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New Light on Mao: 2. His views on the Soviet Union's Political Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Richard Levy
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Although much has been written about Maoist economic theory (about the role of material and moral incentives, for instance, and about the relation between industry and agriculture), the recent appearance of the two volumes entitled Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiong wan-sui and in particular five pieces therein (“Reading notes on the Soviet Union's Political Economy,” the three critiques of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and Mao's comments on Stalin's “Reply to Comrades Sanina and Venzher”), permits analysis to push beyond “Maoist” economics into the theory of Mao himself. In fact these pieces in the Wan-sui on political economy may well be compared to Mao's public speeches and the Selected Works as Marx's Grundrisse is to Das Kapital.

Type
Research Article
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The China Quarterly , Volume 61 , March 1975 , pp. 95 - 117
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Copyright © The China Quarterly 1975

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References

1. The two volumes of Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui (Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought) will be referred to hereafter as Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar and Wan-sui (1969).Google Scholar

2. The Grundrisse is composed of Marx's notebooks and working notes for Das Kapital and the works which were to follow. See Marx, Karl, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, ed. by Nicolaus, Martin (Harmondsworth: Penguin. New York: Vintage Books, 1973)Google Scholar; and Nicolaus, Martin, “The unknown Marx,” in Oglesby, Carl (ed.), The New Left Reader (New York: Grove Press, 1969).Google Scholar

3. See, for example, the writings of William W. Whitson, Andrew Nathan, Franz H. Michael and Parris H. Chang.

4. See, for example, the writings of Lucian W. Pye and Richard H. Solomon.

5. Here one must be willing to accept a Marxist definition of political economy rather than a narrower western capitalist definition of economics lest Mao's writings be dismissed as a mish-mash of economics and politics being in fact neither. To reject out of hand such basic assumptions is to condemn all those which are different from our own to the realm of “immaturity,” “irrationality” and/or “lunacy,” leaving ourselves the sole heirs of “rationality” and “pragmatism.” However, not to reject these assumptions is not to accept them as the correct interpretation of reality. It is merely to accept the possibility of coherent and internally consistent alternate visions of reality – what Mao would describe as the proletarian and bourgeois world outlooks.

6. The law of value is the Marxist law by which the exchange value of an object is equal to the average amount of socially necessary labour required to create it. See Capital, Vol. 1, Chs. I and III (New York: International Publishers, 1967).Google Scholar

7. The law of exchange of equal value means that products with equal exchange value must be exchanged for one another. This is the operating law of exchange under capitalism with the exception of one commodity, labour power, which is the source of all value. For the forced exchange of her/his labour power for wages, the worker creates more value than she/he receives in wages: thus, the capitalist's appropriation of surplus value as a gift, and his domination of capitalist society. Under socialism, however, this one meaningful exception to the law of exchange of equal value would be eliminated. See Marx, , CapitalGoogle Scholar and Grundrisse. As used in the Chinese context, the phrase, “exchange of equal value,” has had two additional special meanings. One such meaning is that as long as the exchange of equal value is appropriate, e.g. as a secondary principle during socialism, then one cannot forcibly take the personal property of individuals without giving these individuals equal compensation. The second specialized meaning of the phrase evolved during a debate on pricing policy in China during the early 1960s. The point in question was how to transfer agricultural surplus into industrial investment, through taxes, differential pricing, or both. Those who argued against differential pricing said this would violate the principle of exchange of equal value since the value of one unit of peasant labour would be set lower than the value of one unit of worker labour. See Nai-ruenn, Chen, “The theory of price formation in Communist China,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 27 (1966)Google Scholar. Mao seems to use this term mainly in the first special sense described above.

8. See, for example, Schram, Stuart R., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp. 226–28.Google Scholar

9. See Schram, Stuart R., Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967)Google Scholar; The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung; and “From the ‘Great Union’ to the ‘Great Alliance,’” CQ, No. 49 (1972), pp. 88–105.Google Scholar

10. For example, in “Spread the campaigns to ‘Reduce rent, increase production’ and ‘Support the government and cherish the people’ in the base areas,” 1 October 1943, in Mao Tse-tung chi (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1970), Vol. 9, p. 56Google Scholar; and The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (SW) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), Vol. III, p. 134.Google Scholar Here the phrase, “and keeping with the principle of the exchange of equal value,” is added to a discussion of production in the base areas.

