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Nanjing's Failed “January Revolution” of 1967: The Inner Politics of a Provincial Power Seizure*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2010

Dong Guoqiang  and
Andrew G. Walder
Dong Guoqiang
Affiliation:
Nanjing University. Email: [email protected]
Andrew G. Walder
Affiliation:
Stanford University. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Scholarship on factional warfare during the first two years of the Cultural Revolution has long portrayed a struggle between “conservative” factions that sought to preserve the status quo and “radical” factions that sought to transform it. Recent accounts, however, claim that the axis of political conflict was fundamentally transformed after the fall of civilian governments in early 1967, violating the central tenet of this interpretation. A close examination of Nanjing's abortive power seizure of January 1967 addresses this issue in some depth. The power seizure in fact was a crucial turning point: it removed the defenders of local authorities from the political stage and generated a split between two wings of the rebel movement that overthrew them. The political divisions among former rebel allies intensified and hardened in the course of tortuous negotiations in Beijing that were buffeted by confusing political shifts in the capital. This created a contest that was not between “conservatives” and “radicals” over the restoration of the status quo, but about the respective places of the rival radical factions in restored structures of authority.

Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 203 , September 2010 , pp. 675 - 692
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2010

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References

1 The classic statement of this position, echoed in many subsequent publications, is Lee, Hong Yong, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), esp. pp. 5–6, 204–43 and 302–22Google Scholar.

2 See, for example, Barnouin, Barbara and Changgen, Yu, Ten Years of Turbulence: the Chinese Cultural Revolution (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993)Google Scholar; Harding, Harry, “The Chinese state in crisis,” in MacFarquhar, Roderick and Fairbank, John K. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15, The People's Republic, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 152–66Google Scholar; and Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (3rd ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1996)Google Scholar.

3 See, for example, Linshan, Hua, Les Années Rouges (trans. Leuwen, Henri and Thireau, Isabelle) (Paris:Éditions du Seuil, 1987)Google Scholar; Linshan, Hua, “Wen'ge qijian qunzhongxing paixi chengyin” (“Causes of mass factionalism in the Cultural Revolution”), in Qingfeng, Liu (ed.), Wenhua da geming: shishi yu yanjiu (The Cultural Revolution: Evidence and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 1996), pp. 191–208Google Scholar; Guokai, Liu, Lun “wen'ge”qianxi Zhongguo shehui de jieji jiegou yu shehui chongtu (Class Structure and Social Conflict in China on the Eve of the “Cultural Revolution”) (Hong Kong: Liu Shanqing, 1996)Google Scholar; Guokai, Liu, Guangzhou hongqi pai de xingwang (The Rise and Fall of the Guangzhou Red Flag Faction) (Hong Kong: Boda chubanshe, 2006)Google Scholar.

4 Youyu, Xu, Xingxing sese de zaofan: Hongweibing jingshen suzhi de xingcheng ji yanbian (Rebellion of All Hues: the Formation and Evolution of Red Guard Mentalities) (Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 1999), pp. 18–21, 81–109Google Scholar.

5 Walder, Andrew G., Fractured Rebellion: the Beijing Red Guard Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009)Google Scholar. Previous accounts labelled the “heaven” faction “conservative” and the “earth” faction “radical”: Lee, Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, pp. 216–29.

6 See Weihua, Bu, Zalan jiu shijie: wenhua da geming de dongluan yu haojie (Destroy the Old World: the Catastrophic Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 2008), pp. 383–428Google Scholar.

7 See Walder, Andrew G., Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1978)Google Scholar, and Harding, “The Chinese state in crisis,” pp. 152–66.

8 In the remaining five provinces there was never a power seizure according to the Shanghai script: Beijing, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia, Fujian and Hunan. See Bu Weihua, Destroy the Old World, pp. 383–428.

