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The Roles of the Monolithic Party Under the Totalitarian Leader

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

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In 1961 Robert C. Tucker argued, contrary to the then prevailing assumption of the uniform nature of totalitarian systems, that such systems could be classified into several different types for purposes of analysis. Subsequently, H. Gordon Skilling applied interest group theory to his study of Communist politics and, by doing so, also called into question the case for regarding totalitarian governments as a single category of states possessing unique attributes. Skilling asserted that Communist states cannot be considered “conflictless,” as is sometimes assumed, but can be more adequately understood in terms of the competing social forces commonly found in non-Communist societies. Because of the special, but varying, limits imposed by a central leadership elite on the public expression of conflict in the several Communist-run countries, he added, Communist political parties could play special and quite diverse roles. His thesis contrasts with that of Carl J. Friedrich, which stresses the uniformity of the party's role under totalitarianism. According to Professor Friedrich, in his discussions of “the unique character of totalitarian society,” the presence of a single mass party is a common feature of all totalitarian politics, and is “typically either superior to, or completely commingled with the bureaucratic organization.” While Friedrich in his later work, written jointly with Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, acknowledges that “within the broad pattern of similarities, there are many significant variations” in totalitarian dictatorships, the authors' emphasis is on the novelty and uniqueness of these dictatorships. They state:

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Research Article
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The China Quarterly , Volume 40 , December 1969 , pp. 39 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1969

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References

1 Tucker, Robert C., “Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. LV (06 1961), pp. 281–289CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Praeger, 1963), as Chapter I.Google Scholar

2 Skilling, H. Gordon, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics, Vol. XVIII (04 1966), pp. 435–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar His thesis contrasts with that of Friedrich, Carl J. (ed.), Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Friedrich, op. cit. p. 53.Google Scholar

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5 Ibid. p. 5. See also Ibid. pp. 27–39 on “The Nature and Role of the Party.”

6 Tucker, op. cit. pp. 284, 288–289. (Italics in original.)Google Scholar

7 Ibid. p. 389.

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24 This section is based on Lewis, “Leader, Commissar and Bureaucrat,” in Ping-ti, Ho and Tang, Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis; China's Heritage and the Communist Political System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 449–481.Google Scholar

25 For a discussion of the important December 9th Group associated with Liu, see Klein, Donald W., “The State Council and the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, No. 35 (07–09 1968), pp. 89–91.Google Scholar

26 Mao, , for example, mentions Liu in 13 places in his Selected Works. The earliest reference is in 11 1938.Google ScholarSee Index to Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 93.Google Scholar

27 For major statements on the Maoist view of Liu Shao-ch'i's “Party-building line,” see, for example, Wen-hui pao (Cultural Exchange News), 26 11 and 28 Dec 1967 and 8 and 16 Jan 1968Google Scholar; Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 18 11 1967Google Scholar; Chieh-fang jih-pao (Liberation Daily), 22 11 and 6 Dec 1967 and 25 Feb 1968Google Scholar; Chieh-fang-chün pao (Liberation Army Daily), article in New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), 25 10 1967; NCNA, 18, 21 and 30 January 1968; and Shanghai Radio, 17 November 1967.Google Scholar

28 Liu, , How to be a Good Communist (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, n.d.).Google Scholar For the English translation of the 1962 revised edition, see Liu, , How to be a Good Communist (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964).Google ScholarFor typical articles on this work, see Current Background (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 827.Google Scholar

29 Liu, , On Inner-Party Struggle (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, n.d.).Google ScholarFor typical recent criticism of this book, see Kuang-ming jih-pao (Bright Daily), 7 04, 1967 in Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 3923, pp. 4–8.Google Scholar

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31 Hung chan pao (Red Combat Bulletin), No. 15 (29 11 1967), pp. 1, 4Google Scholar, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 44, 574 (4 03 1968), p. 28.Google Scholar

