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ERISTIC, ANTILOGY AND THE EQUAL DISPOSITION OF MEN AND WOMEN (PLATO, RESP. 5.453B–454C)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2020

D. El Murr
D. El Murr*
Affiliation:
Département de philosophie, École Normale Supérieure Université Paris Sciences et Lettres
*
[email protected]
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Extract

Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations (= Soph. el.) seeks to uncover the workings of apparent deductive reasoning, and is thereby largely devoted to the caricature of dialectic that the ancients called eristic (ἐριστική), the art of quarrelling. Unlike antilogy (ἀντιλογία), which refers to a type of argumentation where two arguments are pitted against each other in a contradictory manner, eristic takes on in Aristotle an exclusively pejorative meaning, as is made clear, for example, by this passage from Soph. el.: ‘For just as unfairness in a contest is a definite type of fault, and is a kind of foul fighting, so the art of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation.’

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , May 2020 , pp. 85 - 100
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Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 2020

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Footnotes

Earlier drafts of this paper were read at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, the University of Copenhagen, and the American Philosophical Association in Chicago. I wish to thank the audience of each of these events for their feedback and the anonymous referee for CQ for helpful comments. My utmost gratitude goes to Rachel Barney, who read the penultimate draft of this paper, and to David Sedley, who discussed its main claims with me and read its final version with his usual generosity and sagacity.

References

1 Soph. el. 171b22–4 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἀγῶνι ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀδικομαχία τις, οὕτως ἐν ἀντιλογίᾳ ἀδικομαχία ἡ ἐριστική ἐστιν (transl. Pickard-Cambridge, rev. Barnes).

2 Kerferd, G.B., The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), 62Google Scholar.

3 Kerferd (n. 2), 65: ‘in itself it [sc. antilogy] is for Plato simply a technique, neither good nor bad.’

4 The passages in which the word ἐριστικός occurs are: Euthyd. 272b10; Lysis 211b8; Meno 75c9, 80e2, 81d6; Phlb. 17a4; Resp. 454a5 (ἐρίζειν), 454a8 (ἔριδι), 454b5, 499a7 (499a8: ἔριν); Soph. 225c9, 225e1 (ἐρίδων), 225d1, 226a2, 231e2.

5 Kerferd (n. 2), ch. 6 does not say much about this passage, and neither does the otherwise useful paper by Nehamas, A., ‘Eristic, antilogic, sophistic, dialectic: Plato's demarcation of philosophy from sophistry’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1990), 3–16Google Scholar. In his very detailed commentary on Book 5 (Plato Republic Book V. Introduction, Translation and Commentary by S. Halliwell [Warminster, 1993], 146–55), Halliwell contents himself with noting that ‘the contrast between Socratic dialectic, and the contentious style […] of those who aim merely to win the argument, is a recurrent one’, and that ‘the function of the contrast here […] is a Socratic self-reminder to avoid a shallow style of disputation’ (at 148). The lack of scholarly interest in this Republic passage on eristic and antilogy stands in sharp contrast with the exegetical scrutiny devoted to a later passage from Book 7 (537d–539d), where Socrates offers a criticism of the ‘current’ practice of refutation by showing its negative effects on the youth. On this last passage, see the two recent studies by Dorion, L.-A., ‘La critique de l’elenchos socratique dans la République (VII 537d–539a)’, in Gourinat, J.-B. and Lemaire, J. (edd.), Logique et dialectique dans l'Antiquité (Paris, 2016), 43–66Google Scholar (who mentions and discusses the different interpretations available) and Shields, C., ‘The young dogs of eristic: dialectic and eristic in the Early Academy’, in Weisser, S. and Thaler, N. (edd.), Strategies of Polemics in Greek and Roman Philosophy (Leiden and Boston, 2016), 31–54Google Scholar.

6 All translations of the Republic are borrowed from C. Rowe, Plato The Republic. Introduction, Translation and Notes (London, 2012), with occasional slight modifications.

7 On which see D. Sedley, ‘Plato's tsunami’, Hyperboreus 11 (2005), 205–14, who provides fascinating ancient evidence on the ‘triple wave’ motif.

8 On Socrates’ being lost at sea with the argument, note the beginning of the passage considered in this paper, which prepares the introduction of the ‘triple wave’ motif: ‘“I saw these difficulties coming some time ago, Glaucon,” I said, “and lots of others just as terrible; that's why I was so hesitant all along to involve myself in all of this, trying to legislate for the getting and bringing up of women and children.” – “Zeus!” he said. “It doesn't look a simple subject—not simple at all.” – “No indeed”, I said. “But the truth is that it's the same: you fall in, you have to swim, whether it's a little diving-pool (εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικράν) or the middle of the biggest sea (ἄντε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον).” – “Yes, absolutely.” – “So should we start swimming, and try to save ourselves from the argument we've got ourselves into? We'll have to hope for a dolphin to pick us up, or some other unlikely form of rescue.” – “It seems so.”’ (Resp. 5.453c10–e1).