9 Pan Fusheng, the First Party Secretary of Heilongjiang, survived to “seize power” from his own organization, largely by imitating Mao at the early Red Guard rallies in Harbin and publicly supporting rebel groups. Other officials denounced their superiors at an opportune moment: Vice-Governor Liu Geping of Shanxi; Qingdao vice-mayor Wang Xiaoyu in Shandong, who was a close associate of Kang Sheng's son; and Li Zaihan, vice-head of the Political Department of the Guizhou Military District. See Bu Weihua, Destroy the Old World, pp. 304–08, 383–92; and MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael, Mao's Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 171–73Google Scholar.

10 In Beijing, the rebel faction split immediately after their defeat of their “conservative” opponents at the end of 1966, and failed to unite in a power seizure. Instead, Mao turned to the Ministry of Public Security and the Beijing Garrison to install a revolutionary committee in April from the top down See Walder, , Fractured RebellionGoogle Scholar, ch. 8, and Bu Weihua, Destroy the Old World, pp. 392–99.

11 See Mao's many directives about regional power settlements in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di shi'er ce (Mao Zedong's Post-1949 Manuscripts, Vol. 12) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998).

12 Many of which are included in Yongyi, Song (ed.), A New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Part III: a Comprehensive Compilation of Red Guard Tabloids from the Provinces, 52 vols. (Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 2005)Google Scholar. This collection does not include all the issues of Red Guard periodicals that we cite below, some of which were obtained by the first author from local collections in Nanjing.

13 guan, Nanjing shi dang'an, Nanjing “wenhua da geming” dashiji, chugao (A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution” in Nanjing, draft) (Nanjing: Mimeographed, 1985)Google Scholar.

14 Dong Guoqiang, “Jiangsu ‘yi.erliu duoquan’ qianhou de quanli juezhu” (“Power rivalries before and after Jiangsu's ‘26 January power seizure’”), Ershiyi shiji, No. 63, online edition, June 2007, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/.

15 A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” pp. 22, 24 and 27, and interviews with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007, and Zeng Bangyuan, 28 November 2007.

16 Weiqing, Jiang, Qishinian zhengcheng – Jiang Weiqing huiyilu (70 Year Journey – the Memoirs of Jiang Weiqing) (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1996), pp. 540–42Google Scholar.

17 Mao Zedong, “Dui zhongyang wen'ge xiaozu jiu ‘Wenhui bao’, ‘Jiefang ribao’ duoquan shijian de tanhua” (“Mao Zedong's statement to the Central Cultural Revolution Group about the power seizures at Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily”), 8 January 1967, in Song Yongyi (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, CD ROM (Hong Kong: Universities Service Centre for China Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002), and A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 35.

18 The bridge over the Yangzi River at Nanjing was not yet completed, and rail traffic had to be ferried to the north shore. The fighting in Nanjing disrupted this artery, effectively cutting off shipping from the industrial heartland of Shanghai to the northern half of the country. This surely explains Zhou Enlai's close attention to events in Nanjing. The battles are described in “Nanjing daxue ba.erqi geming chuanlianhui jinji shengming” (“Urgent declaration of Nanjing University 27 August Revolutionary Liaison Office”), Ba.erqi zhanbao, 5 January 1967, p. 1, “Nanjing shiduo wan geming zaofan pai juxing ‘yi.san xue an’ shengtao dahui” (“More than 100,000 Nanjing rebels hold mass meeting to condemn the ‘bloody 3 January incident’”), Ba.erqi zhanbao, 11 January 1967, p. 1, A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 34, and “Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei guanyu Nanjing ‘yi.san shijian’ de pingfang jueding” (“Decision of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee on the rehabilitation of the Nanjing ‘3 January incident’”), 30 December 1978, in Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei dangshi bangongshi, Boluan fanzheng: Jiangsu juan (Bringing Order out of Chaos: Jiangsu) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 401–03, and Jiang Weiqing, 70 Year Journey, pp. 541–43.

