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Factions in Chinese Military Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

William L. Parish Jr
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In Chinese Studies, three themes have acquired new emphasis since the Cultural Revolution: first, the view that China is not a simple monolithic state but one with diversified interest groups and potential internal conflict. Second, the influence of the military throughout society and the extent to which its particular interests and internal conflicts shape the nature of government and society. Third, the fact that bureaucratism, though attacked in the Cultural Revolution, is likely to continue shaping Chinese society and to be a perennial threat to revolutionary ideals. This article touches on each of these themes – first, by an analysis of personal loyalty groups during the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair and, second, by an account of the changing nature of Chinese bureaucracies and of how these changes impinge on factional politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 56 , December 1973 , pp. 667 - 699
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1973

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References

1. “The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics,” The China Quarterly (CQ) 37 (1969), pp. 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; The CQ article has since appeared in revised form as chapter 12 of Whitson's more comprehensive The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973)Google Scholar; The revised chapter is essentially the same as the 1969 article and references in this paper are to the original article. Although in Whitson's most recent work (which was published after this article was first written) there are important changes in his treatment of regional competition, the critical standards developed in this paper can still be applied. Whitson's is not the only faction view of Chinese military politics. Though often based on a much more eclectic classification of officers into various factions, analysis based on factional interpretations also dominates publications such as Studies on Chinese Communism (Taipeih) and the China News Summary (Hong Kong).

2. Whitson's, figures (“The Field Army,” p. 10)Google Scholar suggest that only 14 per cent of the officers moved from one system to another. But once we exclude those officers whose Field Army background is simply unknown, this proportion is nearer 20 per cent In a separate calculation using 342 biographies from Chen-hsia, Huang, Mao's Generals (Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968)Google Scholar; I found that an even larger percentage (28%) had transferred from one Field Army to another before 1949. If one considers only those who joined the army before 1936—according to Whitson, these are the ones who fill the top military posts today—then the percentage of officers who have transferred is even higher (38%).

3. Gittings, John, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar and “Army-Party relations in the light of the Cultural Revolution,” in Lewis, John W. (ed.), Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Though not always so explicitly stated, the assumption of national military unity is present in other authors as well: See Nelsen, Harvey, “Military forces in the Cultural Revolution,” CQ 51 (1972), pp. 444–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar; By his emphasis on professional-political conflict, Joffe seems to assume that regional and Field Army conflict is trivial. See, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, East Asian Monographs No. 19, 1965)Google Scholar; Samuel Griffith also places his emphases elsewhere. See, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967)Google ScholarPubMed;

4. Gittings, , “Army-Party relations,” pp. 383–84Google Scholar;

5. For example, Klein and Hager find that service together during the Long March is a major factor in survival on the 1969 9th Central Committee. Klein, Donald W. and Hager, L. B., “The Ninth Central Committee,” CQ 45 (1971), pp. 39–40Google Scholar;

6. There are two sources of randomness in the data. First, there is behavioural randomness with respect to Field Annies, or appointment of individuals without regard to their Field Army background. Second, there is sampling error resulting from too few officers being known by name and background. Sampling error is not too serious in 1966 when about 77% of the elite are known by name and background, but much more serious in 1967 when only about 54% and in 1968 when 62% of the elite are thus known (see Whitson, , “The Field Army,” pp. 8–9, 14 and 18–19)Google Scholar; Nevertheless, it is the behavioural randomness which is of greater interest.

7. As we are interested in the number of experienced leaders rather than the total strength of each Field Army, the number of army groups and columns is a more pertinent index than the total number of men in each Field Army. Because the leaders of the higher level army groups could not have staffed all post-1954 positions by themselves, Table 1 combines army groups with columns to more nearly estimate the total leadership pool available for redistribution. The 1949 distribution of columns is similar to that for 1950 (see Ta-k'ai, Chin and Ta-chun, Chang, Chung-kung chün-shih p'ou-shih (Hong Kong: Freedom Press, 1954, pp. 3–4)Google Scholar;

8. The 1950 and later distribution cannot correspond exactly, because (1) the 1950 distribution is for units rather than men; and (2) it represents positions filled by men with careers in more than one Field Army whereas the 1966 and 1967 distributions exclude such men. Also, without separate information on who was newly added in 1967 and who was left over from 1967, we cannot give an exact test of the correspondence between the 1966 and 1967 distributions – they are not independent selections. However, they appear to be within the ranges one would expect of random selections from a single pool of experienced officers.

