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Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

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Extract

The Cultural Revolution in the field of Overseas Chinese affairs has induced a state of paralysis in the bureaucracy, has accelerated the tendency to extinction of domestic Overseas Chinese status, and reduced policy towards the Chinese abroad to long periods of silence, silence punctuated until late 1968 by protests against incidents involving the Chinese in South-east Asia. The Cultural Revolution also has provided an insight into the Overseas Chinese policies of the People's Republic of China since 1949. Part I of this paper deals with the latter of these two aspects, while Part II is concerned with the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Overseas Chinese policies and institutions.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 40 , December 1969 , pp. 103 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1969

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References

1 “Domestic Overseas Chinese” (derived from kuo-nei ch'iao-wu, “domestic Overseas Chinese affairs”) refers to relatives, dependants, returned Overseas Chinese and Overseas Chinese students in China.Google Scholar

2 These are the Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin (Ke-ming ch'iao-pao), translated in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 3939 (16 05 1967), pp. 5–13Google Scholar; Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin (P'i Liao chan-pao), SCMP, No. 4013 (27 11 1967), pp. 5–11Google Scholar; Fight to the End (Chan tao ti), in Hsing-tao jih-pao (Hong Kong), 1 and 4 05 1967Google Scholar; News Front (Hsin-wen chan-hsien), Ming pao (Hong Kong), 29 07 1967Google Scholar; and an unnamed tabloid, sections of which were published in the Hsiang-kang shih-pao (Hong Kong Times), 28 02 1968.Google Scholar

3 Chairman of the OCAC since April 1959, and effective head of the Commission in the decade before that, when his mother, Ho Hsiang-ning, was Chairman.Google Scholar

4 “Protect the interests of the Overseas Chinese and assist those who return to China,” in “On Coalition Government,” Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she), 1961, Vol. III, p. 1065.Google Scholar

5 An Overseas Chinese Affairs Political Work Conference held in June 1966 directed domestic Overseas Chinese to engage in class struggle, People's Daily, 5 06 1966Google Scholar, p. 3. Moreover, it has been stated clearly in past movements and campaigns that the Chinese abroad are specifically excluded. See, for example, People's Daily, 12 12 1957, p. 4.Google Scholar

6 Collection of Documents on Overseas Chinese Policy (Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), pp. 1–10.Google Scholar

7 This was stated as early as November 1967, in a note from the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon to the Burmese Government. Chung-kuo hsin-wen she (China News Service, CNS), 25 11 1967Google Scholar, p. 3. See also Chinese statements in CNS, 14 12 1967, p. 5; 26 February 1968, p. 4; 30 March 1968, p. 3; and 4 April 1968, p. 5.Google Scholar

8 Chang and Wang were Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs until 1959. Li is former Director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front Work Department.Google Scholar

9 For example, see the Chinese reaction to a suggestion by the United States Secretary of State, Dulles, that recognition of China would lead to subversion through the Overseas Chinese. CNS, 6 11 1958, p. 1.Google Scholar

10 People's Daily, 7 09 1956, p. 5.Google Scholar

11 Ibid. 21 May 1957, p. 1.

12 Ibid. p. 5. The editorial quotes the Hague Convention of 1930 and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.Google Scholar

13 Following the signing of the treaty with Indonesia in 1955, China declared that it was willing to make similar arrangements with other countries (People's Daily, 26 April 1955). In 1956 Chou En-lai told David Marshall that Chinese who elected to take Singapore citizenship after independence would no longer be regarded by China as Chinese citizens, even in the absence of a formal treaty. Collection of Documents on Overseas Chinese Policy, p. 45. This policy was subsequently applied, and propagated, to all Overseas Chinese.Google Scholar

14 See Chou En-lai's talk with the Chinese in Burma, above, p. 106. Also People's Daily editorial 13 08 1957Google Scholar, p. 1; and a decision of the OCAC in December 1957. People's Daily, 12 12 1957, p. 4.Google Scholar