11. For example, “On coalition government,” 24 04 1945Google Scholar, in Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 9, pp. 222, 224 and 244Google Scholar; and SW, Vol. III, pp. 281, 283 and 297.Google Scholar

12. See Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 10, pp. 108–10Google Scholar; and SW, Vol. IV, pp. 168–69.Google Scholar

13. See, for example, “Report to the Second Session of the Seventh Central Committee,” 5 03 1949Google Scholar, SW, Vol. IV, pp. 361–75Google Scholar; “Speech at the Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan liberated areas,” 1 04 1948Google Scholar, Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 10, pp. 135 and 140Google Scholar; SW, Vol. IV, pp. 233 and 239Google Scholar; and “The work of land reform and of Party consolidation in 1948,” Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 10, p. 144Google Scholar; SW, Vol. IV, p. 254.Google Scholar

14. Walker, Kenneth, “Collectivization in retrospect: the socialist high tide of autumn 1955-spring 1956,” CQ, No. 26 (1966), p. 38.Google Scholar

15. “Speech at Chengtu,” 22 03 1958Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1969), p. 174.Google Scholar

16. Wan-sui (1967), pp. 8–49Google Scholar, especially pp. 8–9 and 35; and Wan-sui (1969), pp. 279–88.Google Scholar

17. Wan-sui (1967), pp. 116–20, 121–22 and 156–66Google Scholar; Wan-sui (1969), pp. 247–51Google Scholar. The first, second and fourth of these selections seem to be different versions of the same talk given in November 1958, the date given in Wan-sui (1969)Google Scholar, rather than November 1959, the date given in Wan-sui (1967).Google Scholar

18. Wan-sui (1967), pp. 18–19Google Scholar. This quote reappears in the record of the same speech (misdated to March 1959) in Wan-sui (1969), p. 282.Google Scholar

19. Wan-sui (1969), p. 285.Google Scholar

20. “Reading notes on the Soviet Union's Political Economy,” Ch. 65, Wan-sui (1969), p. 382Google Scholar. Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar gives the date of the “Reading notes” as 1960 whilst Wan-sui (1969)Google Scholar gives 1961–62. A character-by-character comparison of the two versions reveals approximately 100 differences, the vast majority of which are either stylistic changes or typographical errors. However, a number of substantative changes were made, three of which I have reproduced below:

In all three of these examples, Wan-sui (1969)Google Scholar tends to be more critical of the Soviet Union or to distinguish more clearly between the Soviet Union and China than does Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar. In addition to the differences between the two versions of the “Reading notes,” a comparison of the two volumes, contrasting both the selection of articles in each volume and the texts of those articles which appear in both, suggests a Mao who is more anti-Soviet, less criticized by his comrades, more trusting in the peasantry and more optimistic about China's future in Wan-sui (1969)Google Scholar than in Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar. Hereafter I will cite the “Reading notes” in the 1969 volume. These, together with the critiques of Stalin's political-economic writings and a large selection of other pieces in the two Wan-sui collections, are translated in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, Parts I and II (Arlington, Virginia: Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), 1974)Google Scholar, Nos. 61269–1 and 61269–2.

21. “Reading notes,” Ch. 61, p. 379Google Scholar; Appendix 5, p. 395.

22. For examples of these criticisms, see “Reading notes,” Ch. 8, p. 328Google Scholar, Ch. 20, p. 399, Ch. 40, p. 357, Ch. 6, p. 326, Ch. 42, p. 361, Ch. 20, p. 337, Ch. 25, p. 343 and Ch. 29, p. 347.