9. See Gittings, , The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 274–79Google Scholar;

10. This is but one of several migration laws that might explain official transfers. See Bogue, Donald J., “Internal migration,” in Hauser, P. M. and Duncan, D. (eds.), The Study of Population (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959)Google Scholar;

11. These regions had a few additional posts with an incumbent whose name or background was unknown. Because these “mystery figures” do not appear in the Field Army distributions, they are deleted from the number of total posts. Canton was the fourth largest region in 1966. Canton and Lanchow were the other large regions in 1967. An advocate of the hostage and observer theory might argue that the number of positions is not immutably fixed but varies with the desire of opposing Field Armies to send observers into a particular region. If they want to send more observers to Peking, they will demand that more positions be created just to accommodate their men. Therefore, the number of positions is the result rather than the cause of more outside observers. Such an argument would need also to demonstrate that there were more officers in Mukden, Peking and Nanking than seem justified by the numbers and kinds of troops in, or the strategic importance of, each region.

12. See example four in Mosteller, Frederick, “Association and estimation in contingency tables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 63 (1968), pp. 1–28Google Scholar; Also Pullum, Thomas W., “What can mathematical models tell us about occupational mobility?,” Sociological Inquiry 40 (1970), pp. 258–280CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

13. Table 2 somewhat under-estimates the number of outsiders in Peking. The 5th Field Army with only 23 officers for 13 regions, had former members in only five regions. Therefore, by the adjustment procedure, when one “assigns” 54 officers to the 5th Field Army, each of these five regions must “accept” a large number of officers from the 5th Field Army. Peking must accept a particularly large number, leaving no room for outsiders. In a natural setting, if the 5th Field Army had this many new officers, they would probably not be assigned to just five regions but would be spread more widely. An alternative adjustment procedure is to leave the 5th Field Army with its original 23 officers while equalizing the other Field Armies. Under this procedure, most regions appear as in the first adjustment, but Peking ends up with 10 outsiders (instead of 5) and Lanchow with 5 outsiders (instead of 7). The most reasonable adjustment lies somewhere between the extremes of assigning the 5th Field Army its original 23 or a full 54 officers. On such a basis I conclude that in 1966 Peking is still less attractive to outsiders than Chengtu, Wuhan, and Tsinan, about as attractive as Mukden, and only slightly more attractive than Fuchow and Lanchow.

14. The reader who finds such adjustments to be just so much statistical hocus pocus can perform a simple calculation to corroborate the results. Using the actual side of Table 2, calculate the percentage from each Field Army in a Region – i.e., percentage the table horizontally. These percentages can then be viewed as a first approximation of what the officer distribution would be if each region had exactly 100 positions to be filled.

15. The aggregate nature of the data may, however, obscure some faction-like activities before 1967. The data could be analysed by shorter time periods such as 1955 to 1959 or 1959 to 1966. It could also be analysed separately by military region, district, and corps appointments. The post-1967 analysis shows that pinpointing crucial time periods and crucial appointments can be more important than having a large aggregate number of cases.

16. While technically an incorrect designation for those units known as the North-China Field Army during 1948, the term “5th” Field Army is a useful shorthand and has gained wide currency.

17. On the dating of downfall, Yang's, see Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) 4172, p. 2Google Scholar;

18. See “An important speech by Vice-Chairman Lin at reception of army cadres on 25 March,” Kung-lien (Workers' Alliance) (Canton) (04 1968)Google Scholar; in SCMP 4173, pp. 1–5; “Important speeches by central leaders at 100,000 man rally in Peking on 27 March,” Chu-ying tung-fang-hung (Pearl Films' East is Red) (Canton), 20 (04 1968)Google Scholar; in SCMP 4172 and 4168; “A record of Yang Ch'eng wu's counter-revolutionary crimes,” Chung-ta chan-pao (Chung-shan University Cotmbat News) (Canton), 47 (14 04 1968)Google Scholar; in SCMP 4169; “The plague god,” in Hung hao-chüeh (Red Bugle) (Canton) (06 1968)Google Scholar; in Current Background (CB) 857; and Wang, Ting, Tui Yang Ch'eng-wu shih-chien ti ch'u-pu kuan-ch'a (Preliminary Observations on the Yang Ch'eng-wu Affair), Special subject research report No. 1 (Hong Kong: Contemporary China Research Institute, 1968)Google Scholar;

