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Chrysippus on Virtuous Abstention From Ugly Old Women (Plutarch, Sr 1038E–1039A)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Keimpe Algra
Keimpe Algra
Affiliation:
University of Utrecht
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Extract

Plutarch, at De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1038e–1039a (= SVF iii. 211), quotes and briefly discusses a fragment from Chrysippus' On Zeus (Περ⋯ το⋯ Δι⋯ς). This quotation is to some extent paralleled by the scrap, taken from Chrysippus' On the Gods (Περ⋯ Θε⋯ν), which immediately follows at SR 1039a (= SVF Hi. 212). Both quotations are again referred to by Plutarch at De communibus notitiis 1061a (a testimony also included in SVF iii. 212). Although the correct constitution of the text is controversial, it is at least clear that the fragment from the On Zeus deals with the fact that not all virtuous acts are ipso facto also praiseworthy. Plutarch characteristically creates a first and more general contradiction between the On Zeus text and other passages in which Chrysippus argued that virtue and vice do not admit of gradations. In addition, he creates a specific contradiction between it and another quotation, this time from the On the Honourable (Περ⋯ καλο⋯), in which Chrysippus seems to draw the conclusion that the good is praiseworthy.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , December 1990 , pp. 450 - 458
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1990

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References

1 Cf. the whole of Plutarch, , SR 1038c–1039dGoogle Scholar.

2 Plutarch, , SR 1039cGoogle Scholar (= SVF iii. 29).

3 The only treatment of its philosophical aspects which is known to me is Irwin, T., ‘Stoic and Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness’, in Schofield, M., Striker, G. (edd.), The Norms of Nature (Paris, 1986), 205–45, pp. 211–12Google Scholar briefly discussed at the end of the present paper.

4 Cf. Pohlenz, M., ‘Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker’, Hermes 74 (1939), 1–33, 10 n. 1Google Scholar; for the resulting reading of the text see also M. Pohlenz, Westman, R., Plutarchi Moralia vi. 2 (Leipzig, 1959), p. 15Google Scholar.

5 Cherniss, H. (ed.), Plutarch's Moralia xiii. 2 (London, 1976), p. 458Google Scholar.

6 See previous note.

7 οἰκε⋯ων Wyttenbach: οἰκεῖ7nu; MSS.

8 ἔστι τ⋯ <μ⋯> προενεχθ⋯ντα Cherniss: ⋯στ⋯ τὰ προενεχθ⋯ντα (προσνεχθ⋯ντα g) MSS.: ⋯στ⋯ τιν' ⋯ποπροαχθ⋯ντα Pohlenz.

9 [μ⋯] seel. Wyttenbach (followed by von Arnim).

10 τελ⋯ως τ⋯να g: τελ⋯ως τιν⋯ cett.: τελ⋯ως <τε> τιν' Pohlenz.

11 Cf. Plutarch, , SR 1039aGoogle Scholar, where the following quotation from Chrysippus' Περ⋯ Θε⋯ν is presented: …ἔτι γ⋯ρ οἶμαι…τ70gr;ὐς ⋯πα⋯νους ⋯λλοτρισεσθαι κατ⋯ τ⋯ τοια⋯τα τ⋯ν συμβαιν⋯ντων ἀπ' ⋯ρετ⋯ς κτλ.

12 Cf. Plutarch, , Comm. Not. 1070aGoogle Scholar (= SVF iii. 123), τ⋯ αὐτ⋯ πρ⋯γματα…οἰκεῖα κα⋯ οὐκ ⋯γαθ⋯, and the polemical remark at ps.-Alex. De An. Mant. 167, 13ff. Bruns (= SVF iii. 145), τ⋯ οἰκεῖα προηγμ⋯να κα⋯ εὐχρ⋯στς κα⋯ ⋯ξ⋯αν ἔχοντα πρ⋯ς τ⋯ ποτε ταὑτας ἔχει τ⋯ς ⋯νομασ⋯ας, εἰ μηδ⋯ν συνεργεῖ πρ⋯ς εὐδαιμον⋯αν;

