The Illusion of Merit in Political Leadership Selection in China

Abstract

In China, government at all levels relies on the specially selected graduates (SSG) scheme to recruit elite university students as future political leaders. This article examines the mechanism of the SSG scheme and the relationship between elite university education and political selection in China. We show that elite education is increasingly stratified, such that graduates from top elite universities have significant selection advantages in the SSG competition and are more likely to be offered incentives and preferences. We argue that taking elite university education as a hard eligibility criterion reinforces the homophily effects in selection of future political elites and strengthens the political influence of top elite universities on China's politics. Further, because poor and lower-class students have little chance of entering elite universities, the SSG does not provide an effective route of upward mobility for non-elite classes. Merit-based political recruitment as a channel of upward mobility for non-elite classes is largely an illusion.

摘要

选调生政策是中国政府用来选拔和培养党政干部后备人选的重要手段。本文通过考察定向选调生制度的运行机制，分析了中国精英教育和政治精英选拔之间的关系。研究结果表明，教育分层有进一步加剧的趋势，精英大学毕业生在选调生选拔中具有明显优势。本文认为，将精英大学的教育经历作为选调生选拔的准入门槛，强化了政治精英群体中的同质化效应，同时也增强了精英大学的政治影响力。此外，我们发现非精英阶层家庭出身的学生很少有机会能进入精英大学，这导致他们想通过择优的政治选拔制度实现社会向上流动，在很大程度上是一种不切实际的幻想。