19. SCMP 4173, p. 2.

20. SCMP 4172, 4168 and 4173.

21. SCMP 4169, p. 5.

22. Dating is based on appearances in the People's Daily, New China News Agency releases, provincial radio broadcasts, and Red Guard publications as recorded in the U.S. Consulate General biographical file, Hong Kong. The former 1st political commissar of Mukden was last noted in that post on 7 January 1968. Following this, P'an Fu-sheng appeared as political commissar of PLA units stationed in Mukden on 18 January 1968 and then under the more specific title of political commissar of the Mukden Military Region on several occasions between May and August 1968. After 17 March 1968 (at which time the Yang Ch'eng-wu case was presumably already under debate), P'an Fu-sheng shared the political commissar position with Tseng Shao-shan – an alumnus of the 2nd Field Army just like the Mukden Region commander, Ch'en Hsi-lien. Eventually, P'an Fu-sheng was completely supplanted by Tseng.

23. SCMP 4182, p. 1; “Premier Chou speaks on opposing Rightist opportunism,” Kuang-chou kung-tai hui (Canton Workers Representative Congress), 15 April 1968, p. 4.

24. Chen-hsia, Huang, Mao's Generals, p. 134Google Scholar; Chung-yen, Kao, Changes of Personnel in Communist China, 1959–1969 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970), p. 68Google Scholar;

25. Ch'en Hsi-lien, another of the supposed objects of Ch'eng-wu's, Yang schemes, was in the 8 February Kirin delegation (SCMP 4186, pp. 6–16)Google Scholar; Yang Ch'eng-wu was at none of the above four meetings.

26. “Fifteen charges against big conspirator and traitor Yü Li-chin,” Canton, Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao (Reference Material) 1 (07 1968) in SCMP 4222, p. 2Google Scholar;

27. SCMP 4173, p. 2.

28. Though both Yang Te-chih and his new political commissar, Wang Hsiaoyü, had spent time in the 5th Field Army, their disagreements apparently continued into 1969 (“Mao Tse-tung's speech before the 1st Plenum of the 9th Central Committee,” in 1970 Yearbook on Chinese Communism (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1970), p. 7:4Google Scholar). Prior to Yang Ch'eng-wu's dismissal, a total of six former members of the 5th Field Army appeared as new commanders or 1st political commissars of Military Regions. Other than the four referred to in the text, these included regional commanders in Wuhan and Peking. The puzzle is why these last two regions were not also mentioned in Lin Piao's charges against Yang Ch'eng-wu. There is a possibility, though only a distant one, that because in these two regions both commander and political commissar were overturned, no one was left with sufficient prestige to be readily offended or readily heard out at the Centre.

29. According to Ch'ing, Chiang, Ch'eng-wu, Yang feigned illness after 8 March in order better to plot behind the scenes (SCMP 4172, p. 6)Google Scholar; He last appeared in public on 8 March (Wang, Ting, Tui Yang Ch'eng-wu, p. 1)Google Scholar;

30. All officers with some background information were assigned to a Field Army. Those with a “double career” were assigned to the Field Army with which they had served longest or most recently. The assignments do not exactly replicate Whitson's assignments and should be re-checked with better background information.

31. For example, in the Canton Military Region six military representatives were appointed to the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee before 8 March 1968 and a total of six to the Kwangsi and Hunan Committees after that date. Thus, pre- and post-8 March appointments were perfectly balanced. Military appointments were perfectly balanced in three regions (Canton, Mukden, and Fuchow), unbalanced by only one or two officers in two regions (Kunming and Lanchow), and seriously unbalanced in only one region (Shantung, with one military appointment before 8 March and six appointments afterwards).

