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Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2009

Daniel Lynch
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Abstract

China's evidently unstoppable “rise” energizes PRC political and intellectual elites to think seriously about the future of international relations. How will (and should) China's international roles change in the forthcoming decades? How should its leaders put the country's rapidly-increasing power to use? Foreign China specialists have tended to use an overly-streamlined “resisting” the West versus “co-operating” with it (or even simpler “optimistic” versus “pessimistic”) scale to address such questions, partly reflecting the divide between Realism and Neoliberalism in American international relations theory. By 2002, a near-consensus had developed (though never shared universally) that China had become an increasingly co-operative power since the mid-1990s and would continue to pursue the policy prescriptions of Neoliberal international relations theory. But using more nuanced “English school” analytical techniques – and examining the writings of Chinese elites themselves, aimed solely at Chinese audiences – this article discovers an unmistakably cynical Realism to be still at the core of Chinese thinking on the international future. Even elites who appear sincere in their promotion of co-operation firmly reject “solidarism” among the world's leading states and insist upon upholding the difference between China and all others. Many demand – and foresee – China using its future power to pursue world objectives that would depart in significant respects from those of the other leading states and non-state actors.

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Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 197 , March 2009 , pp. 87 - 107
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2009

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References

1 See Zheng's collected speeches from this period in Bijian, Zheng, Sikao de licheng – guanyu Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de youlai, genju, neihan, he qianjing (The Course of My Thoughts: Regarding the Origins, Basis, Meaning, and Prospects of China's Peaceful Development) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party Central Party School Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

2 Zheng Bijian, “Zhonggong shiliu da yu Zhongguo hepingjueqi xin daolu” (“The Chinese Communist Party 16th Congress and China's new road of a peaceful rise”), in ibid. p. 129.

3 Zheng Bijian, “‘Heping jueqi’ he ‘heping fazhan’ shi yihui shi” (“‘Peaceful rise’ and ‘peaceful development’ are the same thing”), in ibid. p. 202.

4 Similarly, Li Qi, vice-director of the Shanghai Municipal Party Research Office, wrote in a 2007 book that “an international environment characterized by waves of globalization and a stress on global governance demands that our Party … craft a clean new image of a rational and responsible 21st century Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government that place heavy stress on [international] cooperation.” Qi, Li et al. , Zhongguo heping fazhan yu Zhongguo gongchandang (China's Peaceful Development and the Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2007), pp. 96–97Google Scholar.

5 There are several different varieties of Realism in international relations theorizing. A key assumption shared by all is that “the international arena remains an anarchical, self-help system, a ‘brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other’ … Survival depends on a state's material capabilities and its alliances with other states.” Lebow, Richard Ned, “Classical Realism,” in Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja and Smith, Steve (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 55Google Scholar.

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7 Ibid. p. 249.

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14 Neoliberals deny Realist pessimism and argue that states seek to co-operate peacefully (even under anarchy) in the pursuit of joint gains, such as those accruing from trade. International institutions, regimes and organizations all help states to overcome the mutual suspicions and other collective action problems that would block co-operation. See Martin, Lisa L., “Neoliberalism,” in Dunne, , Kurki, and Smith, , International Relations Theories, pp. 109–26.)Google Scholar

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22 Ibid. p. 269.

23 Christensen, Thomas J., Johnston, Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert S., “Conclusions and future directions,” in Johnston, Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert S. (eds.), New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 380Google Scholar.

24 My methodology was straightforward: I sampled and analysed 63 book chapters and journal articles published between 2001 and 2007 in which the authors (mostly PRC academics specializing in international relations and political science, but also some Party and state political figures) explicitly and substantively address the international future, even if only in subsections. The articles were published in leading social science or neibu policy journals. The books were published by leading academic and policy presses. The sampling procedure was simple: I included nearly every article or chapter from such sources that I could locate at the Universities Services Centre library in Hong Kong, and in Beijing and Shanghai bookshops during research trips in December 2006, July–August 2007 and May 2008. I also accessed certain journals on the internet. To triangulate and check for errors, I supplemented the reading with 26 interviews at PRC government foreign-policy think tanks and at a leading university. Only a representative subset of the writings and interviews can be discussed in the limited space of this article.

25 Of course Shirk and other authors were aware the shift might be precarious.

26 Three foundational works in the English school approach are Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions (ed. Wight, Gabriele and Brian, Porter) (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992)Google Scholar (compiled from Wight's lectures in the 1950s); Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

27 Wight, International Theory, p. 31.

28 Buzan, Barry, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Ibid. p. 7.

30 Wight, International Theory, p. 45; emphasis added.

31 Buzan, From International to World Society? p. 8. Correspondingly, Realists vary from moderates who seek security defensively in managing mildly dangerous international interactions to imperialists who strive for power maximization in a hyper-dangerous world. Revolutionists differ over whether to seek gradual change of the states-system and its perceived depredations or to pursue change rapidly, even through the use of violence.

