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The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking as Seen Through Allegorical Articles, 1973–76

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Kenneth Lieberthal
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Mao Tse-tung died on 9 September 1976. On 6 October, with the arrest of four leading members of the Politburo, Hua Kuo-feng became Mao Tse-tung's successor. Since then the Chinese media have vilified the “gang of four” as “splittists” who had worked together for years to divide the Party and promote their own personal fortunes. According to the victors, policy issues had little to do with the activities of this nefarious “gang.” Rather, lust for personal power and desire for wealth alone inspired them to wage partisan warfare within the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.

Type
Recent Political Issues
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The China Quarterly , Volume 71 , September 1977 , pp. 528 - 554
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Copyright © The China Quarterly 1977

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References

1. Fox, Butterfield has summed up this aspect of the literature on the “gang of four,” New York Times, 18 11 1976Google Scholar and 19 December 1976.

2. I explored some dimensions of this in my “Strategies of conflict in China during 1975–1976,” Rand P-5680 (June 1976), reprinted (with updated conclusion) in Contemporary China (November 1976).

3. This aspect of Chinese politics has not been highlighted in the secondary literature. Ahn's, Byung-joon excellent dissertation, Ideology, Policy and Power in Chinese Politics and the Evolution of the Cultural Revolution, 1959–1965 (Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 1972)Google Scholar; provides much of the data on which this analysis might be based. Likewise, Dittmer's, LowellLiu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 61–173Google Scholar is particularly instructive on the process by which Mao constructed the coalition necessary to carry out the cultural revolution. My Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1949–1975 (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975)Google Scholar provides additional information on the different coalitions in various policy arenas prior to the Cultural Revolution.

4. For a more detailed analysis, see my “China in 1975: the internal political scene,” Problems of Communism (May-June 1975), pp. 1–11. Starr, John Bryan reviews the recent literature on factional politics in China in his “From the 10th Party Congress to the premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: the significance of the colour of the cat,” The China Quarterly, No. 67 (09 1976), pp. 479–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

5. Wang for many years commanded Mao's personal bodyguard. Since at least November 1966, he has also served as director of the General Office of the CCP. There is no available record of his having declared himself on any specific policy issues before the purge of the “gang of four.” For a purported summary of his report to the 7 October 1976 Politburo meeting that sanctioned this purge, see the series in Hong Kong Ming pao translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: People's Republic of China (FBIS/PRO), 28 October – 3 November 1976. This series supports the notion that Wang was disturbed more by the radicals' attempts to tamper with Mao's writings than by their other substantive policy stands – see especially FBIS/PRC, 28 October 1976, p. E–3.

6. See e.g. Chien, Shih, “The ‘gang of four’ sabotaged the system of democratic centralism in order to usurp Party and state power,” Hung-ch'i, No. 12 (12 1976)Google Scholar;

7. See e.g. the Jen-min jih-pao editorial of 28 November 1976 – FBIS/PRC, 29 November 1976, pp. E1–4.

8. Chieh-fang chun pao, 22 November 1976.

9. I have excluded some aspects of the debate in the domestic sphere, such as policy towards culture, that are not immediately germane to the foreign policy arena.

10. I use the present tense to discuss the radical and moderate perspectives in the following sections because, as suggested above, all these viewpoints remain salient to the policy debate in Peking. Most of the following analysis is drawn from nine major allegorical articles. I list them together here for ease of reference, given the repetition of articles by a single author:

(1) Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration and counter-restoration in the course of the founding of the Chin dynasty.” Hung-ch'i, No. 11 (1973)Google Scholar; transl. in Peking Review, No. 17 (26 04 1974), pp. 7–10Google ScholarPubMed and ibid. No. 18 (3 May 1974), pp. 19–22.

(2) Hsiao, Liang, “Study ‘On Salt and Iron’ –big polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools in the Middle Western Han Dynasty,” Hung-ch'i, No. 5 (1974)Google Scholar transl. FBlS/PRC (21 May 1974), pp. El–9.

(3) Ssu-ting, Lo, “On the struggle between patriotism and national betrayal during the Northern Sung period,” Hung-ch'i, No. 11 (1974)Google Scholar; transl. in FBIS/PRC, 20 November 1974, pp. El–10.