32. While noting two limitations, we can use a binomial test for an approximate estimate of how often the above results would occur by chance. The first limitation is that as used here the test is for unlimited or very large populations whereas the officers were drawn from a relatively small officer pool. However, the loss in precision from this limitation is likely to be small (see Kendall, Maurice G. and Stuart, Alan, The Advanced Theory of Statistics (London: Charles Griffith, 1958), I, 224)Google Scholar; The second limitation is that the test is normally appropriate to situations such as coin flipping where there are only two possible outcomes – heads or tails. Still, we can conceive of Yang Ch'eng-wu viewing the world as divided between only two kinds of people – 5th Reid Army people and non-5th Field Army people. The question then becomes: was the number of 5th Field Army personnel selected so large as to suggest conscious manipulation or would such a number have appeared quite often by chance alone? The 1966 distribution gives the proportion expected in a large number of random selections (14%). The 1968 distribution gives the observed proportion (33%). When choosing 30 officers, such a difference between expected and observed would occur less than once in a hundred by chance (see Harvard University Computation Laboratory, Tables of the Cumulative Binomial Probability Distribution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1955)Google Scholar; Thus, the case that Yang was manipulating appointments is strengthened. In contrast, after 8 March the proportions are very near what one would expect by chance.

33. The 1st to 5th Field Annies had 3, 5, 3,1, and 0 respectively of their former members removed from office. Two other demoted officers had spent equal time in the 2nd and 4th Field Armies. Another had moved among several Field Armies. Two officers had served concurrently as commander and political commissar, and the incumbent of one 1966 position is unknown. Between 1966 and 1968, the 1st to 5th Field Armies had 0, 3, 2, 6, and 6 officers respectively appointed to regional command and commissar posts. One officer of unknown historical background was also appointed.

34. Two appointments cannot be identified by date. Another cannot be identified as to historical background.

35. These probabilities hold regardless of whether the 5th Field Army got three or four appointments in period two. To the extent that the local region was the recruitment base, the 5th Field Army could have expected 12% of all appointments in period two. This 12% is the average proportion of 5th Field Army officers in the five regions of Peking, Nanking, Tsinan, Canton, and Mukden in 1966. Similarly, in period three, the 4th Field Army could have expected 23%. Because during this period two officers (both commander and political commissar) were appointed in Tibet and Sinkiang, 23% is the average 4th Field Army representation of Kunming, of Tibet taken twice, and of Sinkiang taken twice. To the extent that all officers in the country were the recruitment base, the expected proportions for the 5th and 4th Field Armies were 8 and 33% respectively (see 1966 column of Table1). Since we rely only on public appearances, it could be that Yang became secretary-general long before September 1967. However, even if we combine periods one and two, the expected proportion from the regional pool is. 16 and from the national pool is. 08, and the selection of four out of ten officers from the 5th Field Army would occur no more than six times in a hundred by chance. One could also conjecture that it was only after the street fighting and the Wuhan Incident in the summer of 1967 that Yang Ch'eng-wu became seriously worried about political order and accordingly began to promote officers he thought he could trust. If so, the proper statistical period would still be approximately August 1967 to March 1968. (As in n. 34, probabilities are based on the binomial distribution).

36. SCMP 4173, p. 3.

37. The figure six out of ten comes from Whitson's, revised chapter in The Chinese High Command, p. 513Google Scholar; On page 20 of the original China Quarterly article, Whitson lists three additional arguments for how Lin was spreading his influence or maintaining power balances in the Military Regions during 1968. Unfortunately, these arguments rest on a statistical artifact caused by including officers of unknown background in the percentages. On this problem, see Davis, James A. and Jacobs, Ann M., “Tabular presentation,” International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. 15, p. 500Google Scholar; Zeisel, Hans, Say It With Figures (New York: Harper, 1947)Google Scholar;

38. As before, the probability is given by the binomial distribution.

39. For an argument that central control persisted, see Nelsen, , “Military forces in the Cultural Revolution,” pp. 444–474Google Scholar; It could be argued that Lin wanted to increase his regional strength, but Yang Ch'eng-wu deprived him of that opportunity. When things came to a showdown in 1971, Lin was without the regional support he needed for survival. Such an argument, however, would need the support of additional and, as yet, unavailable, evidence.

40. For example, see Gittings, , The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 282–88Google Scholar;

41. For the 1st to 5th Field Annies, membership was 1, 1, 0, 3, and 2 officers respectively. One other member, Yeh Chien-ying, was historically associated with Mao and the Party Centre. Another had spent equal time in the 2nd and 5th Field Armies.

