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Chinese Democratization in Perspective: Electorates and Selectorates at the Township Level*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Melanie Manion
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Progress in democratization is widely judged by how well elections function as instruments allowing ordinary citizens to choose political leaders to represent their preferences. In January 1999, I travelled to villages and towns in Chongqing as a member of a Carter Center delegation invited by the National People's Congress (NPC) to observe the electoral processes that produce delegates to people's congresses, chairmen and deputy chairmen of these congresses, and government leaders at the township level. The Carter Center is an American nongovernment organization associated with Emory University, with an executive board chaired by former President Carter. As part of its mission to enhance freedom and democracy, the Center has observed and reported on Chinese village elections in delegation visits that began in 1996. Ours was the first delegation to observe people's congress elections, however. Only weeks before we visited Chongqing, voters a hundred miles away, in Sichuan's Buyun township, elected a head of township government in an unprecedented exercise of authority vested constitutionally and legally in their people's congress delegates. Juxtaposing the experience of the Buyun elections with the normal processes by which township leaders emerge offers a useful perspective from which to consider electoral mechanisms of representation in China today. My main conclusion is that these mechanisms are designed to align voter preferences with the preferences of Communist Party committees. Ordinary voters and people's congress delegates have choices among candidates in elections at the township level, but these choices are normally constrained by Communist Party committee pre-selection of candidates designated for positions of leadership.

Type
Report from the Field
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 163 , September 2000 , pp. 764 - 782
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2000

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References

1. Indeed, according to our NPC hosts, ours was the first international observation of elections of congress delegates and government leaders. Our delegation was headed by Charles Costello of the Carter Center. Other members were Thomas Crick, Merle Goldman, Yawei Liu, Robert Pastor, Pia Pannula and Elizabeth Perry. We were accompanied to Chongqing by three journalists (Jaime FlorCruz, Matthew Forney and Mary Kay Magstad) invited by the Carter Center to join the delegation. Information about the Carter Center and its China Village Elections Project is available at http://www.cartercenter.org and http://www.cartercenter.org/china.html. The Carter Center summary of the delegation visit discussed here can be located at http://www.cartercenter.org/CHINA/dox/reports/199.html.

2. On the Leninist view of the appropriate relationship between the party and society, see Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)Google Scholar and Meyer, Alfred G., Leninism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion of the Leninist view in the context of Chinese village elections, see Manion, Melanie, “The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1996), pp. 736–748.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a normative and empirical account of pluralist visions, see Powell, G. Bingham Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

3. The best account of the transformation is in Tanner, Murray Scot, The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).Google Scholar

4. On the elections, see Womack, Brantly, “The 1980 county-level elections in China: experiment in democratic modernization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1982), pp. 261–277CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nathan, Andrew J., Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Bedeski, Robert E., “China's 1979 Election Law and its implementation,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1986), pp. 153–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McCormick, Barrett L., Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Jacobs, J. Bruce, “Elections in China,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 25 (1991), pp. 171–199Google Scholar; and Shi, Tianjian, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).Google Scholar On the role of people's congresses, see O'Brien, Kevin J., “Agent and remonstrators: role accumulation by Chinese people's congress delegates,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994), pp. 359–380Google Scholar, and “Chinese people's congresses and legislative embeddedness: understanding early organizational development,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994), pp. 80–107Google Scholar; O'Brien, Kevin J. and Luehrmann, Laura M., “Institutionalizing Chinese legislatures: trade-offs between autonomy and capacity,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), pp. 91–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and MacFarquhar, Roderick, “Provincial people's congresses” (reports from the field), The China Quarterly, No. 155 (1998), pp. 656–667.Google Scholar

5. Formally, rural villages and urban neighbourhoods are not part of the state hierarchy. Their executive committees are considered as “autonomous mass organizations of self-government,” with leaders who are not state cadres.

6. On the post-Mao nomenklatura system, see Manion, Melanie, “The cadre management system, post-Mao: the appointment, promotion, transfer and removal of Party and state leaders,” The China Quarterly, No. 102 (1985), pp. 203–233Google Scholar; Burns, John P., The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989)Google Scholar, and “Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura (research note),” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994) pp. 458–491.Google Scholar

7. Above the county level, delegates are elected by the people's congress at the subordinate level.

8. Not surprisingly, members of the delegation who observed the election in Zhujiaqiao village found it rather better organized and less flawed in some procedures, but with the same notable absence of the secret ballot.

