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REPUBLIC 585B–D: ARGUMENT AND TEXT
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2018
Extract
The so-called ‘Olympian’ proof in Plato's Republic contains one of the first explicit distinctions between the nature of intellectual and bodily pleasures. The argument for the superiority of the former rests on a) identifying pleasure and pain with certain kinds of filling and emptying (583b1–585a7), and b) differentiating between bodily and intellectual pleasures according to the kind of filling:
(i) Bodily depletions differ from depletions of the soul in the kind of lack and, accordingly, in the kind of thing that fills the lack: hunger and thirst are bodily lacks which food and drink can cure, whereas ignorance and folly are cured by intelligence (585a8–b8).
Thus, (ii), the kind of lack (belonging to the soul vs belonging to the body), together with the kind of filler (‘food’ for the soul vs food for the body), and derivatively the method of filling (eating vs learning) determine the kind of filling.
(iii) Kinds of filling differ in truth: filling A is truer than filling B if and only if the kind of fillers used in A are more than the kind of fillers used in B and the kind of thing filled via A is more than the kind of thing filled via B (cf. 585d7–10).
(iv) Fillers of the soul are more than bodily fillers (585b11–d4).
(v) The soul is more than the body (585d5–6).
Therefore, (vi), filling of the soul is truer than bodily filling, that is, filling of the soul is more really a filling (585d7–10).
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References
1 All translations are mine unless stated otherwise. The line numbers correspond to the text in Slings, S.R., Platonis Rempublicam (Oxford Classical Texts) (Oxford, 2003)Google Scholar.
2 For a recent attempt to answer the question, see Wolfsdorf, D., ‘Pleasure and truth in Republic 9’, CQ 63 (2013), 110–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 I do not, primarily, concern myself with assessing the overall plausibility of the Olympian proof. Erginel, M., ‘Inconsistency and ambiguity in Republic IX’, CQ 61 (2011), 493–520CrossRefGoogle Scholar valiantly defends it against the charges of inconsistency (levelled by Frede, D., ‘Rumpelstiltskin's pleasures: true and false pleasures in Plato's Philebus’, Phronesis 30 [1985], 151–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and ambiguity (Gosling, J.C.B. and Taylor, C.C.W., The Greeks on Pleasure [Oxford, 1982], 122–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Warren, J., ‘Plato on the pleasures and pains of knowing’, OSAPh 39 (2010), 1–32Google Scholar also tackles the latter point.
4 The allegory of the Cave makes clear that filling it with knowledge requires the soul to have the right configuration (esp. 518b7–c3: we cannot simply put knowledge into souls that lack it). Therefore, 585b3–7, which does speak of the soul's configuration, does not undermine the proposed interpretation. Erginel (n. 3), 510–13 notes that the distinction between body and soul is too broad to capture e.g. the pleasures of the spirit. I agree, but follow Plato in casting the argument here in terms of bodily vs psychic pleasures.
5 τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον;
6 I shall leave the questions unanswered because the argument's reconstruction—my main goal—does not require the answers. I plan to return to the interpretation and evaluation of Plato's account of pleasure in the Republic in future work.
7 Pace Erginel (n. 3), 501 and 504–8, who takes Socrates in 585c2–6 to refer to the best-fitting psychic filler under a different description.
8 Trans. Grube, G.M.A. and Reeve, C.D.C., in Cooper, J.M. and Hutchinson, D.S. (edd.), Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis, 1997)Google Scholar.
9 Ferrari, G.R.F., ‘Plato, Republic 9.585c–d’, CQ 52 (2002), 383–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 383. He provides a list of emendations at 383 n. 1 and 388 nn. 10–13.
10 Ferrari (n. 9), 384.
11 Adam, J., The Republic of Plato: Books VI–X (Cambridge, 1902), 382–3Google Scholar briefly considers and dismisses the Via Positiva in favour of the Via Negativa.
12 Ferrari (n. 9), 385–7 proposes and defends this emendation.
13 Cf. Adam (n. 11), 382.
14 e.g. Phd. 74c1 and 100d5, Cra. 430c9, La. 192e1 and 193b2, Prt. 356d4, Grg. 505b11, Meno 76e4 and 78e7.
