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Village Elections and Redistribution of Political Power and Collective Property
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 March 2009
Abstract
This study of competitive elections in a northern China village identifies two contradictions: one between villagers and village officials, the other between village elite and those seeking power. The one between villagers and the old leadership in the village focuses on the latter's corruption and bad governance, which had led to serious erosion and unfair distribution of the collective property. The one between villagers and the new leadership lies in the latter's failure to address the problems left by the old leadership. Both led to popular discontent and fuelled political participation. The contradiction between elite members focuses on competing for political office, which has resulted in the formation of factions and factionalism in both election and post-election politics and has become a salient feature of the village politics. The investigation of this village with governing problems found that free elections have brought about a radical redistribution of political power, but little satisfaction to villagers because their deep-seated desire for a fair redistribution of the collective property remains unfulfilled.
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References
1 Brien, Kevin J. O', “Implementing political reform in China's villages,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (1994), pp. 33–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Recently, Rong Hu confirms this view in his study of 40 villages in Fujian by arguing that “village-level economic development is crucial for the implementation of competitive elections.” Hu, Rong, “Economic development and the implementation of village elections in rural China,” Journal of Contemporary China, No. 44 (2005), p. 427CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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5 For a summary of their debate, see Li's, Lianjiang “The empowerment effect of village elections in China,” Asian Survey, No. 4 (2003), pp. 648–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Zhong, Yang and Chen, Jie, “To vote or not to vote: an analysis of peasants' participation in Chinese village elections,” Comparative Political Studies, No. 6 (2002) pp. 686–712CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
6 I stayed altogether 15 days in the village in my three trips and interviewed 35 villagers, including all the members of the current leadership, most former village cadres who were willing to talk and some ordinary villagers. Most of them are male and over 45 years old. Among these, I had long interviews with 15 people, and more than one session with eight of these. I also keep in touch with two of my informants by phone. For village elite, I mean those who have various degrees of power and influence among villagers.
7 Lianjiang Li, “The empowerment effect of village elections,” p. 653. Yong, Xu, “1998 nian yilai cun xuan pingshu” (“Commentary on village elections since 1998”), in Chongqing, Wu and Xufeng, He (eds.), Zhixuan yu cunzhi (Direct Elections and Village Governance) (Yangcheng wanbao chubanshe, 2003), pp. 40–59Google Scholar.
8 Most of the 82 Party members are over 50 years old: only eight are under 50. I thought that it must be because of a lack of interest by the younger generation in Party membership. But villagers I interviewed insisted that it was because the Party chief played favouritism and factionalism. It is also important to note that the most active members of the opposition – those continuing to petition to the upper levels of leadership – are all Party members. They certainly think of themselves as having a more important role to play in village politics than ordinary villagers.
9 While in China in general the perpetrators of land encroachment are governments or government officials of different levels, the problem in West Village is more complex. The village chief and Party chief were by no means the only beneficiaries of the unfair and unjust socio-economic order. At present encroachment of land resources take mainly three forms in West Village: a few village toughs continue digging and selling sand belonging to the collective; some farmers have gathered more contract land through legal or illegal transference; and a general delinquency to pay dues on contract land. The villagers' discontent is directed towards the new leadership, which is incapable of addressing the problem, and to the new elite who have benefited much more than average villagers in encroaching on collective property.
10 “Land privatization – another peasant revolution,” Huaxia Express, 22 January 2008, http://www.hxwz.com/my/modules/wfsection/article.php%3Farticleid=18725.
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