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A Maoist Line for India

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Bhabani Sen Gupta
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Extract

For a key to the Chinese stance on India, one might begin by quoting the first message Mao Tse-tung sent to that country after taking over as Chairman of the People's Republic. Ironically, it went to B. T. Ranadive, who was then the anti-Maoist General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party (CPI), and who is now the doubtfully Maoist editor of the weekly journal of the supposedly pro-Chinese or Marxist Communists (CPI[M]). “The Indian people is one of the great Asian peoples with a long history and a vast population,” said Mao, in reply to a message of greetings from Ranadive; “her fate in the past and her path to the future are similar to those of China in many points.” When India became free, like China after liberation, Mao went on to add, “that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind.”

Type
Recent Developments
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 33 , March 1968 , pp. 3 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1968

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References

1 Quoted in Kautsky, John H., Moscow and the Communist Party of India (New York and Boston: Wiley and MIT Press, 1956), p. 80 and 80NGoogle Scholar. This is perhaps the most standard study on the interplay of Soviet and Chinese influences on the Indian communist movement. Dr. Kautsky shows how the CPI leadership was almost completely ignorant of the Maoist or neo-Maoist line till about 1949, and how Indian Maoism was born in Andhra Pradesh during the Telengana peasant uprising. Also see Gelman, Harry, “The CPI: Sino-Soviet Battleground,” pp. 101–147Google Scholar in Communist Strategies in Asia, A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties, edited by Barnett, A. Doak (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963)Google Scholar.

2 “India's Slanders Cannot Cover Up Intrusions into Chinese Territory,” Peking Review, No. 21 (05 20, 1966), pp. 42–43Google Scholar. In this Note the Chinese for the first time described India's relationship with Sikkim as “unequal,” and spoke openly of Sikkim's “sovereignty.”

3 Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) editorial printed in Peking Review, No. 1 (01 1, 1966), pp. 7–9Google Scholar.

4 This happened in November when Peking denied Indian allegations of Chinese intrusions into Bhutan (Indian Note of September 30) through an NCNA statement and not in a reply to India. The statement questioned India's right to act on Bhutan's behalf. Peking Review, No. 46 (11 11, 1966), p. 46Google Scholar.

5 For the text of the Chinese government statement, see Peking Review, No. 42 (10 16, 1964), pp. 6–7Google ScholarPubMed.

6 , R. J. Z., “World Opinion on Non-aligned Conference,” Peking Review, No. 43 (10 23, 1964), pp. 4–15Google Scholar.

7 “Premier Chou En-lai Reports on the Work of the Government,” Peking Review, No. 1 (01 1, 1965), p. 19Google Scholar. It should be noted that Chou fully registered, China's territorial claim on India: “It has not only occupied 90,000 sq.km. of Chinese territory south of the so-called MacMahon Line.…”

8 Almost immediately after the American bombing of North Vietnam the Chinese government and the CCP celebrated with much fanfare the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Chinese press articles imply strongly that Peking expected the U.S.S.R. to stand by the treaty in case the Vietnam war spilled over to China. The People's Daily in an editorial on February 14, 1965 remarked, “Today, U.S. imperialism is still afraid of the treaty and is trying by hook or by crook to undermine it. What the enemy fears is precisely what we treasure. We will continue to make the treaty play its part in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its stooges.” Peking Review, No. 8 (02 19, 1965), pp. 11–12Google Scholar. Chen Yi, at a Soviet Embassy function, was somewhat more concrete: “Only by concrete action against U.S. imperialism and its followers can the Sino-Soviet alliance be tested and tempered.…” Probably the Chinese pressed the Russians for concrete assurances of support in case China became involved in a war with the U.S., and were disappointed.

9 A People's Daily editorial on April 22, 1965 assailed the 17-nation Belgrade peace appeal as being “master-minded” by the “Tito clique” working as a “Trojan horse for U.S. imperialism.” There was no direct reference to or criticism of Shastri, who was a major signatory to the appeal. The first direct attack on Indian Vietnam peace moves came in the People's Daily on May 9 in an article by Commentator. He rejected President Radhakrishnan's April 24 proposal for an Afro-Asian force to police the boundaries of the two Vietnams after a cease fire as “preposterous,” and added that the proposal revealed India to be an “accomplice of U.S. imperialism.” Observer also criticised Shastri's own peace moves earner in February but, in referring to him, went no further than accusing India of “working hand in glove, with the Tito clique of Yugoslavia.” Peking Review, No. 20 (05 14, 1965)Google Scholar.