23. “Reading notes,” Ch. 58, p. 377.Google Scholar

24. “Reading notes,” Ch. 30, p. 348Google Scholar. Mao's speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (19 12 1958)Google Scholar is also relevant here: “In regard to the socialist system, two types of ownership exist simultaneously in the socialist stage. They are opposites and also united. They are a unity of opposites. Collective ownership contains the nucleus of socialist ownership by the whole people. Its basic essence is collective ownership but it also contains elements of communist ownership by all the people … in nations under the leadership of the Communist Party one can and should allow the elements of communism to grow. Stalin did not solve this problem. He made into absolute opposites and separated the three systems of ownership, namely collective ownership, socialist ownership by all the people and communist ownership by all the people. This is wrong.

Can this be called the development of dialectics?” Wan-sui (1969), pp. 263–64.Google Scholar

25. “Reading notes,” Ch. 23, p. 342, Ch. 40, p. 358.Google Scholar

26. “Reading notes,” Ch. 41, p. 359.Google Scholar

27. Ibid. Ch. 35, p. 353, Ch. 68, p. 388.

28. For example, “Comments on Stalin's ‘Reply to Comrades A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher’,” Wan-sui (1967), pp. 120–21Google Scholar; “A Critique of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.,” ibid. pp. 156–57; “Speeches at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress,” 8–23 05 1958Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1969), pp. 204–205 and 222Google Scholar; “Speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee,” 19 12 1958Google Scholar, ibid. pp. 264–65.

29. “First talk at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee,” 8 05 1958Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1969), p. 195.Google Scholar

30. “Speech at the Second Chengchow Conference,” 27 02 1959Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1967), p. 11Google Scholar; see also ibid. p. 116.

31. “Reading notes,” Ch. 51, p. 371.Google Scholar

32. “Speech at the Second Chengchow Conference,” 27 02 1959Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1967), p. 44.Google Scholar

33. Wan-sui (1967), p. 248.Google Scholar

34. Ibid. pp. 49, 117 and 166, note 32.

35. Ibid. pp. 121–22; “Speech criticizing Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.,” Wan-sui (1969), p. 250Google Scholar; also Wan-sui (1967), pp. 160Google Scholar, note 11, 163, note 23 and 165, note 28.

36. “Critique of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.,” Wan-sui (1967), p. 160Google Scholar, note 10. Thus Mao seems to agree with Lenin's statement that “socialism consists in the abolition of the commodity economy,” Lenin, V. I., “On the agrarian question,” Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), Vol. 12, p. 267.Google Scholar

37. Most of Mao's comments on this topic are found in the criticisms of Stalin's economics (see footnote 17). Some of the different statements include the following: “The assertion that the means of production are not commodities deserves study,” Wan-sui (1967), p. 160Google Scholar, note 9; “Commodity production is not necessarily limited to the means of livelihood,” ibid. p. 156; “Speech at Cheng-chow,” 1 03 1959Google Scholar, ibid. p. 34; ibid. p. 160, note 10; “Its activities [those of commodity means of production] are not confined to individual consumer goods. Some means of production are commodities. If agricultural goods are commodities and industrial goods are not, how are we going to exchange …? In China not only consumer goods but also agricultural means of production are to be supplied. Stalin did not sell the means of production to peasants but Khrush-chov changed [this policy]” (emphasis added), ibid. pp. 164–65, note 27; also ibid. pp. 116–17.

38. Wan-sui (1967), pp. 116–17Google Scholar. A similar debate concerning the problem of commodity production, planning and the exchange of equal value also took place in Cuba in the early and mid-1960s between Ché Guevara and C. R. Rodriguez. See, for example, Gerassi, John (ed.), Venceremos: The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968), Chs. 19, 22, 24 and 32Google Scholar; and Rodriguez, C. R. in World Marxist Review, Vol. 8, No. 10 (10 1965), pp. 12–20.Google Scholar

39. Wan-sui (1969), p. 305Google Scholar. See also “Reading notes,” Ch. 29, p. 347Google Scholar, and Marx, , Grundrisse, p. 100Google Scholar, for further discussion on the relations of production.

40. “Reading notes,” Ch. 25, p. 343Google Scholar; see also, Ch. 32, p. 350, Ch. 57, p. 376.

