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African Perspectives on China–Africa Links

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2009

Barry Sautman  and
Yan Hairong
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Abstract

Scholars and the international media often allude to a putative “African view” of Africa–China links, constructed from anecdotal evidence. Using random sample and university-based surveys, we elaborate the first empirically based study of what Africans think of their relationships with China. We reach three conclusions. First, African views are not nearly as negative as Western media make out, but are variegated and complex. Second, the survey results are at variance with the dominant Western media representation that only African ruling elites are positive about these links. Third, we find that the dominant variation in African perspectives is by country, compared with variations such as age, education and gender. The differences among countries in attitudes towards China are primarily a function of the extent to which national politicians have elected to raise the “Chinese problem” and, secondarily, the extent of Western media influence in African states.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 199 , September 2009 , pp. 728 - 759
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2009

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References

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12 A slight majority of black South Africans are urban; whites are “highly urbanized.” “South Africa,” http://encarta.msn.com/encylcopedia_761557321_3/south_africa.html. Our own South Africa survey's proportion of whites (34%) far exceeded that of whites in the South African population (9%) and was higher than that of whites among university students (27%). Robin Cohen, “Higher education in post-apartheid South Africa,” http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/events/ac21/gsi_cohenr_-_he_in_s_africa_post-apartheid.pdf.

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22 Neo Simutanyi, “Neo-liberalism and the relevance of Marxism to Africa: the case of Zambia,” 2006, University of Zambia Institute of Economic and Social Research, www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/congreso06/conf3_simutanyi.pdf.

23 In regression analysis, independent variables are chosen because they may explain in part a dependent variable, by determining the proportion of variance in the dependent variable caused by each independent variable. E.g. regression analyses in studies of racial discrimination use variables such as race, gender, education, age, skill and output levels to explain employee salary differences by race. See e.g.“Study: New York Hospital RNs report increased challenges, lack of adequate training,” press release, http://www.albany.edu/news/release_2699.shtml (higher wages of white nurses not accounted for by years worked as RN).

24 As all variables had two or more categories, multinomial logistic regression was used.

25 The questions were whether China's policies in Africa benefit the continent, China's rise benefits Africa, and how China's policies in Africa compare with those of Western states.

26 In 2007, in purchasing power parity terms, $9,700 versus $5,400. CIA, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.

27 Competition occurs in many African states between local sellers of high-end imports and Chinese and local sellers of cheaper Chinese goods. See Sabrina N'Diaye, “Gift or curse: the impact of Chinese traders on the actors of the Sandaga market in Darkar,” PowerPoint, University of Frankfurt, 2008, http://www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de/NDiaye_Korrekturen.pdf; Fitzsimmons, Cailin, “A troubled frontier,” South China Morning Post, 17 January 2008Google Scholar. Several tens of thousands of Africans, mainly traders, are in China and are now the main source of Chinese goods in many African states. Montlake, Simon, “Out of Africa – Guangzhou,” Monocle, No. 11 (2008), pp. 61–65Google Scholar; Michael Lyons et al., “A ‘third tier’ of globalization reconsidered: African traders in Guangzhou, City, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2008), pp. 196–206; Bertoncello, Brigitte and Bredeloup, Sylvie, “The emergence of new Africa ‘trading posts’ in Hong Kong and Guangzhou,” China Perspectives, No. 1 (2007), pp. 94–105Google Scholar; “Out of Africa – and into China,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 12 May 2008; Declan, “Black pearls in the Yellow River,” 3 February 2008, http://siftalk.com/talk/?p=14.

28 See Sautman, Barry and Hairong, Yan, East Mountain Tiger, West Mountain Tiger: China, Africa, the West and “Colonialism,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law), No. 186 (2007)Google Scholar.

29 “Chinese Influence in Sudan is subtle, complicated,” National Public Radio, 29 July 2008; “Bush presses China to use influence in Sudan,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 11 August 2008. Africa and Sudan specialists have concluded however that China's influence in Sudan is exaggerated. Morrison, Stephen, “Will Darfur steal the Olympic spotlight?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2008), pp. 181–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“[Sudan President] Bashir may listen to China's entreaties, but he has other bases of external support and is far from an abject dependent”); “Chad eyes China role in conflict,” United Press International, 14 March 2008 (Ambassador Shinn states that “too many people have for too long ascribed too much power to China's ability to influence events in Sudan”); Nancy MacDonald, “China gives in to Hollywood heavyweights,” Macleans's, 24 March 2008 (Harvard University Sudan specialist Alex de Waal states that Beijing has limited traction with Sudan's regime).