(4) Hsiao, Liang, “The great historical role of peasant wars,” Jen-min, 20 12 1974Google Scholar; Survey of People's Republic of China Press (SPRCP), No. 5765 (3 01 1975), pp. 135–46Google Scholar;

(5) Workers' Theoretical Group of the Peking Equipment Installation Company and the Editing and Writing Group of “Manuscripts on Modern History of China,” “Wei Yuan's thought against aggression,” Wen-wu, No. 5 (05 1975)Google Scholar; transl., Survey of People's Republic of China Magazines (SPRCM), No. 838 (15 09 1975), pp. 1–14Google Scholar;

(6) Hsiao, Liang, “Criticize Lin Piao's comprador philosophy,” Hung-ch'i, 2 No. 8 (08 1975)Google Scholar; SPRCM, No. 835–36 (25 08–2 09 1975), pp. 12–18Google Scholar;

(7) Miao, An, “Confucianist capitulationism and the traitor Lin Piao,” Jen-min, 12 08 1975, transl. SPRCP, No. 5921 (22 08 1975), pp. 117–80Google Scholar;

(8) Hsiao, Liang, “The Yang Wu movement and the slavish comprador philosophy,” Li-shih yen-chiu, No. 5 (20 10 1975)Google Scholar; transl., SPRCM, No. 7536 (16 12 1975), pp. 1–10Google Scholar;

(9) Hsiao, Liang, “Critique of Lin Piao's capitulationism,” Jen-min, 28 01 1976Google Scholar; Note: In subsequent citations, page references refer to the translations of these articles.

11. For instance, Liang Hsiao condemns those who argue that “resistance involves the risk of national enslavement.” These people “play up the horrors of war and the strain on manpower and material, saying that ‘the aftermath of a major military operation will last for generations,’ and that ‘the mothers can oaly sob while the wives will live in anguish.’…Therefore, they advocate capitulationism…”Hsiao, Liang, “Study On Salt and Iron,” p. E–6Google Scholar; See also, Miao, An (“Corfucianist capitulationism,” p. 172)Google Scholar another radical author, who condemns the argument that, “The weak cannot contend with the strong.”

12. See e.g. Miao, An, “Confucianist capitulationism,” pp. 174–75Google Scholar: “As the Marxists see it, the question lies not in whether the country is big or small, but in Whether or not the line is correct. The revolutionary new things are always small and weak at the beginning, but they are rich in vitality and can grow from the small to the big and from the weak to the strong. On the other hand, although all reactionary and decadent old things are strong in appearance, they are bound to head from the big to the small, from the strong to the weak and finally to their doom. ‘Only the emerging and developing things are invincible.’ … [The moderates, however] view the big and the small, the strong and the weak from their static, isolated and outward appearance, advocate capitulationism to the reactionary decadent forces and docilely lead the life of lackeys under the imposing power of the big country. This is an out-and-out reactionary theory of capitulationism.” (Note: here and elsewhere, words in brackets are my own. Frequently, the only difference between the words in brackets and the original text is verb tense. I have taken the liberty of putting past tense into the present and/or future (as appropriate) to highlight the intended contemporary message of these allegories.)

13. An Miao (ibid. p. 178), for instance, criticizes Lin Piao for allegedly suggesting that the People's Republic had been at least partly at fault in exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations in 1960. An Miao contends that, “The practice of aggression by imperialism was dictated by the law of necessity of monopoly capital.” To argue that China's actions could in any way affect the degree to which the imperialists would commit aggression “… is the logic of imperialism and its lackeys.”

14. Liang Hsiao castigated those who would make concessions of this nature in an article written directly after the Chinese received a Soviet ultimatum over the Soviet helicopter pilots captured by the Chinese in Sinkiang – Hsiao, Liang, “Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–6Google Scholar; In this same piece, Liang Hsiao argues forcefully that concessions cannot possibly diminish the aggressiveness of the U.S.S.R. against China – cf. p. E–7.

