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Between State and Peasant: Local Cadres and Statistical Reporting in Rural China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Yongshun Cai
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Extract

As an institutional effort to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the statistics collected across the country, the Chinese government enacted the Chinese Statistical Law in 1983. Its enforcement, however, remains a big problem as revealed by a series of nation-wide inspections (zhifa jiancha) carried out after 1985. In the 1989 inspection, for example, there were over 50,000 violations, and more than 60,000 in both the 1994 and the 1997 inspections.1 Such violations, mainly in the form of statistical manipulation, have reportedly occurred at various administrative levels from village to prefecture and even province. In 1998, for example, although the unexpected floods in China and the Asian financial crisis made it difficult for the Chinese government to achieve its pre-estimated growth rate, only one of the 31 principal administrative regions (Xinjiang) reported that it grew at a rate of 7.8 per cent (the national figure), whereas all the rest reported a growth rate of 8 per cent or more. While different ways of price calculation might be partially responsible for the discrepancies between national and provincial figures, “exaggerations about economic performance did exist in some regions.”

Type
Research Notes
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 163 , September 2000 , pp. 783 - 805
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2000

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References

1. In the 1994 inspection, over-reporting, under-reporting and making up statistics accounted for 73.3% of the 60,000 cases; see “Xu bao man bao: guan chu shuzi, shuzi chuguan” (“Over-reporting, under-reporting: officials deciding statistics and statistics leading to promotion”), Liaowang (Perspectives), No. 8 (02 1995), pp. 20–22.Google Scholar Another report suggests that the number of violations totalled 70,000 in 1994; see “Zhifa jiancha cha chu san ge heidong” (“Three black holes found out in the inspection of the law implementation”). Gongshang shibao (Industrial and Commercial Times), 18 01 1995, p. 1Google Scholar; For the 1997 investigation, see “1997 nian shida tongji xinwen” (“Ten pieces of statistical news in 1997”), Zhongguo xinxibao (Chinese Information Newspaper), 9 01 1998, p. 1Google Scholar; Another source points out that the actual number of violations disclosed in the 1997 inspection is over 75,000, among which 15,000 cases were more serious and settled through legal process: see “Buneng rang xubao fukua cheng shengguan jiejin” (“To prevent exaggerations from being a shortcut of promotion”), Baokan wenzhai (Digest of Newspapers and Magazines), 16 04 1998, p. 2.Google Scholar

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4. The fieldwork was conducted in four villages of three townships in one county of the southern part of China in January 1996 and July and August 1997.

5. It is stipulated in the Statistical Law of 1996 that at township level, one or more such persons will suffice.

6. See Oi, Jean, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).Google Scholar

7. Ibid.

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15. This is also pointed by the Head of the Statistics Bureau of Shanxi province. See Wei, Xiang and Mingjiu, Shen, “Shuju zhiliang yi xitan” (“A talk on the quality of statistics”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 10 (1994), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

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19. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

20. According to a report, in the 1994 investigation, only 320 people were given administrative punishment (xinzheng chufen) which was different from a legal punishment based on the law; see “Three black holes,” p. 5.Google Scholar

21. One county official reported that “Both my two predecessors had over-reported the increase rate. One reported the increase rate as 100, whereas the other reported 180. We wanted to be more realistic and decreased the increase rate to 70. The outcome would be that while other counties or cities are making great progress, we are left far behind. How could we explain it to the upper-level officials? They would question that our country was the only true Marxist county while others were not. What's more, the predecessors are now our bosses, how can we deny their success by reporting the true achievements over years?” See Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

22. It has been widely reported that the output of TVEs has been exaggerated. For example, in 1994, the Statistics Bureau of Shandong province found the total output of village enterprises was exaggerated at least by 17.07 billion yuan; “Quanguo renda changweihui weiyuan tan zhonghe zhili yubao fukua” (“The opinions of the members of the standing committee of the National People's Congress on the control over over-reporting and exaggeration”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 10 (1995), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar There are also other ways leading to biased statistics. Travers, for example, observed that the technique employed in sampling in the 1970s had a built-in bias, which, together with the inaccuracy of complete enumeration figures, led to a bias in the calculation of the per capita income in rural China. See Travers, , “Bias in Chinese economic statistics.”Google Scholar Odgaard's study serves as an example of how inappropriate categorization of rural private enterprises tends to underestimate the number of private enterprises. See Odgaard, , “Inadequate and inaccurate Chinese statistics.”Google Scholar

23. See “Zhongkou-yici: yao lijie xujia fukua” (“A unanimous agreement: stopping the manipulation of statistics”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 5 (1995), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

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25. By comparing China's State Statistical Bureau with the Central Statistical Agency of the former Soviet Union, Huang comes to the same conclusion. See Huang, Yasheng, “The statistical agency in China's bureaucractic system,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 59–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. See Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

27. Guoqing, Wu, “Lun nongmin renjun chunshouru yu nongmin fudan” (“A discussion of peasants' net income and peasant burdens”), Jiangsu nongcun jingji (Jiangsu Rural Economy) No. 6 (1995), pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

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29. The “30% based on statistics” means the income from grain is based on the market prices. Also see ibid.

