Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 December 2021
How do subnational agents exercise policy discretion in the social welfare sphere? To what extent do they do so as a result of various bureaucratic and fiscal incentives? The literature has documented several explanatory frameworks in the context of China that predominantly focus on the realm of developmental policies. Owing to the salient characteristics of the social policy arena, local adaptation of centrally designed policies may operate on distinctive logics. This study synthesizes the recent scholarship on subnational social policymaking and explains the significant interregional disparities in China's de facto urban poverty line – the eligibility standard of the urban minimum livelihood guarantee scheme, or dibao. Five research hypotheses are formulated for empirical examination: fiscal power effect, population effect, fiscal dependency effect, province effect and neighbour effect. Quantitative analysis of provincial-level panel data largely endorses the hypotheses. The remarkable subnational variations in dibao standards are explained by a salient constellation of fiscal and political factors that are embedded within the country's complex intergovernmental relations and fiscal arrangements. Both a race-to-the-top and a race-to-the-bottom may be fostered by distinctive mechanisms. The unique role of provincial governments as intermediary agents within China's political apparatus is illuminated in the social policy arena.
在社会福利领域,地方政府如何行使政策自由裁量权?又会在多大程度上出于各种行政和财政激励机制来行使裁量权?现有文献探讨了中国背景下的主要解释框架,研究重点多聚焦于经济发展领域。由于社会政策领域的固有特征,地方政府可能遵循不同的逻辑对中央政策进行适配。本文基于地方社会政策制定的研究成果,解释了中国的事实城市贫困线(城市最低生活保障标准)中所存在的重大地区差距。本研究通过省级面板数据的回归分析,对五个研究假设进行了实证检验:财政能力效应、人口效应、财政依赖效应、省级政府效应和邻省效应。研究发现,低保标准中的地方差异可以用一系列复杂的府际关系和财政安排中所体现的财政和政治逻辑来解释。在低保标准的制定过程中,地方政府间既有逐底竞争,也存在逐顶竞争。本文着重阐明了省级政府作为中国政治体制的 “中间层” 在社会政策领域的独特作用。