Drawn-out Protests in China's Rustbelt: Land Revenue and the Limits to Bargained Authoritarianism

Abstract

The rise of the land revenue regime in China, characterized by land dispossession in the countryside and land redevelopment in the city, has sparked numerous protests. This study draws attention to the paradox that the regime has helped to mitigate labour unrest, at least temporarily, in China's Rustbelt, where millions of workers were laid-off in the 1990s. Based on field research in Anshan, Liaoning province, and data from other cities in the Rustbelt, this article shows that laid-off workers’ protests persisted much longer than previously thought, largely owing to a lack of local fiscal resources to meet workers’ demands. Only with the growing revenue from land sales in the recent decade has the local government finally been able to ease the tension with laid-off workers. The article argues that bargained authoritarianism, or “buying stability,” widely considered to be an effective strategy by the local state to control social unrest, has its limits, mainly owing to its dependence on local fiscal resources. Recent economic downturns and declining land revenue will disrupt this strategy, leading to protracted protests and struggles in future.

摘要

在土地财政的体制下，中国地方政府在农村进行了大规模的征地拆迁，而在城市进行了土地再开发和旧城改造。这些举措催生了大量的社会抗争。本文揭示了一个鲜为人知的悖论：在东北的锈带城市，土地财政体制在一定时期内弱化了甚至减少了了社会抗争。基于在辽宁省鞍山市的田野调查和其他东北城市的数据资料，我们发现 20 世纪 90 年代末以来的下岗工人抗争在国企改革完成后还持续了很长的时间，这是因为东北地区的地方政府缺乏财力来满足工人的诉求。最近十年来由于土地财政的兴起，地方政府终于可凭借土地财政来解决下岗工人的遗留问题，从而大量消减了这类抗争。已有的研究认为，中国政府通过“议价式威权主义”或“花钱买稳定”可以有效地控制社会抗争。本文则认为，这一策略的有效性和地方财政收入水平息息相关。近年来经济增长减缓与土地财政减少将可能降低这一策略的有效性，从而导致更为持久的社会抗争。