30. Interview 109.

31. Hengfu, Wang, Kehao, Sheng and Baige, Sun, “Dangqian nongmin fudan de snida yinxin hua qushi” (“The ten tendencies of peasant burdens at the present time”), Jiangsu nongcun jingji, No. 2 (1995), pp. 31–33.Google Scholar It is estimated that in some areas, the exaggerated part accounts for 25 to 30% of peasants' total income. See Xiayin, Rao, “Dujue fukua feng, jianqing nongmin fudan de guanjian” (“Stopping exaggerations is essential to the alleviation of peasants' burdens”), Nongye jingji wenti (Issues of Rural Economy), No. 7 (1994), pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

32. Interview 010. Also see ibid.

33. Yang reports that, in one village, the actual net income was less than 1,400 yuan, but the village cadres raised it to 1,960 yuan by including the 200,000 yuan income from three water-animal raising households and one factory of a household. See Pengzhang, Yang, “Nongmin fudan fantan de yuanyin (“The reasons for the re-bouncing of peasant burdens”), Nongcun gongiuo tongxun (Rural Work Report), No. 5 (1996), pp. 42Google Scholar; Qinan, Yu and Yinqin, Zhao, “Nongmin fudan zhong de xin qingkuang ji jianyi (“New problems about peasant burdens and some proposed solutions”), Nongcun gongiuo tongxun, No. 12 (1996), pp. 37.Google Scholar

34. This is the basis for the argument that village cadres' power has been reduced because they become dependent on peasants. See Yunxiang, Yan, “Everyday power relation changes in a North China village,” in Walder, Andrew (ed.), The Waning of the Communist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 184–214.Google Scholar

35. This happened only when the village tried to use some sample households for their estimate. And the peasant found it out when he went to the cadre's house to submit his application for permission for house building. See Interview 108.

36. In fact, the net income from pig raising is not that high. One peasant reported that due to various taxes and the cost of forage, net income was at most 200 yuan or even less. Interview 108.

37. See Leiyan, Yu, “Yixie diqu fukua yanzhong wanwan buke diaoyiqingxin” (“Exaggerations are so serious that due attention must be paid to them”), Nongcun gongzuo longxun, No. 8 (1992), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

38. Interviews 201, 302.

39. Xiaoming, Han, “Nongcun gongzuo ruhe zhouchu weicheng” (“When will there be a breakthrough in rural work”), Gaige neican (internal Materials of Reform), No. 9 (1998), pp. 23–26.Google Scholar

40. Interview 302.

41. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

42. Zhongguo tongji, No. 10 (1995), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar Also see Ling, Wang, “Qianxi xiangzhen qiye chanzhi xubao fukua de fashe ji yuanyin” (“A preliminary analysis of the over-reporting and exaggeration of the output of TVEs”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 12 (1994), pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

43. Jinrong shibao (Financial Times), 25 06 1996.Google Scholar Another source suggests that China has about 2.1 billion mu of land, more than that estimated in 1995; see Research Group of Farmland Preservation of the State Land Management Bureau, “Jinnianlai woguo gengdi bianhua ji zhongqi fazhan qushi” (“The recent changes of the farmland of our country and the development trend in a medium period”), Zhongguo shehui kexue (China's Social Science), No. 1 (1998), pp. 75–90.Google Scholar

44. It has been found that even the village does not know the exact amount of land of its production groups; see Zhou, Feizhou, “Tudi tiaozheng zhong de quanli guanxi” (“Power relations in land adjustment”), master's thesis, Beijing University, 1996.Google Scholar

45. This is because village cadres seldom have required education, nor do they have an urban household registration (hukou). See Interview 005. This stands a contrast to Rozelle's finding that promotion tends to be the first priority of village cadres. See Rozelle, Scott, “Decision-making in China's rural economy: the linkage between village leaders and farm households,” The China Quarterly, No. 137 (1994), pp. 99–124.Google Scholar