42. Though never officially announced, the administrative unit was probably set up in April just after Yang Ch'eng-wu's downfall. Two of its members, Huang Yung-sheng and Liu Hsien-ch'üan, moved to Peking at this time. On 20 April 1968, another officer (Ch'iu Hui-tso) for the first time appeared designated as a member of the administrative unit of the MAC (Canton, , Tzu-liao chuan-chi (Special collection of materials) in SCMM 631, pp. 1 and 17)Google Scholar; Despite the high official positions of the others in the unit, Lin's wife, Yeh Ch'ün, may have taken over as executive secretary for Lin personally and for the administrative unit In 1971, Mao complained, “I have never agreed with having a man's wife (lao p'o) as head of his office. In Lin Piao's office, Yeh Ch'iin was the head. When any of the other four [Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-r/eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso] wanted to refer anything to Lin Piao, they had to go through her.” Quoted in “Notes from Chairman Mao's talks with leading comrades during inspection trips to outlying areas (mid-August to 12 September, 1971),” CCP Central Committee Document, Chungfa 12 (1972)Google Scholar; translated in China News Analysis 896 (6 10 1972), p. 5Google Scholar;

43. Except for the assumption that Lo Tung-huan was a member of the MAC standing committee between 1961 and 1963, MAC and Politburo personnel lists follow Ch'ung-yen, Kao, Changes of Personnel in Communist China, 1959–1969 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970)Google Scholar; For a discussion of increasing 4th Field Army presence in other high military offices see Wang, Ting, Chung-kung wen-ko yü-tung chung te tsu-chih yü jen-shih wen-t'i (Organization and Personnel Questions During the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Contemporary China Research Institute, 1970), pp. 155–172Google Scholar; Although his lists of office holders do not always agree with other sources, there is enough overlap for the trends he depicts to be accepted as correct.

44. Liu is not mentioned in current documents attacking Lin Piao and his group. However, we cannot be certain whether he actively resisted Lin and was therefore not purged or whether, for other reasons, he had been removed from the MAC prior to September. From 1 August 1971 and throughout the following year, Liu appeared two or three times per month at cultural events in the role of deputy leader of the Cultural Group of the State Council. During the whole year, he appeared in a military role only two or three times and then only as an undesignated “military leader in the Peking area.” Though committing no serious offence, he could have been demoted shortly before the Lin Piao affair.

45. The following quotations are from “Notes from Chairman Mao's talks.”

46. Chang's, first appearance is in the Peoples Daily of 18 05 1971Google Scholar; Though appointed before August 1970, Fu-chih, Hsieh and Teh-sheng, Li may have been part of the “sand” mixed into the administrative unit See the People's Daily, 9 09 1969Google Scholar and Chung-kung nien-pao, 1972 (Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1972) (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1972), p. 5:12Google Scholar; The latter source lists a number of other military appointments dating back to the time of the 9th Central Committee meeting in 1969 that were supposedly engineered by Mao to confound Lin. These appointments also purportedly show the influence of yet another faction – the 3rd Field Army faction led by Hsu Shih-yu. However, the men involved are characterized less by service together in the 3rd Field Army before 1949 than by service in the Nanking and Fuchow Military Regions after 1949. Also, these men have other points to recommend them besides service under Hsü Shih-yu. As corps commanders, men such as Li Teh-sheng were very attentive to the Centre's needs during the Cultural Revolution (see Nelsen, , “Military forces,” p. 469)Google Scholar;

47. Cheng, with 2nd and 5th Field Army connexions, assumed office on or shortly before 8 March 1968. Conceivably he was Yang Ch'eng-wu's last appointment and, accordingly, suspect. Since Teng is of 2nd and 3rd Field Army background, some analysts will see his appointment as yet another example of increasing 3rd Field Army power.

48. Chung-kung nien-pao, 1972, p. 5:12; Issues and Studies 8 (09 1972), p. 72Google Scholar;

49. People's Daily, 25 December 1970; NCNA, 30 June 1972, cited in Issues and Studies 8 (09 1972), p. 72Google Scholar;

50. “Notes from Chairman Mao's talks.”

51. On appearances and disappearances of military officials since September 1971, see China News Summary 428 (27 07 1972)Google Scholar and 429 (3 August 1972); China News Analysis 892 (1 09 1972)Google Scholar; Issues and Studies 9 (10 1972), p. 82Google ScholarPubMed; Hsiang-chih, Yeh, “An analysis of the current mainland situation,” Chung-kung yenchiu 6 (09 1972), pp. 6–8Google Scholar; There is a dangerous tendency in some of these writings to attribute any change after 1971 to the Lin Piao affair.

