Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-dh8gc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-12T21:24:29.789Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence Amid Political Accountability*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

David Shambaugh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The international relations scholar Arnold Wolfers once noted that national security was an “ambiguous symbol.” While the Republic of China on Taiwan's (hereafter ROCOT or Taiwan) international status has certainly been ambiguous in recent years, its security has been crystal clear. Taiwan has lived under the threat of military attack or other coercive measures from the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. The mainland Chinese authorities have repeatedly refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, claiming it a potentially necessary tool to reunify what it considers to be a renegade province with the “motherland.” As long as Taiwan lives under the threat of military force and coercion from the PRC, this will have a defining impact on the island's domestic life and international profile.

Type
Taiwan's Relations with China
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 148 , December 1996 , pp. 1284 - 1318
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Quoted in 1993–1994 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co. Ltd, 1994), pp. 83, 113. No date given for quotation

2 The PRC has stated three conditions under which it would resort to force: a declaration of national independence by the Taiwan authorities; foreign “intervention” in Taiwan; and social “chaos” on the island.

3 Siew, Vincent C., Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (ROCOT), Cross-Strait Relations: Retrospect and Prospects (Taipei:Mainland Affairs Council, April 1995), p. 3Google Scholar

4 The PRC's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation estimates contracted investment at $22.6 billion through 1994. Ibid.. p. 4.

5 Ibid.. p. 3.

6 The M-9 has a range of approximately 375 miles (600 kilometres) and can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. They were launched from a base in Leping, Jiangxi province

7 Cheng Lang-ping, 1995: Run bayue (Intercalary 1995) (Taipei: Shangzhou wenhua shiyue fuwu youliang gongsi, 1994).Google Scholar

8 Interview with PLA General Staff Department officer, 25 July 1995.

9 Taiwan's foreign military relations must also, of course, be bandied unofficially. Yet Taiwan's representative offices in France, the United States, Singapore and perhaps other countries contain what are, in essence, military attaches who co-ordinate weapons purchases and other defence-related activities. These countries also maintain similar personnel in their representative offices in Taipei. For a number of years, Taiwanese military personnel have trained in the United States and with Singapore. Senior officials of the ROCOT military reportedly go to the U.S. on occasion, albeit in low-key and private visits

10 Interview, Taipei, 8 July 1995.

11 The Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs budgets are reviewed, approved and monitored by the Lifa yuan's Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees respectively.

12 Chang Chung-yung, “Guoanhuiju de juece dingwei yu” (“Adjustments in the National Security Council and Bureau decision-making position and power”), Guojia zhengce shuang zhoukan (Institute for National Policy Research National Policy Bimonthly), No. 77 (1 November 1994), p. 8.Google Scholar

13 “Taiwan's President retains grip on security council,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 24 April 1993, p. 19.

14 Su Chin-Ch'iang, Taihai anquan yu guofang gaige (Taiwan Maritime Security and Defence Reform) (Taipei:Institute for National Policy Research, 1995).Google Scholar

15 For a discussion of the need and measures for enhanced civilian control over the ROCOT armed forces see Ibid.. pp. 64–86; and Sun Chin-ch'iang, “Junxiang guojiahua yu guojun zhengzhan zhidu” (“Military nationalization and the national military political warfare system”), Guojia zhengce shuang zhoukan, No. 77 (1 November 1994), pp. 9–10.

16 The Republic of China Yearbook 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1996), p. 122.Google Scholar

17 Ibid..

18 “Taiwanese in armed forces shakeup,” South China Morning Post Weekly, 29 June 1996, p. 6.

19 See David Shambaugh, “The soldier and the state in China: the political work system in the People's Liberation Army,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (September 1991) pp. 527–568.

20 The best comparative study of this subject is Cheng Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control (Boulder:Wesrview Press, 1990).Google Scholar

21 Hau personified the party-army link, as well as the mainland-oriented generation of officers.

22 Information in this section, unless otherwise specified, derives from The Republic of China Yearbook 1995 and 1996 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1995, 1996); Ministry of National Defence, 1993–94 National Defence Report (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co Ltd, 1994); and International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995/96 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Where there are discrepancies the most up-to-date data have been used. Weaponry is not covered in this section.Google Scholar

23 Compiled from The Republic of China Yearb'ook 1996, pp. 124–25

24 In addition, several other military academies and schools exist. The joint-service Armed Forces University is the national defence university responsible for training senior-level commanding officers from all services, as well as specialists in national defence administration and military intelligence. The Fu Hsing Kang College, located in Peitou, trains political warfare cadres for the armed services. The Chung-Cheng Institute of Technology educates technical military officers in research and development of weapons systems and equipment maintenance. The National Defence Management College educates accountants, statisticians, information management and other managerial personnel. The National Defence Medical College trains military medical specialists in all fields. Various services also administer their own branch schools specializing in specific areas such as infantry, armour, artillery, aeronautics, naval warfare, etc.

