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Implications of China' Reform Experience*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Thomas G. Rawski
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Extract

As reform approaches the end of its second decade, the prospect of an interpretive summary of China's recent economic experience becomes irresistible. The analyst may plausibly hope to separate trend from cycle and pick out key elements in the kaleidoscopic jumble of events. China's unique combination of enormous size, large and unexpected economic gains, unorthodox policies, hybrid institutional structures and formidable challenges to future economic advance adds to the promise of such a review. This article begins with a summary of reform outcomes, followed by discussions of the reform process, the implications of recent reform experience and China's economic prospects. It concludes with a hesitant excursion into the realm of “lessons” from China's reform experience.

Type
China's Transitional Economy
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 144 , December 1995 , pp. 1150 - 1173
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1995

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References

1 Official Chinese statistics undoubtedly overstate the pace of recent growth. Plausible downward adjustments would not alter this or other statements advanced here.

2 In textiles, for example, “fluctuations in international market prices directly affect domestic price movements.” See Yunliang, Dong, “This year's changes in domestic prices of textile products and their consequences,” Jiage lilun yu shijian (Price Theory and Practice), No. 10 (1994), p. 24.Google Scholar

3 One report mentions “bad debts” of “nearly 1 trillion yuan in 1994,40% of the country's total bank loan” ( Xiaozhong, Wang, “Bold, new moves needed to make headway,” China Daily, 9 January 1995, p.4).Google Scholar Another notices: “Statistics indicate that defaulted loans account for 11 to 15% of total bank loans” (“This year's reforms to focus on state enterprises,” China Daily, 30 January 1995, p. 4). A third states that “16.7% or 400 billion… in loans have been defaulted ( Shangwu, Sun, “Workers’ interest is priority,” China Daily, 17 January 1995, p. 4).Google Scholar Any of these figures is high by international standards.

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