19 “Jiang Weiqing gei Zhonggong zhongyang de teji dianbao” (“Jiang Weiqing's urgent telegram to the Party Centre”), 22 January 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

20 Jiang Weiqing, 70 Year Journey, pp. 544–45; “Zijue yu renmin de Jiang Weiqing jue meiyou hao xiachang” (“Jiang Weiqing, alienated from the people, will surely come to no good end”), Nongnu ji, 8 March 1967, p. 4, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 36, p. 15535. Xu Jiatun would return as head of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong during the 1980s, but would defect to the United States in protest over the military suppression of popular protests on 4 June 1989.

21 First author's interview with Geng Changxian, 1 February 2007. Geng was a second-year student in the French Department at Nanjing University (Nanda) in 1966. He was a founder of Nanda's Red Rebel Brigade, and as a leader of that organization was one of the founders of the Jiangsu Red Rebel General Headquarters.

22 A political instructor in his 30s, he was an army veteran and Party member.

23 He was vice-secretary of the Youth League General Branch of his department, and chairman of his department's student association. Zhang Jianshan and Ge Zhonglong were among the founding members of the Red Rebel Brigade. The Brigade was highly selective in admitting members, and decided to have Zhang establish an auxiliary rebel group, 27 August, in order to absorb the many people who sought to join the movement. The new organization grew much larger than the original Red Rebel Brigade, and rivalled the original group for influence.

24 The similar motives of the Beijing rebels are described in Walder, Fractured Rebellion, ch. 6.

25 The account in this paragraph is based on interviews with Ge Zhonglong, 14 and 15 April 2007. Ge was a senior in the Nanda Mathematics Department. In December 1966 he accompanied a delegation of Nanda rebels to Beijing to lodge complaints, and met Zhou on three successive days beginning 6 January. See Zhou Enlai nianpu (xiajuan) (Zhou Enlai Chronology [Vol. 3]) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), p. 109.

26 Gao Xiaoping had been demoted by provincial leaders in the late 1950s, stalling his career. His wife was a student at Nanda and joined the 27 August rebel group.

27 Liang was Vice-Political Commissar of the Jiangsu Military District; Du was director of the National Defence Industry Department of the Nanjing Military Region; Wu was vice-director of the Nanjing Military Region's Logistics Department.

28 See the discussion of the role of reporters as CCRG liaison personnel in Walder, Fractured Rebellion, ch. 6.

29 “Yi er liu duoquan qianhou” (“Before and after the 26 January power seizure”), Geming zaofan bao, 17 February 1967, p. 2, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 16, p. 6833.

30 Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007.

31 The account in this paragraph is based on an interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 28 November 2007. Zeng was a 1964 graduate of Nanda's Mathematics Department who was kept on as a political counsellor after graduation. He was a Party member and the Department's Youth League General Branch Secretary.

32 “Fangwen Liang Jiqing tongzhi jilu” (“An interview with Comrade Liang Jiqing”), Geming zaofan bao, 18 February 1967, p. 4, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 16, p. 6913.

33 “Wuchan jieji geming pai da lianhe, duo zou ziben zhuyi daolu dangquan pai de quan!” (“Proletarian revolutionaries unite, seize power from those in power taking the capitalist road!”), “Yiqie quanli gui geming zaofanpai” (“All power to revolutionary rebels”), and “Zaofan jiu shi yao duoquan!” (“To rebel is to seize power!”), Renmin ribao, 22 January 1967, p. 1.

34 “Zhou Enlai tongzhi daibiao Mao zhuxi, dang zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei, zhongyang wen'ge dui wuchan jieji geming zaofan pai da lianhe, da duoquan wenti zuo zhongyao zhishi” (“Comrade Zhou Enlai relays important instructions to proletarian revolutionary rebels about the great alliance and great power seizure on behalf of Chairman Mao, the Party Centre, the State Council, the Central Military Commission and the Central Cultural Revolution Group”), 22 January 1967, in Zhongyang fuze tongzhi jianghua chaolu (di san ji) (Transcripts of Central Leaders' Speeches [No. 3]) (Beijing: no publisher, January 1967), pp. 194–95.