30 Sides, John and Citrin, Jack, “European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests and information,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2007), pp. 477–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This study found that Europeans also greatly overestimate the actual level of immigration to their countries and that a high level of unemployment is strongly correlated with a high level of opposition to immigration. African unemployment levels are the highest in the world.

31 Hagos, Asgede, Hardened Images: the Western Media and the Marginalization of Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000)Google Scholar and essays in New African, No. 474 (2008).

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42 See, “State monitors Sata's anti-government campaign,” Times of Zambia, 25 October 2007.

43 “Mazoka must accept that he is sick, says Walamba,” Post (Lusaka), 13 December 2005.

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46 “Ruling party cries foul over Sata's remarks” Post, 16 August 2006; “Opposition censures Sata,” Times of Zambia, 29 October 2007.

47 “China's growing presence,” IPS, 18 July 2007.

48 “While protecting Africans from its fire,” Business Day (Johannesburg), 1 November 2006; Davies, Martyn, “Yin and yang,” Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 2 February 2007Google Scholar.

49 Clayton, Jonathan, “African protests show China that investment comes with heavy price,” The Times (London), 3 February 2007Google Scholar.

50 “Expel Nakzwe, Sata directs councillors,” Times of Zambia, 2 March 2007.

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52 “Stop defending Chinese investors, says opposition leader,” Times of Zambia, 1 November 2007.

53 Gershom Ndhlovu, “‘Cobra’ Sata spits venom,” 30 November 2007, http://gndhlovu.blogspot.com/2007/11/cobra-sata-spits-venom.html.

54 Hitchens, Peter, “In China, 5,000 people die and there is nothing. In Zambia, 50 people die and everyone is weeping,” Mail on Sunday (London), 28 September 2008Google Scholar; Plummer, Simon, “The Games will expose China's weaknesses,” Daily Telegraph (London), 14 February 2008Google Scholar; “Kaunda, Sata and Chiluba rail at Mugabe's critics,” newzimbabwe.com, 22 March 2007, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 March 2007.

55 Ofeibea Quist-Act,” Chinese-built Zambian smelter stirs controversy,” National Public Radio, 31 July 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93081721on.

56 One commentator stated that if Sata became president “investor confidence will drop to zero almost immediately. Even China, which has been our all-weather friend, will put out some of its investments.” Nyuma Banda, “Who will be country's next president?” Times of Zambia, 25 September 2008.

57 Shacinda, Shapi, “Zambia's Sata backtracks on Chinese firms,” Business Day, 9 September 2008Google Scholar.

58 “Zambian acting president urges ruling MMD party members to be honest to voters,” Zambia Daily Mail, 11 September 2008; “Sata rules out pact,” New Times (Uganda), 18 September 2008. A PF leader has stated that he “could not categorically say whether the PF was still receiving financial support from Taiwan.” “PF warns KK over his support for Banda,” Post, 7 October 2008.

59 “Sata files in presidential nomination,” Times of Zambia, 24 September 2008.

60 “My vision to lead Zambians lives on – Sata,” Times of Zambia, 6 October 2008.

61 “We'll continue booing Sata – UNZA students,” Post (Zambia), 14 December 2005.

62 “Levy and King Cobra,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 47. No. 16 (2006), p. 8.

63 Only one Zambian newspaper group (the Daily Mail, Financial Mail and Sunday Mail) carries a large amount of international news and it is “drawn almost exclusively from foreign wire services.” Donna Kips, “Zambia web report,” s.d., http://journ.ru.ac.za/amd/webzam.htm.

64 See “China's engagement of Africa,” p. 159.

65 Barry Sautman and Yoon Jung Park, “Southern Africa's ‘dragon slayers’: political oppositions and anti-Chinese agitation,” paper in progress.

66 From 2009 however, Botswana's economy was hard-hit by the decline in the world diamond market. Burgis, Tom, “Botswana's diamonds drained of sparkle,” Financial Times, 12 March 2009Google Scholar.

67 “Botswana, world's largest producer of rough diamonds, wants share of cutting, polishing,” Associated Press, 19 March 2008.