46. Interview Oil.

47. Oi, , State and Peasant.Google Scholar

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49. Interviews 007, 010. Also see Xiaoping, Shi, “Woyanzhong de xiangzhen ganbu” (“Town government cadres in my eyes”), Nongcun gongzuo longxun, No. 6 (1997), pp. 30.Google Scholar

50. Interview 305.

51. Wenjian, Zhou, “Nongcun ganbu ‘chengshihua’ xianxiang jidai gaibian” (“It is urgent to change the situation of the ‘urbanization’ of rural cadres”), Nongcun gongzuo longxun, No. 9 (1995), pp. 36–37.Google Scholar

52. Ibid.; Yan, Chen, “Xiangzhen ganbu qing ba gen liuzhu” (“Town government officials, please be settled”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 5 (1997), pp. 38–39Google Scholar; Wenting, He and Kelin, Hong, “Zhide zhuyi de ganbu ‘sihua’ xianxiang” (“The phenomenon of cadres' ‘four tendencies’ should receive enough attention”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 11 (1996), pp. 43.Google Scholar

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54. Oi, Jean, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).Google Scholar

55. In each of the three towns I interviewed, there is one statistician. None of them seemed to think that they needed to submit a report according to the facts instead of their leaders' will. See Interviews 008, 011,014. Other research has yielded the same finding. Reportedly, one statistician pointed out the dilemma of being honest, “I am the person to suffer if I stick to the Statistical Law, but neither the person who tells me to stick to the Statistical Law nor the person who violates the Law suffers.” See Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration”Google Scholar; Shaolang, Yang. “Xianqu tongji gongzuo de xianzhuang yu sikao” (“Thinking on the statistical work at county and district levels”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 4 (1996), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

56. Interviews 007, 009.

57. Qiu reports a tragic case. In one village, to prepare for the inspection by the upper-level government on cattle raising, a peasant told her daughter to go to another village to borrow cattle since the number of the cattle had been exaggerated by village cadres. The daughter never returned: she was raped and killed on the road. See Chuan, Qiu, “You ren zhen chui niu” (“Some people really exaggerate the number of cattle”), Shehui (Society), No. 2 (1997), p. 37.Google Scholar

58. See Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

59. Interview 010.

60. See Leiyan, Yu, “Exaggerations are so serious,” pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

61. For the discussion of the revenue-sharing systems at the township and county levels, see Oi, , Rural China Takes OffGoogle Scholar; Wong, Christine, “Rural public finance,” in Wong, (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 167–212.Google Scholar

62. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

63. Jian, Tang, Yanghe, Yuan and Yonghui, Bao, “Sunan xiangzhen qiye gaizhihou ‘shui’ luo ‘si’ chu” (“Water was squeezed out and the truth came out after the reform of TVEs in Southern Jiangsu”), Xuanbian (A Compilation of Selected Materials), No. 15 (1998), pp. 24–25.Google Scholar

64. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

65. For the discussion of peasant burdens, also see Lü, Xiaobo, “The politics of peasant burdens in reform China,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1997), pp. 113–138.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

66. The Ministry of Finance of PRC, Zhongguo nongmin fudan shi 1949–1985 (A History of Peasant Burdens in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1994), pp. 197–200.Google Scholar

67. See Renjian, Tang, “Nongye shuifei zhidu gaige yanjiu” (“A study of the reform of the agricultural taxes and fees”), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 1 (1995), pp. 37–42Google Scholar; Kaiyin, He and Jianxin, Gu, “Nongye shuifei zhidu gaige shi zai bixing” (“The reform of agricultural taxes and fees is imperative”), Nongye jingji wenti, No. 9 (1996), pp. 43–48.Google Scholar From 1987, the state began to adopt a system called “translating the amount of grain into cash” (zhi zhen daijin). A number of places have instituted some other taxes: tax for special agricultural produce (nongye techan shui), tax for special forestry produce (linye techan shui) and slaughter tax (tuzai shui). See “Nongcun shuifei zhidu gaige shi zai bixing” (“An imperative move to reform the taxes and fees in rural areas”), Jingji ribao, 12 11 1996, p. 5.Google Scholar

68. “Nongmin chengdan feiyong he laowu guanli tiaoli” (“Regulations on peasant responsibilities and the management of labour”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 2 (1992), pp. 28–30.Google Scholar

69. As to the authorized levies and fees, they must be approved by the government at provincial level or above, but this has been violated all the time. In 1993, the State Council issued a directive to cancel 37 items of such taxes. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falü quanshu (A Compilation of the Laws of the PRC) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 901–905.Google Scholar

70. Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 24 07 1998.Google Scholar

