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The Sino-Vatican Negotiations: Old Problems in a New Context*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Beatrice Leung
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Extract

The relationship between the PRC and the Vatican formally broke down in 1951 with the expulsion of the Papal Nuncio Archbishop Ribieri. Given Mao's emphasis on class struggle and his intolerant approach to ideological issues, no prospect of a dialogue emerged during his lifetime that could have led to a rapprochement. However, after Deng Xiaoping initiated the policy of “openness” as a component of his modernization programme, the Vatican saw the opportunity to try and begin a dialogue in order to establish a Sino-Vatican concordat.

Type
Research Note
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 153 , March 1998 , pp. 128 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1998

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References

1. See Leung, Beatrice, Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority (1976–86) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 189–256Google Scholar. Bishop Deng Yiming in his memoir has a chapter on this event. See Tang, Dominic, How Inscrutable His Ways! Memoirs 1951–1981, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: n.p., 1991), pp. 126–130Google Scholar. It was revealed that Casaroli went to Hong Kong to greet Bishop Deng Yiming who was released in 1981 after 22 years of imprisonment in China as the first overture from the Vatican. The Pope in his visit to Manila visit in February 1981 made a very conciliatory speech to China. See “The Pope speaks to Chinese Christians”, Sunday Examiner, 27 02 1981.Google Scholar

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3. In 1957, the CCP demanded Chinese Catholics sever relations with the Holy See. The CCP-staffed Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) was a demarcation of those who yielded to this demand and proclaimed independence in administering the Chinese Catholic Church. Those who refused were either gaoled or turned to the underground. In this article the Catholics functioning under the CPA are the official sector of the Catholic Church, while those who refused are the unofficial sector. Both sectors are part of the same Chinese Catholic Church.

4. TVB (Hong Kong) news report, 12 11 1995Google Scholar. The Catholic spokesman, Fr. J. B. Tsang, in the TVB interview remarked that the nature of the present Vatican-Taiwan relations might be changed if Sino-Vatican relations were about to be established. Many local Hong Kong newspapers reported this piece of news.

5. Luxian, Bishop Jin of Shanghai in an interview with this author expressed this view in 11 1994Google Scholar. Some government-appointed bishops in China also supported this view. Apparently Catholic leaders in the open Church circle have arrived at a consensus on the question of appointment of bishops.

6. The Chinese Prime Minister Peng, Li, at a meeting about religious work with the State Council on 5 12 1990Google Scholar, reminded religious workers at all levels about interference in religious matters by foreign forces. A few months later (February 1991) the Party Centre and the State Council jointly issued a document to reiterate the policy of allowing foreign religious forces to interfere in China's internal religious matters. See Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affair Bureau, Xinshiqi zongjiao gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (Selected Documents on Religious Work of New Age) (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 1995), pp. 186–197, 213–237.Google Scholar

7. Peng, Li and Zemin, Jiang on 5 and 7 12 1990Google Scholar talked to religious cadres and both brought up these points. See ibid. pp. 189–204.

8. On various occasions over a long period, the government-appointed Bishop Michael Fu of Beijing responded to the Pope's 1981 Manila speech by echoing the Chinese government's stance that the Pope should cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan. See Leung, , Sino-Vatican Relations, pp. 196–200Google Scholar. In 1990, the former Foreign Minister Wu Xue Qian repeated the same view. See Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 186–88Google Scholar. In October 1997 China for the first time issued a White Paper on Religious Freedom in which it reiterated that the cutting of Taiwan-Vatican diplomatic relations was pre-requisite for Sino-Vatican reconciliation. See “Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang, baipishu” (“White Paper on China's religious freedom policy”), Tai Kung Pao, 17 10 1997.Google Scholar

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11. Weigel, George. The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and Collapse of Communism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 143Google Scholar; Ash, Timothy Garton, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), p. 72.Google Scholar

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14. Paul, John II, Centesimas Annus, (Vatican: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1991).Google Scholar

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16. As a matter of fact the Roman Curia did not take the initiative to appoint a Chinese bishop, but when the non-official sector of the Chinese church asked for approval of the bishop candidate the Roman Curia gave its approval. Internal Document, No. 5 (1996).Google Scholar

17. ibid.