25 Quoted in “Taiwan to keep troop strength,” International Herald Tribune, 26 April 1996, p. 2.

26 “Military budget proposal detailed,” Taipei CNA, 9 January 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (FBIS-CK), 10 January 1995, p. 90; “Chinese threat prompts Taiwan budget rise,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 12 June 1996.

27 Ibid., and HSS, The Military Balance, p. 192

28 See, for example, the sections on national defence policy, readiness and training, political warfare, warfighting, combined service forces, budget and finance, defence intelligence, protection of national security, command and control, and defence science and technology in Ufa yuan gongbao (Communiqué of the Legislative Yuan) (Taipei: Secretariat of the Legislative Yuan, 25 February 1995), pp. 365–370.

29 The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, and Dennis Engbarth, “Secret budget gives HK $17 billion boost to defense,” South China Morning Post Weekly, 18 March 1995

30 1993–94 National Defence Report, p. 119

31 Engbarth, “Secret budget.”

32 Other sources estimate the F-16 deal (including associated weaponry and training) to be worth US$6 billion. “Sales to Taiwan may become easier,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 24 July 1993, p. 5.

33 HSS, The Military Balance, p. 192

34 1993–94 National Defence Report, p. 126.

35 The sale was confirmed by France on 25 October 1995, and it was claimed that since it predated the 1994 French agreement with the PRC to cease sales of weapons to Taiwan, it was not a violation of the agreement. The Mistral has a range of 1.8 miles. Joseph Fitcbett, “French confirm sale of missiles to Taiwan,” International Herald Tribune, 26 October 1995.

36 “Taiwan to buy French-made missiles, weapons,” Taipei CNA, 17 March 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 17 March 1995, p. 80.

37 See, for example, Julian Baum, “Fear of August,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1995, p. 18.

38 Virginia Sheng, “U.S. to sell missiles to Taiwan to bolster defense,” The Free China Journal, 31 May 1996, p. 1

39 “Taiwan is said to buy 300 more U.S. tanks,” New York Times, 15 April 1996. In 1994 Taiwan purchased 160 M60-A3 tanks for $590,000 each.

40 “Taiwan to boost artillery,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 April 1996; “Taiwan looks over artillery,” Ibid.., 17 April 1996.

41 “Naval boost,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 April 1996, p. 13; Joris Janssen Lok, “France lifts covers on Lafayettes for Taiwan,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 July 1995, p. 16. David Hughes, “Taiwan to acquire Patriot derivative,” Aviation Week Space Technology, 1 March 1993, p. 61, as cited in Chong-Pin Lin, “The military balance in the Taiwan Straits,” The China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996), pp. 577–595.

42 Interview with knowledgeable U.S. Department of Defense official, 12 January 1995.

43 Interview with knowledgeable U.S. official, 20 May 1996.

44 Bitzinger, Richard A. and Bates Bill, Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare: Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995–2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), p. 38.Google Scholar

45 Nigel Holloway, “Asian Star Wars,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 1996, p. 20

46 Ibid.. p. 21.

47 Taipei CNA, “Air Force official confirms AWACs delivery,” 6 February 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 6 February 1995, p. 86.

48 See the discussion in Andrew N.D. Yang, “Taiwan's strategic capacities and defence options,” paper presented at the conference “Political and Strategic Foundations of Taiwan's Future,” Canberra, Australia, May 1996.

49 Interview with ROCOT Ministry of Defence, 24 November 1995; Bitzinger and Gill, Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare, p. 28.

50 Ibid.. pp. 28, 41

51 Interview with defence specialist, Taipei, 10 July 1995.

52 Interview with knowledgeable U.S. official, 20 October 1995

53 Chong-Pin Lin, “The military balance in the Taiwan Straits.”

54 The Mirage deal was reportedly worth $2.6 billion. “Guozhi 60 jia huanxiang zhanji” (“Purchase of 60 Mirage fighters”), Zhongguo shibao (China Times, Taipei), 17 November 1992, p. 7.

55 As cited in “Taiwan signs arms agreement with France,” South China Morning Post Weekly, 28 October 1995, p. 6.

56 For elaboration see David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949–1995 (London:SOAS Contemporary China Institute Research Notes Studies No. 11, 1996), chs. 8–9.Google Scholar

57 See Denis Fred Simon's contribution to this volume.

58 Bitzinger and Gill's study details Taiwan's defence industry and foreign assistance programmes. See Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare, especially pp. 36–42.

59 See The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, p. 166; Bitzinger and Gill, Gearing Up ForHigh- Tech Warfare; and Sean Boyne, “Taiwan: looking over the horizon,” Jane's Intelligence Review (November 1995), pp. 501–505.

60 The Institute was established in 1969 and presently employs 6,300 scientists and more than 8,500 technicians. It is a dedicated defence R establishment spread across Taiwan, although its headquarters are at Longtan in Taoyuan county. It is divided into four major research divisions: aeronautics, missiles and rockets, electronics, and chemistry. Various in precision-guided munitions and the SAMs and AAMs noted above were developed there. See The Republic of China Yearbook 1995, pp. 165.