32 Quoted on Hofei, Radio, 18 01 1968. For text of Jen-min jih-pao, 1 January 1968 editorial, see Peking Review, No. 1 (3 January 1968), pp. 10–13.Google Scholar The campaign against factionalism may well have allowed supporters of Liu Shao-ch'i to return to power in Hopei province. Also on factionalism, see Tientsin Radio, 3 and 4 February 1968; Jen-min jih-pao, 25 and 26 01 and 5 and 26 February 1968Google Scholar; and NCNA, 4 February 1968. On factionalism in general, see as a sample of the many articles and broadcasts in this period Wen-hui pao, 12 and 16 01 1968 (as found in Shanghai Radio, 11, 16 and 28 January 1968) and 17 February 1968 (Shanghai Radio, 16 February 1968); Hupeh Radio, 31 January 1968Google Scholar; Hei-lung-chiang jih-pao (Heilungkiang Daily), 23 01 1968 (in Harbin Radio, 31 January 1968); Hofei Radio, 1 February 1968; and Huhehot Radio, 4 February 1968.Google Scholar

33 There has been a consistent emphasis on “trusting and relying on the majority of cadres.” See, for example, NCNA, 23 10 1967, in SCMP, No. 4052, pp. 9–12; and footnote 34 below.Google Scholar

34 For a statement on Liu's building a personal machine in the Party, see the pamphlet “Down with Liu Shao-ch'i—Life of Counter-revolutionary Liu Shao-ch'i,” by Ching-kang-shan Fighting Corps of the Fourth Hospital, Peking, dated 05 1967, in Current Background, No. 834, p. 4Google Scholar; the pamphlet by the Peking Railway Institute of April 1967 in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (hereafter SCMM) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 591, p. 17Google Scholar; and Hung ch'i (Red Flag), No. 13 (1967), p. 25.Google Scholar

35 For a rigorous review of these guidelines in parts of the Communist system, see A. Doak, Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).Google Scholar

36 The “50 days” ran from early June through the third week of July 1966. In his first attack on Liu, Mao said: “… in the last 50 days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great Cultural Revolution of the proletariat.”Google ScholarMao, Tse-tung, “Bombard the Head-quarters” (5 08 1966), in Peking Review, No. 33 (11 08 1967), p. 5.Google Scholar

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40 On the question of “impure” class elements in the Party see, for example, the pamphlet of the Peking Railway Institute, 04 1967, in SCMM, No. 591, p. 10Google Scholar; and the article on the proletarian dictatorship and China's Khrushchev in Jen-min jih-pao, 26 08 1967.Google Scholar

41 Text of Red Guard leaflet in SCMM, No. 591, p. 10.Google Scholar See also Wen-hua ko-ming t'ung-hsün (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), No. 11 (1967), in SCMM, No. 599, p. 21.Google ScholarTeng, Hsiao-p'ing made this statement at the Eighth Party Congress: “Nowadays … it is easy to find people who have joined the Party for the sake of prestige and position” (“Report on the Revision of the Constitution,” Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 209). Similar statements by Liu hardly suggest approval of such motives for joining the Party.Google Scholar

42 For the standard Maoist treatment of this subject, see The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 453–459.Google Scholar

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44 See, for example, NCNA, 16 10 1968; Wen-hui pao, 7 November 1968Google Scholar; and Jen-min jih-pao, 11 11 1968.Google Scholar

45 See above, footnotes 26 and 32. It is important to keep in mind that many of these accusations against Liu may be false or highly exaggerated.Google Scholar

46 Wen-hua ko-ming t'ung-hsün, No. 11 (1967), in SCMM, No. 599, p. 25.Google Scholar

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48 Peking, Radio, 17 11 1967; and Hung ch'i, No. 13 (1967), pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

49 Conversely Liu is said to have attacked the “majority” (or “suspected all”) in an attempt to preserve his own standing. See, for example, P'i T'ao chan-pao (Criticize T'ao Combat Bulletin), No. 7 (10 04 1967), in SCMP, No. 3962, pp. 1–5; and Jen-min jih-pao, 2 and 4 04 1967.Google Scholar