35 “Before and after the 26 January power seizure,” and A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 38.

36 “Duo quan ji” (“Account of the power seizure”), Hongweibing bao, 15 February 1967, p. 1, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 28, p. 12251.

37 “Before and after the 26 January power seizure,” and A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 40.

38 Interviews with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007, and Geng Changxian, 1 February 2007. In his memoir, Xing Wenju denies that the rebels informed him beforehand but he implies that the Nanjing Military Region and Party Centre in Beijing did approve the plans beforehand. See Xing Wenju koushu, Yang Minqing zhengli, “Wei ‘zhongyang wen'ge’ zuo jizhe de rizi (shang)” (“My days as a reporter for the ‘Central Cultural Revolution Group’ [part 1]”), in Lao zhaopian, No. 59 (2008), pp. 6–7.

39 “Wenji duoquan weiyuanhui zui'e zhongzhong” (“The multiple crimes of Wen's power seizure committee”), Geming zaofan bao, Dongfanghong zhanbao, Ba.erqi zhanbao, Hongweibing (special joint issue), 23 February 1967.

40 Ibid.

41 “Jinghu shengwei shujichu” (“Sound the alarm on the provincial secretariat”), Dongfanghong zhanbao, 9 February 1967, p. 4, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 8, p. 4301.

42 “Jiangsu sheng geming zaofanpai lianhe duoquan shengming” (“Joint declaration of power seizure by Jiangsu province revolutionary rebels”), Xinhua ribao, 28 January 1967, p. 1; and “Before and after the 26 January power seizure.”

43 A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 42. Mao had only recently instructed the Nanjing troops to “support the left” by attending a rebel rally in Hefei. See Mao Zedong's Post-1949 Manuscripts, Vol. 12, pp. 197–98.

44 A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” pp. 42–43.

45 Both Li and Bao were members of the Jiangsu Province Party Secretariat. Li had ties to Kang Sheng due to postings in Shandong and Beijing before his transfer to Jiangsu in the early 1960s.

46 Zhou also instructed that Ge Zhonglong be added as a representative of the rebels who opposed the power seizure, apparently unaware that Ge had recently defected to the Power Seizure Committee and was now a member of its leadership. Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007, and A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” pp. 42–43, which supports Ge Zhonglong's account, as does “‘Wenji qiangyin daibiaotuan’ jiujing shi shenme huose” (“What kind of rubbish ‘Wen's urgent delegation’ actually was”), Dongfanghong zhanbao, 5 March 1967, p. 3 in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 8, p. 3416.

47 Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007.

48 See Hongqi, No. 3 (3 February 1967), and Renmin ribao, 4 February 1967, p. 1.

49 “Zhou Enlai, Tan Zhenlin yu Jiangsu sheng geming zaofan lianhe weiyuanhui zuotan jiyao” (“Minutes of the discussions of Zhou Enlai and Tan Zhenlin with the Jiangsu Province Revolutionary Rebel Alliance Committee”), 8 February 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

50 Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 124, and “Tan Zhenlin Chen Yi gei Zhou Enlai de liangfeng xin” (“Tan Zhenlin and Chen Yi's two letters to Zhou Enlai”), 6 February 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

51 Jiang Weiqing, 70 Year Journey, pp. 546–48, is very clear about the date of release from rebel captivity, contradicting other sources that report a later date: “‘Dixia shengwei’ fubu ji” (“An account of the restoration of the ‘Underground Provincial Party Committee’”), Gongren zaofan bao, 21 January 1968, pp. 2–4, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 18, pp. 7529–31.

52 The following sources report meetings held on 10, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 February: “Chumu jingxin de ziben zhuyi fubi” (“A shocking restoration of capitalism”), Xinghuo liaoyuan, 25 April 1968, “Xinhua ribao jiujing shi sheijia de baozhi?” (“Whose newspaper is Xinhua ribao after all?”), Liu.san zhanbao, 23 January 1968, pp. 2–6, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 35, pp. 14906–10, and “An account of the restoration of the ‘Underground Provincial Party Committee’.