71. For the influence of the fiscal reform on local governments, see Oi, , Rural China Takes OffGoogle Scholar; Wong, , “Rural public finance”Google Scholar; Oi, Jean, “Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China,” World Politics, Vol. 45 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wong, Christine, “Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline: the paradox of fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, No. 128 (1991), pp. 691–715.Google Scholar

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73. For a similar finding, see Tanzhen, Sun and Goang, Zhu, “Qian fada diqu xiangzhen caizhen yunxing de tedian” (“Features of the operation of the financial system in less developed areas”), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 5 (1994), pp. 43–48.Google Scholar For the discussion of the fiscal reform on local governments, see Wong, , “Rural public finance.”Google Scholar

74. If upper-level government branches face the same budget constraints, they also tend to transfer the burdens downward to peasants through the township government. For a detailed report, see Xiaoyan, Fu and Guangwu, Qin, “Nongmin fudan zhuizong ji” (“A follow-up investigation of peasant burdens”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 5 (1993), pp. 4–8.Google Scholar

75. “Guanyu sheji nongmin fudan xiangmu shenhe chuli yijian de tongzhi” (“A notice of the decisions regarding peasant burdens based on the examination of items of taxes of peasants”), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo falü quanshu (A compilation of the Laws of the PRC) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp. 901–905.Google Scholar

76. Xiaoyan, Fu, “Nongmin fudan de you si” (“A worry of peasant burdens”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 1 (1993), pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

77. Interview 012.

78. Interviews 202, 401, 403.

79. Interview 207. Also see Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration”Google Scholar; Xiayin, Rao, “Stopping exaggerations is essential,” pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

80. Development Research Centre of China's State Council, Cunji caizhan bianhua diacha (An Investigation of the Changes of Village Collective Property), unpublished report, 1994.Google Scholar

81. See Xiayin, He, “Nongye shuifei zhidu gaige shi zai bixing” (“It is imperative to reform the agricultural tax and fee collection system”), Nongye jingji wenti, No. 9 (1996), pp. 43–48Google Scholar; Congliang, Xu, “Cun ganbu huyu jianqing cunji zuzhi de fudan” (“Village cadres ask for the alleviation of the burdens put on village organization”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 1 (1995), p. 38.Google Scholar

82. The village cadres reported that tax collection has been even more difficult than the implementation of family planning because peasants felt the increase rate of the amount was unexpectedly high and the cadres had no convincing explanation. Interviews 201, 202.

83. Interview 101. In one county in 1992, 774 peasants collectively wrote a letter to the CCP central committee, suing the township Party secretary for the heavy taxes. While the third type of taxes was the major reason for their discontent, cadres' fulfilment of various competition projects (dabiao) was also an important reason. Su, Liu, Ding, Shi, and Li, Wang, “Qibai duo nongmin shang shu an de jishi” (“Lessons from the collective suit by over 700 peasants”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 11 (1992), pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

84. For the discussion of the tension between peasants and cadres also see, among others, Yang, Dali, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 54–62.Google Scholar For the discussion of other reasons for peasants suing cadres, see O'Brien, Kevin and Li, Liangjiang, “The politics of lodging complaints in rural China,” The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 756–783.Google Scholar

85. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

86. Ibid.

87. See Leiyan, Yu, “Exaggerations are so serious,” pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

88. Zhanxiu, Jin, “Worries of exaggeration.”Google Scholar

89. In one province in 1993, the planted acreage of cotton was 1,461 mu according to the reported statistics. It was thus estimated that the total amount of cotton in the whole province could be 11 million to 12 million dan on the basis of 45 kilogram per mu. Based on this estimate, the provincial government made its allocation plan of 1994 for the factories within the province. Yet it turned out that the amount of procurement for 1993 was 5.54 million dan, only half of the estimated amount. A number of factories were forced to stop production because of the shortage of cotton, and dozens of factory managers appealed to the city governments, provincial government and the central government for help. It was finally found out that the actual planned acreage had been exaggerated by millions of mu. Unfortunately, the author does not give the name of the province. See ibid.

90. Chinese Central Television, Dongfangzhizi (Sons of the East), 28 03 1999.Google Scholar

91. China Daily (Business weekly), 14–20 02 1999.Google Scholar

92. “Quanguo renda changwei hui weiyuan tan zhonghe zhili xubao fukua” (“The talk by the members of the standing committee of the National People's Congress on the curb of the manipulation of statistics”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 10 (1995), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar

93. Zhifang, Deng, “Guan chu shuzi, shuzi chuguan xing de long” (“Both officials deciding statistics and statistics leading to promotion are possible”), Zhongguo tongji, No. 11 (1994), pp. 37.Google Scholar