13 To be sure, Chrysippus at times spoke as if he restricted the congenial to what is strictly speaking ⋯γαθ⋯ν, i.e. to the actions of the wise; thus, at Plutarch, , SR 1038bGoogle Scholar (= SVF iii. 674) we find Chrysippus saying that τῷ μ⋯ν ⋯στείῳ ⋯λλ⋯τριον οὐδ⋯ν τῷ δ⋯ φαὑλῳ οὐδ⋯ν οἰκεῖ⋯ν ⋯στιν. Such statements, however, should be viewed against the background of familiar Stoic sweeping statements of the kind that only the wise is ‘truly free’, ‘truly king’ etc. In a similar fashion only the actions of the wise may be said to be truly congenial. (Note, by the way that this very contrast between ‘congenial’ and ‘truly congenial’ is skilfully exploited by Plutarch, at SR 1038b.Google Scholar) However, even if the quotation from On Zeus, which is discussed in the text above, uses the word ‘congenial’ in this restricted sense, it remains unclear why Chrysippus should introduce the contrast congenial/not praiseworthy instead of simply speaking of deeds which are virtuous without being praiseworthy.

14 On my interpretation of προενεχθ⋯ντα see below, note 22.

15 See above, n. 13.

16 For yet another instance of this non-technical use of οἰκεῖον by Chrysippus see Plutarch, , SR 1035cGoogle Scholar, where a quotation from Chrysippus' Φυσικα⋯ Θ⋯σεις (= SVF iii. 68) contains the word οἰκει⋯τερον in the sense of ‘more suitable’.

17 Cf. Plutarch, , Comm. Not. 1061aGoogle Scholar (= SVFiii. 212): λ⋯γει…Ξρὑσιππος ⋯ν τῷ Περ⋯ το⋯ Δι⋯ς συγρ⋯μματι…ψυχρ⋯ν εἶναι κα⋯ ἄτπον κα⋯ ⋯λλ⋯τριον τ⋯ τοια⋯τα τ⋯ν ⋯π' ⋯ρετ⋯ς συμβαινόντων ⋯παινεῖν. Compare also the passage from Περ⋯ Θε⋯ν quoted above (note 11), where Chrysippus himself speaks of the danger that τοὐς ⋯πα⋯νους will ⋯λλοτριώσεσθαι when deeds like abstaining from an old crone are being praised.

18 Note that the phrase with which Plutarch introduces the fragment already contains the word ⋯παινε7ῖν.

19 Incidentally, it should be noted that in antiquity Chrysippus was well known for his uncouth style; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.180 (= SVFii. 1): …τ⋯ν λ⋯ξιν οὐ κατώρθωσε; also Cicero's verdict, , De Oratore 1.50Google Scholar (= SVF ii. 26) that Chrysippus… non habuerit hanc dicendi…facultatem.

20 See above, note 4.

21 Cf. Cherniss, , op. cit., p. 458Google Scholar, n. 5. Irwin, , art. cit., pp. 211–12, note 9Google Scholar, proposes to read τ⋯ προαχθ⋯ντα, a reading which is susceptible to the same objections as the one suggested by Pohlenz.

22 In addition to the parallels adduced by Cherniss (viz. Plutarch, , Pelop. 289aGoogle Scholar and Aristotle, , Cat. 4a 12Google Scholar) one could point to Aristotle, EN 1173b21 (πρ⋯ς δ⋯ τοὐς προφ⋯ροντας τ⋯ς ⋯πονειδ⋯στους τ⋯ν ⋯δον⋯ν λ⋯γοι τις ἄτλ.) and Pol. 1288a20. Note that in principle τ⋯ προενεχθ⋯ντα might just refer to ‘the examples just adduced’, i.e. to actual examples in Chrysippus' original text. However, I would suggest that in the present case the word has a more general meaning: ‘the deeds which are [sc. generally] cited as exemplary’ (cf. Plutarch, , Comm. Not. 1075aGoogle Scholar: (οἱ γο⋯ν ἄθεοι προσαγορευθντες οὖτοι). Thus it would appear that the προφ⋯ρειν (or προφ⋯ρεσθαι) to which Chrysippus refers is in some way connected with what is elsewhere called σεμνὑνεσθαι: the wise man may be proud of his deeds and refer to them as an example, as appears from the following passage from the third book of Chrysippus' On Nature, ap. Plutarch, , SR 1038cGoogle Scholar (= SVFm. 526): ὥσπερ τῷ Δι⋯ προσ⋯κει σεμνὑνεσθαι' αὐτῷ τε κα⋯ τῷ β⋯ῳ…οὓτω τοῖς ⋯γαθοῖς π⋯οι τα⋯τα προσ⋯κει κτλ.;see also Chrysippus ap. Plutarch, , SR 1039cGoogle Scholar (= SVF ui. 29). I would therefore surmise that προενεχθ⋯ντα is the Greek equivalent of the prae seferendum which is mentioned as one of the characteristic properties of the Stoic good at Cicero, , Tusc. Disp. 5.43Google Scholar (part of SVF iii. 37) and which is there also connected – via the gloriosum (= σεμν⋯ν) - with the laudabile (ὐπαινετ⋯ν): ‘quod tale autem (sc. prae se ferendum), id etiam gloriosum; si vero gloriosum, certe laudabile.’ On the texts here referred to see also below, note 30.

