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Science Policy Shifts, Organizational Change and China's Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Richard P. Suttmeier
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Extract

One of the most notable features of post-1949 China has been its striking periodicity. Through their pronounced policy changes and frequent political campaigns, Chinese leaders have incidentally provided the foreign analyst with a set of periods according to which events may be readily classified. Indeed, the temporal variable is the chief qualifier on which our generalizations must be contingent. There are few statements about the People's Republic, particularly those dealing with its conscious efforts at “development,” which can be made without a modifying phrase such as “before the cultural Revolution …” or “as a result of the Great Leap….” Thus, though considerations of time are obviously important for any developmental analysis, they are particularly significant with regard to China where one is struck by the frequency, suddenness and apparent disjointedness of change. The untidy set of events since 1949 which comprises China's developmental experience violates the sense of orderly progress on which so much of our thinking about development has been based.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 62 , June 1975 , pp. 207 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1975

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References

1. The term “research and development” is generally avoided here. Although this term is widely used with some precision in the literature, its use in this context may be misleading. Although R & D are carried out in China, they are often intermixed with other science-related activities. Indeed, one of the issues that has been at stake in the competing approaches to scientific development has been the extent to which science-related activities should be differentiated into R & D and non-R & D categories. “Science programmes” then will be used loosely to include scientific research, the development of new technology and its application in production, the popularization of science and technology and scientific and technical training.

2. The term “science system” will be used to describe an inter-related set of organizations that pertain to science. These include research and development organizations, policy-making and support organizations, educational institutions, scientific societies, organizations for popularizing science, and worker and peasant research groups. This term reflects the systemic approach to science policy which the Chinese have taken.

3. New China News Agency (NCNA), 14 03 1958Google Scholar, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong), No. 1737.

4. The absolute amount of expenditure for CAS continued to increase, however; see Cheng, Chu-yuan, Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949–63 (Washington D.C.: U.S. National Science Foundation, 1965), p. 83.Google Scholar

5. Although the details of the plan have never been made public, a list of priorities was published. These include: (1) peaceful uses of atomic energy; (2) radio electronics; (3) jet propulsion; (4) automation and remote control; (5) petroleum and scarce mineral exploration; (6) metallurgy; (7) fuel technology; (8) power equipment and heavy machinery; (9) problems relating to harnessing the Yellow and Yangtze Rizers; (10) chemical fertilizers, mechanization of agriculture; (11) prevention and eradication of detrimental diseases; and (12) problems of basic theory. These reflect China's often expressed concern that she quickly develop capabilities in the world's advanced areas of scientific technology. At the time these were announced, China's capability in most of these fields was indeed limited. NCNA, 30 12 1956, in SCMP, No. 1442.Google Scholar

6. For a discussion of the formal organization of research during the 1950s, see Lindbeck, John, “The organization and development of science,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 6 (1961), pp. 98–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a more recent treatment, see Orleans, Leo A., “Research and development in Communist China,” Science, No. 157 (28 07 1967), pp. 395–97.Google ScholarPubMed

7. CAS's president, Kuo Mo-jo, stated that in 1952 there were 1,290 researchers and assistant researchers in CAS, see NCNA, 17 September 1958, in SCMP, No. 1737. Chu-yuan Cheng states that there were 164,000 engineers in 1952. Scientific and Engineering Manpower, p. 11.Google Scholar See also Orleans, Leo A., Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China (Washington D.C.: U.S. National! Science Foundation, 1961).Google Scholar

8. “Numerous contradictions within the ranks of the scientific circle,” NCNA, 30 04 1957Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 1541. The microbiologist mentioned, Fang Hsin-fang, was a member of the Academic Committee of the Institute of Applied Mycology, but he was not a member of the Department Committee of the department of biology. It is difficult to determine whether a Department Committee member would suffer the same plight, but it may be that the Department Committee member, with far more influence in the planning process, was capable of ensuring that his own work would be included in the plan, hence financially supported. It is not impossible that planning and the department system, with its elite membership, worked to create a “scientific establishment” that produced a cleavage in the ranks of Chinese scientists. The recurring injunction to practise “academic democracy” may be a response to the development of social stratification within the scientific community itself.

