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The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

David L. Blank
David L. Blank
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Extract

In Aeschines' dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates sees his brilliant young partner's haughty attitude towards the great Themistocles. Thereupon he gives an encomium of Themistocles, a man whose wisdom and arete, great as they were, could not save him from ostracism by his own people. This encomium has an extraordinary effect on Alcibiades: he cries and in his despair places his head upon Socrates' knee, realizing that he is nowhere near as good a man as Themistocles (Aesch., Ale. fr. 9 Dittm. = Ael. Aristid. 286.2). Aeschines later has Socrates say that he would have been foolish to think he could have helped Alcibiades by virtue of any art or knowledge, but nonetheless by some divine dispensation he has, in virtue of the eros he felt for the youth, been allowed to make him better (fr. lla, c Dittm. = Ael. Aristid., Rhet. 17).

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , December 1993 , pp. 428 - 439
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1993

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References

1 E.g., Döring, K., ‘Der Sokrates des Aeschines von Spettos und die Frage nach dem historischen Sokrates’, Hermes 112 (1984) 27–9Google Scholar.

2 One of the few to note this sort of effect was Gaiser, K., Platone come scrittore filosofico (Istituto Italiano per gli studi filosofici. Lezioni della scuola di studi superiori in Napoli 2; Napoli 1984) 41Google Scholar: ‘La componente poetica e artistica di questi dialoghi non deve manifestarsi solamente nella loro forma, ma anche e sopratutto nell'effetto che provoca sul lettore’, and 43f.: ‘… Platone nei suoi dialoghi caratterizza in modo ben preciso l'effetto dei colloqui e dei discorsi filosofici. Secondo queste affermazioni di Platone l'effetto principale dei suoi dialoghi letterari non è cercarsi nella comunicazione di dottrine, ma nelle funzioni psicagogiche: essi intendono liberare il lettore da legami erronei, stimolarlo, incoraggiarlo e confermarlo nella sua aspirazione verso l'Areté e l'Eudaimonia’.

3 For some considerations on the nature of Platonic arguments, see now Frede, M., ‘Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, OSAP Suppl. Vol. ‘Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues’, ed. Klagge, J. C. and Smith, N. D. (Oxford, 1992) 201–19Google Scholar.

4 SE 165a37–b8: Ἔστι δ τν ν τῷ διαλγεσθαι λγων ττταρα γνη, διδασκαλικο κα διαλεκτικο κα πειραστικο κα ριστικο, διδασκαλικο μν οἱ κ τν οἰκεων ρχν κστου μαθματος κα οὐκ κ τν το ποκρινομνου δοξν συλλογιζμενοι (δεῖ γρ πιστεειν τòν μανθνοντα), διαλεκτικο δ' οἱ κ 1F31; τν νδξων συλλογιστικο ντιφσεως, πειραστικο δ' οἱ κ τν δοκοντων τῷ ποκρινομνῳ κα ναγκαων εἰδναι τῷ προσποιουμνῳ ἔχειν τν πιστμην (ν τρπον δ, διώρισται ν τροις), ριστικο δ' οἱ κ τν φαινομνων νδξων μ ντων δ συλλογιστικο ἢ φαινμενοι συλλογιστικο See also Frede, (op. cit. in n. 3) 208ffGoogle Scholar.

5 SE 183b7; a37–b8: Προειλμεθα μν οὖν εὑρεῖν δναμν τινα συλλογιστικν περ το προβληθντος κ τν ὑπαρχντων ὡς νδοξοττων τοτο γρ ἔργον στ τς διαλεκτικς καθ' αὑτν κα τς πειραστικς. πε; δ προσκατασκενζετι πρς αὐτν δι τν τς σοφιστικς γειτνασιν, ὡς οὐ μνον πεῖραν δναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικς λλ κα ὡς εἰδώς, δι τοτο οὐ μνον τ λεχθν ἔργον ὑπεθμεθα τς πραγματεας, τ λγον δνασθαι λαβεῖν, λλ κα πως λγον ὑπχοντες φυλξομεν τν θσιν ὡς δι' νδοξοττων μοτρπως. τν δ' αἰταν δεἰρκαμεν τοτου, πε κα δι τοτο Σωκρτης ἢρώτα, λλ' οὐκ πεκρνετο· ὡμολγει γρ οὐκ εἰδναι.

6 Note Aristotle's insistence that the questioner need not know about the subject: οὐδ γρ πειραστικ τοιατη στν οἶα ἠ γεωμετρα, λλ' ἤν ἄν ἔχοι κα μ εἰδώς τις. ἔξεοτι γρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν κα τν μ εἰδτα τ πρἄγμα το μ εἰδτος, εἴπερ κα δδωσιν, οὐκ ξ ὦν οἶδεν οὐδ' κ τν ἰδων λλ' κ τν πομνων … SE 172a21ff.;cf SE 169b24–29.