15 Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), 20 12 1959, p. 1.Google Scholar

16 Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), 8 02 1961), p. 2.Google Scholar

17 See Fang, Fang in Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), 20 12 1959Google Scholar, p. 1; Liao, Ch'eng-chih's New Year broadcast in CNS, 1 01 1960Google Scholar; and Ho, Hsiang-ning's Spring Festival broadcast in CNS, 30 01 1960.Google Scholar

18 This was not simply a case of intimate talks with selected Overseas Chinese. It was urged on the relatives and dependants in China, and recommended to visiting Overseas Chinese. It was the constant theme in the national and provincial press, in the Ch'iao-wu pao (Overseas Chinese Affairs Journal), and local Overseas Chinese papers in the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. It was the subject of statements and broadcasts by Chinese leaders to the Chinese abroad, and it was promoted in the releases of CNS and its daily broadcasts in various Chinese dialects to South-east Asia.Google Scholar

19 Policy in the 1962–66 period appears to have distinguished between those who no longer regarded themselves as Chinese subjects, and the minority who remained “patriotic Overseas Chinese.” In 1960, Peking estimated that some 40 per cent. of Overseas Chinese were in this category (Fang, Fang, in Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), 23 12 1960, p. 1). It is probably more than coincidence that this figure, a little over five million, corresponds roughly with the number of Overseas Chinese Peking had proposed to repatriate from all countries.Google Scholar

20 For example, Fang Fang, in a speech to visiting Overseas Chinese, Peking, 2 October 1960, CNS, 4 10 1960.Google Scholar

21 Liao's name was retained in the Liao-Takasaki Office of Sino-Japanese trade until renegotiation of the trade agreement in March 1968. CNS, 8 03 1968, p. 5.Google Scholar

22 CNS, 26 02 1968, p. 4. The OCAC has been mentioned only on five other occasions since 1 July 1967.Google Scholar

23 Ch'en Ch'i-yu, member OCAC, last identified as such April 1960 (appeared 1 October 1967, 1 May 1968); Chuang Hsi-ch'üan, Vice-Chairman OCAC, last identified as such September 1966 (1 October 1967, 1 May 1968, 1 October 1968); Ho Hsiang-ning, Chairman OCAC until April 1959 (1 October 1967, 1 October 1968); and Hsieh Nan-kuang, member OCAC, last identified as such September 1959 (1 October 1967, 1 May 1968). Three others, Shao Li-tzu Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and Ch'en Ch'i-yüan, have died since July 1967.Google Scholar

24 Chan tao ti, in Hsing-tao jih-pao (Hong Kong), 4 05 1967, p. 4.Google Scholar

25 The following account is based on a number of articles in Ke-ming ch'iao-pao (Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin), 16 May 1967Google Scholar, translated in SCMP, No. 3939.Google Scholar

26 Fang Fang, a Vice-Chairman of the OCAC and head of its party committee; Su Hui, wife of Fang Fang, member of the OCAC, director of one of its departments, and member of its Party committee; Wu Chi-sheng, member, head of a department, and member of the Party committee of the OCAC; Wang P'ing, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Political Department, and Deputy Director of the Hopei Province OCAC; Chang Fan, member and head of a department in the OCAC, and director and member of the Party committee of CNS.Google Scholar

27 It was possibly in this connexion that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Political Work Conference was held in Peking in June 1966. People's Daily, 5 06 1966, p. 3.Google Scholar

28 This latter organization was identified also in the official press in what appeared to be some kind of leading capacity in Overseas Chinese affairs. See CNS, 27 and 29 04 1967.Google Scholar

29 Lin was dragged back by rebels from Fukien, indicating that his “crimes” may not have concerned his work in the Commission.Google Scholar

30 Hsiang-kang shih-pao (Hong Kong Times), 28 02 1968, p. 3. Ch'en was a member of the OCAC and Deputy Secretary-General of the All China Returned Overseas Chinese Association. She is alleged to have sold secrets to United States intelligence organizations for 17 years.Google Scholar