53 “A shocking restoration of capitalism.”

54 See “Bixu zhengque duidai ganbu” (“It is necessary to treat cadres correctly”), Hongqi, No. 4 (1 March 1967); the editorial was published in advance in Renmin ribao, 23 February 1967, p. 1.

55 This editorial finally was published in Hongqi, 1 March 1967, but Zhou had reviewed the prepublication draft on 18 February. Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 129.

56 Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 16 July 2008.

57 “Tan Zhenlin shi pohuai Jiangsu wenhua da geming de zuikui huoshou” (“Tan Zhenlin is the ringleader and chief culprit in the sabotage of Jiangsu's Cultural Revolution”), Jinggangshan, 23 June 1967, p. 3, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 32, p. 13920.

58 Interview with Du Fangping, 8 October 2007, also “Du Fangping zai jing xuexi hui shang jiantao zhailu” (“Extracts from Du Fangping's self-examination at the Beijing study meeting”), 12 November 1967, in Jiangsu gongren, 15 March 1968.

59 Interview with Du Fangping, 8 October 2007.

60 Interview with Dai Guoqiang, 8 July 2007. Dai participated in the Beijing delegation; he was a reporter for the Jiangsu branch of New China News Agency and a leader of the rebel group there that supported the 26 January power seizure.

61 “Yi.erliu duoquan jiushi hao” (“The 26 January power seizure is indeed good”), Xinhua ribao, 8 February 1967, p. 1; also, “Whose newspaper is Xinhua Daily?”, “Before and after the 26 January power seizure,” and A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 45.

62 See “Zhongyang shouzhang zai xiang zichan jieji fandong luxian menglie kaihuo shishi dahui shang de jianghua” (“Speeches by central leaders at the mass rally to swear to fiercely open fire on the bourgeois reactionary line”), 6 October 1966, and “Zhou Enlai liuliu zhi liuba nian you guan Jiangsu sheng wenhua geming de bufen jianghua” (“Some of Zhou Enlai's statements from 1966 to 1968 on Jiangsu's Cultural Revolution”) in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

63 Interview with Geng Changxian, 1 February 2007. Also see “Zhongyang shouzhang jiejian Jiangsu sheng fu jing daibiaotuan jianghua de jiyao” (“Minutes of the talks of central leaders with the Jiangsu delegation to the capital”), 5 March 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, during which Kang Sheng was quoted as saying, “I say support Wen Fenglai, and I said this even before you did.” See also “Mao Zhuxi he women xinlianxin” (“Chairman Mao cares deeply for us”), Renmin ribao, 19 August 1966.

64 Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007, and “Before and after the 26 January power seizure.”

65 Interviews with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007, and Ge Zhonglong, 14–15 April 2007.

66 Interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007.

67 Xing Wenju, “My days as a reporter for the ‘Central Cultural Revolution Group’,” pp. 14–15. According to Xing's memoir (p. 12), Gao Xiaoping had already become involved with the CCRG after relaying two anonymous letters, reportedly discovered by rebels in the files of the provincial public security bureau, to the CCRG. They accused Jiang Weiqing of conspiring with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai to murder Lin Biao. The CCRG appointed Gao to lead a special investigation group to look into the allegations.

68 Interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007. See also “Huiyi Zhou zongli dui ba er qi de zhichi he guwu” (“Recalling the support and inspiration Premier Zhou has given 27 August”), Ba.erqi zhanbao, 14 January 1968.

69 Interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007, and “An account of the restoration of the ‘Underground Provincial Party Committee’.”