9. A note with a different complaint was passed to another member of our delegation: it described unreasonably low prices for pigs bought from villagers by a monopsonist in league with the town authorities.

10. Interview with Lei Mingheng, 10 January 1999.

11. Village committee and people's congress elections do not take place on the same day in Dazu, however. On the elections, see “Dazu xian Baoding zhen di shisan jie renmin daibiao dahui daibiao zige shencha weiyuanhui guanyu Dazu xian Baoding zhen di shisi jie renmin daibiao dahui daibiao zige de shencha baogao” (“Report on examination of qualifications of delegates to the Dazu county Baoding town 14th people's congress by the Dazu county Baoding town 13th people's congress committee for the examination of delegate qualifications”), passed at the 13th Session of the Dazu County Baoding Town 13th People's Congress Presidium and reported to the Preparatory Committee for the Dazu County Baoding Town 14th People's Congress First Session, 5 January 1999. The report states that 96 candidates were initially nominated. Based on our examination of original election records by voting district, in addition to 94 candidates initially nominated, there were four write-in candidates. Of the four, only one (in district 5) received more than ten votes, and he received 110 votes.

12. To the best of my recollection, lack of information about candidates in districts 1 and 2 is due to our failure to record it rather than the unavailability of these data.

13. This includes positions of leadership at the administrative village level (village Communist Party branch secretaries and deputy secretaries, village committee directors and deputy directors, village women's association heads) and at the natural village level (village small group heads). One incumbent delegate I have not included in this category is a village accountant, an office that can also be considered village leadership.

14. In at least two districts (5 and 6), incumbents nominated initially did not become candidates.

15. In districts 1 and 6, however, winning and losing candidates are separated by 14 and 12% of the vote respectively; in district 15, a mere 3% of the vote separates an elected delegate from the losing candidate.

16. Interview with Yi Zeliang, 12 January 1999.

17. “Political parties” and “mass organizations” at the township level “have the authority” to nominate candidates for delegates to the township people's congress, while parties and organizations within voting districts “also may” nominate candidates. Xiaoyang, Qiao and Chunsheng, Zhang (eds.), Xuanju fa he difang zuzhi fa shiyi yu jieda (An Explanation of the Electoral Law and the Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments), revised edition (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1997), p. 47.Google Scholar

18. The Party committee may also be concerned about a rough distribution of communist delegates among districts, so that each discussion group at the people's congress has a sufficient number of Party members to nominate candidates (see below). On the other hand, Changyuan election officials told us that the town did its best to ensure nomination of a certain percentage of non-Party members (as well as women) as candidates.

19. The head and deputy heads of town government need not (by law) be people's congress delegates, but at this lowest level of government, which is supposed to maintain the most direct contact with ordinary citizens, it is presumably unusual for a government to include no elected congress delegates.

20. Discussion with Jin Lie, Deputy Chairman, Chongqing People's Congress Standing Committee, 13 January 1999.

21. Discussion with Chen Zhong, Division Head, Chongqing People's Congress Standing Committee, Working Committee on Liaison with Delegates, Liaison Division, 12 January 1999. Chen explained to me that the fact that Yi was transferred indicates the county had decided that he should enter the leadership group of Baoding town. Yi told me he had been “acting” deputy chairman (because of Li's poor health), but this can only have been in an unofficial capacity as chairmen and deputy chairmen of local people's congress are required by law to be elected delegates. Interview with Yi Zeliang, 12 January 1999. Li Yonghua was elected as adelegate to the 14th Baoding people's congress, winning 86% of the vote in district 8.

22. In Baoding, we were told: “All major decisions are made by the Party committee; the government implements decisions.” Interview with Lei Tianhua, Secretary, Baoding Communist Party Committee, 11 January 1999.

23. On the other hand, county and town Party committees may also be concerned that the “bridge” between town and villages enables town leaders to learn about villager opinions. No district has more than one town official.

24. “Provisional Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres,” 9 February 1995, Xinhua (Beijing), 16 May 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS), 16 05 1995.Google Scholar See articles 9–11 and 21. The regulations deal only with leading cadres at and above the county level, but they instruct provinces to issue parallel regulations for cadre management at lower levels. I have made the conversions to leaders at the township level.

25. According to Jin Lie, the evaluation was very thorough. It is not clear to me, however, whether Jin based his description on Chongqing regulations about what these sorts of evaluations ought to be or on specific knowledge about evaluation of Baoding's leaders. Discussion with Jin Lie, 13 January 1999.