41. Ibid. Ch. 32, pp. 350–51.

42. Mao had also put forward the idea that “uninterrupted revolution” would involve the division of communism into a series of stages, e.g. “Talk at Chengtu,” 20 03 1958Google Scholar, and “Talks on questions of philosophy,” 18 08 1964Google Scholar, in Schram, Stuart (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed. Talks and Letters: 1956–1971 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974)Google Scholar published in the U.S. as Chairman Mao Talks to the People (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 110 and 227–28Google Scholar. This statement is part of the theoretical evolution of Mao's idea of revolution in the superstructure and suggests that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was not solely an ad hoc reaction to an unfavourable power situation but was also part of a larger strategy of revolution. See “Opening speech at the First Plenary Session of the new political consultative conference,” 22 09 1949, Mao Tse-tung chi, Vol. 10, p. 358.Google Scholar

43. “Reading notes,” Ch. 25, p. 344.Google Scholar

44. Ibid. Ch. 1, p. 320; also Ch. 4, p. 324. This statement seems to contradict a statement made by Mao in his March 1958 talk at Chengtu in which he said: “They [some comrades] closed their eyes to the sprouts of socialism even after such forms had appeared. The mutual aid teams in Jui-chin and the anti-Japanese base areas were such sprouts.” Schram, , Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 117Google Scholar. However, this seeming contradiction might be resolved since, in the “Reading notes” Mao says that such sprouts cannot “fundamentally,” i.e. to a large degree, be developed. In addition, production in the base areas was aimed at producing use values while public utilities in capitalist societies still aim at producing profits and hence both use value and exchange value.

45. “Reading notes,” Ch. 13, p. 333Google Scholar. The definition of a “big revolution” which is suggested here would seem to be more in line with Mao's 1927 definition of revolution: “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture or doing embroidery, it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an in surrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.” SW, Vol. I, p. 28Google Scholar. This suggests a continuing refinement by Mao of his concepts of revolution.

46. For this he is criticized by the Soviets as a voluntarist. See Krivtsov, V. N. and Sidikhmenov, V. Y. (eds.), A Critique of Mao Tse-tung's Theoretical Conceptions (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 215 and 241.Google Scholar

47. “Reading notes,” Ch. 15, p. 334Google Scholar. Also Ch. 28, pp. 346–47: “From world history we can see that the bourgeoisie launched their revolution and founded their own countries not after the industrial revolution but before it. They also brought about a change in the superstructure and, having acquired the state apparatus, they then conducted propaganda and gained strength. Only then did they push forward a change in the relations of production in a big way. When the relations of production had been arranged to their satisfaction and were running smoothly, this paved the way for the development of productive forces. Of course, the revolution in the relations of production is brought about by a certain development of productive forces, but the rapid development of the forces of production invariably takes place after the relations of production are changed.…

First create public opinion and seize power; then resolve the question of ownership. Later develop the forces of production in a big way. This is also a general law.” For a further discussion on Mao and the creation of public opinion, see Ahn, Byung-joon, “Ideology, Policy and Power in Chinese Politics and the Evolution of the Cultural Revolution” (Columbia University, New York, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1971), p. 50.Google Scholar

48. “Reading notes,” Ch. 49, p. 370Google Scholar. See also Appendix, Ch. 7, p. 398. As far back as January 1956, in his speech to the Supreme State Conference Mao talked about the “liberation” of productive forces after a revolution in the ownership system. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 26Google Scholar. Mao is also criticized on this specific point by the Soviets, see Krivtsov, and Sidikhmenov, , A Critique of Mao Tse-tung's Theoretical Conceptions, p. 215.Google Scholar

49. “Reading notes,” Ch. 15, p. 334, also Ch. 6, p. 326.Google Scholar

50. Ibid. Appendix, Ch. 5, p. 396. This information reinforces the hypothesis stated earlier that Mao had conceived of the need for continuous struggle in the superstructure as part of a developing grand strategy of revolution and development rather than purely as a response to power politics.