68 Siphambe, Happy, “Botswana: diamonds aren't forever,” Southern Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996), pp. 21–30Google Scholar; Nkala, Gideon, “BDP gets Chinese windfall,” Mmegi, 7 September 2006Google Scholar.

69 Akaki, Sam, “Would we prefer a Chinese ‘commonwealth’ today? Monitor (Uganda), 27 October 2007Google Scholar.

70 Hilsum, Lindsey, “Prosperity and a red carpet trump democracy,” New Statesman, 13 November 2006Google Scholar.

71 “Ambassador Ding tells Botswana a real China,” unpublished interview with Mmegi, 31 March 2008, http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t425042.htm.

72 Gabathuse, Ryder, “BNF honours Koma,” Mmegi, 20 June 2008Google Scholar.

73 “BNF petitions government,” Daily News (Botswana), 23 August 2007.

74 “I support Taiwan, says BNF legislator,” Mmegi, 3 December 2007.

75 Piet, Bame, “Magama chides Chinese for bad workplace rules,” Mmegi, 14 February 2008Google Scholar.

76 “MPs divided over Chinese loan,” Mmegi, 14 July 2006. See also “BHC units must meet set standards,” Daily News, 5 August 2004.

77 “Chinese P55 million loan to BHC debated,” The Voice, 25 July 2006.

78 “CKGR issues attracts international human rights organizations,” Daily News, 23 November 2005.

79 Piet, Bame, “Unskilled Chinese laborers flood the country,” Mmegi, 12 August 2008Google Scholar; “Chinese projects create over 2,000 jobs.” Mmegi, 29 November 2006; “MPs divided over Chinese loan.”

80 Dube, Moondisi, “Of Chinese, tenders and labor relations,” Mmegi, 16 May 2008Google Scholar.

81 “An overview of the relations between China and Botswana,” 1 February 2008, http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t404979.htm. The ambassador later stated that there are 18,000–20,000 Batswana working for Chinese; in construction, Chinese firms employ 700 Chinese, 5,270 permanent and 5,000 contract workers, while 5,000 locals work for the Chinese-owned Caratex textile exporting firm. “Ambassador Ding tells Botswana a real China.” Chinese are to invest $200 million in a China–Botswana Economic and Trade Co-operation Area, to be opened in 2011 and employ 8,000. Machinery, auto electronics etc. will be assembled. “Chinese propose light industry plan,” Mmegi, 17 August 2007; “Two Chinese firms win nod to invest in Botswana project,” China Knowledge Newswire, 4 March 2008; “China to invest $200 mil. in industrial park in Botswana,” Global Insight, 19 May 2008.

82 Biet, Bame, “Work permit process frustrates Chinese envoy,” Mmegi, 15 August 2008Google Scholar.

83 “Protect citizens against Chinese,” Botswana Gazette, 2 July 2003; “‘Mixed reactions’ to Chinese invasion,” Mmegi, 24 May 2005; “China: friend or foe?” Mmegi, 17 October 2006; Editorial, “China must not repeat colonizers' mistakes,” Mmegi, 8 November 2006; “Chinese are slave drivers, claim local workers,” The Voice, 7 November 2006; “The Chinese way,” The Voice, 24 July 2007 (claiming Chinese shop owners beat a customer); “Some bad apples among Chinese,” Mmegi, 19 July 2007; “Employees of Chinese shops exploited?” Mmegi, 5 September 2007; “Beware of Chinese toothpaste,” Mmegi, 23 January 2008; “Unions want fair trade with Chinese,” Mmegi, 4 April 2008. China has also been sharply attacked over its relations with Zimbabwe. “A victory of good over evil,” Mmegi, 23 April 2008; “Russia and China sell out to capitalism,” Mmegi, 15 July 2008.

84 Wene Owino, “Wanted: a magician for the Botswana opposition,” 16 April 2008, http://politics.nationmedia.com/Blog/default.asp?Display=230.

85 China also has non-oil investments, e.g. hydro-electric facilities and textile plants. Lee, Henry and Shalmon, Dan, Searching for Oil: China's Oil Initiatives in the Middle East (Cambridge: Belfer Center, 2007), p. 24Google Scholar. The United Arab Emirates has $7 billion invested in Sudan, but no political problems have been raised about its role. “UAE investment in Sudan touch $7 billion: Sudanese president,” The Emirates, 12 March 2008.

86 US Department of Commerce, US–African Trade Profile (Washington, DC: International Trade Administration, 2006), p. 13Google Scholar.

