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Political Change in Hong Kong*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Brian Hook
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Extract

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong, the only significant remaining part of the British Empire, will revert to China. In the same year India, once the jewel in that crown and whose emancipation marked the beginning of the end, will celebrate the 50th anniversary of its independence. History will record that for the latter part of these five decades the economic development of Hong Kong was, compared to other former British territories, spectacular. Once Hong Kong had overcome the challenge of the mass influx of refugees following the Chinese civil war, which endured for almost two of the five decades, its subsequent development, measured in material terms, was exemplary. No matter what the challenge, the Hong Kong population rose to it. Yet, compared to India and other parts of the former empire, its government until the eve of the reversion remained, judged by recognized criteria, “undemocratic” and unrepresentative, executive-led, and based on a colonial form of constitution.

Type
Greater China
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 136 , December 1993 , pp. 840 - 863
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1993

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References

1. See Jiatun, Xu, “Xianggang huiyilu” (“Hong Kong memoirs”), Lianhebao (Hong Kong) serialized from 9 05 1993Google Scholar, which provides a unique and fascinating insight into the perception of the former Head of the Hong Kong branch of the NCNA, of his relations with the Beijing leadership, his colleagues, certain members of the Hong Kong business elite, the Sino-British negotiations, and of attempts in Hong Kong to develop representative government. In addition, referring to the background to the negotiations, Xu claims that the former Governor of Hong Kong, Lord MacLehose, raised the question of the expiry of the lease on the New Territories with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) during his visit to China in 1979. The MFA was unprepared and had to seek instructions. Having done so, the response was that “China would take back Hong Kong” (“Zhongguo yao shouhui Xianggang”). The MFA also indicated it was hoped he would not raise the matter with Deng Xiaoping. Nevertheless, the Governor did so, with the result that Deng told him unequivocally China would “take back sovereignty over Hong Kong at the appointed time” (“Zhongguo jieshi yiding yao shouhui Xianggang”). This claim begs the question as to whether the outcome of negotiations could have been any different had the MFA been given more time and had the issue not been put to Deng in 1979, as it had requested. In his memoirs Xu opines that the negotiations would have come later had the issue not been raised then. That option did not address the uncertainty felt in Hong Kong business circles at the time.

2. The JD provided the terms for an agreed retrocession of the territory, or, looked at through Chinese eyes, the restoration of the rightful sovereignty of China over Hong Kong. It therefore determined that the future government and politics of the territory would not be the same as that for other parts of the British Empire, normally for the territory to proceed from dominion or colonial status to independence. Instead the JD provided for the sovereignty over the entire territory under the administration of the Hong Kong government, both ceded and leased, to be restored to China on the expiry of the lease governing that part known as the New Territories at midnight on 30 June 1997. Thereafter it would become the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The text of the JD appeared in a White Paper published by the British government in London on 20 September 1984.

3. The BL was adopted on 4 April 1990 by the Seventh NPC at its third session. The text used in this article was published by the Consultative Committee of the Basic Law of the HKSAR, Hong Kong in 1990. The concept of convergence was actually acknowledged by Britain in 1985 by the then Minister of State Timothy Renton shortly after the Director of the Hong Kong branch of the NCNA had implied that Britain would be departing from the JD if direct elections were to become an option in the 1987 constitutional review.

4. The business incorporation, which has been followed by other groups, avoided both the need to register as a society, and any breach of the law on assembly. Such matters were enforced by the police; business incorporation was within the purview of the Registrar General.

5. The information on the HKO is based in part on an interview with the Hon. Christine Loh Kung-wai, an appointed Legislative Councillor, in July 1993. There is a view that the HKO began as a pressure group/think tank and ended by being itself co-opted into the establishment. This it would deny, indicating its members were seldom, if ever, appointed to formal consultative bodies in the political system they sought to improve by reform.

6. Scott, Ian, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

7. See Brian Hook, “The government of Hong Kong.”

8. Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

9. Fairbank, John K., “Synarchy under the treaties,” in Fairbank, John K (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163–203Google Scholar.

10. King, Ambrose Yeo-chi, “The administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong: emphasis on the grass roots level,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 5 (05 1975), pp. 422–439CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. Siu-kai, Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1987), p. 187Google Scholar.

12. Ibid. The note is drawn from “A problem of credibility,” a mimeographed talk by John Walden, former Director of Home Affairs, given to the HKO on 13 February 1980.

13. See Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy; Miners, Norman et al. , in Cheek-Milby, Kathleen and Muskat, Miron (eds.), Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation (Hong Kong: The Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1989)Google Scholar.

14. Quon, Ann, “Support mounts for elections,” Sunday Morning Post, 31 05 1987Google Scholar, noted in Scott, , Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 291Google Scholar. Scott states “that all polls showed that at least a plurality and, in most cases, an absolute majority were in favour of direct elections in 1988.…”

15. Scott, , Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, pp. 312–16Google Scholar.

16. Xitong, Chen, “Guanyu zhizhi dongluan he pingxi fangeming baoluan de qingkuang baogao” (“Report on quelling the turmoil and counter-revolutionary rebellion”), Renmin ribao, 10 07 1989, p. 2Google Scholar.

