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Overseas Chinese in China's Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

C. Y. Chang
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Extract

During the first decade of the People's Republic of China from 1949, overseas Chinese affairs were considered important to the national interest of China, and a special department called the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But during the period from 1967–69, when the Cultural Revolution was caught in the wild wind, overseas Chinese and their institutions, particularly the ones at home, were considered ideologically suspect and undesirable because of their allegedly bourgeois background and foreign connexions. The privileges previously given to them as a cushion to adjust themselves gradually to the socialist system were repudiated and removed. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was disbanded.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 82 , June 1980 , pp. 281 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1980

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References

1. Zhengzhi, Liao, “Criticize the ‘gang of four’ and their revolutionary fallacies of overseas relations,” People's Daily, 4 01 1978Google Scholar.

2. Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, 5–11 January 1978, p. 4.

3. This article was originally published in Nanfang ribao but later was reprinted in Da Gong Bao(Hong Kong), 17 Febuary 1978, p. 3.

4. Hong Kong Standard, 29 December 1978, p. 4.

5. See supra, n. 1.

6. FitzGerald, Stephen, “ Overseas Chinese affairs and the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, No. 40 (1969), p. 122Google Scholar.

7. ibid. p. 121.

8. Ibid. p. 111.

9. Ibid. pp. 120–21

10. This conclusion is reached by a comparison of the book published by People's Publishing Society in 1957 entitled Collected Works of Overseas Chinese Policy with the book published by Joint Publishing Co. in 1978 entitled We Must Take the Overseas Chinese Affairs Seriously.

11. See supra, n. 3.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. The article does not list all six regulations but does mention three important regulations as follows: “ First, all Party cadres who have connexions with the overseas Chinese of all professions and have refused to sever connexions with them politically and economically, even after being told to do so, will be seriously punished. Secondly, we should look into all specific cases and carry out necessary criticism and education. The serious cases should be told to resign from their Party posts. Thirdly, from now on we must not recruit those who have connexions with overseas Chinese abroad, Hong Kong and Macao, into the post of Party cadres.”

14. See supra, n. 3.

15. There were almost a hundred reports on rehabilitation of returned overseas Chinese who were purged during the Cultural Revolution, especially in Guangdong, from January 1978 to July 1979. For examples, see Da Gong Bao, 3 January 1978, p. 1; 26 January 1978, p. 3; 31 January 1978, p. 1; 27 February 1978, p. 3; 26 February 1979, p. 3; 3 March 1979, p. 3; 29 March 1979, p. 3.

16. See supra, n. 3.

17. See Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate-General of Hong Kong, No. 4013 (1 09 1967), pp. 5–11Google Scholar.

18. Ibid. p. 6.

19. Ibid.

20. For the citation and Lin's version of China's foreign policy, see Lin's article, “Long live the victory of people's war” in Chai, Winberg (ed.), The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (New York: Capricorn Books, 1972), pp. 346–54Google Scholar.

21. Liao Zhengzhi, “ Criticize the ‘gang of four’.” The English translation of this citation is by the author.

22. See Taylor, Jay, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York and London: Praeger, 1975), p. 210Google Scholar.

23. Cheng, Chi Shee, “ A great fight in defence of the principle of Party ” in People's Daily, 26 01 1979, p. 2Google Scholar.

24. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia.

25. Ibid.

26. Zheng Ming (Hong Kong), No. 12 (10 1978), pp. 5–9Google Scholar.

27. Ibid. p. 7. Zheng Ming reported that Zhou was brushed aside by the revolutionary rebels to do such insignificant work as checking statements and important news releases prepared by the revolutionary committees. At this time, the most that Zhou could do was to revise some sentimental wordings to avoid further disturbing the already chaotic situation.

28. This was probably true in view of the fact that most of Zhou's right-hand men in foreign affairs like Chen Yi, Li Xiannian, Liao Zhengzhi and many others were in serious trouble with the revolutionary rebels.

29. FitzGerald, Stephen, “ Overseas Chinese affairs and the Cultural Revolution,” p. 123Google Scholar.

30. This account is based on several papers published by leftist parties such as Parted Rakyat's People's Tribune, 15 October 1968, p. 1; 15 November 1968, p. 1, and Barisan Socialis' Socialist Front Party Paper, 5 November 1967, p. 1; 23 June 1968, p. 1.