70 See “Tan Zhenlin is the ringleader and chief culprit in the sabotage of Jiangsu's Cultural Revolution.”

71 Interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007. Zhou may already have learned of Gao's behind-the-scenes plotting with the CCRG. He was reported to have said at the 22 February meeting: “Gao Xiaoping has a complicated background,” “This guy is no good,” “When he talks to me he always embellishes the facts,” and “I don't advocate a second power seizure, but according to what Gao Xiaoping suggests, he really wants to seize it all over again!” See “Gao Xiaoping shi zenyang zai Jiangsu fubi ziben zhuyi de? Ge Zhonglong zai Nanda Mao Zedong sixiang xuexi ban douzheng fangeming liangmian pai Gao Xiaoping dahui shang de fanyan” (“How did Gao Xiaoping restore capitalism in Jiangsu? Ge Zhonglong's speech at the Mao Zedong thought study class struggle meeting against the counter-revolutionary double-dealer Gao Xiaoping”), Jiangsu hongweibing, 25 June 1968, p. 4, in New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Vol. 32, p. 13621.

72 Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, pp. 126–27, and MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution, pp. 191–94.

73 See MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution, pp. 194–97; Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 129, and Li, Wang, Xianchang lishi: Wenhua da geming jishi (At the Scene of History: An Account of the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Niujin daxue chubanshe, 1993), pp. 31–32Google Scholar.

74 “Tan Zhenlin gei Lin Biao de yi feng xin ji Lin Biao he Mao Zedong de piyu” (“Tan Zhenlin's letter to Lin Biao and Lin Biao and Mao Zedong's notations”), 17 February 1967, Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, and Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 128.

75 Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 129. The uproar over the “February Adverse Current” apparently caused Mao to change his mind about restoring Jiang to power. Mao seemed to have a positive view of Jiang, and consulted him personally during the 11th Plenum in August 1966. While Mao permitted Jiang to be repudiated as the “Khrushchev-type revisionist of Jiangsu,” he repeatedly denied subsequent CCRG requests for Jiang to be taken back into rebel custody in Nanjing. See Jiang Weiqing, 70 Year Journey, pp. 526–28 and 548–49.

76 They were both from Hunan and joined the CCP in the 1920s. Jiang had served under Tan in the New Fourth Army and as a member of the Jiangsu Party secretariat when Tan was on the East China Bureau secretariat.

77 Interview with Ge Zhonglong, 16 July 2008.

78 Interview with Zeng Bangyuan, 2 December 2007. The delegation in fact did hand over their charges against Tan Zhenlin. See “Gei zhongyang wen'ge de yifeng xin – Jiangsu geming zaofan pai fu jing konggao tuan konggao Tan Zhenlin” (“A letter to the CCRG – accusations of the Jiangsu Petition Delegation against Tan Zhenlin”), Dongfanghong zhanbao, 21 June 1967.

79 “Zhongyang wen'ge xiaozu jiejian Jiangsu daibiaotuan de tanhua” (“Central Cultural Revolution Group's talks with Jiangsu Delegation”), 2 March 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

80 A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” pp. 45–49, describes a series of eight violent conflicts between 8 February and 1 March.

81 “Jun ji yishang ganbu huiyi jingshen chuanda” (“Transmission of the spirit of the meeting of officers at the army level and above”), March 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

82 “Zhongyang shouzhang jiejian Jiangsu fu jing daibiao tuan de jianghua” (“Central leaders' speeches in meeting with Jiangsu Delegation in Beijing”), 5 March 1967, in Chinese Cultural Revolution Database.

83 A Chronology of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” p. 51.

84 Ibid. pp. 49–50. This source gives the date for the orders as 5 March, but Zhou Enlai Chronology, Vol. 3, p. 134, gives 10 March as the date.

85 See Dong Guoqiang, “1967 nian xiatian Nanjing ‘dao Xu’ fengchao de taiqian muhou” (“The story behind the summer 1967 ‘Overthrow Xu’ movement in Nanjing”), Ershiyi shiji 56, online edition (October 2006), http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/, and Michael Schoenhals, “‘Why don't we arm the left?’ Mao's culpability in the ‘great chaos’ of 1967,” The China Quarterly, No. 182 (2005), pp. 277–300.