61 Originally 250 were ordered, but after the agreement to purchase F-16s the order was cut back.

62 Julian Baum, “Winged: locally made jet fighter fails to convince critics,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 January 1995, p. 21

63 See Ibid..; Sung Yu-ning etal., “Taiwan-made fighter planes take to the skies,” Defense Technology Monthly (Taipei), 1 January 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 30 March 1995, pp. 79–82Google Scholar; “Article outlines IDF missionsInterview with Taiwan Air Force personnel and military specialists, Taipei, 9–10 July 1995., procedures,” Ibid.. pp. 78–79; and Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1994–95 (London: Janes Information Group, 1994).

64 Reliable Taiwanese, Russian and American sources indicate that the second squadron of 22 were finally delivered in late summer 1995 and will be based in Guangdong.

65 Interview with Taiwan scholar, Taipei, 9 July 1995. Approximately 150 million tons of cargo was shipped into and out of Taiwan during 1994, compared to only 0.076 million tons transported by air.

66 Interview with Taiwan Air Force personnel and military specialists, Taipei, 9–10 July 1995.

67 Interview, Joint Forces War College, Taipei, 10 July 1995

68 Interview, Ministry of National Defence, Taipei, 23 November 1995.

69 While not the first to identify these scenarios, I agree to a large extent with Chong-Pin Lin's categorization. See Chong-Pin Lin, “The military balance in the Taiwan Straits.” Also see Stephen Vines, “Taiwan and China do the sabre dance,” The Independent (London), 3 October 1995, p. 9Google Scholar; “China and Taiwan: the prospects for T-Day,” The Economist, 2 September 1995, p. 76; BaiJunrong, “Rising fear of invasion of Taiwan,” Guang jiao jing (Wide Angle) (Hong Kong), 16 October 1994, pp. 22–27, in FBIS-CHI, 5 January 1995, pp. 36–40; Bitzinger and Gill, Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare, pp. 31–32.

70 Whenever China has attacked a neighbour since 1949 (repeatedly), it has characterized its action as a “defensive counter-attack.”

71 Interview with Taiwan military expert, Taipei, 9 July 1995.

72 Ibid..

73 For China to pursue such a strategy intentionally would require the PLA to mobilize forces in preparation for a wider attack, which would be detected beforehand.

74 Interview with Taiwan military expert, Taipei, 9 July 1995.

75 China Times (Taipei), 26 November 1992, p. 3. The Sea Dragon is the principal submarine in the Dutch Navy.

76 the event of a blockade, Taiwan already has in place plans to route its registered vessels and tankers through the Palawan Passage next to Luzon and Borneo and to the east of Taiwan - well beyond the reach of the PLAN. As two-thirds of Taiwan's shipping (5,700 ships in 1994) passes through the South China Sea and Malacca Strait, and given the fact that the PRC would be hesitant to extend a blockade into the contested South China sea contingency plans are intended to skirt a blockade of any form by the PRC.

77 This section has benefited from a number of sources, including the analysis of Andrew N.D. Yang and Martin Lasater. See Andrew N.D. Yang, “Taiwan's defense buildup in the 1990s: remodeling the fortress,” in Gary Klintworth (ed.), Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen Unwin, 1994), pp. 72–88; Martin, Lasater, The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the Security of Taiwan (Boulder:Westview Press, 1994), especially pp. 187–215.Google Scholar

78 Interview with Taiwan military expert, Taipei, 9 July 1995.

79 See Joris Janssen Lok, “Taiwan's force updates revealed,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 January 1993, p. 24; Jane's Fighting Ships 1995–96 (Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1995), pp. 690–700.Google Scholar

80 “Defence Ministry, U.S. firm sign missile agreement,” Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 16 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 26 July 1994, pp. 75–76; Taipei CNA, “Army buys 200 Patriot missiles from U.S.,” 2 July 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 7 July 1994, p. 75.

81 See Taipei CNA, “Taiwan hopes to acquire more Patriot missiles,” 25 February 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 27 February 1995, p. 77.

82 Lu Chao-lung, “Missiles secretly deployed on offshore island,” Zhongguo shibao, 3 November 1994, in FBIS-CHI, HNovember 1994, p. 93; “Hsiung Feng nmissile in service,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 28 August 1993, p. 7.

83 Interview with Taiwan military expert, 9 July 1995, Taipei.

84 Chien Cheng, “Wo zouyan biaoli duidi feidan,” Lianhe bao (United Daily News), 8 January 1996, p. 1.

85 Interviews with Taiwan defence and security officials, 9–10 July 1995, Taipei.

86 Ibid..

87 This article has not discussed the PRC's nuclear arsenal, as most analysts deem it an irrelevant weapon in this context.