9 See the analytical summary of the argument appended to this paper.

10 See e.g. M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Utopia and fantasy: the practicability of Plato's ideally just city’, in J. Hopkins and A. Savide (edd.), Psychoanalysis, Mind, and Art (Oxford, 1992), 175–87; repr. in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 2. Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford, 2000), 297–308, at 302–6.

11 A good overview of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century scholarship on this question can be found in J. Adam, The Republic of Plato. Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices, with an Introduction by D.A. Rees, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 19632), 1.345–55. For a more recent discussion, see the Appendix in Halliwell (n. 5).

12 Cf. 452d4–5, where Socrates mentions the physical exercises that male and female guards will undergo together: ‘I imagine that, when they did start the practice, and found it better to strip for all such things than to cover up, its ridiculousness in their eyes melted away as their arguments proved it best’ (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου).

13 See 453b3–5: ‘Didn't you [Socrates and Glaucon] yourselves agree, when you started founding this city of yours, that every single individual must fulfil the single function that belongs to them by nature?’ (αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἣν ᾠκίζετε πόλιν ὡμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἓν τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττειν).

14 See 454d10–e1: ‘they turn out to differ just in the respect that the female gives birth while the male mounts the female’ (τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτειν, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀχεύειν).

15 See the analytical summary appended to this paper.

16 As Halliwell (n. 5), 146 rightly notes: ‘it is around this passage [sc. 454a–456c] that the keenest modern debate about Plato's credentials as a “feminist” has revolved.’ I shall not consider this debate, on which much ink has already been spilt, but see the important contributions of e.g. J. Annas, ‘Plato's Republic and feminism’, Philosophy 51 (1976), 307–21; G. Vlastos, ‘Was Plato a feminist?’, in G. Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy II, ed. D.W. Graham (Princeton, 1995), 133–43; and C.C.W. Taylor, ‘The role of women in Plato's Republic’, in R. Kamtekar (ed.), Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honour of Julia Annas (Oxford, 2012), 75–86.

17 The text of 454b4 has often been emended by editors (e.g. Burnet reads τὸ <μὴ> τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν …). See the helpful discussion in S.R. Slings, Critical Notes on Plato's Politeia (Leiden and Boston, 2005), 81–2, who convincingly argues in favour of the reading of the manuscripts.

18 See 453c3–4 τἀναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε, 454a1–2 ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, 454a7–8 τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, 454b2 ἀντιλογίας. See also 454e6 τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα, 455a9 τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος.

19 See 454a5 ἐρίζειν, 454a8 ἔριδι, 454b5 ἐριστικῶς.

20 See 454a5 διαλέγεσθαι, 454a6 τὸ […] δύνασθαι κατ’ εἴδη διαιρούμενοι, 454a8 διαλέκτῳ, 454b7 εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως, 454b8 ὡριζόμεθα.

21 See 452e5 ἀμφισβήτησιν, 452e6 ἀμφισβητῆσαι, 453a8 ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, 453b3 ἀμφισβητεῖν.

22 Note the bellicose vocabulary at 453a9 πολιορκῆται.

23 This does not mean, however, that antilogy and eristic should be understood as conceptually identical. As the Sophist (225b–d) clearly shows, antilogy is conceptually distinct from eristic, and broader in scope, since it also includes the controversies concerned with contractual matters. Yet, I think that this Republic Book 5 passage is strong evidence that despite their difference Plato considers that they often coincide in practice. I am grateful to Rachel Barney for pressing me on this and for sharing her own thoughts on the matter.

24 Adam (n. 11), 285.

25 Cf. Dissoi Logoi 2.2–18. See T.M. Robinson, Contrasting Arguments. An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi (Salem, 19842).

26 Among the several hypotheses available in the vast scholarship on Protagoras, perhaps the most influential is Mario Untersteiner's, according to which the items in Protagoras’ list of works mentioned by Diog. Laert. 9.55 constitute the parts of these Opposing Arguments (Antilogies), which it is possible to reconstruct in outline thanks to Plato's testimony in the Sophist (232b–e). See M. Untersteiner, Les sophistes, French transl. by A. Tordesillas (Paris, 19992), 1.30–5.

27 For a good survey of the accusations of plagiarism against Plato in antiquity, see L. Brisson, ‘Les accusations de plagiat lancées contre Platon’, in M. Dixsaut (ed.), Contre Platon, tome I: Le platonisme dévoilé (Paris, 20072), 339–56.