15. The Soviet attempt to conquer China through subversion runs like a thread through almost all articles that articulate the radicals' views. It is stated most clearly and forcefully in: Liang Hsiao, “Critique of Lin Piao's capitulationism.” For example, in order to conquer the People's Republic, “Soviet revisionism … must find and foster its agents in our Party to push the revisionist line, to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system in China and to restore capitalism. This is its unchangeable imperialist policy” – ibid. p. 18.

16. Ibid.; Hsiao, Liang, “Criticize Lin Piao's comprador philosophy,” p. 144Google Scholar;

17. An Miao, , “Confucianist capitulationism,” pp. 174–75Google Scholar;

18. I interpret the first section of Liang Hsiao's “Salt and Iron” piece as dealing with the question of whether the government should remove some restrictions (or at least not tighten up restrictions) on material incentives and private economic activities – i.e. wage incentives, private plots, free markets and sideline production. The first of these issues arose in the form of strike activity by many Chinese workers during the period when this article was published and the others appeared in terms of specific guarantees, which were subsequently attacked in the press, contained in the new state constitution adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. Hsiao, Liang (“Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–3)Google Scholar attacks those who advocate maintaining (and broadening?) these rights (on the pretence that this will raise the standard of living of the people) with the argument that, “Obviously, the ‘people’ for whom those virtuous learned men [the moderates] tried to gain some profit were not the broad masses of working people, but local princes, big businessmen, and slaves-owners … it would be only those local tyrannical forces who would gain profit; the state would achieve nothing.” In non-allegorical terms, the beneficiaries of these policies would be the local bourgeois elements, whose interests are not at all identical with those of the Chinese Communist state. The guarantees appear in articles 5, 7 and 9 of the new state constitution (text: Peking Review, No. 4 (24 01 1975), pp. 12–17Google ScholarPubMed); major criticisms of these guarantees and their long-term effects are contained in: Wen-yuan, Yao, “On the social basis of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique,” Peking Review, No. 10 (7 03 1975), pp. 5–10Google Scholar; and Ch'un-ch'iao, Chang, “On exercising all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie,” Peking Review, No. 14 (4 04 1975), pp. 5–11, among numerous other articlesGoogle Scholar;

19. See e.g. Hsiao, Liang, “Criticize Lin Piao's comprador philosophy,”p. 18Google Scholar; Hsiao, Liang, “The Yang Wu movement,” p. 9Google Scholar – “When we uphold the policy of ‘independence and initiative’ and ‘self-reliance,’ it does not mean that we reject the study and importation of foreign advanced experience and technical equipment. The question is: Do we ‘make foreign things serve China’ with a view of catching up with and overtaking them? Or do we copy them blindly and crawl behind others at a snail's pace?”

20. The most comprehensive and cogent formulation of this argument appears in Liang Hsiao, “The Yang Wu movement,” passim.

21. An Miao, , “Confucianist capitulationism,” p. 174Google Scholar;

22. An Miao (ibid. p. 178) castigates Lin Piao's belief that, “We cannot depend on the infantry but have to rely on the air force, atomic weapons and missiles.” He argues that this led Lin to worship Soviet nuclear power to the degree that Lin's ultimate bertayal of China and flight to the U.S.S.R. became a virtual certainty. See ibid. p. 179.

23. Ibid. China's real security resides in her “revolutionary people who are united and persist in struggle.”

24. All radicals argue that the system emerging from the Cultural Revolution enjoys broad popular support, and any attempts at “restoration and retrogression” would cause popular strife and dissension. The linking of one's attitude towards the Cultural Revolution and foreign policy is portrayed most explicitly in Hsiao, Liang, “Critique of Lin Piao's capitulationism.” See e.g. p. 19Google Scholar;

25. In Liang Hsiao's words. “One who practises revisionism will invariably be a capitulationist,” ibid. p. 13. The moderates likewise argue that domestic and foreign policies are inseparably linked, as explained below.

26. Hsiao, Liang, “Study ‘O n Salt and Iron’,” p. E–6Google Scholar;

27. Liang Hsiao, “Th e Yang Wu movement.”

28. An Miao, , “Confucianist capitulationism,” pp. 172–73Google Scholar;

29. Ibid.

30. Hsiao, Liang, “The Yang Wu movement,” p. 5Google Scholar;

31. E.g. Liang Hsiao (ibid. p. 2) argues that the “Yang Wu” programme, which the author uses as a surrogate for the contemporary programme of the moderates, “was entirely a product of the collusion between the feudal forces [moderates] and the imperialists.”