51. Lenin, 's “weak link”Google Scholar theory of imperialism argues that since imperialism has transformed capitalism into a world-wide system, the first revolutions will take place not in the most industrialized countries as Marx had suggested, but rather in the least industrialized countries like Czarist Russia, China or perhaps post-Second World War Vietnam. These countries would be the soft under-belly of the integrated world capitalist system and would therefore be the most amenable to revolutionary change.

52. “Reading notes,” Ch. 14, pp. 333–34.Google Scholar

53. Marx, , Grundrisse, pp. 325, 399 and 706Google Scholar; also Nicolaus, , “The unknown Marx.”Google Scholar However, as one reads Das Kapital, one gets the impression that by this time Marx may have begun to feel that the revolution was more immediately imminent.

54. Ibid. p. 494.

55. “Reading notes,” Ch. 21, p. 340Google Scholar; see also “First talk at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee,” 8 05 1959Google ScholarWan-sui (1969), p. 195.Google Scholar

56. “Reading notes,” Ch. 5, p. 325.Google Scholar

57. Ibid. Appendix, Ch. 4, p. 394. This can be contrasted to a 1950 statement by Shao-ch, Liu'i that “a rich peasant economy will be preserved throughout the whole stage of the New Democracy.” Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i 1945–1957 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1967), p. 226Google Scholar. This statement also conflicts to some degree with Mao's report to the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee on 6 June 1950 in which he called for the implementation of land reform and protraction of the rich peasant economy, Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 13 06 1950.Google Scholar

58. “Reading notes,” Ch. 27, p. 345Google Scholar. Since Mao has frequently disagreed with both the Soviets abroad and with “capitalist readers” at home over his contention that class struggle does not die out once socialism is established and that the revolution must continue in the superstructure, it should not be surprising that the Chinese should have completed the narrower Soviet version of the socialist revolution before they completed what Mao considers to be the socialist revolution.

59. “Talk at the Peitaiho Central Committee Work Conference,” 9 08 1962Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1969), p. 424Google Scholar. At that time Mao said that transformation of the ownership system is not the same as resolving the political and ideological struggle. In 1957, following the higher level co-operatives and the socialist transformation of agriculture in 1956 which completed the elimination of the bourgeois ownership system, he suggested a political and ideological revolution to complete what was still undone and to prevent a capitalist restoration such as had taken place in the Soviet Union. Although this statement shows Mao post-dating his own thoughts, it also supports the hypothesis that he developed the idea of the need for a cultural revolution in the late 1950s.

60. “Reading notes,” Ch. 25, p. 345.Google Scholar

61. Ibid. Ch. 42, p. 363. This interpretation is reinforced by Mao's statement that what makes socialism superior to, and therefore different from, capitalism is not, as the Soviets would have it, that socialism continually raises wages, but rather that socialism changes the ownership of the means of production, thus allowing a better distribution of wages to the labouring people.

62. Ibid. Ch. 25, p. 343.

63. Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar here reads 65 yüan.

64. “Reading notes,” Ch. 58, p. 377Google Scholar. Thus commune ownership in its early stages will still have a “tail” in which “trees near houses, domestic fowl and animals, small agricultural tools etc., houses which were largely built before public housing” will still be private property since they are objects of consumption and not means of production. “Speech at the Chengchow Conference,” 27 02 1959Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1967), p. 15.Google Scholar

65. It is also important to note that Mao constantly distinguishes between communes, whose establishment had his support, and commune ownership, which he opposed as early as the Chengchow Conference, 02–03 1959Google Scholar. See, for example, Wan-sui (1969), pp. 281–83Google Scholar, Wan-sui (1967), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

66. “Speech at the Chengchow Conference,” 27 02 1959Google Scholar, ibid. pp. 8–49.

67. “Reading notes,” Ch. 31, p. 349Google Scholar; also Ch. 58, p. 377.

68. “Reading notes,” Ch. 30, p. 348.Google Scholar

69. Ibid. Ch. 10, p. 330. For a further discussion of the need continuously to change ownership systems in order to eliminate regional inequalities, see Ch. 19, pp. 336–37.

