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Politics of Scale, Bargaining Power and Its Spatial Impacts: Planning for Intercity Railways in the Pearl River Delta, China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2020

Mengmeng Zhang Open the ORCID record for Mengmeng Zhang [Opens in a new window] ,
Jiang Xu Open the ORCID record for Jiang Xu [Opens in a new window]  and
Calvin King Lam Chung Open the ORCID record for Calvin King Lam Chung [Opens in a new window]
Mengmeng Zhang*
Affiliation:
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Jiang Xu
Affiliation:
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Email: [email protected].
Calvin King Lam Chung
Affiliation:
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Email: [email protected]
*
Email: [email protected] (corresponding author).
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Abstract

The recent proliferation of China's railways has posed challenges to the dominance of the national-level railway authority on railway development. Since the 2000s, the planning of new railways has evolved into a politics of scale in which actors across multiple scales of government have bargained over railway alignment and station siting for their respective interests. This politics is shaped by the uneven bargaining powers of the contending state agents over railway planning. Interscalar division of regulatory oversight over strategic resources for railway development enables state agents at some scales to bargain more successfully, whereas variations in administrative and economic standing further differentiate the interscalar bargaining powers of municipal governments. Different results of bargaining across scales for each city have produced, as intercity railway planning in the Pearl River Delta illustrates, significant intercity variations in average travel times to the stations for the new railways that these cities share. Owing to the peculiar scalar distribution of the costs and benefits of the new railways, municipal governments with greater bargaining power have, contrary to traditional wisdom, bargained for less accessibility to intercity railway stations.

摘要

摘要

近年来，中国铁路的扩张挑战了中央政府在铁路发展中的主导地位。自2000年代以来，新铁路线规划已经演变成为一种尺度政治，即不同层级的政府从各自的利益出发，就线路走向和车站选址进行博弈。受到铁路发展战略资源分配模式的影响，不同层级政府的博弈能力并不均等。某些层级博弈能力强，成功机会高。就市级政府而言，行政和经济实力的差异也导致了他们跨层级博弈能力的不同，博弈结果因而存在显著差别。珠江三角洲城际铁路规划的研究表明，居民到达车站的平均出行时间在不同城市间存在明显差异。由于新建铁路的成本和收益在不同层级政府间的特殊分配模式，具有更高博弈能力的市级政府更倾向于降低车站的可达性。这与传统认知大相径庭。

Keywords

politics of scalecentral–local relationslocal protectionismbargaining powerintercity railwayPearl River Delta尺度政治央地关系地方保护主义博弈能力城际铁路珠江三角洲
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 243 , September 2020 , pp. 676 - 700
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Copyright
Copyright © SOAS University of London 2020

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