31. New China News Agency (NCNA) (Beijing), 20 May 1969. (See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Washington, D.C., 20 05 1969, A1–A2.)Google Scholar.

32. See The Times (London), 6 06 1969, p. 11Google Scholar and Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 June 1969, pp. 598–99.

33. NCNA (Beijing), 20 May 1969; 29 May 1969; 12 June 1969; 20 June 1969; 9 August 1969. (See FBIS, 20 May 1969, A1–A2; 5 June 1969, A8; 13 June 1969, A5–A6; 25 June 1969, A7; 13 August 1969 A4–A7.)

34. For detail of this party struggle between party power holders and the rebel faction, see the account given by Trager, Frank N. in his article, “Burma: 1968 A New Beginning?” in Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 2 (02 1969), pp. 104–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Taylor's, account, China and Southeast Asia, p. 208Google Scholar.

35. Many discussions were published in leftist party papers around 1967–69 in Singapore and Malaysia. For instance, see “ Give up illusion for parliamentary democracy and hold up the great red banner of armed struggle,” in Parted Rakyat Negeri Singapura, 10 October 1968, pp. 3–5.

36. For instance, Dr Wei Li Huang, Ahmad Boestaman and many others were forced to leave United Front Socialist around 1967–69.

37. For instance, in its news-text condemning the Malaysian Government, NCNA had specifically called the Premier of the Malaysian Government the Rahman clique. (See NCNA (Beijing), 20 May 1969.)

38. The English Translation of this article was published in Peking Review, VoL. 20, No. 45, 4 11 1977 pp. 10–38Google Scholar.

39. Ibid. pp. 31–32.

40. This account is based on several speeches given by top leaders like Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Liao Zhengzhi and several leaders who are in charge of overseas Chinese affairs. All of these speeches were published in the People's Daily orDa Gong Bao in the year of 1978 and the first half of 1979. (For instance, seeDa Gong Bao, 3 January 1978, p. 1; 30 September 1978, p. 1; 25 October 1978, p. 1; and 18 November 1978, p. 2.)

41. FitzGerald, Stephen, China and the Overseas Chinese (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 196Google Scholar.

42. Ming Bao Monthly, Vol. XII, No. 143, 11 1977Google Scholar.

43. Chanda, Nayan, “Peking says it out loud to Hanoi,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 05 1978, pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

44. China argued that the case of Cambodia was different from Vietnam in the sense that Chinese in Cambodia were affected like everybody else, while in Vietnam they were the only group subjected to ruthless treatment. But some observers, like Nayan Chanda, have pointed out (seeFar Eastern Economic Review, 16 June 1978, pp. 20–21) that there is no evidence that the communist authorities have discriminated between Vietnamese and Chinese in their anti-capitalist drive. Furthermore, while facing the least traumatic situation in Indo-China, overseas Chinese in Laos were issued with passports by the Chinese Embassy in Vientiane with the accord of the government. Overseas Chinese in Cambodia were not treated in the same way, Nayan Chanda argued. However, there are so far no known cases reported in which China has issued the overseas Chinese in Cambodia passports or has accepted them home in the same way she has done in the case of Laos.

45. Chanda, Nayan, “Comrades curb the capitalists,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 04 1978, pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

46. This account is based on reports published in Hong Kong newspapers such as the South China Morning Post and the Hong Kong Standard from April to June, 1978. Up to 8 June 1978, over 2,000 refugees had escaped to Hong Kong from South Vietnam, see Hong Kong Standard, 8 May, 1978, p. 1.

47. Da Gong Bao, 1 May 1978, p. 1.

48. Ibid., 8 June 1978, p. 1.

49. See supra, n. 36.

50. Peoples Daily, 25 May 1978. The translation of the citation is taken from Hong Kong Standard, 25 May 1978.

51. Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, 4–10 May 1978, p. 1.

52. Most of these reports from western and Japanese sources were published between 10 and 20 May 1978.

53. Hong Kong Standard, 6 May 1978, p. 1.

54. Ta Rung Pao Weekly Supplement, 25–31 May, p. 13.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. People's Daily, 28 May 1978, p. 2.

