No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Extract
This paper attempts to develop some hypotheses concerning Communist China's political strategy toward the Asian area, with particular reference to the function in this strategy of neutralism. I have chosen November 1957 as the initial date for the period to be examined in the belief that a major shift in the overall Chinese line on both domestic and international problems took place at or about this time. At the root of this shift was the Chinese conviction that a decisive shift in the world balance of power, symbolised by Sputnik I, had occurred. I take this Chinese estimate to be genuine and to provide the essential standpoint from which all problems of foreign political strategy have been evaluated by the Chinese for the past three years.
- Type
- China, Russia and Asia
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The China Quarterly 1961
References
1 Forecasts of a U.S. depression are contained in articles by Tai, Chi, in World Culture, No. 4, 1958Google Scholar, Chung-kwang, Yang, in World Culture, No. 10, 1958Google Scholar, and Wen-t, Chang'ien, in the inaugural issue of Red Flag, 06 1958Google Scholar. See also Kwang-ming Jih-pao, 05 11, 1958Google Scholar. Negative effects of the U.S. recession on South-east Asian economies are described in Ta Kung Pao, 04 26, 1958Google Scholar. The Jen-min Jih-pao New Year's editorial, 01 1, 1959Google Scholar, refers briefly to 1958 as a year of economic disaster for the capitalist world, but Red Flag, No. 4, 1959Google Scholar, in its editorial and in an article by Yu Chao-li, concentrates on Communist growth with little or no mention of capitalist decline. The drop in China's exports is briefly described by Durdin, Tillman, in the New York Times, 02 7, 1959.Google Scholar
2 Jen-min Jih-pao, 11 25, 1957, translated by NCNA.Google Scholar
3 NCNA, Peking, November 6, 1957. See also an article by Po, Chu in Ta Kung Pao, 12 15, 1957Google Scholar, translated in the Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 1685, which asserts that world proletarian unity is the “real content of internationalism,” and which restates Mao's older formulation of the revolutionary uses of the national bourgeoisie.
4 It should be noted here, since the tactics later were altered, that this view provides for co-operation on the government-to-government level.
5 See particularly Chinese comments on the March, 19S8, SEATO Council meeting in Manila.
6 This position was already indicated in the Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of 11 24, 1957Google Scholar, previously cited: “Some say, since the meetings of the Communist and workers parties call for peace and peaceful co-existence in their declarations, why should they indulge in discussing the balance of forces? We Communists have always stood for peace, but peace can only be won, not begged for. The imperialists show no compassion for the people. They recognise only strength. History has seen numerous aggressive wars which have never been caused by too great a strength on the side of the people opposing war or the victims of aggression. On the contrary, the aggressors have invariably unleashed wars when have been able to do as they wished with impunity, or at least when they thought they could.… In this situation, is it not very clear who is for and who is against peace? Is it not very clear that peace cannot be begged for from the aggressors? The declarations of both the Moscow meetings point to the characteristic feature of the present situation—that the people already have sufficient strength to prevent war and safeguard peace provided they unite in this struggle and constantly maintain their vigilance. The declarations explain the changes in the balance of forces precisely in order to give the people full confidence in the cause of peace and convincingly mobilise the broad masses to force the imperialist blocs to abandon their diabolical plans of war.” Several writings of the first half of 1958 recount the post-war history of “people's” military successes and stress the thesis of the superiority of man over weapons. But it is only in the context of the Quemoy affair that provocation of imperialism is actively justified.
7 See, for example, the New York Times, 05 13, 1958Google Scholar, account of Nehru's criticism of Chinese attacks on Tito.
8 Jen-nan Jih-pao, 06 4, 1958, translated by NCNA.Google Scholar
9 Jen-min Jih-pao, 06 26, 1958, translated by NCNA.Google Scholar
10 Jen-min Jih-pao, 02 22, 1959, translated by NCNA.Google Scholar
11 Jen-min Jih-pao, 03 18, 1959Google Scholar, translated by NCNA. An even more explicit statement of the leading role of Communist parties is in Jen-min Jih-pao's editorial of 11 19, 1958Google Scholar, on the anniversary of the Moscow Declaration.
12 The need felt by the Chinese to have a quiet rear in South and South-East Asia is somewhat amusingly illustrated by a map entitled “The World in 1958,” published in Peking Review, 01 6, 1959Google Scholar, in conjunction with the Jen-min Jih-pao New Year's editorial. The only spot between Quemoy and Arabia deemed worthy of a number designating an important development was Indonesia, where the “rebellion with backstage U.S. support” is said to have been “foiled”—without, we may point out, any meaningful participation by the Chinese.