23 Another solution was opted for by Bréhier, ,Les Stoiciens (Paris, 1962), p. 102Google Scholar, who apparently assumed that the word οἷον did not introduce a number of examples προενεχθ⋯ντα, but that it should be connected with the clause τ⋯να…⋯γκωμι⋯ζειν (probably reading τ⋯να, thus creating a somewhat loosely constructed sentence which he translates (loc. cit.) as follows: ‘…par exemple allonger courageusement le doigt, s'abstenir par continence d'une vieille près de la mort, comprendre sans faillir que trois n'est pas quatre, quelle vanite de nous faire un mérite de telles choses et d'en faire l'éloge’).

24 Cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.46 (= SVFu. 130) where ⋯προπτωσ⋯α is defined as ⋯πιστ⋯μη το⋯ π⋯τε δεῖ συγκατατ⋯θεσθαι.

25 In that case the expression τ⋯ τρ⋯α τ⋯σσαρα (‘three equals four‘) lacks a verb, but the suppression of finite forms of εἶναι in such cases is not exceptional.

26 Such a shift from a finite indicative to an infinitive may have different explanations on different occasions. Thus (1) a writer may be tempted to shift to a construction with an infinitive because the preceding context implicitly contains a verb which may be thought of as governing the infinitive construction (see e.g. Sextus, , P 1.232Google Scholar, where it is said of Arcesilaus that …οὔτε κατ⋯ π⋯στιν ἤ ⋯πιστ⋯αν προκ⋯νει τι ἕτερον ⋯τερο⋯, ⋯λλ⋯ περ⋯ π⋯ντων ⋯π⋯χει. κα⋯ τ⋯λος μ⋯ν εἶναι τ⋯ν ⋯ποχ⋯ν κτλ., where the infinitive in the latter phrase may be thought to depend on a ‘he thinks’ which is implicit in the two verbs προκρ⋯νει and ⋯π⋯χει). Alternatively, (2) a sentence with a finite verbal form may constitute a break-a s it were by way of an ‘aside’ –in an otherwise coherent series of (accusative and) infinitives. Or (3) the shift may be inexplicable and irregular (for some examples in the tragedians see Braunlich, A. F., ‘Notes on the Text of Euripides’, AJPh 83 (1962), 405–6)Google Scholar. I would suggest that in the present case we are dealing with an example of either (2) or (3).

27 Galen, , PHP 2, p. 170, 9ffGoogle Scholar. De Lacy (= SVFu. 885). It is true that here also an attempt has been made to smooth the construction and read φων⋯ν <φαμεν> εἶναι (Müller, followed by von Arnim), but this addition, appealing though it may at first glance appear, badly fits the rest of the sentence (which contains a second infinitive which can hardly be dependent on φαμε7nu;) and has been rightly rejected in De Lacy's critical edition. A somewhat different, but no less harsh instance can be found in the Chrysippean fragment at PHP 2, p. 104, 29ff. De Lacy (= SVF ii. 895):οἶναι δ⋯ κα⋯ τ⋯ ⋯γὼ λ⋯γομεν, κατ⋯ το⋯το δεικνὑντες ⋯αυτοὐς ⋯ν ᾧ φα⋯νεθαι δι⋯νοιαν εἶναι κτλ. De Lacy, ad be, comments: ‘A verb of saying or thinking must govern the infinitive φα⋯νεσθαι. Perhaps Chrysippus means that persons who point to their chest when they say “I” are saying, in effect, that thought appears to be there. Chrysippus' Greek is difficult at best.'