87 International Crisis Group, “China's thirst for oil,” Report No. 153, 9 June 2008.

88 Shichor, Yitzhak, “Sudan: China's outpost in Africa,” China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 21 (2006), pp. 9–11Google Scholar.

89 “Sudan: oil sector's background,” APS Review Downstream Trends, 25 February 2008, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7552580/SUDAN-Oil-Sector-s-Background.html.

90 “Good man in Africa,” China Daily, 11 May 2007.

91 Hong, Zhao, “China's oil venture in Africa,” East Asia, No. 24 (2007), pp. 399–415Google Scholar.

92 “International society should help Darfur people as China has,” Xinhua, 20 March 2008; “Sudan – exports,” APS Review Downstream Trends, 25 February 2008).

93 Downs, Erica, China (Washington: Brookings 2006), p. 31Google Scholar. Similarly, Nigeria accounts for 11% of US crude imports. “US warns of Al-Qaeda attacks,” This Day (Nigeria), 7 September 2007.

94 “China's overseas investments in oil and gas production,” report to the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington: Euro/Asia Group, 2006), p. 3. Three US oil companies, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Conoco Phillips, alone produce ten times the volume of equity oil that China does. US Department of Energy, “Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 1837: national security review of international energy requirements” (Washington: DOE, 2006), p. 28.

95 Darren Taylor, “Concerns mount about Chinese oil interests in Africa,” VOANews, 3 May 2007, www.voanews.com/english/Africa/Concerns-=Mount-about-Chinese-Oil-Interersts-in–Africa.cfm; Freeman, Nicholas, The Dragon on the Nile: China's Pursuit of Energy Security in Sudan (Annapolis: US Naval Academy 2006), p. 79Google Scholar. CNPC reported that 90% of its 2003 equity oil production was sold on the international market. With the Grain or Against the Grain: Energy Security and Chinese Foreign Policy in the Hu Jintao Era (Washington: Brookings, 2006), p. 28.

96 Downs, Erica, “The fact and fiction of Sino-African energy relations,” China Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2007), pp. 42–68Google Scholar. See also Atlantic Council and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, “US–China energy security cooperation dialogue,” 2006, p. 6 (Chinese firms that invest in Sudan and elsewhere say “a very small percentage of the oil they produce overseas is transported back to China”), http://www.acus.org/docs/070612-US_China_Energy_Security_Cooperation_Dialogue_Report.pdf.

97 Houser, Trevor, “The roots of Chinese oil investment abroad,” Asia Policy, No. 5 (2008), pp. 141–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. IMF figures for 2006 show that some 50% of Sudan's oil exports went to Japan. Large, Daniel, “China and the contradictions of non-interference in Sudan,” Review of African Political Economy, No. 115 (2008), pp. 93–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Official 2006 trade statistics show “Sudan shipped 14,000 bbl/d of its crude exports to Japan, and China's import of Sudanese crude exports averaged only 99,000 bbl/d.” “Sudan: whose oil?” Fatal Transactions, 2008, p. 25, www.su-dan.org/home.htm. Unaware that Japan is the largest buyer of Sudan oil, a prominent Japanese weekly referring to China and Sudan, rhetorically queried, “What does one call it when an economic powerhouse buys the lion's share of a backwater's exports? How about ‘virtual economic domination?’” “Beijing pursues ‘virtual domination’ in Africa,” Nikkei Weekly, 29 September 2008.

98 Interview, Abd Almoniem Abuedries Ali, , Al-Ahbdath journalist, Khartoum, 29 November 2008Google Scholar. Politically, India is more closely aligned with Sudan than is China. See Daniel Large, “Sudan's foreign relations with Asia: China and the politics of ‘looking east’,” Institute of Security Studies Paper 158 (2008), p. 5.

99 William Hartung, “Deadly traffic: China's arms trade with the Sudan,” New America Foundation, August 2008, http://www.newamerica.net/files/080606PBChinaArmsTrade.pdf; “China denies report it increased small-arms sales to Sudan as Darfur violence escalated,” Associated Press, 14 March 2008.

100 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database, http://armstrade.sipri.org.

101 “It is not objective to one-sidedly accuse China of arms sales to Sudan,” Xinhua, 8 March 2008. China helped develop the industry during the 1980s.