10 On May 17, 1965 China rejected an Indian protest, but the tone was mild. India was asked to abandon its “big power chauvinism and settle its boundary disputes with neighbouring countries in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the ten principles of the Bandung Conference.” Peking Review, No. 22 (05 28, 1965)Google Scholar.

11 Much of the attack, by Observer in the People's Daily, May 27, was directed against the new leaders of the Soviet Union. Soviet and American aid was linked as “reward” for India's “anti-China” policy. Peking Review, No. 23 (06 3, 1965), pp. 17–19Google Scholar.

12 It seems that the theme of a U.S.-Soviet-Indian alliance against China began to be developed in Peking after Shastri's visit to Moscow. Observer in his article noted above only spoke of a Soviet-Indian alliance against China; America's link with it began to be suggested during and after the Indo-Pakistan war, especially following the talks in New Delhi, on the occasion of Shastri's funeral, between Kosygin and Humphrey. By early 1966, the formulation was almost complete. “Asia, not Europe, is now the focal point for U.S. aggression. … Confrontation with China, instead of the Soviet Union, is the military strategy Washington now subscribes to. … As part of this strategy, a U.S.-dominated anti-China front is being patched up.” “The Shift in U.S. Global Strategy,” Peking Review, No. 7 (02 11, 1966)Google Scholar. “The policy of the new leaders of the CPSU is to unite with U.S. imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries in forging a counter-revolutionary ring of encirclement against China.” Commentator in Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), translated in Peking Review, No. 8 (02 18, 1966), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

13 China's support for Pakistan during the Pakistan-India armed clash in the Rann of Kutch is a landmark in her geo-political policy for the subcontinent. This was the first time that China took sides in a conflict between India and Pakistan. The Chinese view, according to an NCNA news report, was that the war was the result of an Indian attempt to “occupy the disputed territory by force,” and smacked of India's “policy of armed expansionism,” of “bullying its neighbours” with the massive foreign armed aid she was getting from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; Pakistan and China were both victims of Indian aggression. Peking Review, No. 20 (05 14, 1965)Google ScholarPubMed.

14 “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action,’” the editorial departments of People's Daily and Red Flag, in Peking Review, No. 46 (11 12, 1965), p. 14Google Scholar. It also offers an ideological justification of China's friendship with Pakistan.” “The reason is that in the contemporary world, opposition to or alliance with U.S. imperialism constitutes the hallmark for deciding whether or not a political force can be included in the united front against the United States.”

15 “The Pakistan people can rest assured that, when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance,” declared Liu, , at a state banquet given by President Khan, Ayub in Rawalpindi on 03 26, 1966Google Scholar. China, he said, fully appreciated Pakistan's refutation of the “nonsense about China's threat to the subcontinent,” and its staying out of efforts to form a ring of encirclement around China. Peking Review, No. 14 (04 1, 1966), p. 5Google ScholarPubMed. Ch'en Yi, speaking at an official reception in Dacca, capital of East Pakistan, added, “In the future, should East Pakistan or West Pakistan again face the armed attack of any aggressor, the Chinese government and people will continue to support them in their struggle for the right of self-determination.” Ibid., p. 7.

16 Since 1963, this has been a constant Chinese propaganda theme to India's neigh-bours. It has been considerably stepped up since the Indo-Pakistan war and appeals to Pakistani fear of Indian aggression. A recent example: “In the past four years or more since the defeat of India's massive attack on China in October 1962, the Soviet revisionists actually gave more military ‘aid’ to the Indian reactionaries than did U.S. imperialism. This included four submarines, over 50 MIG-21s, 74 transport planes, over 100 helicopters, 100 tanks (with an additional 200 on order) and 17 guided missile launching sites each with six missiles. Besides, they provided three MIG-21 assembly plants. In addition to this military ‘aid’ which totalled an estimated US $900 million, the Soviet revisionists have promised to provide India with non-military ‘aid’ valued at US $2,000 million, the emphasis of which is on helping the Indian reactionaries lay the foundations for an arms industry.” Peking Review, No. 27 (06 30, 1967), p. 46Google ScholarPubMed.

17 “Unite to Combat Imperialism and Defend Peace,” People's Dally editorial, March 27, 1966, Peking Review, No. 14 (04 1, 1966), p. 7Google Scholar.

18 Peking Review, No. 23 (06 3, 1966), pp. 41–42Google ScholarPubMed.

19 “U.S. and Soviet Union Collaborate in a Despicable Plot,” Commentator, People's Daily, June 5, 1967, in Peking Review, No. 24 (06 9, 1967), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

20 “The Shift in U.S. Global Strategy,” Peking Review, No. 7 (02 11, 1966), pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

21 “Communique of the 11th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP,” Peking Review, No. 34 (08 19, 1966), pp. 4–8Google Scholar.