9. Ibid.

10. “Criticisms and suggestions made by scientists at department meetings of Department Committee of the Academy of Sciences,” Jen-min jih-pao (Jen-min), 27 05 1957Google Scholar, in Current Background (CB) (Hong Kong), No. 460.

11. “Academy of Sciences convenes forum for Peking scientists to discuss contradictions within their ranks,” NCNA, 3 05 1957Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 1541. The criticism of the awards was made by Yuan Han-ch'ing (Ph.D. University of Illinois), a scientist of some standing, who referred to the awards as “the purchase of passiveness with cash.” There is the possibility that Yuan, who was not an award winner, might be expressing feelings of sour grapes. A more likely explanation, however, is related to the ambiguity of the awards themselves. If the awards were a reflection of competent and genuine colleague recognition of achievement, it is likely that scientists would support them even if they were not themselves winners, because of their commitment to the norms of the professional community. Considerably less professional enthusiasm would be expected for awards that are offered as incentives by the state.

12. “Numerous contradictions within the ranks of the scientific circle,” NCNA. The issue of bureaucraticism received much attenion at this time, and was a charge that was apparently levelled at some scientists as well as administrative cadres. In words that could have been spoken in Washington or Moscow, Kuo Mo-jo, the president of CAS, defended these scientists and, as a necessary annoyance, the support bureaucracy of modern research as well. Kuo noted: “Here I wish to salute … those of our comrades engaged in administrative and office work whose organizational ability is comparatively strong. Their work is valuable but their tasks are thankless. If they do their jobs well, they are merely doing their duty; but if they make the slightest mistake, everyone will jump on them. It seems that we should give them our thanks and respect, particularly those who are scientists themselves, but who because of the needs of the state are compelled to take up administrative or office work in service of scientific research…. These respectable friends, so far as I know, do not love to be government officials. They too want to return to the ranks of scientists. The term ‘bureaucracy’ exposes its members to odium, but since you have a state and a government, you cannot help but take part in its management. Science administration is an important part of the business of the state, and it will not do to leave it to chance….” “Closing Address,” at Second Plenum of Department Committee, Jen-min, 31 05 1957, in CB, No. 460.Google Scholar

13. Statement by metallurgist, Kung Tsu-t'ung, in “Criticisms and suggestions made by scientists at department meetings of Department Committee of the Academy of Sciences,” CB.

14. The introduction of planning provided a powerful control device that contributed to this transformation. Cf. Vucinich, Alexander, The Soviet Academy of Sciences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 81–89.Google Scholar

15. This was particularly true in regard to expanding research beyond CAS to production ministries, and especially universities, and in providing material resources and support services for research. The scientists' desire for substantially more autonomy, however, was not met. See “Conclusion of enlarged meeting of the Scientific Planning Commission of the State Council,” NCNA, 15 06 1957, in SCMP, No. 1564.Google Scholar

16. See Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 193–205.Google Scholar

17. NCNA, 28 11 1957, in SCMP, No. 1670.Google Scholar

18. NCNA, 20 02 1958, in SCMP, No. 1728.Google Scholar

19. NCNA, 12 03 1958, in SCMP, No. 1735.Google Scholar

20. Ch'ang-chiang, Fan, “The question of ‘motive power’ of the intellectuals,” Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien, 1 06 1958Google Scholar, in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM) (Hong Kong), No. 142.Google Scholar Another critique of the ideology of scientists by a Party science-administrator, Chang Ching-fu, is offered in “For the liberation of thought and the determined follow-through of the main Party line concerning the construction of socialism in the tasks of science,” Jen-min, 7 06 1958Google Scholar, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) (Washington, D.C.), No. 472.

21. Jung-chen, Nieh, “The realization of a big leap forward in science,”Google ScholarNCNA, 14 03 1958Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 1745.

22. Suttmeier, Richard P., “Scientific societies and Chinese scientific development,” The Developing Economies, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Fall, 1973), pp. 146–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. Cheng, Scientific and Engineering Manpower, pp. 21 and 81.Google Scholar

24. Perhaps the best statement of the “walking on two legs” strategy as it applies to science policy is Nieh Jung-chen, “Let the whole Party lay a firm hold on scientific and technological work to carry out the technological revolution,” Jen-min, 2 08 1958Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 1831.

