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Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Economic Policy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Peter Schran
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Extract

Anyone who had hoped that the proceedings of the National People's Congress would shed more light on China's current problems and future prospects than previous pronouncements had done, could console himself after its adjournment with the thought that he had been right in his suspicions, after all. By convening behind closed doors, the Congress avoided having to provide information on the state of the economy in the customary detail and thus merely reinforced the common speculation that all was not well or all was ill, depending on one's predilections.

Type
Recent Developments
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 11 , September 1962 , pp. 58 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1962

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References

1 People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao). 01 1, 1962, p. 1.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., April 17, 1962, p. 1.

3 For a detailed discussion of the state of the Chinese economy on the occasion of the Communist take-over see Wu, Yuan-li, An Economic Survey of Communist China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956).Google Scholar

4 The logic of the argument is presented most clearly in Marx, 's Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy.Google Scholar

5 All this is evident in Mao Tse-tung's On the People's Democratic Dictatorship as well as in his On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.

6 For a detailed discussion of the growth of modern industry see, e.g.. Li, Choh-ming, Economic Development of Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).Google Scholar

7 See Central-South Wage Reform Committee, Kung-tzu Ch'ang-shih Chiang-hua (Common Sense Talk on Wages) (Peking: 1952).Google Scholar

8 See Hua, Ch'ien et al. (ed.), Ch'i Nien-lai Wo Kuo Ssu-ying Kung-shang-yeh ti Pien-hua (1949–1956) (Changes in Our Country's Privately Operated Industry and Commerce in the Past Seven Years (1949–1956)) (Peking: 1957)Google Scholar. See also Ching-chi Yen-chiu (Economic Research). 04 17, 1956, pp. 40–53Google Scholar, and T'ung-chi Kung-tso (Statistical Work). 03 29, 1957, pp. 30–32.Google Scholar

9 See State Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years (Peking: 1960)Google ScholarPubMed, for data on increases in output (p. 87 et seq.). in investment (p. 57 et seq.). and in labour (pp. 183, 184).

10 For a detailed discussion of agricultural developments see Li, Choh-ming, op. cit.Google Scholar, and Kuo-chun, Chao, Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1959 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960).Google Scholar

11 See Chao, , op. cit., p. 2Google Scholar, for references to works dealing with the inferior state of technology.

12 See Ten Great Years. pp. 118, 168.Google Scholar

13 See Chao, , op. cit., pp. 262, 305et seq.Google Scholar

14 See footnote 12.

15 For a detailed discussion of the distribution problem see Schran, Peter, The Structure of Income in Communist China (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1961).Google Scholar

16 Ten Great Years. p. 173.Google Scholar

17 See ibid. as well as Ching-chi Yen-chiu 04 17, 1959, pp. 40, 41Google Scholar, and ibid., March 17, 1959, p. 35. For the inflationary impact of budget deficits see Li, Choh-ming, op. citGoogle Scholar

18 In particular, the above presentation fails to account for the impact of the agricultural cycle on consumer goods industries. For data see Ten Great Years. pp. 87, 118, 166 and 168.Google Scholar

19 For the opposite premise that commune-isation must be understood as an “escape forward” which occurred as a result of the failure of rural collectivisation see Li, Chohming, “Economic Development,” The China Quarterly. No. 1 (01–03 1960), pp. 35–50.Google Scholar

20 For a discussion of changes in urban employment see Emerson, John Philip, “Man power Absorption in the Non-Agricultural Branches of the Economy of Communist China, 1953–1958,” The China Quarterly. No. 7 (07–09 1961), pp. 69–84.Google Scholar

21 See Hua, Ch'ien et al. (ed.), op cit.Google Scholar, and Ten Great Years. p. 185.Google Scholar

22 See footnote 13 and Orleans, Leo A., “Problems of Manpower Absorption in Rural China,” The China Quarterly. No. 7 (07–09 1961), pp. 57–68.Google Scholar

23 Note, however, that at least some agricultural production co-operatives planned in early 1958 on the same principles as the communes in general did at a later time in the year. See T'ung-chi Yen-chiu (Statistical Research). 05 23, 1958, pp. 36, 39Google Scholar, and ibid., June 23, 1958, p. 29.

24 See Ts'ai-ching Yen-chiu (Financial and Economic Research). 01 15, 1959, pp. 34–36, 40.Google Scholar

25 Note that the non-agricultural labour force increased from 24·5 million persons at the end of 1957 to 45·3 million persons at the end of 1958. See Ten Great Years, p. 180.Google Scholar

26 For a summary presentation of newspaper themes see China News Analysis (Hong Kong), “Wage Policy in Industry,” No. 261 (01 23, 1959), pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

27 See footnote 7.

28 For a case study of the extent of such occurrences see Li, Choh-ming, “Statistics and Planning at the Hsien Level in Communist China,” The China Quarterly. No. 9 (01–03 1962), pp. 112–123.Google Scholar

29 For an exhortation about the beneficial effects of cattle raising on crop growing see People's Daily. 10 11, 1961, p. 2Google Scholar. Note that the advocated policy could well have contributed to food shortages under less favourable circumstances than those described in the article.

30 Note, however, that the failure to export and the decision to import foods are not by themselves indicative of the extent of actual shortages, since they may also reflect the extent to which the Chinese Communists could or were willing to go in an attempt to appease the population.

31 See People's Daily. 04 17, 1962, p. 1.Google Scholar

32 See footnote 25. Note that many of the recent Hong Kong refugees seem to belong to this group of people.

33 Note in particular that they have not discredited the “great leap forward.” Rather, they have stereotyped the initial gains as a success which was attributable to policy and the “three hard years” as a disaster which was caused by nature.

34 Note the extension of payments of “fixed interest” to expropriated capitalists in this conection. See People's Daily. 04 17, 1962, p. 1.Google Scholar