52. In his 1971 talks, Mao criticized excess military involvement in civil affairs (“Notes from Chairman Mao's talks”).

53. At one point, Issues and Studies stated that 47 of the 200 missing officials were proven members of “Lin's faction.” The total number for whom historical background was known was not stated, but 47 seems almost below the 4th Field Army's quota in a random selection of officers to be purged. (Issues and Studies 9 (10 1972), p. 82.)Google ScholarPubMed

54. On Han, , see China News Summary 446 (30 11 1972), p. 3Google Scholar;

55. Nelsen, , “Military forces,” pp. 465–66Google Scholar;

56. China News Summary 445 (23 11 1972)Google Scholar;

57. See the broadcast material in “Problems in criticizing Lin Piao,” CNS 446 (30 11 1972)Google Scholar;

58. Crozier, Michel, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 107–11, 139–142, 165–171 and 187–197Google Scholar; Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 61–74 and 158–166Google Scholar; Blau, Peter M. and Scott, W. R., Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 113, 134 and 234–242Google Scholar;

59. Crozier, , The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, pp. 195–98Google Scholar; Downs, , Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 158–166, 195–96 and 202Google Scholar; Ossification and resistance to change are not endemic to all organizations. Conditions such as small size and professionalized personnel can lead to systematic and painless change. See Blau, Peter, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 183–200Google Scholar; Downs, , Inside Bureaucracy, p. 202Google Scholar; Hage, Jerald and Aiken, Michael, Social Change in Complex Organizations (New York: Random House, 1970)Google Scholar; Zald, Mayer N. and Ash, Roberta, “Social movement organizations: growth, decay, and change,” Social Forces 44 (1966), pp. 327–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

60. Michel Oksenberg, “Getting ahead and along in Communist China: the ladder of success on the eve of the Cultural Revolution,” in Lewis (ed.), Party Leadership.

61. Following the 1959 Lushan Conference, two provincial Party secretaries were removed from office or criticized along with P'eng Teh-huai – but apparently more as members of an opinion group at the Conference than as a personal loyalty group. Teiwes, Frederick C., “Provincial politics in China,” in Lindbeck, John M. H. (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 131–32Google Scholar and Teiwes, , Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956–1966 (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967), pp. 29–30Google Scholar;

62. For Whitson's interpretation of this phenomenon see Whitson, , “The Field Army,” p. 25nGoogle Scholar;

63. Klein, Donald W. and Clark, Anne B., Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921–1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 435Google Scholar; Teiwes, , Provincial Party Personnel, p. 76nGoogle Scholar;

64. At this time, Mao's other opponents in the East China Region apparently used normal channels of communication within the Party and separated themselves from the Kao-Jao conspiracy (Bridgham, Philip, “Factionalism in the Central Committee,”in Lewis, (ed.), Party Leadership, pp. 205–206Google Scholar).

65. On these often irresponsible charges by radical Red Guards, see Gittings, , “Army-Party relations,” pp. 377–79Google Scholar;

66. Downs, (Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 67–68)Google Scholar lists conditions that cause greater reliance on personal contacts among top officials. Blau, and Scott, (Formal Organizations, pp. 161–63)Google Scholar present somewhat contradictory evidence. Gordon Tullock notes how, in the American government bureaucracy, personal factions tend to depend on a central leader and once that leader is removed the faction tends to disappear. See The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 39Google ScholarPubMed;

67. There are yet other models. Andrew Nathan uses a network theory of factions drawn from anthropology to explain pre- and post-1949 factions; “A factionalism model for OCP politics,” CQ 53 (1973), pp. 34–66Google Scholar; To explain the smaD size of group purged, Solomon, Richard would point to the difficulty Chinese have with authority and peer relationships (“Communication patterns and the Chinese revolution,” CQ 32 (1967), pp. 88–110)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vogel, Ezra would argue that before 1966 cliques were limited by political pressure and the decline of friendship (“From friendship to comradeship,” CQ 21 (1965), pp. 46–60)Google Scholar; It is unclear how these authors would deal with changes in China before and after 1967.