25. Tsai-ming, Li, “How forward leaps were accomplished at the laboratory of semiconductors,” K'o-hsueh t'ung-pao (Science Bulletin), No. 18 (27 09 1958)Google Scholar, in JPRS, No. 1479.

26. One case against the older scientists is made by the chairman of the SSTC, Jung-chen, Nieh, “The realization of a big leap forward in science.”Google Scholar According to Nieh, “… it has been found that some scientists are conservative and backward at their jobs…. As soon as they have achieved a certain social position, many people would not seek further advancement They are devitalized and cling tenaciously to their old and out of date knowledge. They no longer engage themselves actively in research work, and moreover would not even read new publications. There are even those who, though they are already lagging behind in learning, are not aware of the fact and do not try to catch up with others in front, but on the contrary … reject correct suggestions, suppress the growth of youthful forces, and insist that the younger scientists should work according to their old, out of date methods, thus obstructing the formal progress of science…. Some young people have achieved good results in their research work, but unfortunately the results were achieved not under the active support and assistance of the scientists concerned in the supervision of the research work, but by struggling against them or by purposely concealing the work from them…. We must resolutely support our young scientists in their struggle against conservatism” (emphasis added). Chu-yuan Cheng has noted that promotion and opportunities for upward mobility generally have been denied younger scientists. Thus there may be other than ideological reasons motivating the younger men to struggle against their elders. See Scientific & Engineering Manpower, p. 175.Google Scholar

27. Suttmeier, Richard P., “Party views of science: the record from the first decade,”Google ScholarCQ, No. 44 (1970), pp. 146–68.Google Scholar

28. See Kuang-ming jih-pao (Kuang-ming), 20 08 1961Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2590; Jen-min, 5 09 1961Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2580; and Kuang-ming, 20 09 1961Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2598.

29. For a discussion of this type of leadership, see Lo Ying, “Achieve rejuvenation by our own efforts, make haste to catch up with the advanced,” Kuangming, 30 04 1963Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2983.

30. For a statement of guidelines, see “Actively unfold scientific study and discussion of technological policies,” Hung-ch'i, No. 11 (1 06 1962)Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 319.

31. See Tsu-hsiu, Ho. “The roles of experiments, abstractions and hypotheses in scientific research,” Hung-ch'i, No. 11 (1 06 1961)Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 266; Tsu-hsiu, Ho, “Natural science and practical application,” Hung-ch'i, No. 7 (1 04 1962)Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 311; Kuang-ming, 22 12 1962Google Scholar, in JPRS. No. 18023; Chung-wei, Wu, “The procedure problem in scientific research work,” Kuangming, 4 06 1964Google Scholar, in JPRS, No. 25, p. 337Google Scholar; Hsueh-sen, Ch'ien, “Large-scale scientific experimental work,” Jen-min, 30 08 1964Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 3297; Yu-chih, Kung, “On scientific experiment,” Hung-ch'i, No. 1 (1 01 1965)Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 454; and I-sheng, Mao, “Knowledge and experience of scientific experiment,” Hsin chien-she, Nos. 11–12 (20 12 1965).Google Scholar

32. See, particularly, “Correct way of conducting agricultural scientific experiments,” Jen-min, 23 07 1963Google Scholar; and Ch'i-pao, Yu, “Some points concerning research to be carried out jointly by agronomists and the masses,” Hung-ch'i, No. 22 (19 11 1963), in JPRS, No. 22660.Google Scholar

33. For a Soviet justification of science as direct production force, see Kurakov, I. G., Science, Technology and Communism: Some Questions of Development, trans, by Dedijer, Carin (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966).Google Scholar

34. Chung-kuo hsin-wen, 15 07 1964Google Scholar, in JPRS, No. 26289, and Jen-min, 7 12 1963Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 3117.