58. See Asiaweek, Vol. 4, No. 29 (28 06 1978), pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

59. For Chinese documents on this issue, see On Vietnam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), pp. 29–119Google Scholar.

60. See Hong Kong Standard, 28 June 1978, p. 4.

61. Ibid. pp. 29–43.

62. For this account in detail, see this author's article, entitled “Vietnam's political motivations and the consequences in dispatching refugees to Southeast Asia,” published in The Seventies, No. 114 (07 1979), pp. 16–19Google Scholar.

63. NCNA, 26 April 1979.

64. Hong Kong Standard, 7 May 1979, p. 1.

65. Japan's Kyodo news service reported that Deng Xiaoping called for “political and economic sanctions” against Vietnam which, he said, was “exporting refugees.” See Hong Kong Standard, 29 June 1979, p. 1.

66. Chanda, Nayan, “ Comrades curb the capitalists,” 12 05 1978, pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

67. Hong Kong Standard, 25 May 1978, p. 1.

68. For this account, see Mackie, J. A. C. (ed.), The Chinese in Indonesia (Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1976), p. 82Google Scholar.

69. For a further account of the crisis of 1960, see J. A. C. Mackie, ibid. pp. 82–97.

70. Ibid. p. 112.

71. For an account of the response of the Chinese press to the issue, see de Crespigny, Rafe, “ Chinese newspaper reports of the changes in Indonesia, September to December 1965,” Australian Outlook, Vol. 20, No. 2 (08 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72. The changing attitude of Suharto toward anti-Sinicism in Indonesia is recounted by Mackie, J. A. C. in his article, “ Anti-Chinese outbreaks in Indo-aesia 1959–68,” in Mackie, J. A. C., The Chinese in Indonesia, pp. 111–129Google Scholar.

73. Ibid. p. 123.

74. For Mozingo's, account on the contributing factors to the Chinese protest over the anti-Chinese riots, see his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chinese Policy in Indonesia, 1949–1967 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1971)Google Scholar.

75. Beijing Review, No. 13, 30 03 1979Google Scholar.

76. ibid. p. 18.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Chanda, Nayan, “ Vietnam prepares for the worst,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 06 1978, pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

80. Ibid. p. 13.

81. Deng Xiaoping told the president of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, Tomokazu Sakamoto, “We cannot understand why the Vietnamese side has adopted this unpleasant attitude. They were not very friendly, even when we were giving them a lot of aid.” Although Deng did not specify the time, he clearly implied in his talk that Vietnam had not been friendly to China at any time, even during the war against France and the United States. (See Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, 8–14 June 1978, p. 1.)

82. For instance, a survey of the Beijing Review indicates that in the first half of 1978, news coverage or articles on Vietnam were almost totally dropped while Cambodia was still covered regularly.

83. After the outbreak of war between Vietnam and Cambodia, top leaders like Deng Yingzhao and Zhen Yongguai paid visits to Cambodia but no visits of this kind were made to Vietnam. This practice is quite unusual compared to the past.

84. This point is well stated in Liao Zhengzhi's article published on 4 January 1978 “Like the multiplicity of Party activities, the overseas Chinese policy is mainly directed to promote socialist revolution and socialist construction, and to strengthen proletarian dictatorship. The overseas Chinese policy of the Party has not only to comply with the needs of domestic class struggle but also with the needs of international class struggle. Even in dealing with the same problem, because of the different conditions within and outside the nation, we have to be flexible in handling overseas Chinese policy.” Referring to the weight of national interests and overseas Chinese interests, He Xiangning also pointedout that mutual interests should be promoted. When a conflict of interests cannot be avoided, the national interest prevails over the interests of the minority. See He Xiangning, “In clearing up some confusing thoughts on the conduct of overseas Chinese affairs,” in Enlai, Zhou et al. , Collected Works on Overseas Chinese Policy (Peking: People's Publishing Society, 1957), pp. 73–81Google Scholar.

85. People's Daily, 3 January 1978, p. 1.

86. Da Gong Bao, 18 March 1978, p. 2.