28 Resp. 10.600c6. There is an interesting scholium to this passage, which reads: ‘[…] he [sc. Protagoras] was the first person to invent eristic discourses’ (Schol. ad Resp. 600c1 Greene = D16 Laks–Most καὶ πρῶτος λόγους ἐριστικοὺς εὗρεν).

29 See S. Menn, ‘On Plato's Πολιτεία’, in J.J. Cleary and G.M. Gurtler (edd.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XXI (Leiden and Boston, 2005), 1–55, at 7–14.

30 Diog. Laert. 9.50 = Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 150 Wehrli.

31 For arguments in favour of the historical authenticity of this testimony, see J. Muir, ‘Protagoras and education at Thourioi’, G&R 29 (1982), 17–24.

32 According to Menn (n. 29), 14, this suggests that the Περὶ πολιτείας was part of the Antilogies and included arguments pro et contra each constitution. See also Untersteiner (n. 26), 32.

33 See Menn (n. 29), 14 n. 20.

34 D. Dawson, Cities of the Gods. Communist Utopias in Greek Thought (Oxford and New York, 1992), 20–1. See also (cited by Dawson [this note]) H.D. Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics (London, 1983), 86, 173–4 and 222.

35 See, however, Dawson (n. 34), 54 n. 15: ‘the frequency with which Roman writers mention it suggests that in antiquity, as today, communism was to the average reader the best-known feature of Plato's Republic; and this does much to explain the schedon holen.’

36 As well noted by Menn (n. 29), 14 n. 20.

37 I. Lana, Protagora (Torino, 1950), 11–13 examines the hypotheses proposed by Mullach, H. Gomperz, Th. Gomperz and Levi, and argues (at 22), on his part, that the Antilogies included the refutation of the Thrasymachean doctrine of justice, which is also found in the first book of the Republic, hence Aristoxenus’ accusation that Plato plagiarized Protagoras.

38 See Mi-Kyoung Lee, Epistemology after Protagoras. Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus (Oxford, 2005), 26.

39 See 358d3–4: ‘That's why I'm going to talk forcefully in praise of the unjust life’ (διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν).

40 On this work, see Untersteiner (n. 26), 31.

41 Meno 71c–d.

42 For the traditional view of feminine virtue, see e.g. Pericles’ mention of the γυναικεία ἀρετή in his Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.45.2): ‘If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, referring to those of you who will henceforth be in widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame’ (transl. Smith). Virginia Woolf comments: ‘the chief glory of a woman is not to be talked of, said Pericles, himself a much-talked-of man’ (A Room of One's Own [1929], ed. by D. Bradshaw and S.N. Clarke [Oxford, 2015], 37). The two passages are quoted by N. Loraux, ‘Aspasie, l’étrangère, l'intellectuelle’, Clio. Histoire, femmes et société [online], uploaded 19 June 2006, consulted 11 October 2018. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/clio/132 ; DOI: 10.4000/clio.132>.

43 See Bluck, R.S., Plato's Meno. Edited with an Introduction, Commentary and an Appendix (Cambridge, 1961), 217–18Google Scholar.

44 Mention should also be made of two dialogues by Aeschines of Sphettus. The evidence on the Axiochos is too scanty to be conclusive, but, on some reading of fr. 13 Dittmar (= VI A 57 SSR), it is not impossible to claim that Aeschines defended some version of the thesis that women are not inferior to men. The evidence on Aeschines’ Aspasia on the same matter is more substantial: see e.g. fr. 17 Dittmar (= VI A 62 SSR), where Socrates is said to encourage Callias to make his son a pupil of Aspasia. On Aeschines, see the recent edition of the testimonies by Pentassuglio, F., Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze (Turnhout, 2017)Google Scholar, especially 119–66 (dedicated to the Axiochos and the Aspasia).

45 As suggested by Barnes, J., ‘An introduction to Aspasius’, in Alberti, A. and Sharples, R.W. (edd.), Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics (Berlin and New York, 1999), 28–30Google Scholar.

46 Compare Resp. 454a6 (τὸ […] δύνασθαι κατ’ εἴδη διαιρούμενοι) with e.g. Phdr. 273e1–2 (κατ’ εἴδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα), Soph. 253d1 (τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι) and Plt. 285a4–5 (κατ’ εἴδη … διαιρουμένους).

47 See 511b4 τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, 511c5 τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης, 532a6 τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, 532d8 τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, 533a8 ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, 537d5 τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει.

48 For more details on this issue and how it is connected to Plato's view of the practicability of the ideal city, see D. El Murr, ‘Plato and utopia: philosophy, power, and practicability in Plato's Republic’, in P. Destrée, J. Opsomer and G. Roskam (edd.), Ancient Utopias (forthcoming).