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Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
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The object of this paper is to show that, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., two different and radically opposed systems of thought were elaborated within the Pythagorean school. They may be called respectively the mystical system and the scientific. All current accounts of Pythagoreanism known to me attempt to combine the traits of both systems in one composite picture, which naturally fails to hold together. The confusion goes back to Aristotle, who usually speaks indiscriminately of ‘the Pythagoreans,’ though now and then the phrase ‘some Pythagoreans’ indicates that he was aware of different currents within the school.
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page 139 note 1 ProfessorBurnet, (Early Greek Philosophy,3 1920, p. 92)Google Scholarsays ‘wholly conjectural’—perhaps too strong an expression. I take this opportunity of acknowledging the debt which, in common with all students, I owe to Professor Burnet's work.
page 139 note 2 For this view of the Acousmatics and Mathematici see Delatte, A., Études sur la Littèrature pythagoricienne, 1915, p. 29Google Scholar.
page 140 note 1 The pious attribution of all discoveries to the Founder may be illustrated by a penetrating observation made in another connexion by Bouché-Leclerq, (Astrologie grecque, Paris, 1899, p. 51)Google Scholar. He speaks of ‘un fait psychologique, largement démontré par l'histoire de la littérature apocryphe: c'est que toute doctrine qui fait appel à la foi à intérêt à se vieillir, et que les individus qui la développent se gardent bien de donner leurs inventions particulières pour lesopinions de leur propre génie. Ils échappent à la discussion en se couvrant d'un amas, aussi énorme que possible, d'expériences ou de révéla tions invérifiables.’
page 140 note 2 Sext. Emp. Math. IX. 127. ο μν οὖν περἱ τðνIIνθαγραν κα 'Eμπεδολέα κα ττ 'Iταλτ πλθος φασ μ μóνον μῖν πρòν λλήλονς καἰ πρðς τοὺς θεοὺς εῖναί τινα κοινωνίαν λλ καί πρðς τ ᾰλογα τν ζΨων. έν γρ ύπρχειν πνεμα τò δι παντòς το κϬσμον δικον ψʋχς τρϬπον τð καί Ʋον ᾑμς πρðς έκεῖναThe last sentence, though later terms are used, is, I believe, true in substance, Iambl. V.P. 108.
page 140 note 3 Cf. Glotz, G., Solidarité de la Famille, 1904, P. 587Google Scholar.
page 141 note 1 The Pythagorean term was rather δεσπϬτης —' the father and master of the household, or κúριος (Euxitheos, A then. IV. 157c).
page 142 note 1 Iambl. V.P. 137. Diels, Vors 3. 45 D2. Arius Didymus (?) ap. Stob. Eth. VI. 3 Σωκρτης IIλτων ταὐτωƲ τψ IIνδαγϬρα τέλος μοίωσιν θεο.
page 142 note 2 Aristotle, , Frag 192Google Scholarτο λογικο ζΨοƲ τð μέν έατι θες τò δέ ᾰνθρωπος τð δέ οῖον IIνθαγϬρας.
page 142 note 3 Frag. 112. 4. Cf. Frags. 146, 147. ‘At the last they appear among mortal men as seers, singers, physicians, and leaders of men’ (Empedocles was all these), ‘and then they spring up as gods highest in honour, sharing the hearth of the other immortals, free from human sorrows, from destiny, and from all harm.’
page 142 note 4 The expression ‘microcosm’ first occurs in arbitrary. Democritus, Frag. 34 έν τΨ ᾀνθρώπΨ μικρΨ κϬσμψ ǒντι but the conception is much older and akin to the astrological premiss of a ‘sympathy’ between the heavenly bodies and earthly life. See Lobeck, , Aglaophamus, 1829, Bk. II. chap, ix., p. 908 sqqGoogle Scholar. Zeller I5, 1892, p. 419 denies to the Pythagoreans the doctrine of a ‘world-soull’; but by that he means ‘die Annahme einer Weltseele, als eines besondern, unkörperlich gedachten Wesens.’ He admits that the world was ‘compared’ to a living creature which breathed. His denial that this thought ‘influenced’ the system (p. 441) is arbitrary.