15 The exceptions are 476d1 (a substantivized participle), 503d7 and 539c6—none of which presents any difficulty in identifying the object of μετέχειν.
16 396e5 and 432b4–5.
17 It is not my central task to decide between these options: the rest of my argument works equally well with either. I will stick to my preference and invite the reader, should her preference differ from mine, to substitute ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμης when I write of ἢ ἐπιστήμη in 585c8.
18 Adam (n. 11), 382. Wolfsdorf (n. 2), 124 and n. 24, taking the Via Positiva, seems to opt for the change of subject at 585c13.
19 Often they propose much more wide-ranging changes. See in particular Bury, R.G., ‘On Plato, Republic IX. 585 C–D’, CR 13 (1899), 289–90Google Scholar; Vermehren, B.M., Platonische Studien (Leipzig, 1870), 114–17Google Scholar; and most recently (and subtly) Ferrari (n. 9).
20 Adam (n. 11), 382–3. Erginel (n. 3) defends this reading most recently.
21 Proclus’ commentary does not help the interpretation of our passage.
22 Adam (n. 11), 383.
23 Cf. Adam (n. 11), 381.
24 Ferrari (n. 9) proposes and defends this emendation.
25 We can account for the plural in two ways: either a) each genitive introduces a new kind (‘the kind of true belief, [the kind] of knowledge …’) or b) τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ belong together as truth-related kinds of mental states, whereas virtue is its own class of psychic filler—a break indicated by the αὖ in καὶ συλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς. (I thank Charles Brittain for suggesting this option to me.) I prefer a) because b) leaves unclear how one would show virtue to excel in being and truth—if virtue as kind of psychic filler differs from the kind that aims at truth.
26 Ferrari (n. 9), 387–8 undertakes both a) and b). The reading splits up τι μᾶλλον, which invariably forms an adverbial phrase—with one, possibly two, exceptions. As precedent for splitting τι μᾶλλον, he cites Phdr. 278d3–7 and Tht. 182e3, the latter of which he acknowledges to be ambiguous. I do not think that the former counts as precedent. Plato writes τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλόν τε ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ ἁρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι. — καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου. Here the enclitic τε leaves no doubt that we read the familiar phrase τοιοῦτόν τι. Our passage has no similar markers. It is very unlikely that Plato wrote τι μᾶλλον and expected the reader to split it.
27 For instance, Frede (n. 3), 160 thinks that only knowledge can be a real filler.
28 Cf. Erginel (n. 3), 504–5. He notes that the Via Negativa allows for differences in the degrees of being between the kinds of psychic fillers. For his ranking, see Erginel (n. 3), 505–8.
29 So Erginel (n. 3), 519.
30 The other occurrence is at Prt. 360a8.
31 τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; — ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. — οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; — ἔμοιγε. (Phd. 64d8–e7; translation from Cooper and Hutchinson, n. 8).
32 καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία; — οὔκ, ἀλλ’ ἀεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται.
33 Adam (n. 11), 382.
34 For a little more detail, see §2.1, penultimate paragraph.
35 The claim that people partake in knowledge does have a precedent. At Plt. 260a2 the master-builder partakes in knowledge. Cf. Prm. 134b12.
36 Cf. Resp. 534a2–4.
37 For further elaboration, see Warren, J., ‘Socrates and the patients: Republic IX, 583c–585a’, Phronesis 56 (2011), 113–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with whose interpretation of the metaphor and of its role in the argument I largely agree.
38 If we take the comparatives to be real comparatives, as the Via Negativa does, then the argument can only show the philosopher's pleasures to be more real, and therefore higher up, than the non-philosopher's, but falls short of establishing that the philosopher has true pleasures, i.e. that the philosopher moves to the truly up.
* The ideas for this paper were first presented at the King's–Yale Republic workshop. I learned much from the discussion, especially thanks to Tad Brennan, Charles Brittain, Fiona Leigh and M.M. McCabe. I would also like to thank James Warren for giving me the helpful opportunity to present my thoughts at the B Club. I thank Harold Tarrant for sharing his take on the passage with me. I am especially grateful to Verity Harte and the anonymous reader for CQ for their keen insights and suggestions.