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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
The fact that Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, since last October has accepted a series of invitations to visit the Eastern European satellites “at an appropriate time” is one indication of Peking's growing interest in developing her relations with these countries. The now fairly close relationships between China and the Eastern European satellites are a rather new dimension in Communist China's foreign policy posture and represent a radical break with China's traditional non-involvement in European affairs. Geographical remoteness, the inability to communicate, lack of interest, and preoccupation with the problems of her more immediate surroundings effectively isolated China from involvement in European affairs until very recent times. It is true that traders intermittently journeyed between China and European trade centres, carrying on a limited exchange of goods, but these exchanges had only a very marginal significance. Western imperialist encroachment upon China in recent centuries, particularly the nineteenth, finally brought to China an awareness of the principal powers of Western Europe, such as Portugal, Spain, England, the Netherlands, Imperial Germany, France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Much against her will China was eventually forced into unequal “treaty relations” with these European powers, as well as with Japan, Russia, and the United States of America. However China's political, commercial, and cultural relations with the nations now known as the “East European satellites” were virtually non-existent until 1949. The reasons for this lag lie in obvious historical, political, and developmental factors. When the Chinese door was kicked open in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century the East European nations either were not at the time independent or simply did not exist (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) as national entities as yet. Even had they existed, it is doubtful whether they would have been in a position to participate in the scramble for trade advantage, concessions, and souls characteristic of the “treaty powers.”
1 Eastern European satellites here refers to Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Because of the special position of Yugoslavia it cannot be included in any collective references to the Soviet satellites enumerated above, and will be discussed separately.
2 Shao-ch'i, Liu, Internationalism and Nationalism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 19.Google Scholar
3 No agreements with Yugoslavia were signed until February 1956.
4 More properly “Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend.”
5 An Editorial appearing in the People's Daily on 04 5, 1956.Google Scholar
6 On November 6, 1956, Chou En-lai sent a message of congratulation to Janos Kadar and announced that China would render material and financial aid in the value of 30 million roubles.
7 The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp. 59–60.Google Scholar
8 Ibid. p. 62.
9 Tse-tung, Mao. On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958.)Google Scholar
10 Level of Sino Yugoslav trade: £7 million annually.
11 But not with Yugoslavia.
12 “Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality” in Encounter, 06 1960, Vol. XIV, No. 6, pp. 40 and 41.Google Scholar
13 Reproduced in The China Quarterly, No. 2, 04–06, 1960, pp. 84–89.Google Scholar
14 Dr. J. Dieckmann, President of the East German People's Chamber, upon his arrival in Peking in April 1959, had said: “Germany will one day be unified, Taiwan will one day be liberated.”
15 See the Frankfurter Zeitung, 06 17, 1960.Google Scholar