which Cicero willingly submitted, although his involvement was only as a spectator of the deed (Att. 14.14.4: ‘the joy with which I fixed my eyes on the just killing of a tyrant’, laetitiam quam oculis cepi iusto interitu tyranni).
33 Phil. 11.2–10.
34 Phil. 11.1–5.
35 Phil. 11.2: ergo id quod fecit Dolabella in quo potuit multis idem minatur Antonius; cf. Phil. 11.6.
36 For example, the designation of Nucula and Lento as a mime and writer of tragedy respectively allows Cicero to illustrate the typical company Antonius keeps (see Phil.11.13; cf. 2.101). In this way Cicero can accumulate negative characteristics without directly assigning them to Antonius.
37 Phil. 11.11–14.
38 Plut. Brut. 20; Ant. 13; Vell. Pat. 2.58; also mentioned at App. B Civ. 2.114; Brutus had counselled against Antonius' murder, which Cicero repeatedly decried as childish and ill-conceived (Att. 15.20.2; 14.14.2; Fam. 10.28.1; 12.4.1; Ad Brut. 2.5.2; Phil. 2.34; 1.22).
39 Att. 15.11.1.
40 Sen. Suas. 6.14.
41 Plut. Brut. 8.
42 Calenus is not mentioned by name, but he routinely opened debate during the period of the Philippics, and was surely the sponsor of the proposal: Phil. 11.21–2; Frisch (n. 2), 169–71; Ryan (n. 10), 328–30.
43 Frisch (n. 2), 227–8.
44 Inv. rhet. 2.173. Deiotarus, Bassus, Bibulus and other commanders and resources are shown to be prepared for the forthcoming conflict, a further inducement to support Cassius in the immediate conflict (Phil. 11.32–6).
45 In 51, in the wake of Crassus' failed Parthian campaign, Cassius retired to Syria where he repulsed a Parthian incursion (Att. 5.16.4; 5.18.1; 5.20.3; App. B Civ. 5.10; Syr. 51; Vell. Pat. 2.46.4).
46 Phil. 11.27; Antony and Dolabella are similarly set in parallel by their actions, but these are actions contrary to law (Phil. 11.4): ‘Antonius has invaded Gaul, Dolabella [has invaded] Asia, each into another's province’ (in Galliam invasit Antonius, in Asiam Dolabella, in alienam uterque provinciam).
47 Rawson, E., ‘Cassius and Brutus: the memory of the Liberators’, in Moxon, I.S., Smart, J.D. and Woodman, A.J. (edd.), Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing (Cambridge, 1986), 101–19.Google Scholar
48 Brutus and Cassius were the urban and peregrine praetors for 44, and related by marriage. Cassius married Junia Tertia, the daughter of Servilia, and so half-sister of Brutus.
49 This characterization was formative in subsequent years. Tacitus (Ann. 1.2) remarked on the two personalities, attributing to them traditional values: ‘with Brutus and Cassius dead, there were now no republican arms’ (Bruto et Cassio caesis nulla iam publica arma). The arms of Sextus Pompeius and Antonius, by contrast, were privata arma. At Ann. 4.34–5, Tacitus records how Cremutius Cordus, on trial in a.d. 25 for maiestas, praised Brutus and Cassius, calling the latter the ‘last of the Romans’. Nor did Tacitus limit this viewpoint to Cordus alone, but claimed that others too sympathized with the Liberators' ideals. In his catalogue of those who praised Brutus and Cassius, Tacitus has Livy call them ‘remarkable men’ (insignis viros), while he has Asinius Pollio (Tac. Ann. 4.34–5) refer to the ‘outstanding memory of those men’ (egregiam eorundem memoriam). Many others saw a virtue in their actions and ‘no one named them without honour’ (nemo sine honore nominavit: Tac. Ann. 4.34). For a discussion of this passage see J. Moles, ‘Cry freedom: Tacitus Annals 4.32–35’, Histos 2 (1998), 95–184. See Rawson (n. 47) for the subsequent tradition of Brutus and Cassius.
50 Cic. Leg. Man. 60.
51 RG 1.
52 Phil. 5.23; 5.43.
53 Phil. 6.2.1. A similar approach was taken in Cicero's support of the lex Manilia: ‘we have to look to situations, not procedures’, a nuanced acknowledgement of legal ambiguity.
54 P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), 486.
55 See Manuwald (n. 1).
56 We could point to a number of examples here, but some notable ones include: praise of Octavian for his spontaneous resistance to Antonius at Phil. 3.3–5; similar praise of D. Brutus at Phil. 3.8; and of the Martian and Fourth legions at Phil. 3.6; and, of course, the eulogy for Ser. Sulpicius in Phil. 9.
57 Phil. 10.4.