35. The apparent fascination with the research-intensive electronics industr may be indicative of the role of science in China's industrial development en visioned by Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters. This Liuist position is criticizes in “A criticism of the theory of making the electronics industry the center,” Jen min, 12 08 1971Google Scholar; and “Deliberate castration and shameless betrayal,” Kuang ming, 13 12 1971Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 5045.

36. Hsueh-sen, Ch'ien. “Organization and management work in science and technology,” Hung-ch'i, No. 22 (19 11 1963), in JPRS, No. 22660.Google Scholar

37. Kornhauser, William, Scientists in Industry's Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962).Google Scholar

38. See “Regulations on awards for inventions,” Jen-min, 2 12 1963Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 3117; and “Encourage inventions and technical improvements by rewards in order to promote development of our production and construction,” Jen-min, editorial, 2 12 1963Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 3117.

39. This meeting was reported a year later in K'o-chi chan-pao (Science and Technology Combat News), 2 06 1967, in SCMP, No. 4011.Google Scholar

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. This is not to say that certain administratively prominent scientists were not attacked, nor that the persistence of “bourgeois” ideology among the scientists was ignored.

43. NCNA, 16 10 1966, in SCMP, No. 3805.Google Scholar

44. NCNA, 13 04 1967, in SCMP, No. 3920.Google Scholar

45. Yen-hung, Shih, “Down with the chief backer of the revisionist educational line,” Jen-min, 18 07 1967Google Scholar, in CB, No. 836.

46. See Kordon, Bernardo, “Kuo Mo-jo discusses the Cultural Revolution,” Clarin (Santiago), 9 02 1969Google Scholar, in JPRS, No. 47685.

47. For an interesting account of the experiences of scientists in the May Seventh schools, see Jen-min, 24 06 1972Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 5168.

48. NCNA, 22 07 1968Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 4227.

49. For a detailed account of factory management in one plant, see Meisner, Mitch, “The Shenyang Transformer Factory: a profile,” CQ, No. 52 (1971), pp. 717–36.Google Scholar

50. See, for instance, “Mao Tse-tung illuminates the road of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in geological work,” Jen-min, 14 02 1971Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 4846. See also Donnithorne, Audrey, “China's cellular economy: some economic trends since the Cultural Revolution,” CQ, No. 52 (1972), pp. 605–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51. Private communications to the author from recent visitors to China.

52. See Kuang-ming, 18 05 1972Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 5143; and NCNA, 26 June 1972, in SCMP, No. 5170.

53. Jen-min, 21 10 1971.Google Scholar

54. See Yu, P'ei, “Establish a good link-up between factory and school in an earnest way,” Hung-ch'i, No. 9 (1 09 1972).Google Scholar P'ei Yu noted that these linkups may need central support and states that the Centre should not shirk its responsibilities. Interestingly, P'ei Yu is on the staff of the central Fourth Ministry of Machinery Building.

55. These objectives go back to the Chinese People's Consultative Conference's “Common Programme” of 1949, see CB, No. 9.Google Scholar

56. Geertz's, Clifford “Ideology as a culture system,” in Apter, David, Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964)Google Scholar, is particularly germane to China's mobilization models.

57. Although no explicit attention has been given here to the role of social learning in the movement from one model to the next, I believe this is an important aspect of the phenomena of policy shifts in China discussed at the outset. In terms of the competing models for science, an indication of the operation of social learning may be that useful innovations from an old model or models are recognized as such and are incorporated into the new model which replaces it. Thus much of the local-level research network inspired by the first mobilization model is retained in the bureaucratic-professional model. Mobilization model II combines a feature of the pre-1957 model, an influential CAS at the Centre, with a web of decentralized, provincial-level science and technology bureaux, a feature of the first mobilization model. The latter was not part of the pre-1957 model, and mobilization model II differs from the first mobilization model in not having a powerful centralizing force in the SSTC.

58. This interpretation of political development in terms of political culture is drawn from the findings of Solomon, Richard as reported in “Communications patterns and the Chinese Revolution,” CQ, No. 32 (1967), pp. 88–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “On activism and activists” CQ, No. 39 (1969), pp. 76–114Google Scholar, and Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971.)Google Scholar Although Solomon is not explicitly concerned with administration, the implications of his work for administration and organizational behaviour are significant.