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Strange Bedfellows: The Communist Party and Shanghai's Elite in the National Salvation Movement*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Patricia Stranahan
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Extract

During the National Salvation Movement of the mid-1930s, the Shanghai Party forged its most workable alliance not with members of the proletariat but with progressives from the city's middle and upper classes. Making use of multi-class patriotism, Party leaders established a co-operative relationship with members of the elite that became a crucial part of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resistance work against Japan. In many cases, the relationship continued into the post-war years and contributed significantly to the CCP's easy takeover of the city in May 1949.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 129 , March 1992 , pp. 26 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1992

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References

1. It is difficult to tell precisely what elements of Shanghai's elite were involved in the National Salvation Movement. For example, did more intellectuals join than businessmen? Were the businessmen who participated members of the national bourgeoisie? Given the available sources, these questions are impossible to answer. Certainly individuals are named but no material was found on what segments of the middle and upper classes joined the patriotic movement nor how many were involved. It is clear from the data, however, that men and women from all strata did participate.

2. The support the bourgeoisie showed for Chiang Kai-shek declined during the Nanking decade (1927–37). When Chiang broke with the Communist Party in 1927, the bourgeoisie supported him. They feared CCP-dominated labour unions and opposed social revolution. They hoped their world would not change under a Chiang government but such was not the case. Political control obsessed Chiang's faction and it refused to tolerate any group that might challenge its power. Within weeks of the 12 April 1927 coup, Chiang redirected his reign of terror on the very class which had financed it to the tune of 10 million dollars. He used the powerful Green Gang to penetrate the International Settlement and forced capitalists to continue their financial support for his military organizations. The terror ended when Chiang Kai-shek's army took Peking in 1928 (renaming it Beiping), thus ending the Northern Expedition. Nevertheless, it defined the Guomindang's relations with the Shanghai capitalists until the late 1930s. See: Coble, Parks, The Shanghai Capitalists and the National Government, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 261–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bergere, Marie-Claire, “The other China: Shanghai from 1919–1949,” in Howe, Christopher (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 17–18Google Scholar; Ling, Pan, Old Shanghai (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1984), p. 57.Google Scholar

3. Chengzong, Zhang, “KangRi banian de Shanghai dixia douzheng,” (“The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle”), in KangRi fengyun lu (Record of Unstable Conditions During Resistance) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), p. 12.Google Scholar

4. Shanghai historians with whom I discussed the issue in September 1988 and May 1989 deny that the underground was influenced more by the Comintern than the Central Committee. Instead, they give two different explanations: (1) the Party followed an independent course derived from the lessons of the past; (2) the Party followed the correct line of the CCP's Central Committee. Since all agree that the city's Party had little, if any, contact with the main body of the CCP during the mid-1930s, the second argument is implausible.

5. The Internationalists associated with Wang Ming and Bo Gu are also called the 28 Bolsheviks and the Russian Returned Students. They were young CCP members sent to study in the Soviet Union in 1925. Loyal to the Comintern representative in China, Pavel Mif, they took over key positions in the CCP during the first half of 1931. By the mid-1930s their position weakened as the rural party under Mao Zedong gained strength.

6. I wish to thank Lawrence Sullivan who discussed these and other issues with me in a letter dated 22 May 1989.

7. Thomas, S. Bernard, Labor and the Chinese Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), pp. 27 and 33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sullivan, Lawrence R., “Communist Party in the Shanghai underground: 1931–34,” The China Quarterly, No. 101 (03 1985), pp. 91–95.Google Scholar During the early 1930s, the fortunes of the CCP in Shanghai fell to an all-time low. In 1931, Chiang Kai-shek's agents arrested both the Party's general secretary and the head of its Security Police. When the Security Police chief turned informer Party members all over Shanghai abandoned their posts and “lost” contact with the organization. Police in the International Settlement and French Concession aided Chinese police in their efforts to weed out suspected communists. Shanghai Municipal Police records show that police raided 95 “communist” bases in the International Settlement in 1931, arresting 276 people and seizing 963, 601 copies of subversive literature. On 15 June 1931, Settlement police raided local offices of the Comintern seizing 211 documents and 1,081 books and papers. In 1932, they raided 103 “communist” bases. These raids led to the prosecution of 233 “communists” and the confiscation of 117, 920 copies of subversive literature. Chen Duxiu, former leader of the CCP, was arrested during one of these raids. See: Han, Wang, “Yu dang Zhongying shiqu lianxi zhi hou” (“After losing contact with the Party's Central Committee”), Dangshi ziliao (Party Materials), No. 1 (1980), pp. 91–95Google Scholar; Shanghai Municipal Police Records (hereafter SMP Records), Box 38 D4825.