32. As An Miao, (“Confucianist capitulationism,” p. 179)Google Scholar put this case in discussing Lin Piao, “Because he wanted to practise revisionism in China, he was extremely isolated among the people. Awed by the strong might of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he felt that his own strength was inadequate and had necessarily to form an alliance with international revisionism.” See also, Hsiao, Liang, “Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–6Google Scholar: “… people advocating splittism and retrogression will, because of their own unpopularity and weakness, invariably look for backstage bosses or seek assistance from foreign aggressive forces by serving as traitors or lackeys in order to undermine the country's solidarity.”

33. In Hsiao's, Liang (“Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–2)Google Scholar words, they would try to “carry out a struggle against the political and economic interests of the newly-emerging forces.”

34. This fear partly explains the prominence given in the spring of 1975 and subsequently to Mao's, quote, “Our country at present practises a commodity system, the wage system is unequal, too, as in the eight-grade wage scale, and so forth. These can only be restricted under the dictatorship of the proletariat. So if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system,” Peking Review, No. 14 (4 04 1975), pp. 7–8Google Scholar;

35. Hsiao, Liang, “Critique of Lin Piao's capitulationism,” p. 17Google Scholar;

36. Ssu-ting, Lo (“On the struggle,” p. E–1)Google Scholar describes this threat as that of “predatory, aggressive wars” launched from the North of China. The radicals, however, “… give no thought to the threat of national extinction …,” ibid. p. E–6.

37. Lo Ssu-ting (ibid. p. E–2) castigates those whose programme “squeezes the people without reservation … [which] sharpens the class contradictions and confronts [the government] … with the grave situation in which ‘it has to worry about the society being destroyed at home and about invasions by the barbarians abroad’.”

38. See, e.g. imperialists have an “‘unscrupulous profiteering’ nature which makes them commit economic aggression with the backing of violence, ‘accompanying commercial activities with military activities, making trade and armed force accompany each other’.” Workers Theoretical Group, “Wei Yuan's thought,” p. 2.

39. The Wei Yuan article, for instance, notes that those who oppose importing foreign military technology and who cling to the current system, “once faced with the armed armada of the foreign powers [will be] scared out of their wits and fall on their knees,” ibid. p. 5.

40. Ibid. p. 7.

41. Ibid. pp. 4–6.

42. Pravda, 3 May 1974.

43. Hsiao, Liang, “Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–6Google Scholar;

44. “… foreign aggressors [bully] the weak but [yield] to might. ‘Might inspires fear, and only with that [do] they respect us and abide by our rules.’ ‘Favours [i.e. concessions] and righteousness [i.e. ideological purity] … only whet their aggressive appetite.’ To halt aggression, the only way [is] to ‘counter armed force with armed force’.” See “Wei Yuan's thought,” p. 4. The available literature on the two major Soviet invasions of neighbouring countries provides considerable support for this “hard”view. The Politburo wavered back and forth before launching the invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) and in each case seems to have opted for military intervention only when the chances of active resistance appeared minimal. On this vacillation see, for instance, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 415–19 (for Hungary)Google Scholar; and Valenta, Jiri, “Soviet decisionmaking and the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968,” Studies in Comparative Communism (Spring–Summer 1975), pp. 147–73Google Scholar;

45. The “Wei Yuan” piece (p. 5) argues that “… troops should be enlisted on a highly selective basis, trained strictly and maintained rationally – in other words, only when troops [are] trained regularly in the spirit of fighting courageously and skilfully [can] their combat efficiency be raised.”

46. Ssu-ting, Lo, “On the struggle,” p. E–7Google Scholar;

47. This issue was first raised by Lo Ssu-ting, ibid. pp. E1–2, E7–8. The radical rejoinder appeared in Hsiao, Lìang, “The great historical role,” pp. 143–44Google Scholar; The “Wei Yuan” piece then refuted the radicals' argument. See Workers' Theoretical Group, “Wei Yuan's thought,” pp. 7–9.