70. See footnote 24.

71. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 65.Google ScholarPubMed

72. Wan-sui (1969), p. 163Google Scholar. The fifth contradiction listed here is not mentioned a great deal in the documents I am discussing although Schurmann, Franz in The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon, 1974)Google Scholar argues that this is a key factor in Mao's political-economic thinking.

73. “Reading notes,” Ch. 36, p. 352.Google Scholar

74. “Reading notes,” Ch. 37, p. 355.Google Scholar

75. Ibid. Ch. 41, pp. 359–60.

76. For instance, Mao still points out a few timeless characteristics of people: “Humans are queer animals, as soon as they have a bit of superiority they put on airs. … Not to pay attention to this is very dangerous” “Reading notes,” Ch. 25, p. 344Google Scholar. “This animal, the human, has one defect. It is despising others. Humans with a little achievement look down on people who have not yet achieved anything” “Reading notes,” Appendix, Ch. 2, p. 392Google Scholar. One can only wonder why these traits could not and would not change in light of the view of the malleability of human nature in Marxist thought and especially in view of Mao's heavy emphasis on education.

77. See Hirschman, Albert O., The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958)Google Scholar for an analysis of the two possibilities. Hirschman argues that investment in transportation should be under taken only when it is necessary (and has already created a bottle-neck) rather than being built before the demand for it exists. This theory is, to some extent, being put into practice at present in Brazil.

78. “Reading notes,” Ch. 53, and Ch. 54, pp. 373–74.Google Scholar

79. Ibid. Ch. 53, p. 373. See also Marx, Karl, Capital, Vol. II, p. 149 and Vol. III, pp. 288–89Google Scholar. Practice seems to show a strong disagreement between Hirschman and the Chinese. As Liu, Alan points out in Communication and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar, the building of roads and railroads linking the provinces with the Centre was one of the first projects undertaken by the Chinese. Although this was a period of strong Soviet influence, the absence of any criticism by Mao of this investment schedule suggests his agreement with it. Of course, a significant part of the reasoning behind building these roads may have been military and security considerations, a factor which is left out of Hirschman's calculations and which reveals either the unrealistic narrowness of this “purely economic” approach or its hypocrosy in describing as “economic” roads etc. built for military purposes. For example, U.S. “economic aid” in Thailand has built roads to the northern mountain areas. These roads seem mainly to increase the ability of government counter-insurgency forces to reach the hill areas and only secondarily to allow the cities to penetrate the rural areas for extractive purposes. To an even lesser degree, they allow peasants, who are either self-reliant or who live in local village-market based economies, to bring their goods great distances to urban markets.

80. “Reading notes,” Ch. 12, p. 332Google Scholar. For an analysis of the Eastern European collectivization, see Ch. 12 and also Ch. 20, p. 337, Ch. 12, p. 330, Appendix, Ch. 4, p. 394.

81. Ibid. Ch. 38, p. 356, Ch. 54, p. 374.

82. Krivtsov, and Sidikhmenov, , A Critique of Mao Tse-tung's Theoretical Conceptions, pp. 183 and 241Google Scholar. Mao's approach in the “Reading notes” of emphasizing agriculture and light industry seems to take into account more satisfactorily Anthony Tang's argument that Soviet agricultural policy, based on agriculture with a higher level of consumption than that of China, could afford to be extractive rather than developmental, while the Chinese agricultural policy had to be both extractive and developmental. See Tang, in Galenson, Walter, Eckstein, Alexander and Ta-chung, Lin (eds.), Economic Trends in Communist China (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 459–507.Google Scholar

83. “Reading notes,” Ch. 42, especially pp. 361–62.Google Scholar

84. See also, “Talk at Second Chengchow Conference,” Wan-sui (1969), pp. 282, 284Google Scholar; and Wan-sui (1969), p. 250.Google Scholar

85. “Reading notes,” Ch. 25, p. 343.Google Scholar

86. Kenner, Martin and Petras, James (eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove Press, 1969), pp. 180–90.Google Scholar

87. “Hit 'em where they ain't” is an American sports colloquialism coined by Wee Willie Keeler, a baseball player in the early days of the game. When asked to explain how he got so many base hits he said simply, “I hit 'em where they ain't.”