102 Large, “China and the contradictions of non-interference in Sudan,” p. 101. The Chinese government does not however necessarily regard Darfur rebel groups as anti-China. Ben Blanchard, , “China's role in Sudan ‘distorted’ by the media,” Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 29 June 2008Google Scholar.

103 See Liu Guijin, “BBC misrepresents China's relations with Sudan with ulterior motives,” Xinhua, 19 July 2008. See also Guijin, Liu, “No logic in blaming China for Darfu,” China Daily, 6 May 2008Google Scholar; Marklund, Klas and Odqvist, Karin, Perspectives on Africa Today: a Swedish–Chinese–African Dialogue (Uppsala: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2008), p. 17Google Scholar.

104 Gwen Thompkins, “Chinese influence in Sudan is subtle, complicated,” National Public Radio (US), 29 July 2008. In other authoritarian African states, opposition parties have attacked government deals with China. Halff, Antoine, “The panda menace,” National Interest (July 2007), pp. 35–41 (Angola)Google Scholar; Amosu, Akwe, “China in Africa: it's (still) the governance, stupid,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 9 March 2007, pp. 2–3 (DRC)Google Scholar.

105 Ali Abdalla Ali, , “EU, China and Africa: the Sudanese experience,” Sudan Tribune, 10 July 2007Google Scholar; “Workshop on foreign existence calls for foreign labor laws,” Khartoum Monitor, 3 April 2008, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 April 2008; “Chinese commodities imperil craftsmen,” Al-Ra'y al-Amm, 27 April 2007, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 April 2007.

106 “China to finance development projects in south Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, 1 September 2007; James Dak, “China to increase investment in southern Sudan: diplomat,” Sudan Tribune, 25 September 2008.

107 “Sudan opposition parties and SPLM urge quick resolution to Darfur crisis,” Sudan Tribune, 15 July 2008; “Sudan's opposition leader presents national reconciliation initiative,” Xinhua, 2 June 2008.

108 “Sudan media study summary,” Concordia University Media Relations, 8 September 2006, http://mediarelations.concordia.ca/pressreleases/archives/2006/09/sudan_media_study_summary.php.

109 Chege, Michael, “Economic relations between Kenya and China, 1963–2007,” in Cooke, Jennifer (ed.), US and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center of Strategic and International Studies 2008), pp. 12–32Google Scholar; see Alaba Ogunsanwo, “A tale of two giants: Nigeria and China,” in Ampiah and Naidu, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? pp. 192–207.

110 Elsewhere in Zambia, Chris Burke found that “the overwhelming majority of people interviewed have very favourable perceptions of China, simply because they can now buy a broader range of affordable consumer goods” and Muna Ndulo concluded that “it is clear that the reaction of Zambians to Chinese investments is complex, but on the whole, welcom[ing].” Burke, Chris et al. , China's Engagement of Africa: Preliminary Scoping of African Case Studies (Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007), p. 158Google Scholar; Ndulo, “Chinese investments in Africa: a case study of Zambia,” in Ampiah and Naidu, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? pp. 138–51.

111 Trofimov, Yaroslav, “In Africa, China's expansion begins to stir resentment,” Wall Street Journal, 2 February 2007Google Scholar.

112 Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008).

113 Ralph M. Wrobel, “China's role on the international markets for natural resources: implication for sustainability and growth in less developed countries,” paper presented at the Congress of Political Economists International annual meeting, 12–19 July 2008, New Delhi, p. 11.

114 Geda, Alemayehu and Meskel, Atnafu, “China and India's growth surge: is it a curse or blessing for Africa? The case of manufactured exports,” African Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008), pp. 247–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

115 Loxley, John and Sackey, Harry, “Aid effectiveness in Africa,” African Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008), pp. 163–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

116 A group of Africans involved in assessing China–African links have averred that a non-interference policy obviates “the sense of condescension and dictation that frustrates many Africans in their dealings with the West.” Marklund and Odqvist, Perspectives on Africa Today, p. 15.

117 See Gu Jing, , “Global governance and developing countries: the implications of the rise of China,” World Development, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2008), pp. 274–92Google Scholar; Long Yongtu, “United States goes against WTO rules by subsidizing agriculture,” Wen wei po (Hong Kong), 31 July 2008, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 July 2008.

118 “Build capacity for growth, say African leaders as World Economic Forum on Africa opens,” 14 July 2007, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/11874; Marklund and Odqvist, Perspectives on Africa Today, p. 9.