8. Wang Ming and many other Internationalist leaders had left Shanghai by this time. Wang Ming returned to the Soviet Union in September 1931 and Bo Gu took his place as general secretary. The central leadership left Shanghai in November 1931 but the organization they created remained in place.

9. The discussion of the Leagues is taken from Yaoshan, Wang, “Guanyu Shanghai dixiadang chongjian de jingguo” (“Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground”), Dangshi ziliao, No. 1 (1979), pp. 47–48Google Scholar and Yaoshan, Wang, “Weida jinian Ri yinqi de huiyi” (“Great memories commemorating the Japanese setting off”), KangRi fengyun lu, Vol. I, p. 23.Google Scholar

10. Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 48.Google Scholar

11. Ibid. p. 49.

12. Historians in Shanghai with whom I have talked (22–31 May 1989) denounce the notion that the Shanghai Party under Internationalist control left a positive legacy. They argue that Wang Ming's left-wing opportunism which organized strikes and demonstrations during major holidays exposed the Party organization to undue danger doing more harm than good. Although participation in strikes and demonstrations did expose members of the underground unduly, I agree with Lawrence Sullivan's assessment of the Internationalists' legacy. He argues that the Internationalists' adeptness at organizing the city's Party kept it from complete destruction at the hands of the Guomindang and foreign police during the early 1930s. Interview with historians at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' History Institute (27 05 1989)Google Scholar; Sullivan, , “Communist Party in the Shanghai underground,” pp. 78–97.Google Scholar Sullivan also believes that one reason why Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, two Internationalists, continued to play important roles in the Party after other Internationalists lost power was that Mao recognized and needed their organizational abilities and knowledge of Leninism. Correspondence with Sullivan, Lawrence (22 05 1989).Google Scholar

13. No Internationalists served on the Jiangsu Provincial Committee but it was subservient to them.

14. Sullivan, , “Communist Party in the Shanghai underground,” p. 96.Google Scholar

15. It appears that in theory the Literary Committee directed the Provisional Committee. In reality, it was too busy with its own save-the-nation activities in literature and art to devote much time to the Provisional Committee. Eventually, the Provisional Committee took control of its own affairs. It disbanded in May or June 1937 when Shanghai salvation groups formed an alliance following the formation of the United Front. See: Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 52Google Scholar; Xiao, Liu, “Lue tan Shanghai dixiadang.de gongzuo” (“A brief account of Party work in the Shanghai underground”), Dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials), No. 1 (1981), p. 4Google Scholar; Han, Wang, “After losing contact with the Party's Central Committee,” pp. 131, 134–35.Google Scholar

16. Interview with historians at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' History Institute (27 05 1989).Google Scholar

17. Yaoshan, Wang, “Great memories commemorating the Japanese setting off,” p. 24.Google Scholar

18. Quotation from Pantsov, A., “Life given to the struggle for freedom,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 1 (1983), p. 127.Google Scholar I have found no exact date for the start of regular radio communications between Shanghai and Yan'an. However, by 1941–42 there were radio bases in Shanghai transmitting regularly to the Party headquarters. See Peiqun, Li, “Huiyi jiefangqian dang dixia jiaotong gongzuo” (“Recollections of the communication work of the Party underground before liberation”), Dangshi ziliao, No. 1 (1982), pp. 28–32.Google Scholar

19. Interview with Shanghai historian Yiyu, Zhang (29 05 1989).Google Scholar

20. Han, Wang, “After losing contact with the Party's Central Committee,” p. 131.Google Scholar

21. Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 22 and 25.Google Scholar

22. Garver, John W., “The origins of the second united front,” The China Quarterly, No. 113 (03 1988), p. 36.Google Scholar Like the 1 August Declaration, the Jiuguo shibao was not what it appeared to be. Supposedly published by leftist Chinese expatriates as propaganda for the united front against Japan among their countrymen and overseas Chinese, it was actually edited in Moscow by the Chinese delegation to the Comintern and flown secretly to Paris where it was published.