17. On a 39% turn-out the liberals (United Democrats, Meeting Point, Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood and the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation) gained 58% of the vote. Their 21 candidates won 15 seats; liberal independents won three seats with some 27% of the vote. The United Democrats with 12 of the 18 seats dominated the Legco. None of the five conservative candidates of the Liberal Democratic Federation who gained 5% of the vote, nor any of the Pro-China candidates (from the Federation of Trade Unions, New Hong Kong Alliance, Hong Kong Citizens Forum, Kwun Tong Man Chung Friendship Promotion Association) who gained some 8% of the vote, nor any of the other groups (The Reform Club, Civic Association and the Trades Union Council) who gained about 2% of the vote, won any seats. Hong Kong Government Gazette Extraordinary, No. 133 (41), 20 September 1991.

18. The Basic Law Drafting Committee was established by the NPC on 18 June 1985 with 59 members, 23 of whom were from Hong Kong. The PRC members represented the departments of the government and the CPC. Among the Hong Kong members were ten businessmen and financiers, three lawyers and a retired judge. The Basic Law Consultative Committee was formed through discussion and consultation (initially described as democratic consultation) from August 1985 onwards, on 18 December 1985, to seek views on the appropriate content of the BL. It had 180 members from eight categories in differing proportions.

19. The Decision of the NPC on the Method For the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the HKSAR, third session of the Seventh NPC on 4 April 1990. The Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC, Annex 11.

20. Green Paper, A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong, June 1980; White Paper, District Administration in Hong Kong, January 1981; both were published by the Hong Kong Government Printer.

21. Green (July 1984) and White (November 1984) papers: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong.

22. Xu Jiatun, “Xianggang huiyilu,” section 50.

23. Ibid. section 29.

24. Ibid. sections 51 and 52. Xu Jiatun claims his views were supported by a number of Chinese and foreign business elites.

25. Scott, , Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy, p. 24Google Scholar.

26. Commercial (2), industrial (2), financial (2), real estate and construction (1), tourism (1).

27. The United Democrats of Hong Kong, led by Martin Lee Chu-ming, Szeto Wan and Yeung Sam, became a party in 1990 on the basis of a 1989 coalition of democratic groups including the HKO, Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Affairs Society. See n. 17.

28. See n. 17. The only “conservative” party, the Liberal Democratic Federation, fielded five unsuccessful candidates who gained 5% of the vote.

29. The section on the Liberal Party is based substantially on an interview with its leader Allen Lee Peng-fei on 14 July 1993 and documents made available at the time.

30. See n. 17. Although the explanation offered was based on the refusal of United Democrat Leaders to take the oath of confidentiality, it is widely believed that opposition by China to the elevation of the leaders was a major factor in British Hong Kong policy. Both Martin Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah (the former Hong Kong's most outspoken liberal campaigner for human rights, political reform and livelihood issues such as opposition to the Daya Bay nuclear power plant, the latter a “patriotic” liberal proponent of democratization in Hong Kong), had been accused of “counter revolutionary activities” in July 1989 and removed from the BLDC by the NPC on 31 October 1989.

31. See Kwok, Rowena, Leung, Joan and Scott, Ian (eds.), Votes Without Power, The Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

32. Legislative Council of Hong Kong, Report of the Select Committee on the Legislative Council Elections (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 07 1992)Google Scholar.

33. See Burns, John P., “The process of assimilation of Hong Kong (1997) and implications for Taiwan,” AE1 Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1986), pp. 19–26Google Scholar.

34. The first group of Hong Kong advisers (44 people) was inaugurated on 11 March 1992. See the South China Morning Post, 12 March 1992. The DAB was founded on 10 July 1992 by pro-China Hong Kong activists. Its programme, which includes dialogue with China, is aimed at grass-roots electoral politics.

35. Our Next Five Years: The Agenda for Hong Kong (Hong Kong; Government Printer, 1992)Google Scholar.

36. Ibid.

37. Exchanges between the British and Chinese Sides in January-February 1990 on constitutional development in Hong Kong, released by the Government Information Services, Hong Kong.

38. Guangjiaojing (The Mirror), Hong Kong, 2 04 1993Google Scholar; South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 23 06 1993Google Scholar.

39. See Chen, Edward K. Y., “Foreign direct investment in East Asia,” Asian Development Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1993), pp. 24–59Google Scholar; and Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh's article in this volume.

40. I am grateful to the Social Science Research Centre at the University of Hong Kong for giving me access to the data. I am responsible for the interpretation. The preceding (April-August 1992) and intervening trackings have been omitted; the aim here is to show the range and relative stability of the ratings. The shifts can be correlated with events such as the gazetting of the proposals and related legislation in February and March, and the progress of the talks.

41. The potential for this is shown by the forming of a Full Democracy in 1995 Movement, by a number of legislators and other political activists. See South China Morning Post, 15 July 1993.

42. See South China Morning Post, 14 July 1993.