48. Ssu-ting, Lo (“On the struggle,” p. E–2)Google Scholar castigates the radicals for allowing a “decline in the … relations of production” and argues the need to increase the economic and military might of the country.

49. Hsiao, Liang (“Study ‘On Salt and Iron’,” p. E–8)Google Scholar sarcastically sums up this argument by saying that “According to them, ‘good deeds to people [are] rewarded by heaven’ so that even the weather [is] always fine.”

50. Yuan, Wei (Workers Theoretical Group, “Wei Yuan's thought,” p. 5)Google Scholar insists that “Agricultural development be slowed down to make way for the urgent development of industry … [and] the armaments industry should be turned into civilian industries … the development of big industry [has] wider prospects with civilian production.”

51. In the words of the article “Wei Yuan's thought” (p. 12): “By training and using capable and talented people, the military and political establishments of the nation will be greatly improved. … [The moderates] actively advocate the idea of educating the people and cultivating talents.” The radicals, by contrast, suffer from two diseases which must be cured: “ignorance of the people” and “waste of human talent” (ibid.). See also Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 17, p. 9Google Scholar;

52. “… a wise ruler … must reward those who render meritorious service and appoint the capable to official posts. Those who work hard get bigger emoluments, those who render more meritorious service enjoy superior rank, and those who can govern a larger number of people become higher officials,” Lo Ssu-ting, ibid. p. 9.

53. The moderate argument asserts that China needs unity to maintain its independence but that there can be no unity as long as the radicals retain a toehold in the political system: Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 18, pp. 19–22Google Scholar;

54. According to Lo Ssu-ting (ibid. pp. 20–21), restoring the radicals to executive positions throughout the bureaucracy would produce a situation where cadres “‘would attack one another like enemies’ and the former situation of division and chaotic fighting … would be restored. … [Moreover, the radicalsare] reluctant to quit the stage of history of [their] own volition … they should be suppressed because they [are] creating public opinion for staging a restoration. … [The only proper solution is] disbanding their gang.” The other elements in this argument are contained in ibid. pp. 19–22; they also suffuse the other articles that present a moderate perspective.

55. Ssu-ting, Lo, “On the struggle,” p. E–5Google Scholar warns of this by recounting that, “After the death of the Emperor … the diehards … came back to assume the reins of power with the support of the Empress Dowager. …

56. “The ‘Son of Heaven’ [cares] only for ‘his own personal power and interests,’ and [gives] no thought to state affairs; officials, civil and military, [open] the doors and [bow] with hands folded. … How [can] victory be won with such corrupt politics? How [can we] avoid being humiliated by the enemies?” See Workers' Theoretical Group, “Wei Yuan's thought.” p. 8.

57. “Wei Yuan's thought” (p. 12) accuses the radicals of “… deception, cowardice, conspiracy and manipulation of power” and castigates “… the bureaucratic practices of officials who were unrealistic and hypocritical.” Ssuting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 17, pp. 7–10Google Scholar makes many of the same points.

58. “Wei Yuan's thought,” p. 11. Ssu-ting, Lo (”On the struggle,” p. E–2)Google Scholar charges that the radicals “squeeze the people without reservation. This sharpens the class contradictions and national crisis and confronts the [government] … with the grave situation in which it has to worry about the society being destroyed at home and about invasions by the barbarians abroad.”

59. The radicals argue that “the trouble lies not without but within … [and thus they] guard against the people with greater care than against bandits.” The moderates know, by contrast, that “The principal enemies [are] … not the people but the foreign aggressors.” “Wei Yuan's thought,” p. 7.

60. Stressing ideology “to rule our state … will lead to its doom.” Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 17, p. 8Google Scholar;

61. This is the major theme of Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 18, pp. 19–22Google Scholar;

62. The “Wei Yuan's thought” article (p. 19) expresses this as follows: “They [choose] to capitulate and resort to treason rather than change ‘the laws of their ancestors,’ the slightest tampering with which was absolutely forbidden.”