13 A key document of the period is the collection of Mao Tse-tung's writings reissued in late October 1958, under the title The Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers.
14 Chao-li, Yu, “The Forces of the New are Bound to Defeat the Forces of Decay,” in Red Flag, 08 16, 1958Google Scholar; translation in SCMP No. 1837.
15 Jen-min Jih-pao editorial, 11 19, 1958, previously cited.Google Scholar
16 See, for example, Durdin, Tillman in the New York Times, 09 13, 1959Google Scholar, and Palmer, Norman D., “Chinese Shadow on the Asian Rim,” in New Leader, 05 23, 1960Google Scholar. The latter covers also the deterioration of Chinese-Indonesian relations. The nearest thing to a clean Chinese repudiation of bourgeois nationalist leadership in the newly independent countries was made by Chia-hsiang, Wang, “The International Significance of the Victory of the Chinese People,” Red Flag, No. 19, 10 1, 1959Google Scholar, and by Yu, Ying, “Ten Years' Peaceful Foreign Policy,” World Culture, No. 19, 10 5, 1959Google Scholar. A passage from the latter is worth quotation: “… U.S.-headed imperialism… has left no stone unturned in sabotaging our good relations. The imperialists are also conspiring with the reactionary clique of these nationalist countries to whip up an anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet movement in a vain attempt to make these countries give up peace and neutrality and join the military aggressive camp under the wing of U.S. imperialism. It must be pointed out that the leaders of these countries often, in varying degrees, align themselves with the reactionary clique in its anti-Chinese movement. What they differ from the latter is that there still exist certain contradictions between them and the imperialists, and besides that, they cherish the desire for peace and neutrality. But, at the same time, they maintain such intricate relations with the imperialists as lead them to manifest an expansionist ambition. Under the clamour and instigations of imperialism and reactionaries, such double-faced ‘neutralists’ often show vacillations.
“Recently, the leaders in India, seizing the opportunity of China curbing the rebellion started by the upper-level reactionary clique of Tibet, have come out openly to interfere with what is purely a matter of China's internal affairs. Furthermore, they attempted to violate the territorial integrity of China on the Sino-Indian border. Such acts in contravention of the Five Principles are obviously harmful to Sino-Indian friendship, and will only please the imperialists and reactionaries. The Chinese people have exercised the greatest patience toward these anti-Chinese activities and after long periods of tolerance, found it necessary to hit back so as to distinguish what is right and what is wrong.”
17 Without going into excessive detail, I should like here to indicate the type of documentation available.
Thailand: After the Sarit coup, a number of NCNA releases dealing with closure of Chinese schools, arrests of subversive elements, the Thai-Cambodian dispute, and the role of Thailand in the Laotian incident; specifically, NCNA on December 15, 1958, expressing the end of China's “patience”; March 6, 1959, on the Thai ban on Chinese imports; May 30, 1959, and July 30, 1959, on Thai-Laotian co-operation; September 30, 1959, on Thai “persecution of peace fighters”; and January 4, 1960, on U.S. economic aid.
Pakistan: NCNA, April 8, 1959, critique of the Pakistani economy; July 23, 1959, on Pakistani collaboration with the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek; and August 1, 1959, Kwang-ming Jih-pao article, generally critical of Pakistan's policies.
Malaya: NCNA, August 1, 1958, transmission of a manifesto of the Communist Party of Malaya; February 5, 1959, on closure of the Bank of China office in Kuala Lumpur; May 2, 1959, in reply to the Malayan Government's White Paper on subversive activities; and November 27, 1959, on U.S. investments in Malaya.
18 Joint Soviet-Indonesian statement of 02 28, 1960Google Scholar, translation by TASS.
19 Peking Review, 04 12, 1960.Google Scholar
20 Chou's travelling companion, Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi, at this point in the Press conference, revealed the continued existence of Chinese resentment by breaking in to say: “I want to call your attention to the fact that China is a country which is being wronged. I want to stress the fact that China is a country which is being wronged.” It is to be noted that several of Ch'en Yi's recent statements have conformed to those of the native radicals.
21 “An Excellent Situation for the Peace Struggle,” Red Flag, 01 1, 1960.Google Scholar
22 “Imperialism—Source of War, etc.,” Red Flag, 04 1, 1959Google Scholar, translation in Peking Review, 04 12, 1959.Google Scholar
23 NCNA, 04 10, 1960.Google Scholar
24 Translation by NCNA, 05 15, 1960.Google Scholar