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Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP's “Taiwan” Frames

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2015

Anne-Marie Brady*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Email: [email protected].

Abstract

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government engages in a vast range of measures aimed at moulding global and domestic public opinion on the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan frames set by the CCP are not just aimed at shaping domestic Chinese public opinion and global discourse on Taiwan-related matters; they also succeed in curtailing the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan's global political and commercial space. The CCP's Taiwan frames are in direct conflict with the evolving “Taiwanese identity” frames coming out of the ROC. Moreover, they form part of the CCP government's wider ideological project to frame global concepts of “Chineseness,” which is aimed at combating other ideological challenges to that trope such as the Falun Gong movement, Tibetan independence activism and Chinese democracy groups. Yet, political, economic and technological changes in the PRC and globally suggest that, despite the CCP government's increased efforts, it may be harder than ever to ensure that the CCP frames have the desired effect.

摘要

中国共产党 (CCP) 政府就台湾问题在引导世界和国内公众舆论上实施了一系列的措施。中国共产党制定的台湾政策框架的目的, 不仅着眼于引导公众舆论和构建全球话语权, 而且在全球范围内限制中华民国 (ROC) 的政治和商业空间上也颇为成功。中国共产党的台湾政策框架直接抵制中华民国不断演变的 “台湾身份”。此外, 这些政策框架亦构成中国共产党政府更广泛的意识形态战略, 以展现一个全球的 “中国性” 概念; 旨在对抗其他意识形态方面的挑战, 如法轮功运动、西藏独立活动和中国民主运动团组。然而, 由于中国国内以及全球在政治、经济和技术方面的变化, 尽管中国共产党政府付诸更大的努力, 要保证这一政策框架取得预期的效果可能比以往都更加困难。

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2015 

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