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Mao, Lin Biao and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
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In more respects than one, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933–34 against the Jiangxi Soviet may be considered as an important landmark in contemporary Chinese history. From a purely military standpoint, in view of its scope and the particular means used, it is undoubtedly the first modern Chinese campaign. General Jacques Guillermaz points out, quite rightly, that “the methodical nature of the operations, the importance given to fire power and logistical resources, and the tactical use of large and small units all bring the Fifth Campaign closer to certain phases of the 1914–18 war than to traditional Chinese civil wars.” Precisely because of its scope and its methodical nature, the Fifth Campaign, rather than the first four, led Mao, after the Long March, to evolve a theory of guerrilla warfare which “has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy.” This theory, applied first of all to the war against Japan and later to the Third Revolutionary Civil War, was to change the face of China.
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References
1. Jacques Guillermaz, “The fifth encirclement campaign,” unpublished article.
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19. I will return to this point later on.
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38. See Annex, point 23.
39. Jiaofei zhanshi, Vol. III, pp. 353–58; Wuci weijiao zhanshi, Vol. I, pp. 211–31. For a communist account of the battle, see Hekong, Liu, “Donghuashan zhandou” (“The battle of Donghuashan”), Huoxian shang di yinian (A Year at the Front), Jiangxi, 1934, pp. 91–93Google Scholar, Chen Cheng Collection, reel 7. Unlike the other texts of the same kind, which usually emphasize merely the bravery of communist soldiers and cadres, this article describes the case of a battalion commander and two company commanders who “disobeyed the orders of their superiors, hesitated and fled in the opposite direction to that of the front.” It also says that during the battle, “the Seventh and Ninth Regiments did not have complete control over their troops.”
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43. See Annex, point 2.
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50. Wuci weijiao zhanshi, Vol. I, pp. 391–407; Jiaofei zhanshi, Vol. I, p. 397; Zhenhua, Su, “Gaohulao zhandou” (“The battle of Gaohulao”), Xinghuo Hooyuan, II, pp. 186–199Google Scholar; Zhang Zhen, “Lazhuxing gaodi shangdi fangyuzhan” (“The defensive battle on the heights of Lachuhsing”), ibid. pp. 200–205.
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52. Guoping, Yuan, “Xianshi zhandou zhong di zhengzhi gongzuo,” pp. 22–24Google Scholar. It should be noted that the Third Army Group was responsible for the three “victories” mentioned as examples.
53. Dehuai, Peng, “Gei mou shizhang di xin” (“Letter to a division commander”), Geming yu zhanzheng, No. 9 (19 09 1934), pp. 1–6Google Scholar.
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56. Ibid.
57. Chu, Gong, Wo yu hongjun (I and the Red Army) (Hong Kong, 1954), p. 489Google Scholar.
58. Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 489Google Scholar.
59. Fu, Hua, “Duancu tuji di zhanli” (“Examples of short, swift thrusts”), Geming yu zhanzheng, No. 7 (25 07 1934), pp. 1–10Google Scholar. This article gives an eyewitness account, probably that of Otto Braun himself, of two battles, and gives topographical details on the locations. The movements of the troops are described, hour by hour.
60. Ibid. p. 6.
61. Ibid. p. 8.
62. Snow, , Red Star Over China, pp. 401Google Scholar and 412–13.
63. “Resolutions of the Zunyi Conference,” point 13.
64. The extract from Lin Biao's article quoted by Edgar Snow in Random Notes on Red China contains two comments in brackets. The whole article contains about a dozen similar comments. Judging by their authoritarian tone, and by their meaning, which is often the opposite of that expressed by Lin Biao, some of these comments may be supposed to have been made by Otto Braun.
65. “Resolutions of the Zunyi Conference,” points 7, 9 and 11.
66. See Annex, point 12.
67. “Resolutions of the Zunyi Conference,” point 5.
68. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), n.p., 1969, p. 542. Mao made this statement during talks with members of a delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party.
69. “Mao Zetan tongzhi di Sanguozhire” (“Comrade Mao Zetan's passion for the Romance of the Three Kingdoms”), Hongse zhonghua, No. 92 (8 07 1933), p. 6Google Scholar.
70. For a criticism of Lin Biao's military line, from the Yanan period onwards, see the 12 articles in Xuexi Maozhuxi junshi sixiang—pipan Lin Biao zichan jieji junshi luxian (Study the Military Thought of Chairman Mao, Criticize Lin Biao's Bourgeois Military Line), Beijing, 1974.
71. Jun, Gun and Da, Shi, “Jueding xing di lishi zhuanbian—jinian Zunyi huiyi sizhi zhounian” (“A decisive historical change—commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Zunyi Conference”), Lishi yanjiu (Historical Research), No. 1 (1975), pp. 18–19Google Scholar.
72. See Annex, point 12.
73. Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 165–66Google Scholar.
74. Hongse zhonghua, No. 89 (29 06 1933), p. 8Google Scholar. This unsigned article, published in June 1933, was incorporated in Mao's Selected Works in 1951. The version in the Selected Works is dated October 1933 and has been largely rewritten. In the new version, Mao has eliminated in particular all the passages dealing with the agrarian policy of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
* On the “history” and the authorship of this article, see supra, pp. 253–256.
† The meaning of this sentence is not very clear in Chinese.
‡ and § These two comments in brackets were added by Otto Braun.