page 143 note 1 Met. N. 6. 9876 10 τν δέ μέθεξιν τοǒνομα μϬνον μετέβαλεν. οι μέν γρ IIνθαγϬρειοι μιμήσει τᾀ ǒντα øασίν εῖναι τν ᾀριθμν, IIλτων δ μθοει. O.Gilbert (Arch. Gesch. Phil. XXII. 40 sqq.) rightly urges that μίμησις, μοιωμα, μοιοƲ etc., imply a relation between two different things, and holds that pythagras and his school (I should say the Pythagoreans other than the ‘mathematicians’ or number-atomists) did not identify numbers with things in ihrer stofflichen Grundlage. At Met. 1020b 3 Aristotle uses μιμημα for the plane or solid figure, which is the graphic ‘representation’ of a number. In this case any number of similar figures can ‘represent’ the same number.
page 143 note 2 Eurip. Bacch. 72 ὦ μκαρ ǒστις εὐδαίμων | τελε τς θεƲ ειδώς; | βιοτν ᾁƳιστεὐει καί | θιασεὐεται ψʋϰν | έν ǒρεσσι βακϰεὐων | ðσιοις καθαρμοῖσι Cf.Verrall, A. W., The Bacchants of Euripides, 1910 p. 30Google Scholar.
page 144 note 1 Met. N. 6. init. [Alexander] (ad loc.) explains, Some Pythagoreans did not hesitate to say that the virtue or good (τò εὖ καί τò) in every thing in this world results from numbers, when the mixture of ingredients is expressed by an even or an odd number, and most of all when the result is perfect and similar (τέλειον καί ǒμοιον) and obtained by multiplication, e.g. 3 * 3, not 3 + 3.’ [Alexander] wrongly interprets εὐλογίστΨ to mean ρτίψ The true meaning is clear from Ar. de sens. 439b 34. εὐλϬγιστοι ᾀριθμοt = ‘proportions where the division of one term by the other takes very little trouble’ (Ross, ad loc), i.e. the simplest proportions.
page 144 note 2 de sensu, 439b 21. Cf. Problems XIX. 35 (920a 27 sqq.): The octave is the most beautiful concord because the terms of the ratio (1 : 2) are whole numbers, and the division leaves no remainder.
page 145 note 1 Alcmaeon, Frag. 4 ρν δέ ὑγίειαν τν σύμμετρον τν ποιν κρσιν Plato, Symp. 186 D.
page 145 note 2 Iambi. V.P. 164.
page 145 note 3 Protag. 326 A πρòσ δέ τούτοις, έπειδᾲν κιθαπίζειν μᾀθωσιν (οί νέοι), ᾰλλων α ποιητν ᾀγαθν ποιῄματα διδᾴσκονσι μελοποιν, εἰσ τᾲ κιθαρσματα ντεινοντεσ, κα ταῖσ ψυϰαῖσ τν παδων, ῐνα ᾑμερῴτεροε τε σι κα εὐυθμτεροι κα εὐαρμοσγττεροι γιγνμενοι ϰρσι μοι σιν εἰσ τò λγειν τε κα πρττειν πσ γᾲρ βιοσ το ᾀνθρῴπον εὐνθμιασ τε κα εὐαρμοστασ δεῖται. Cf. Eryximachus in Sympos. 187 D. ᾀλλ' πειδν δŊ πρòσ τοσ ᾀνθρῴπουσ καταϰσθαι ῤυθμ τε κα ᾁρμον … χρῴμενον ρθσ τσ πεποιημνοισ μλεσ τε κα μγροισ, δ δ παιδεα κλθη …
page 146 note 1 Professor Burnet, who uses this argument, is hardly entitled to do so, since he regards inconsistency between religious and scientific beliefs as normal in the presocratic philosophers. Early Greek Philosophy 3, 295. Cf. p. 250 ‘All through this period there seems to have been a gulf between men's religious beliefs, if they had any, and their cosmological views.’
page 146 note 2 Cf. Rohde, , Psyche 2 II. 169Google Scholar.
page 146 note 3 de anim, a 4, init.
page 146 note 4 Phaedo, 92b.
page 146 note 5 Phil. d. Gr. I5, 445.
page 146 note 6 Claud. Mam. II. 7(Vors 3. I. 320): anima inditur corpori per numerum et immortalem eandemque incorporalem conuenientiam.
page 147 note 1 The Pythagoreans regularly grouped ισῖσ and κᾴλλοσ with ὑγεια.
page 147 note 2 ᾀτεῖνσ, as elsewhere, implies that Plato is taking a current phrase and justifying it ‘in the literal sense.’ So Soph. 246a ταῖσ χερσν ᾀτεχνσ πτρασ κα δρσ περιλαμβνοντεσ (of the materialists).