18. On the religious crackdown see South China Morning Post, 14 11 1996Google Scholar. For the Muslim riot in Xinjiang see Hong Kong Economic Journal, 12, 13, 14 02 and 18 09 1997Google Scholar, and Ming bao, 10 02 1997.Google Scholar

19. The Nineties, 01 1991. pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

20. Selected Documents on Religious Work, p. 177Google Scholar; English translation by the author.

21. Franz, Michael, “China and the crisis of Communism,” in Hicks, George (ed.), The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen (London: Longman, 1990), pp. 445–455.Google Scholar

22. The illegal dealings of princelings have been well known throughout China, Hong Kong and among Chinese communities throughout the world. He Pin and Kao Xin have a systematic discussion and description on this issue. See Pin, He and Xin, Kao, Zhonggong de taizidang, (The Princelings of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1994).Google Scholar

23. Many sinologists hold this opinion. See Goodman, David and Hooper, Beverley (eds.), China's Quiet Revolution, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994), p. x.Google Scholar

24. In the Han Dynasty the Yellow Turban bandits used Daoism as a haven for their underground activities. In the Qing dynasty, the White Lotus Religion added some Christian features to that, while the Christian elements could be found easily in the Taiping Rebellion whose leader claimed the Son of Heaven to be Father. See also Haar, B. J. Ter, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).Google Scholar

25. The figures are taken from “A chronology of the Catholic Church in China in the context of selected dates in world and Chinese history,” Tripod (Hong Kong), Vol. XIII, No. 76 (07 – 08 1993), pp. 19–76.Google Scholar

26. This author has a more detailed discussion on the impact of the bridge-church in Leung, Beatrice, “The uneasy balance: Sino-Vatican-Hong Kong relations after 1997”, in Leung, Beatrice and Cheng, Joseph (eds.), Hong Kong SAR: In Pursuit of Domestic and International Order (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 97–118.Google Scholar

27. Document 19, section 11, Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 53–73.Google Scholar

28. A private and reliable source of information in the top administration of German Missio and Miserior in 1995. However, a private and reliable source of information in the top administration of German Missio in 1997 reported that its projects declined from DM 1.5 million in 1995 to DMI million in 1996.

29. The English translation appeared in major books dealing with religion in China. See Leung, Beatrice and Young, John (eds.), Christianity in China: Foundation for Dialogue (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. 1993), pp. 286–309.Google Scholar

30. Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 222–24, 273–77.Google Scholar

31. “Document 19 in 1982” was jointly issued by the Party Centre and the State Council to circumscribe an area for various kinds of religious activities. See Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 53–76.Google Scholar

32. The author learned of this meeting in March 1990. Many overseas Catholic news services reported it and it was recorded in the chronology of the Catholic Church in China. See “A chronology of the Catholic Church in China.”

33. Kung kao po (Chinese Catholic Weekly) (Hong Kong), 27 09 1996.Google Scholar

34. “Guowuyuen guanyu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli tiaoli” (“The Council of State on the managing institutions for religious activity”), Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 275–77.Google Scholar

35. “Guowuyuen guanyu zhongua renmin gongheguo jingnei weiguoren zongjiao huudong guanli kuiding” (“On the State's Council management of foreigners staying in the People's Republic of China”), Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 273–74Google Scholar

36. A religious official from the CPA opined to various groups of religious visitors to Beijing in the 1990s that after the handover the Hong Kong Catholic Church should stop “interfering” in the Chinese Church.

37. Art. 141, Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

38. Catholic-funded social service projects go as far as Tibet. See Zellweger, K., Caritas-Hong Kong's Development, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong-Caritas 1992)Google Scholar. In 1994, in an interview, the author was told by Zellweger that it has been the policy of Caritas-Hong Kong to give first priority to those China projects in the most remote and poor areas.

39. As early as 1990 foreign reporters in Beijing were able to gather information about Muslim riots in Xinjiang areas. See Delfs, Robert, “Islamic call to arms,” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 05 1990, pp. 10–11Google Scholar, and Delfs, Robert “Growing unrest reported among Muslim minorities,” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 04 1990, pp. 10–11Google Scholar. Censorship imposed on foreign reporters by the Chinese authorities meant that later the quantity of this type of report reaching the West declined drastically. However, from the officials' calling for Chinese Muslims to maintain stability in the north-west region, we can infer that social unrest in that area has been a major concern of Beijing until recently. See Huan, Li Rui. “Chongfen fahui yisilanjiao xiehui de jiji zuoyong” (“Maximizing the positive use of the Islamic Association”), Selected Documents on Religious Work, pp. 256–59.Google Scholar