63. Ssu-ting, Lo, “Struggle between restoration,” Peking Review, No. 18, esp pp. 20–21Google Scholar;

64. The major article articulating this theme appeared during the second day of Secretary Kissinger's four-day visit to China in October 1975: Liang Hsiao, “The Yang Wu movement.” The western press at the time noted the unusual coolness that marked Secretary Kissinger's welcome in Peking.

65. Text in Peking Review, No. 1 (2 01 1976), p. 7Google ScholarPubMed;

66. Wu Han was one of the first victims of the Cultural Revolution. He has not been rehabilitated.

67. For such criticism of the “gang,” see e.g. Chengchow, , Honan Provincial Service in Mandarin, 15 November 1976 – FBIS/PRC, 16 11 1976, p. H–5Google Scholar;

68. In more detail, the radicals through Yao Wen-yuan had editorial control over Jen-min jih-pao and Hung-ch'i. Clearly some constraints operated, however, to limit what they could publish in these media. Given Chu Mu-chih's purge in the summer of 1976 and his rehabilitation after the arrest of the radicals, the “gang of four” evidently could not dominate New China News Agency for most of the period under review. The journals of Peking and Tsinghua Universities did provide forums for the radicals, as did the journal Li-shih yen-chiu. The pattern of their control over other university media and provincial radio broadcasts is less clear, although it is likely that both Shanghai and Liaoning radios consistently broadcast their views. Teng Hsiao-p'ing evidently planned to sponsor a new journal that would present the views of the moderates, but he was overthrown before he could bring this project to fruition. The radicals had published such a journal since late 1973 – Hsüeh-hsi yü p'i-p'an, published in Shanghai.

69. For a listing of allegorical articles by author see: Bibliography of Literature Written in the People's Republic of China During the Campaign to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, July 1973–December 1974 (CIA: Reference Aid, A CR 75–40, 10 1975), pp. 1–220Google Scholar;

70. For example, Chiang Ch'ing is alleged to have convened a conference in March 1976 at which she praised Empress Lu and Wu Tse-tien and instructed a writing group controlled by the “gang of four” to draft articles that praised these historical figures in order to prepare public opinion for having a woman take power: Changsha Hunan Provincial Service in Mandarin, 11 November 1976 – FBIS/PRC, 12 November 1976, p. H–1.

71. “Liang Hsiao” has now been identified as a writing group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities that served as a spokesman for the radicals: Hong Kong Hsin wan pao, 4 November 1976 – FBIS/PRC, 9 November 1976, N–l; Jen-min, 14 November 1976 – FBIS/PRC, 16 November 1976, E–4. Lo Ssu-ting, unlike Liang Hsiao, wrote articles that appeared inconsistent over time on the basic points at issue. In late 1973, as indicated above, he articulated the anti-radical position on all key issues, while some of his later writings seem to edge over towards the radical side. The Chinese media now target Lo Ssu-ting as a radical-backed writing group at Futan University. A number of “his” specific articles have been denounced, including the two used as sources for moderate views in the earlier sections of this article. My own review of Lo's articles, however, convinces me that the situation is at a minimum considerably more complicated than the Chinese suggest. A number of Lo Ssu-ting articles clearly and strongly articulate the views of the moderates, and I use selections from these pieces in this analysis accordingly. I do not know what political twists and turns have produced the current negative judgment on Lo Ssu-ting, but this development should sensitize analysts to the danger of “instant revisionist history” during the current succession period in China. On identification of the authors of allegorical articles in the Chinese media, see inter alia: Hangchow Chekiang Provincial Service in Mandarin, 29 11 1976Google Scholar – FBIS/PRC, 6 December 1976, G–2; NCNA, 29 January 1977 – FBIS/PRC, 31 January 1977, E–15; Peking, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 14 01 1977Google Scholar – (SPRCP), No. 6283, 17 February 1977, pp. 131–147; and Hong Kong Hsin wan pao, 4 November 1977 – 9 November 1976, N1–2.

72. My analysis in this paragraph conflicts with that of Goldman, Merle in her “China's anti-Confucian campaign, 1973–74,” The China Quarterly, No. 63 (09 1975), pp. 435–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

73. As the citations in the preceding sections illustrate, the debate waged through the allegorical articles then went well beyond the confines of this one campaign.