23. His desire for a united front did not prevent him from attacking Chiang Kai-shek as a “traitor” for suppressing the masses' national salvation activities and refusing to resist Japan, in a Jiuguo shibao article in late 04 1936.Google Scholar See Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 64.Google Scholar

24. Garver, , “The origins of the second united front,” pp. 34–56.Google Scholar Shum varies slightly from Garver in his portrayal of events. He writes that Wang Ming sent Pan Hannian to China from Moscow to negotiate with Guomindang officials. See Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 64.Google Scholar

25. Interview with historians at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' History Institute (27 May 1989). Eventually the most powerful associations were the Cultural Circles Salvation Association, the Salvation Union of College Professors, the Union of Primary School Teachers in Shanghai, the Salvation Society of Film Workers in Shanghai, the Educational Society under National Emergency, the Salvation Federation of College Students in Shanghai, the Shanghai Students' Salvation Federation, the Chinese Students' Salvation Federation. See Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” p. 2Google Scholar; Xian, Zhao, “Kangzhan de shiqi de Shanghai funu jiuwang yundong” (“The resistance period's Shanghai women's salvation movement”), in “Bayisan”: kangzhan shiliao xuanbian (August 13: A Compilation of Resistance Materials) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 377Google Scholar; Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 52Google Scholar; Nai-kuang, Hsiang, “The trick of Chinese communists in taking advantage of war against Japanese aggressors to expand their strength,” Symposium on the History of the Republic of China, Vol. IV (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1981), p. 210.Google Scholar

26. Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” p. 2Google Scholar; Xian, Zhao, “The resistance period's Shanghi women's salvation movement,” p. 377Google Scholar; Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 52Google Scholar; Nai-kuang, Hsiang, “The trick of Chinese communists,” p. 210.Google Scholar

27. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

28. Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 66.Google Scholar

29. Interview with Yiyu, Zhang (29 05 1989)Google Scholar; Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 51.Google Scholar

30. According to Parks Coble, in 1930 Zou Taofen supported moderate social doctrines in his popular periodical Shenghuo. By 1937, Zou had become a committed leftist, opposed to Chiang Kai-shek, and strongly sympathetic to the CCP. “The transformation was wrought not only by the Japanese issue but by the actions of [Nanking], which drove Zou into the arms of the opposition.” Coble, Parks, “Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Japanese movement in China: Zou Taofen and the National Salvation Association, 1931–37,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (02 1985), p. 307.Google Scholar

31. Nai-kuang, Hsiang, “The trick of Chinese communists,” pp. 210–11Google Scholar; Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian, 5: Zhonggong huodong zhenxian (Nationalist China's Important Historical Materials First Compilation, No. 5: The Communist Movement's True Situation), Vol. I (Taipei: China's Cultural Service, 1985), p. 75.Google Scholar

32. National Salvation Alliance leaders did develop close associations with the CCP. The Seven Gentlemen all had careers intimately linked to causes espoused by the CCP. After 1949, the five surviving “gentlemen” all worked for the Party. Zou Taofen died in 1944 but was posthumously admitted to the CCP. See Klein, Donald W. and Clark, Anne B., Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921–1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 764.Google Scholar

33. Interview with historians at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' History Institute (27 05 1989).Google Scholar

34. Wang Ming was in Moscow in the mid-1930s. There, he advocated Lenin's united front tactics for China. That meant allying with bourgeois-reformist parties against the main enemy (i.e. the Japanese) while simultaneously using legal and parliamentary channels to expand CCP influence. See Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, pp. 105 and 110Google Scholar; Thomas, , Labor and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 50, 136 and 143.Google Scholar

35. Xiao, Liu, “A brief account of Party work in the Shanghai underground,” p. 4Google Scholar; Ristaino, Marcia, China's Art of Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 180.Google Scholar

36. Following their attack on Mukden in September 1931, the Japanese sent 500 marines to the Hongkou area of Shanghai where many of their nationals lived. Patriotic Shanghai citizens responded by forming the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association to boycott Japanese goods on 27 September. On the night of 28 January 1932 the Japanese retaliated by attacking Shanghai itself. The Japanese government landed 20,000 troops in the city officially to “protect Japanese nationals and their interest,” but they intended to use the city as a base of operation for their takeover of coastal China. A bitter month-long battle with the 19th Route Army followed, killing or wounding more than 10,000 people. Unable to stand up to superior Japanese firepower, the Chinese army fled in March. The two sides concluded a peace agreement in May under intense international pressure.