50 Huan ch'iu chih (The Whole World is Red), No. 2 (27 06 1967), pp. 1–3Google Scholar, in Joint Publications Research Service, No. 41, 514, pp. 1–11.Google Scholar For another example, see Hsüan chiao chan-pao (Combat Bulletin of the Communications System of Hsüan wu ch'ü Party Committee), 26 05 1967Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 4051, pp. 8–11.Google Scholar

51 Ch'un lei (Spring Thunder), No. 4 (13 04 1967)Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 3940, pp. 6–15.Google Scholar

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54 See above, footnote 32. Jen-min jih-pao, 18 11 1967, stated that Liu “shamelessly advocated: ‘the idea of gaining a little to lose a lot and of losing a little to gain a lot’ conforms with the ‘proletarian world outlook of Marxism-Leninism.’ He also wantonly clamoured: ‘It is not all public interest without self-interest; there should be room for self-interest in complete devotion to public interest; equal consideration should be given to both public and self-interest, placing public interest before self-interest.’”Google Scholar

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59 See Ko ti t'ung-hsün (Correspondence from All Parts of the Country), No. 4 (13 09 1967)Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 4081, p. 7Google Scholar; and Pei-ching jih-pao (Peking Daily), 7 08 1967, as given in Tanyug (Belgrade), 6 08 1967.Google Scholar

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61 Mainichi, 3 08 1967.Google ScholarSee also Sankei, 2 08 1967.Google Scholar

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64 Ibid.The present is said to be the “era of Mao's thought” and is considered to be the third great “era” of Communism, the first being associated with Marx and the second with Lenin: Chieh-fang-chün pao, article on China's Khrushchev, in NCNA, 23 09 1967.Google Scholar

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68 Jen-min jih-pao, 18 11 1967.Google ScholarOn democratic centralism as defined by Mao, see Chieh-fang-chün pao, 16 02 1968.Google Scholar

69 For details on the movement to seize power, see Peking Review, Nos. 3–8 (1967).Google Scholar

70 Chu ying tung-fang-hung (Pearl River East is Red), 13 09 1967, in SCMP, No. 4036, p. 6; and also citations in note 76. The most obvious indication of the importance of the army is the position of Liu, who is referred to as Mao's “most ideal successor” (tsui li-hsiang ti chieh-pan-jen). NCNA, 25 February 1968.Google Scholar

71 Chieh-fang jih-pao, 26 10 1967.Google Scholar

72 Harbin Radio, 10 June 1967.Google Scholar

73 See Asahi, 19 10 1967.Google Scholar

74 See the definition of Mao's injunction in Peking Review, No. 1 (3 01 1968), p. 11.Google Scholar

75 He said: “At present we should consider whether or not they [the cadres] support Chairman Mao, his proletarian revolutionary line and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and whether or not they stand on the side of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionaries” (Jen-min jih-pao, 31 08 1967).Google Scholar Later statements have described loyalty to Mao as the “first requirement of the times.” See Jen-min jih-pao, 4 03 1968Google Scholar; and Wen-hui pao, 30 03 1968.Google Scholar

76 On the “revolutionary three-way alliance,” see Hung ch'i, No. 5 (1967), pp. 5–8Google Scholar; and Jen-min jih-pao, 17 February, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 23 and 25 March and 20 10 1967.Google Scholar

77 A convenient and fairly representative collection of articles on the question of cadres is in Current Background, No. 849.Google Scholar

78 Jen-min jih-pao, 18 11 1967, quotes Mao as saying: “We Communists do not want to be officials; what we want is revolution.” The whole tone of this article was to belittle officialdom with the statement that cadres should follow Mao whether or not his thought “is of a ‘majority’ and no matter at what ‘superior level’ it may be.”Google Scholar

79 See, for example, NCNA, 15 December 1967.Google Scholar

80 For a suggestive article on the pathology peculiar to totalitarian systems, see Karl W. Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in the Totalitarian Systems,” in Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 308–333.Google Scholar