28 Alternatively, as the Editors have pointed out to me, we could take the infinitive with οἰκεῖον. Note, however, that also in this case we would be left with an oddly constructed sentence (‘it is fitting (for us) to praise…and that among the προενεχθ⋯ντα… do not belong’). On the other hand this reading has the advantage of explaining the infinitive as well as the use of μ⋯ instead of οὐ on balance, I slightly prefer the interpretation proposed in the text, especially since the infinitive is perhaps not that anomalous (on which see the previous notes) whereas μ⋯ instead of οὐ, particularly with infinitives, is not at all uncommon in Hellenistic Greek: cf. Schwyzer, E., Debrunner, A., Griechische Grammatik (München, 1949), pp. 594–5Google Scholar. I found some comparably ‘irregular’ occurrences of μ⋯ (and the compound μηδ⋯ν) in fragments from Chrysippus' On the Soul in Galen PHP 3, p. 200, 29 De Lacy (= SVF ii. 891): οὕτω δ⋯ λ⋯γεσθαι κα⋯ μηδ⋯ν αὐτοῖς τοὑτων καταβα⋯νειν; PHP 3, p. 202, 28 De Lacy (= SVF i\. 892): λ⋯γομεν μ⋯ καταβα⋯νειν τ⋯ λεγ⋯μενα; p. 192, 19 De Lacy (= SVF ii. 902): καθ' ὅ φαμεν μ⋯ ἔχειν τιν⋯ς ⋯γκ⋯φαλον.

28 Cherniss put a comma after εἶναι τελ⋯ως and translated ‘hearing without precipitate assent that three is exactly four’ which makes little sense; Pohlenz rightly put a comma before τελ⋯ως, and changed the MSS. reading into τελ⋯ως <τε> τιν' ὐμφα⋯νει κτλ., no doubt to avoid asyndeton. However, it may well be that the demonstrative pronoun τοιοὑτων was thought to constitute a sufficient link with the preceding sentence, so that a connecting particle was not obligatory. Cf. Chrysippus, at Galen, PHP 3, p. 206Google Scholar, 24 De Lacy (= SVF ii. 896): ⋯ρμ⋯μεν κατ⋯ το⋯το τ⋯ μ⋯ρος κτλ (no particle); and the Chrysippean fragment at p. 206,15 De Lacy (= SVF ii. 896): τοὑτοις π⋯σι συμφώνως κα⋯ το⋯τ' ἔσχηκεν κτλ. (no particle, although in the fragment at PHP 3, p. 204, 4 De Lacy (= SVF ii. 892) we find: τοὑτοις δ' ⋯κολοὑθως ⋯νεμεῖν τ⋯ τιν⋯ς φαμεν τ⋯ φαν⋯ντα κτλ.).

30 Note that comparable lists of predicates survived in the doxographical tradition, as appears from Cicero, Fin. 3.27; 4.50 (where it is claimed that this list issued from a sorites), and Tusc. Disp. 5.43 and 45 (all subsumed under SVF iii. 37), Diog. Laert. 7.98 (= SVF iii. 87), and Stobaeus, Eel. 2, p. 100. 15ff. W. (= SVF iii. 208).

31 Here the transmitted text is difficult to make sense of and perhaps lacunose. For some proposed emendations see the critical apparatus in Cherniss' edition.

32 Note that this tallies with the information provided by Stobaeus (Arius Didymus) and Diogenes Laertius, namely that the state of being wise is not always accompanied by joy; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.98 (= SVF in. 102): …κα⋯ ⋯ε⋯ μ⋯ν παρ⋯ντα (sc. ⋯γαθ⋯) αἱ ⋯ρετα⋯, οὐκ ⋯ε⋯ δ⋯ οἷον χαρ⋯…; Stobaeus, , Eel. 2, p. 68. 24ffGoogle Scholar. W. (= SVF iii. 103). It appears, therefore, that Seneca's statement, Ep. 59. 2 (= SVF iii. 435), that ‘…gaudio autem iunctum est non desinere nee in contrarium verti’ is in need of qualification, at least so far as the early Stoics are concerned. For although gaudium (= χαρ⋯) could never turn into its opposite, λὑπη having no counterpart at the level of the eupatheiai, it could nevertheless cease to be present. On the so-called eupatheiai (χαρ⋯, εὐλ⋯βεια, βοὑλησις) in general see esp. Diog. Laert. 7.116 (= SVFiii. 431), and Cicero, , Tusc. Disp. 4.12Google Scholar (= SVF iii. 438). Useful comments in D. Tsekourakis, , Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics (Wiesbaden, 1974), pp. 92–6Google Scholar; Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers i (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 421–2Google Scholar.