37. Xiao, Liu, “A brief account of the work of the Shanghai Party underground,” p. 5.Google Scholar

38. On 20 February 1936 the Red Army crossed the Yellow River and launched the Eastern Expedition, a full scale offensive in eastern Shaanxi against Chiang Kai-shek and the warlord Yan Xishan. Within a month, the CCP was ready to stop fighting; by May it expressed a willingness to negotiate a united front with Chiang.

39. Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 74.Google Scholar

40. Ibid. pp. 64, 74–75. Quotation from p. 75.

41. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jiangyi (Chinese Communist Party Historical Materials) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1980), p. 134.Google Scholar

42. Chengzong, Zhang, “Jiefangqian Shanghai dixiadang de douzheng” (“The struggle of the Shanghai underground Party before liberation”), Shanghai wenshi ziliao xuanji (An Anthology of Historical Accounts of Past Events in Shanghai), No. 43 (1983), p. 7.Google Scholar

43. These salvation groups included the Banking Association, the Foreign Firms' Club, the Society for Benefiting Friends, the Medical Circle Association, the Hardware Circle Association, and the Association of Six Departments of Fruit and Delicacies from South China.

44. They included the Ant Society (an oddly-named group of professionals), the Liang Cai Library, the Chinese School of Continuing Education, the Liang Cai Continuing Education School and the Li Xin Accounting School.

45. Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 2, 11–13.Google Scholar

46. Honig, Emily, Sisters and Strangers (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 223Google Scholar; Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” p. 7Google Scholar; Xiang, Yin (28 11 1986 interview).Google Scholar

47. That theatre was located at 1440 Avenue Edward VII. Its compliance ended when the Shanghai Municipal Police found out. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

48. The success of the Wusong trip led national salvation groups to form a travelling group called the “Shanghai Amateur Travelling Group” in 06 1937Google Scholar. The Manager of the Zhong Hua Chemical Works was one of its chief promoters. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

49. SMP Records, Box 59 D77340.

50. Nationalist China's Important Historical Materials, p. 92.Google Scholar

51. Xiao, Liu, “A brief account of the work of the Shanghai Party underground,” p. 6.Google Scholar

52. “Shanghai gongren de fanRi bagongchao,” (“The anti-Japanese strike tide of Shanghai's workers”), in Shanghai kangRi jiuwang yundong ziliao xuanbian (Selectedly Edited Materials from Shanghai's Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement) (Shanghai: Shanghai shi Zhonggong dangshixuehui, 1985), p. 401.Google Scholar

53. Nationalist China's Important Historical Materials, pp. 75–76Google Scholar; Naikuang, Hsiang, “The trick of Chinese communists,” p. 211Google Scholar; Coble, , “Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Japanese movement in China,” p. 305.Google Scholar

54. When the Seven Gentlemen arrived back in Shanghai from Suzhou where they had been detained, they were entertained by relatives, friends and followers at a luncheon at Dinty Moore's restaurant, 35 Ningpo Road. In speeches after lunch, each of the seven pledged to continue to work for national salvation. See SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

55. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

56. Coble, , “Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Japanese movement in China,” pp. 305–306Google Scholar; Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years of anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

57. Xiao, Liu, “Shanghai dixiadang huifu he chongjian qiahou,” (“The Shanghai Party's restoration and rebuilding”), Dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials), No. 1 (1979), pp. 32–34.Google Scholar

58. Yaoshan, Wang, “Great memories commemorating the Japanese setting off,” p. 28.Google Scholar

59. Teiwes, Frederick C., “Mao and his lieutenants,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, Nos. 19 & 20 (1988), pp. 38–39.Google Scholar

60. Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, pp. 111 and 124.Google Scholar

61. Wang Ming was not the only CCP leader challenging Mao for power. Zhang Guotao was as well. At the Luochuan Conference in August 1937, Mao and Zhang had a bitter confrontation over the development of the resistance movement. Even after the conference, many among the Party's top leaders, including Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun, continued to oppose Mao's plan. See Kui-kwong, Shum, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power, p. 108Google Scholar; Garver, John W., Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 63Google Scholar

