Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2020
In spring 2018 China, indignant popular nationalists demanded that the “spiritually Japanese” activities of a fringe group of young Chinese who figure themselves as Japanese be proscribed. The National People's Congress quickly complied, passing legislation that made it illegal to “beautify the war of invasion.” Exploring how and why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responded to the demands of popular nationalists, we suggest that authoritarian representation occurs in China even beyond the bounds of everyday apolitical issues like education and healthcare. Indeed, because the CCP relies upon a nationalist claim to legitimate rule, authoritarian legislators may respond to the public on politically sensitive issues like nationalism as well. Journalists and lawyers, furthermore, can play a vital mediating role between elites and masses, facilitating the transmission of the information and expertise needed for authoritarian responsiveness. Implications for our understanding of Chinese nationalism, authoritarian responsiveness and state legitimation in China today are discussed.
2018年春天,愤怒的中国民族主义者要求政府禁止“精神日本人” —— 一个由自认为是日本人的年轻中国人组成的边缘群体 —— 的有关行为。全国人大迅速予以应允,通过了相关立法禁止“美化侵略战争”。本文考察了中国国家怎样以及为什么回应了民族主义者的要求。我们认为中国的威权代表甚至超出了教育、医疗等非政治日常议题的边界。因为中国共产党依靠民族主义合法化其统治,威权的立法机构可能在像民族主义这样关系到合法性的敏感议题上扮演其代表角色。此外,记者和律师也可以在精英和大众之间扮演关键的中介角色,以推动威权响应所需要的信息和专业知识的传播。我们也讨论了本研究对于理解今日中国的民族主义、威权响应以及合法化的意义。
Author names are listed alphabetically; each contributed equally.