31 Interview with Li Chün, Peking, 6 February 1968. Li described himself as a “commissioner” (chuan-yüan) in the OCAC. He was not formerly identified in Overseas Chinese affairs. Li asked that our discussion should not be regarded as a formal interview, but as an informal chat.Google Scholar

32 Hsiang-kang shih-pao (Hong Kong Times), 28 02 1968, p. 3.Google Scholar

33 CNS, 10 02 1968, p. 5. In the same item it was reported that revolutionary committees existed in the Peking Returned Overseas Chinese Supplementary Middle School (already identified in November 1967), and the Fine Arts Faculty of the Overseas Chinese University.Google Scholar

34 See “Yang Ch'eng-wu's Eight Major Crimes,” SCMP, No. 4186 (27 05 1968), p. 2.Google Scholar

35 Kwang-chou kung-jen (Canton), 10 07 1968Google Scholar, p. 4, in Tsu Kuo (Hong Kong), No. 53 (08 1968), p. 407.Google Scholar

36 CNS, 15 02 1968, p. 4.Google Scholar

37 Ibid. 2 February 1967, p. 7.

38 Ibid. 14 May 1967, p. 4.

39 See People's Daily, 11 10 1966Google Scholar, p. 3; 12 October 1966, p. 3; 30 November 1966, p. 3; 6 February 1967, p. 5; and CNS, 14 05 1967, p. 3.Google Scholar

40 CNS, 21 11 1967Google Scholar, p. 4; 28 July 1968, p. 3. See also CNS, 16 09 1968, pp. 5–8.Google Scholar

41 Chinese Communist Affairs, Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 3 (29 11 1967) (Taipeh), p. 11.Google Scholar

42 CNS, 28 07 1968.Google Scholar

43 Anna Louise, Strong, Letter from China (Peking), combined issue 58–59, 10 05 1968.Google Scholar

44 People's Daily, 5 06 1966, p. 5.Google Scholar

45 Wen hui pao (Hong Kong), 8 11 1966Google Scholar, p. 1; 20 December 1966, p. 2, and Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), 1 11 1966, p. 1.Google Scholar

46 Statement by a “responsible person of the Bank of China in Hong Kong” in Wen hui pao (Hong Kong), 5 01 1967, p. 1.Google Scholar

47 Chen pao (Hong Kong), 24 04 1967, p. 3.Google Scholar

48 Established 28 October 1957, with Ch'en Yü as Chairman. CNS, 30 10 1967, p. 4.Google Scholar

49 Following the discrediting of the extremist groups in the Foreign Ministry, it was revealed that “Without permission, they dispatched telegrams to foreign countries, sent notes to the country of xx, ‘appointed’ diplomats to foreign countries, searched and closed the Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry, and detained the Vice-Foreign Ministers, thus seriously damaging the diplomatic activities.” Yeh chan pao (Canton), combined issue of Nos. 12 and 13 (March 1968) (in SCMP, No. 4158, 16 04 1968). Elsewhere in this and other bulletins, it is reported that the “extremists” constantly resisted and opposed specific directives from Chou En-lai and the Central Committee concerning activities in the Foreign Ministry.Google Scholar

50 See, for example, report in Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 28 09 1967), p. 631.Google Scholar

51 Stanley, Karnow in International Herald Tribune, Nos. 4–5 (11 1967).Google Scholar

52 CNS, 30 06 1968, p. 5.Google Scholar

53 There are a number of accounts of the position of the Chinese in post-coup Indonesia. For example see Harold Munthe, Kaas in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 6 (9 11 1967), p. 281.Google Scholar

54 A survey of articles of the “XX Love Chairman Mao” type in CNS in 1967 shows that in the majority of cases it is possible to substitute for “Overseas Chinese,” terms like “world's people,” “people of five continents,” “world's seamen,” “Russian masses,” etc., without substantially altering the meaning.Google Scholar