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Into the Trap of Strengthening State Capacity: China's Tax-Assignment Reform*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Pak K. Lee
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Extract

The Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 1993 decided in principle for a comprehensive reform of central-provincial fiscal relations. Soon after the Plenum, the central government announced that the new fiscal system, known as the tax-assignment system (fenshuizhi), would be implemented nation-wide in 1994. With the aim of providing adequate revenues for government, particularly the central government, by revamping central-provincial revenue-sharing arrangements, the reform is to “[change] the current fiscal contractual responsibility system of local authorities to a tax assignment system …” and to “gradually increase the percentage of fiscal income in the gross national product (GNP) and rationally determine the proportion between central and local fiscal income.”

Type
Research Notes
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 164 , December 2000 , pp. 1007 - 1024
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2000

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References

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