62. Teiwes, , “Mao and his lieutenants,” p. 39.Google Scholar

63. Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” p. 4.Google Scholar

64. Jones, F. C., Shanghai and Tientsin (New York: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 62–68Google Scholar; Shanghai Municipal Headquarters, Police Headquarters, Circular 1937, No. 74Google Scholar; Shanghai Municipal Council, Police Force Central Registry, No. 2900, 1937.Google Scholar

65. Within days of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Municipal Police were arresting anti-Japanese demonstrators. On the night of 9 July 1937, police arrested seven Chinese youths for singing national salvation songs. The next day, police arrested seven young people who were members of the China Amateur Travelling Group. Along with children from a primary school, they had been singing national salvation songs. These songs became very popular among Shanghai residents. Two examples are:

“New Life”

Here exists new life and burning passion

Here exists [our] aim to live and [the] spirit of war

Here exists free people and [a] strong long wall

“Hot Blood”

Who wishes to be slaves? Who wishes to be

horses and oxen?

Our hot blood is burning like a stream

For the sake of fraternity, equality and freedom

We shall not regret paying any price, even

sacrificing our skulls

Our hot blood is like a stream of water

We shall not regret sacrificing our lives for

the purpose of struggling for equality,

fraternity and freedom.

See SMP Records, Box 64 D7999; Box 70 D8118

66. SMP Records, Box 87 D8597/8.

67. Ibid.

68. The Municipal Council's statement may have been a reaction to gatherings that had taken place several days earlier to commemorate the death of China's premier writer, Lu Xun. On 18 October between 1.30 and 4.00 p.m. some 100 people held meeting at the Chinese YWCA to commemorate the deceased. The speaker urged his listeners to continue to struggle against the Japanese in the same spirit as Lu Xun in order to realize the emancipation of the nation. The next day, the Youth's National Salvation Service Group held a meeting at a local primary school to remember Lu Xun. That group dispatched 25 propaganda parties and 25 parties to solicit funds for antiJapanese work. See SMP Records, Box 70 D8140.

69. SMP Records, Box 77 D8166.

70. Police claimed incorrectly that of the remaining 38 offices raided, some 13 had moved to the interior or to unknown addresses while 25 had dissolved voluntarily. This is, as far as I can tell, an inaccurate statement. National Salvation groups did remain active. See fn. 74 below.

71. Typical of the handbills being distributed at this time were ones reading: “Unite the people under the pressure of the Japanese,” “Drive our cruel enemy out of China,” “Comfort the soldiers at the front,” “Boycott Japanese goods,” “Arm all young men,” “Purchase liberty bonds immediately,” See SMP Records, Box 70 D8122.

72. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

73. Ibid.

74. Not only did already-established salvation groups continue their work but new ones sprang up after the 7 July incident. On 28 July, returned Chinese students from Japan formed the Association of Chinese Returned Students from Japan; on 21 October, the Preparatory Committee of All China Labour Circles National Salvation Association to Resist the Enemy was formed; on 4 November, the Literary and Art Circles National Salvation Association; on 6 November, the China Labour Circles National Salvation Association; and on 5 August 1938 members of the Commercial Press Formed the Thrift Society. See SMP Records, Box 77 D8189; Box 70 D8144; G-2 Document 67; Box 87 D8640; Box 77 D8191.

75. SMP Records, Box 69 D8103.

76. Yaoshan, Wang, “Regarding the process of rebuilding the Shanghai underground,” p. 67Google Scholar; Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 14–15Google Scholar; Yibao zhoukan (Translation Weekly), 1 01 1939, p. 303.Google Scholar

77. Fan, Yang, “Kangzhan chuqi Shanghai kangRi jiuwang yundong de yixie huiyi” (“Some recollections of the Shanghai anti-Japanese salvation movement in the initial period of salvation”), Dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials, No. 1 (1981), pp. 93–94.Google Scholar

78. Ibid.

79. The Chinese term for “Shanghai Place Society” is “Shanghai difang xiehui.”

80. Fan, Yang, “Some recollections of the Shanghai anti-Japanese salvation movement,” pp. 102–103.Google Scholar

81. Among the women who joined were Song Ling and Yu Fengzhi, the wives of Sun Ke and Cai Yuanpei; the wives of leading Guomindang officials Yu Hongjin and Yang Hu; as well as the wives of gangsters Du Yuesheng and Huang Jinrong.