7 Top. 101a27: …πρς γυμνασαν, πρς τς ντεξεις, πρς τς κατ τν φιλοσοφαν πιστμας (sc. χρσιμος διαλεκτικ).

8 SE 165b 11: περ δ τν γωνιστικν κα ριστικν νν λγωμεν.

9 Top. 100a30: διαλεκτικς δ συλλογισμς ξ νδξων συλλογιζμενος.

10 Some of the other passages which follow here were discussed by Robinson, Richard in his Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953 2) 7–19Google Scholar. Robinson's concerns, however, seem quite different from those I shall pursue here. He assumes that Plato changes his attitude towards Socrates' elenchus in the later dialogues, giving up the ‘ironic’ elenchus, which tended to anger Socrates' respondents, in favour of a kinder, ‘open’ elenchus, such as those Socrates used on his friends, who after all could not continually be fooled by any claim that no elenchus was taking place. Strangely enough, Robinson omits discussion of Tht. 167eff. (although he stresses Sph. 229eff.). Had he considered it, his notions of an ironic and an open elenchus would have collapsed.

11 Gaiser, (op. cit. in n. 2) 44f. lays great stress on the magicalGoogle Scholar, incantatory nature of philosophy's effect on Socrates' interlocutors. In this paper I am less interested in philosophy as πῳδ (cf. Chrm. I75a–c, etc.) than in the emotional interactions of Socrates, his interlocutors and his audience.

12 Cf. Ap. 23c2: …οἱ νοι μοι πακολουθοντες—οἶς μλιστα σχολ στιν, οἱ τν πλουσιωττων—αὐτματοι, χαρουσιν κοοντες ξεταζομνων τν νθρώπων, κα αὐτο πολλκις μ μιμονται, and 33c2: κοοντες χαρουσιν ξεταζομνοις τοῖς οἰομνοις μν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὔ· ἔστι γρ οὐκ ηδς.

13 Not only tragedy, but also comedy will produce an Aristotelian katharsis, as argued by Janko, R., Aristotle on Comedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984) 150ffGoogle Scholar. In Philebus 48a both tragedy and comedy are said to evoke a mixture of pleasure and pain or weeping.

14 Note also the medical metaphors there and in 1337b40ff. and 1339b15.

15 A translation of this text appears in Aristotle. Poetics I with the Tractatus Coislinianus, a hypothetical reconstruction of Poetics II, the fragments of the On Poets, trans. Janko, R. (Indianapolis, 1987) 61Google Scholar. Janko (187) thinks the text is either a summary of (perhaps in the context of a Philodemean polemic) or an actual fragment of Aristotle's On Poets; the first edition of the Greek text is found in Nardelli, M. L., ‘La catarsi poetica nel PHerc. 1581’, CErc 8 (1978) 96–103Google Scholar, and a new edition with full commentary in Janko, R., ‘Philodemus' On Poems and Aristotle's On Poets’, CErc 21 (1991) 5–64Google Scholar. Salkever, S. G., ‘Tragedy and the Education of the Demos: Aristotle's response to Plato’ in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, ed. Euben, J. P. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986) 274–303Google Scholar equates Aristotelian tragic catharsis with the katharsis of false opinions in the Sophist, but this, I think, goes too far in intellectualizing the Aristotelian doctrine.

16 Note the concentration of talk about ‘bystanders’ of dialectic in the Apology (21dl, el, 23a3, c2, 33c2), where Socrates explains the origin of his ill repute.

17 On this passage cf. Belflore, E., ‘Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry’, in Pelletier, F. J. and King-Farlow, J. (edd.), New Essays on Plato (Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Suppl. vol. IX; Guelph, 1983) 39–62Google Scholar.

18 Resp. 606a8: τ δ φσει βλτιστον μν, ἄτε οὐχ ἱκανς πεπαιδευμνον λγῳ οὐδ ἔθει, νησιν τν φυλακν το θρηνώδους τοτου ἄτε λλτρια πθη θεωρον κα αυτῷ οὐδν αἰσχρν ν εἰ ἄλλος νρ γαθς φσκων εἶναι καρως πενθεῖ, τοτον παινεῖν κα λεεῖν, λλ' κεῖνο κερδανειν γεῖται, τν δονν … Cf. Belfiore, (op. cit. in n. 18), 53Google Scholar.

19 Cf., e.g., House, H., Aristotle's Poetics: a course of eight lectures (London, 1956), 105–12Google Scholar and Janko, Aristotle, Poetics I … (op. cit. in n. 15) xviiif., 200Google Scholar.

20 Previous versions of this paper were delivered to audiences in Los Angeles, Berlin, Princeton, Melbourne, and Chicago. I am glad to have had these opportunities to try out my ideas and grateful for the comments of my audiences.