22 Peking Radio, English morning service, November 11, 1966.

23 Quoted in Peking Radio evening transmission to India in English and Hindi, November 12 and 13, 1966.

24 For example, the November 11 bulletin put the number of Jan Sangh demonstrators at “700,000,” and those killed and wounded at 10 and 500 respectively. Actually, not more than 200,000 joined the demonstration and only two were killed and seven wounded. Another typical instance is a “news item” of the evening Indian transmission on August 14, 1966: “The struggle of the Indian people for subsistence and against persecution is developing highly and vigorously throughout the country. They are using violence to deal with the armed suppression by government authorities.” “15,000” students in Assam, “over 220,000 government employees” in Maharashtra and “200,000 tea garden workers” in West Bengal were said to be on strike or engaged in various kinds of agitations, apart from smaller numbers of petty businessmen. Actually, only about 5,000 students in Assam were agitating at that time, and there was no “strike” of government employees in Maharashtra, but only a token protest.

25 Evening English transmission, October 8, 1966.

26 Late evening Indian transmission, October 10, 1966. For an ideological attack on Indian non-violence, see Peking Review, No. 42 (10 14, 1966), p. 34Google ScholarPubMed.

27 Late evening transmission, November 14–15, 1966.

28 Evening transmission, December 10, 1966.

29 Evening transmission, December 24. It is interesting to trace the ideological and geo-political evaluation in Peking of the tribal rebellion in the eastern frontier of India. Throughout 1966 the Nagas and Mizos were waging only an “armed struggle” against the Indian government, without any specific goal. In January 1967, it was the “heroic armed struggle” of the Mizos and the “armed struggle of the Nagas” against the “reactionary Congress government's genocidal policy towards them.” A little later, the Mizos were fighting for “national independence” and the Nagas for “national salvation.” Also, since the beginning of 1967, Peking Radio has quoted Pakistani newspapers on the armed struggle of the Nagas and Mizos, thus fostering Indian suspicion of Pakistan active support for them and indirectly urging Pakistan to do this. In references to the Naga and Mizo rebellions in the Peking Review, no mention has so far been made of the goal of “national independence.”

30 “India: Anti-Tyranny Struggle Rocks Reactionary Rule,” Peking Review, No. 9 (02 24, 1967), p. 29Google Scholar.

31 “After the Indian Elections: A Still More Reactionary Government,” Peking Review, No. 13 (03 24, 1967), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

32 “The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle,” Peking Review, No. 29 (07 14, 1967), p. 25Google Scholar.

33 June 10, 1967 and subsequent transmissions.

34 The strategic importance of this area was not lost on Peking. “Naxalbari is only four miles from Nepal, 30 miles from Sikkim, 14 miles from East Pakistan and 60 miles from China's Tibet. Siliguri is a trading and communications centre which runs the only railway linking Assam with other parts of India.” “The Darjeeling District,” Peking Review, No. 29 (07 14, 1967), p. 25Google Scholar.

35 Ibid., P. 24.

36 “Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher,” Commentator, People's Daily, August 3, 1967, Peking Review, No. 33 (08 11, 1967), p. 21Google Scholar.

37 “Spring Thunder Over India,” People's Daily editorial, July 5, 1967, Peking Review, No. 29 (07 14, 1967), pp. 22–23Google Scholar.

38 “Dozens of Naxalbaris,” Peking Review, No. 31 (07 28, 1967), p. 31Google Scholar.

39 See Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India, Chap. 3.

40 For a fairly full summary of Liu's speech, see Scalapino, Robert A., The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920–1965 (mimeographed), The Rand Corporation, pp. 108–110Google Scholar.

41 Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India, Chaps. 3 and 4.

42 Scalapino, , The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 140–141Google Scholar.

43 “The Soviet renegade revisionist group and China's Khrushchov too, have always preached the ‘parliamentary road’—the so-called ‘Indian road’—in an effort to prevent the Indian people from taking the road traversed by the Chinese revolution to victory.” “Experience Gained by Indian Peasants at the Price of Blood,” Commentator, People's Daily, September 5, 1967, Peking Review, No. 29 (07 14, 1967), p. 25Google Scholar.

44 “Indian Revisionists in Kerala: Serving the Reactionaries,” Peking Review, No. 37 (09 8, 1967), p. 39Google Scholar.

45 “Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher,” Commentator, People's Daily, August 7, 1967, Peking Review, No. 33 (08 11, 1967), p. 21Google Scholar.

46 “Experience Gained by Indian Peasants at the Price of Blood,” Commentator, People's Daily, September 5, 1967, Peking Review, No. 39 (09 22, 1967), p. 19Google Scholar.