32 Jisi, Wang, Guoji zhengzhi de lixing sikao (Rational Reflections on International Politics) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006), p. 1Google Scholar. Wang elaborates on the necessity of putting development at the centre of China's grand strategy in Jisi, Wang, “Guanyu gouzhu Zhongguo guoji zhanlue de jidian kanfa” (“A few points regarding the construction of China's international strategy”), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (International Politics Quarterly), No. 4 (2007), pp. 1–5Google Scholar.

33 Sharing a similar perspective is Fudan University's Shen Dingli. See Dingli, Shen, “Shenhua Zhong Mei zhanlue duihua” (“Deepen the Sino-American strategic dialogue”), Zhongguo fazhan guancha (China Development Observation), No. 1 (2007), pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

34 Wang Jisi, Rational Reflections, p. 2. On the other hand, Wang can sometimes sound stridently Realist. For example, see Jisi, Wang, “Meiguo baquan de luoji” (“The logic of American hegemony”), Meiguo yanjiu (American Studies Quarterly), Vol. 17, No. 3 (2003), pp. 7–29Google Scholar.

35 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 1.

36 Honghua, Men, “Zhongguo zhanlue wenhua: yixiang yanjiu yicheng” (“China's strategic culture: a topic of research”), in Shuyong, Guo (ed.), Guoji guanxi huyu Zhongguo lilun (International Relations Calls for a China Theory) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2005), p. 313Google Scholar.

37 Ibid. p. 314.

38 Ibid. pp. 315–16.

39 Yiwei, Wang, “‘Hexie shijie’ guan de sanchong neihan” (“The three dimensions inherent in the ‘harmonious world’ view”), Jiaoxue yu yanjiu (Teaching and Research), No. 2 (2007), pp. 68–70Google Scholar.

40 Ibid. p. 70.

41 Ibid. p. 70.

42 Ibid. pp. 68–69. On this point, also see Guangshun, Fang, “Duoyuan wenhua de hexie fazhan yu goujian hexie shijie” (“The harmonious development of plural culture and construction of a harmonious world”), in Zhengang, Ma (ed.), Jianshe hexie shijie de zhanlue huanjing yu lilun tansuo (The Strategic Environment and Theoretical Explorations for Constructing a Harmonious World) (Beijing: Dangdai shijie chubanshe, 2007), pp. 55–64Google Scholar.

43 Wang Yiwei, “The three dimensions,” p. 68.

44 Jidong, Li, “Ruan quanli yu guojia liyi – ruxue de jieyong” (“Soft power and national interests – borrowing and using Confucianism”), in Jia, Xu (ed.), Zhongguo guojia liyi yu yingxiang (China's National Interests and Influence) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), pp. 182–83Google Scholar.

45 Ibid. p. 183.

46 Ibid. p. 183. Li does not address the question of to what extent Confucian benevolence, propriety, morality and harmony actually characterize the cultural mainstream in contemporary China.

47 Ibid. p. 183. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, first publicly articulated by Zhou Enlai in 1954, include: mutual respect for each country's territorial integrity; mutual commitment to non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each country's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

48 Ibid. p. 183. Also see Qin, Yao, “Yingjian Zhongguo dui zhoubian guojia de wenhua xinheli” (“Constructing China's cultural attractiveness to neighbouring countries”), in Renwei, Huang (ed.), Guoji huanjing yu Zhongguo de heping fazhan (The International Environment and China's Peaceful Development) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), pp. 117–35Google Scholar. Yao, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Eurasian Studies Institute, analyses the success of China's 42 (as of February 2006) Confucius Institutes abroad, concluding that “the attractiveness of Chinese culture has already attained its highest level since the West's Industrial Revolution advanced eastward and China's traditional culture lost its position as the East Asian cultural system's core” (p. 53). Yao quotes with approval an official from the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, who wrote in March 2006 that “in a sense, whoever starts to like your culture becomes a person you own” (pp. 121–22).

49 Even Men Honghua, in the year before denying that China's strategic culture is Realist, declared that “China's purpose is both to stimulate the further increase in Chinese power and expansion of China's strategic national interests and to push for the wealth and prosperity of all of humankind.” Honghua, Men, “Da guo jueqi yu guoji zhixu” (“The rise of great powers and international order”), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (Studies of International Politics), No. 92 (2004), p. 142Google Scholar.

50 Wei, Pan, “Lun xiandai shehui de hexin jiazhiguan” (“On the core values of contemporary society”), Zhongguo yu shijie guancha (China and World Affairs), No. 4 (2006), p. 9Google Scholar.