page 147 note 3 Plutarch (Plat. Qu. 9) debates whether tò λογιστικóν or τò θυμοειδσ is the middle term of the three. On the latter view, αἱτ ᾑ τξισ κα τ ν τν συμφωνιν ᾀναλογιαν φυλσσει, το μν θυμοειδοσ πρòσ τò λογιστικòν ᾡσ νῄτην τò διᾰ πντε, το δ λογιστικο πρòσ τò πιθυμητικòν ὡσ ὑπγη πρòσ ντην τò δι πασν On the former, το λóγου δναμισ ᾀντιλαμβανομνη κινονμνων ᾀλóγωσ τν παθν καισυναρμóττονσα περι αὑτν εισ τò μτριον λλεΨεωσ κα ὑπεβολσ μεσóτητα καθιστησι. Proclus (in remp. I. 212 Kroll) guves θυμóσ, as middle term, the ratios διᾲ πντε to λóγοσ and διᾲ τεσσᾴρων to πιθυμια. As the διᾲ πντε is, according to teh Pythagoreans, ‘more of a συμφωνια’ than the διᾲ τεσσρων, so there is a better concord between θυμóσ and λóγοσ than between θυμóσ and πιθυμα.
page 147 note 4 Burnet, Phaedo, 1911, note on 68c, where the passages cited by Zeller (I5, 447) are quoted. Professor Burnet also points out that the doctrine of the tripartite soul agrees with the Pythagorean apologue of the Three Lives, compared to the three classes of men who go to Olympia (I) θασ νεκα, (2) to compete (δóξα) (3) to buy and sell (κρδοσ), Iambl. V.P. 58.
page 148 note 1 Cf. Ar. Pol. α i, 12. The unsocial man is θηρον θεóσ.
page 148 note 2 See, e.g. Plato, Rep. 589c. It passes on into later literature, e.g. Hermes (Stob. Eel. I. 323 W) ιδαι δ ψυ χν θεια, ᾀνθρωπινη,ᾰλογοσ.
page 149 note 1 Professor Burnet, in his valuable lecture, The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul (Proc. Brit. Acad. 1915–16, p. 252), dismisses the Pythagoreans in distwo sentences as having been led by their musical and medical studies to regard the soul as ‘a “blend” (κρσισ) or “attunement” (ᾁρμονια) of the elements which compose the body, of which, therefore, it is merely a function.’ The fallacy of Professor Burnet's method of ex- whatamining the usages of ψυχ in sixth and fifth century literature in order to show that the notion of ‘caring for one's soul’ originated with Socrates, lies in ignoring the fact that the Pythagoreans have left us no literature before Philolaus. If they had left writings of a religious or moral character, it may safely be affirmed that they would have contained this notion, and probably the appropriate use of Ψυχ. The notion is manifestly implied in the whole way of life or φιλοσοφια of a religious fraternity which teaches the achievement of immortality by means of purification, and practises asceticism, dailyself-examination, and so forth. I cannot follow Acad. Professor Burnet's view that the Orphic or Empedoclean migrating fallen soul was dis sociated from the ‘rest of the personality’ or ‘what we call “ I ‘’ When Empedocles said of the fallen δαμονεσ ‘τν κα γῲ νν εἰμμ’ (115, 13), when he said ‘δη γρ ποτ’ γὼ γενóμην κοὼρóσ τε κóρη τε θμνοσ τε, κ.τ.λ. (117), did he did he dissociate this γώ from the rest of his ‘personality’ (whatamining ever the Greek for that may be) or from ‘what we call “I ?”’ The value of Professor Burnet's paper lies in his proof that Socrates introduced the ‘care of the soul’ to his contemporaries at Athens. But that he originated the notion is not proved.
page 149 note 2 Hence the doctrine vacillated: πολλοι φασι τν σοφν οι μν ᾁρμονιαν ειναι τν υχν, οι δι δ; ἓχειν ρμοναν, Ar. Pol. 1340b 17.
page 149 note 3 Plato, Gorg. 482b. κα τν λραν μοι κρεῖττον εἷναι ᾀναρμοστεῖν τε κα διαφωνεῖν … μῖλλον ἓνα ǒντα μ μαντῷ ᾀσμφωνον εἶναι κα ναντα λγειν.
page 150 note 1 There is the same confusion and obscurity about the λγο της of Empedocles, which Aristotle suggests that he identified with ρμονα κα ψυχ (de anim. a 4, 408a 13 sqq.). I believe that Empedocles' physical doctrine of the nature of oul was consistent (to his mind) with transmigration. See From Religion to Philosophy, 1912, p. 239. Since the peculiar features of Empedocles' physical system can only be explained by the desire to accommodate his religious doctrines, the common view that the religion and science are incompatible must be rejected.
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