33 Cf. Cicero, , Fin. 4.42 and 4.39Google Scholar.

34 Cf. Alexander, , In Top. 147.12ffGoogle Scholar. Wallies (= SVF iii. 595): εἰ γ⋯ρ τ⋯ν πολλ⋯ν πλοὑσιον λεγ⋯ντων μ⋯νον τὸν πολυκτ⋯μονα μ⋯ κατ⋯ τοὑτου τις χρῷ ⋯ν⋯ματι τοὑτῳ, κατ⋯ δ⋯ το⋯ σοφο⋯ κα⋯ το⋯ τ⋯ς ⋯ρετ⋯ς ἔχοντος παραβα⋯νοι ἄν τ⋯ν κε⋯μενον τ⋯ς τ⋯ν ⋯νομ⋯των χρ⋯σεως διορισμ⋯ν; cf. also ibid., 147.22ff. and 124.13 (= SVF iii. 594). On a similar shift of meaning of the word ‘useful’ as applied to the Stoic good see Forschner, M., Die stoische Ethik (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 178–9Google Scholar. See also Tsekourakis, , op. cit., pp. 68–75, esp. p. 74Google Scholar.

35 Zeller, E., Die Philosophic der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 6 iii. 1 (Hildesheim, 1963), p. 258Google Scholar.

36 For the example see Gregory of Nazianzus, , Epist. 32Google Scholar (=SVF iii. 585).

37 Bury's translation in the Loeb edition of Sextus. Note that Sextus' interpretation of the Stoic example might at first glance appear to be supported by one of the definitions of continence which he provides (viz. ⋯ρετ⋯ ὑπερ⋯νω ποιο⋯σα ⋯μ⋯ς τ⋯ν δοκοὑντων εἶναι δυσαποσχ⋯των). However, this definition is most probably of his own making. For, contrary to the other definition provided by Sextus (δι⋯θεσις ⋯νυπ⋯ρβατος τ⋯ν καθ' ⋯ρθ⋯ν λ⋯γον γιγνομ⋯νων), it is not attested anywhere else. Moreover its wording (in particular the use of ⋯ρετ⋯, rather than e.g. ⋯πιοτ⋯μη, as a genus) does not square with the early Stoic habit of defining all virtues either in terms of 1F10;πιοτ⋯μη, or in terms of ἔξις (in some accounts δι⋯θεσις), as becomes obvious if one compares the various texts printed as SVF iii. 262–94. Finally, the presentation suggests that the definition is an interpretative addition of Sextus' own making, which is itself dependent on his interpretation of the Stoic examples of the old woman and Phryne or Lais (in fact the examples are connected with this definition by γ⋯ρ) the same goes for the alternative definition and the examples of καρτερ⋯α, adduced some lines further on, at M 9.154. Of course this should not be taken to suggest that the interpretation of the examples as provided by Sextus is new with him. In fact, in the end he may well have been dependent on the same polemical tradition as Plutarch, one of whose contradictions, we may recall, also centred on an implicit misinterpretation of the Chrysippean examples as dealing with actions being more or less virtuous (rather than more or less praiseworthy).

38 Loc. cit. (n. 3). Unfortunately Irwin does not provide a literal translation. It is difficult to see how he could find support for his interpretation in the text as it stands. Indeed, both the last sentence of the fragment itself and Plutarch's paraphrase make clear that Chrysippus is arguing against praising trivial actions. In a footnote (note 9), however, Irwin does offer some arguments. He there argues that Plutarch relies on an equivocation in ‘things done according to virtue’, which might sometimes refer to ‘actions, as expressing virtue’ [my ital.], and at other times to the results of these actions (in which connection he refers to SR 1039a, the quotation from On the Gods, which speaks of τ⋯ν συμβαιν⋯ντω7nu; ⋯π' ⋯ρετ⋯ς). According to Irwin, Chrysippus' position was probably that the former were always praiseworthy, whereas the latter were not. Against this it should be objected that what at 1039a are called συμβαιν⋯ντα ⋯π‘ ⋯ρετ⋯ς are in the quotation from the On Zeus – even following Irwin's reading of the text (on which see above, note 21) – classed among the ἔργων κατ⋯ τ⋯ς ⋯ρετ⋯ς, which shows that these formulas could be used interchangeably. Indeed, the examples adduced are not so much the results of virtuous action as the virtuous actions themselves.

39 I would like to thank Patty van Hees, Jaap Mansfeld and Teun Tieleman who read and criticised earlier versions of this paper. I am particularly grateful to the Editors for a number of pertinent critical comments and suggestions.