82. Jingping, Wu, “Shilun Shanghai bayisan qijian jiuwang tuanti de xingzhi yu zuoyong” (“Examining the nature and use of Shanghai's national salvation organizations during the 13 August period”), Dang'an yu lishi (Archives and History), No. 1 (1985), p. 60.Google Scholar

83. For example: Jin Xiecheng covered the propaganda and culture offices; Shen Tilan of Malan School, Liu Xiao and his wife; Xu Yanfei, the confidential secretary and the secret radio stations run by Gong Yinbing. Cai Shuhou obtained the release of many underground members arrested by Japanese and puppet police. See Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 15 and 17Google Scholar; Huiquan, Yao, “KangRi jiuwang gongzuo huiyi” (“Recollections of anti-Japanese salvation work”), KangRi fengyun hi (A Record of Unstable Conditions During Resistance), p. 202.Google Scholar

84. Fan, Yang, “Some recollections of Shanghai's anti-Japanese salvation movement,” p. 97.Google Scholar

85. Ibid. p. 97; Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” p. 7.Google Scholar

86. Yibao zhoukan (Translation Monthly) (10 10 1938–30 03 1939).Google Scholar

87. SMP Records, Box 77 D8187A.

88. Among those closing by the end of 1937 were: Dangong bao, Shen bao, People's Tribune (in English), Wen Di, Jiuwang ribao, and Dikang. Even the creative Yibao zhoukan could not stand up to the pressure; it ceased publication on 30 March 1939, five months after its first issue. See SMP Records, Box 77 D8187A. The document contains the names of other newspapers and magazines which either suspended publication or moved inland.

89. Fan, Yang, “Some recollections of Shanghai's anti-Japanese salvation movement,” p. 99Google Scholar; Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 7–8.Google Scholar Not everyone was so altruistic. The Shanghai Municipal Police reported that they arrested the manager of the Yasheng radio station for embezzling $20,000 collected for wounded soldiers and refugees. It also reported the arrest of three men for fraudulently obtaining contributions for refugees on behalf of the National Crisis Youth Service Group. See SMP Records, Box 70 D8126 and D8127.

90. Police Headquarters Circular, 1937, No. 64. The number of refugees in camps increased significantly during 1938 with 154 camps sheltering 90, 484 people. By the end of the year, there were 68 camps with 49,844. See: Police Headquarters Circular Report 1938, Budget 1939.Google Scholar

91. Chengzong, Zhang, “The Shanghai underground's eight years in anti-Japanese struggle,” pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

92. See articles on 10 September 1937, pp. 1 and 3; 11 September 1937, p. 4; 12 September 1937, p. 3; 13 September 1937, p. 1; 19 September 1937, p. 4; 27 October 1937, p. 1; 4 November 1937, p. 6.

93. Qiluan, Zhu, “Guanyu dang de Shanghai nanmin gongzuo weiyuan hui de huigu”Google Scholar (“Reviewing the Party's Shanghai refugee work committee”), in Bayisan: Kangzhan shiliao xuanbian (August 13: A Compilation of Resistance Materials), p. 470Google Scholar; Qiluan, Zhu, “Guanyu dang de Shanghai nanmin gongzuo weiyuanhui de nanmin gongzuo” (“Regarding the Party's Shanghai refugee work committee and refugee work”), Dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials), No. 2 (1985), pp. 129–130Google Scholar; Ke, Zhou, “Nanmin gongzuo he dixiajun gongzuo huiyi pianduan” (“Scattered recollections of refugee work and underground Party work”), in KangRi fengyun lu (A Record of Unstable Conditions During Resistance), pp. 164–65.Google Scholar

94. Yibao zhoukan (1 01 1939) p. 304.Google Scholar

95. Harrison, John Pinckney, The Long March to Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 288.Google Scholar

96. “Zenyang zuo Shanghai gongren qunzhong de gongzup” (“How to do woik among the Shanghai masses”), Dang'an yu lishi (Archives and History), No. 1 (1985), pp. 35–38Google Scholar; Zhonggong zai kangRi zhanzheng zhong de zhengge yinmou (The Full Scheme of the Communist Party in the Anti-Japanese Struggle), n.p., n.d.

97. “Guanyu weihu yu gaishan Shanghai renmin shenghuo de jueding” (“Regarding the decision to defend and improve the lives of the Shanghai masses”), Dang'an yu lishi (Archives and History) No. 1 (1985), p. 39.Google Scholar