51 Ibid. p. 10. Also see Wei, Pan, “Minzhu mixin yu Zhongguo zhengti de qiantu” (“Infatuation with democracy and the future of China's political system”), Xianggang chuanzhen (Hong Kong Fax) (neibu cankao), 27 February 2003, pp. 1–51Google Scholar.

52 Pan Wei, “On the core values of contemporary society,” p. 12 (emphasis added).

53 Xuetong, Yan, “Jueqi zhong de Zhongguo guojia liyi neihan” (“The content of a rising China's national interests”), in Jia, Xu, China's National Interests and Influence, pp. 4–5Google Scholar. Even the liberal Tiananmen dissident Chen Ziming, writing under a pseudonym, acknowledges that “to surpass the West and outstrip Europe and America has in modern times been the Chinese people's tightly-held ambition.” Xilai, Yu, “21 shiji Zhongguo xiandaihua yicheng (xia)” (“China's 21st century modernization agenda, part 2”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 4 (2001), pp. 1–11Google Scholar; quotation on p. 7.

54 Xuetong, Yan, “Da guo jueqi de xingzhi” (“The nature of a great country's rise”), in Xuetong, Yan and Xuefeng, Sun et al. (eds.), Zhongguo jueqi ji qi zhanlue (The Rise of China and Its Strategy) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

55 Luo Shou and Wang Guifang, “Zhongguo heping jueqi de neihan ji qi tujing” (“The intrinsic meaning and course of China's rise”), in ibid. p. 155.

56 Ibid. pp. 155–56. Wang Qingdong of the Party's internal discipline-inspection apparatus also cautions on the need to be prudent in dealing with Taiwan prior to 2020. Of course independence must be deterred, but “in the event military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it would inevitably spoil China's strategic plans, [negatively] influencing China's peaceful development path.” Qingdong, Wang, “Zhongguo heping jueqi mianlin tiaozhan” (“China's peaceful rise faces challenges”), Neibu canyue (Internal Circulation Reference) 20 (713), 28 May 2004, pp. 22–26Google Scholar.

57 Luo and Wang, “The intrinsic meaning and course of China's rise,” p. 156.

58 Ibid. p. 156.

59 Ibid. pp. 164–65 (emphasis added). Indeed, almost all of the political leaders and academics who promote Rationalist approaches to international relations reserve power-maximizing Realist approaches for Taiwan, which they pre-define as an integral part of China, suggesting that any violence used against the island cannot be considered “international” violence. See, for example, Hanzhang, Niu, “Shixi haixia liang'an de yitihua quxiang” (“Analysing the trend of integration across the Taiwan Strait”), in Shoude, Liang and Yihu, Li (eds.), Quanqiuhua yu hexie shijie (Globalization and a Harmonious World) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), pp. 360–69Google Scholar.

60 Luo and Wang, “The intrinsic meaning and course of China's rise,” p. 157.

61 Ibid. pp. 157–58.

62 Zheng Bijian, “‘Peaceful rise’ and ‘peaceful development’,” p. 208.

63 Tuo, Cai and Zhenye, Liu, “Quanqiu shimin shehui yu dangdai guoji guanxi (shang)” (“Global civil society and contemporary international relations, part one”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 158 (2002), p. 4Google Scholar.

64 Ibid. pp. 4–5.

65 Ibid. p. 5.

66 Ibid. pp. 5–6.

67 Ibid. p. 6.

68 Ibid. pp. 6–7.

69 Tuo, Cai and Zhenye, Liu, “Quanqiu shimin shehui yu dangdai guoji guanxi (xia)” (“Global civil society and contemporary international relations, part two”), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 159 (2003), p. 29Google Scholar.

70 Ibid. p. 30.

71 Ibid. p. 31.

72 Ibid. p. 32.

73 Ibid. p. 32.

74 Also see Cai Tuo, “Quanqiu zhengzhi de yaoyi ji qi yanjiu” (“The key elements of global politics and their research”), and Zhenye, Liu, “Shijie zhengzhi de xin fazhan yu quanqiu zhengzhixue de goujian” (“The new development of world politics and the establishment of global politics studies”), both in Shuyong, Guo, International Relations Calls for a China Theory, pp. 200–11 and pp. 227–37Google Scholar respectively.

75 Interview 407 is the source for this and the immediately succeeding paragraphs.

76 Interview 407.

77 A few minutes after making the prediction that political integration is ultimately inevitable, the scholar had second thoughts. “Come to think of it, better not include that part, the part about the political integration,” he said. When I reminded him that no interview subject would be named in publications, he laughed and said “well, then, it should be okay” (Interview 407).