26. These are described in “Provisional Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres,” articles 32 and 33.

27. I did not ascertain whether the Party congress was held before or after the people's congress election on 20 December. I am guessing here that it was held between the election and the first session of the 14th people's congress; certainly, this would be a convenient time to brief Party member delegates on their role as agents in elections of congress and government leaders.

28. Our delegation divided up to allow us to observe the three discussion groups on 11 and 12 January. I observed group two, comprising 17 delegates, from voting districts 8 to 15.

29. Prior to the 1986 revision of the Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments, township governments were responsible for convening meetings of the people's congress. Since 1986, by law, the township people's congress elects a presidium at its preparatory meeting, to preside over the first session and convene the next meeting. Article 15 of the law describes the presidium as a provisional committee, with responsibilities that do not extend beyond congress meetings. People's congresses at and above the county level establish standing committees, which act for the full congress between sessions. At the township level, the law does not provide for establishment of standing committees. Article 2 of the law states that people's congresses at the township level do not need standing committees because there are fewer delegates (therefore, congress meetings are more easily convened) and fewer responsibilities (therefore, a chairman and deputy chairman can manage congress matters on their own). An official interpretation of this article explains that congresses at this most basic level of state ought not to have too many layers, which obstruct closeness to the people. Despite this, since 1986, many townships (including Baoding town) have established a people's congress presidium that acts for the full congress between sessions – a standing committee in all but name. See Qiao, and Zhang, , An Explanation of the Electoral Law and the Organic Law, pp. 85, 102.Google Scholar The people's congress chairman and deputy chairman elected at the congress become ex officio members of the presidium, but both Lei Tianhua and Yi Zeliang were among the delegates originally proposed (and approved) as members of the presidium in Baoding.

30. Ibid. p. 110.

31. Ibid. p. 111 (emphasis added).

32. Discussion with Jin Lie, 13 January 1999. Left unstated is whether opposition to the official candidate had anything to do with the mass protests and their suppression in 1989.

33. In group two, delegates voiced strong complaints about many aspects of town government performance: collection from villages of water conservancy fees without apparent government effort to solve serious problems, lack of a road connection linking three villages to the town, failure to exploit the tourism associated with the famous Dazu stone carvings, penalties assigned to villages for not meeting tax obligations imposed by the town, extra fees charged for schooling, unreasonably low prices paid for crops, lack of a programme to educate villagers about laws relevant to village issues, and fines assigned to women who fail to have their IUD checked on the single day scheduled for this each month. Town congress and government leaders responded, often defensively, to questions and criticism. Yi Zeliang noticeably outperformed the other participants in group two: he spoke more than other delegates, displayed broad knowledge of local conditions, cited specific laws and provincial regulations, and used examples of policy initiatives drawn from his experience in other localities. He also regularly exhorted his fellow delegates to voice more criticisms. Discussions in other groups also appeared lively and unconstrained.

34. Article 22 of the Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments permits a non-competitive election for the offices of township people's congress chairman and government head, but not for deputy offices of the congress or government.

35. Discussion with Jin Lie, 13 January 1999.

36. On the Buyun elections, see especially the article by Jianguang, Tang “Feature on Sichuan township election,” Nanfang zhoumo (Guangzhou), 15 01 1999, internet version at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/1990/15/amat.htmGoogle Scholar. See also the series of three articles by Fan, Li in Kong, Hong's Ming bao: “China directly elects township chief for the first time,” 11 02 1999, p. E6Google Scholar, “Expectations: taking Buyun out of Buyun,” 12 02 1999, p. E4Google Scholar, and “Leave mark in history: first township holding direct election,” 13 02 1999, p. E4Google Scholar, all in FBIS, 16 February 1999. Other interesting articles include Qingjiu, Zha, “Democracy shall not transcend the law,” Fazhi ribao (Beijing), 19 01 1999, p. 1Google Scholar, in FBIS, 3 February 1999, and “China's first direct election of a township chief,” Fazhi ribao (Beijing), 23 01 1999, p. 2Google Scholar, in FBIS, 4 March 1999. American newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post) also reported on the Buyun elections.

37. It seems improbable that the decision was taken without consultation and approval at higher levels, but that is another matter.

38. A Chinese scholar who monitored the election explained Tan's victory as follows: “Some voters at first had reservations about Tan since he had a record of spending too much public money on drinking and dining. But they finally chose him because he had the connections to get subsidies for the township and promised to raise income.” See Chan, Vivien Pik-Kwan, “Town poll awaits Beijing ruling,” South China Morning Post, 27 01 1999.Google Scholar