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Jiang Zemin's Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Li Cheng
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Extract

Shortly after Jiang Zemin and his so-called “third generation of leaders” took over power from Deng Xiaoping and other revolutionary veterans, China began to face a new round of political succession. This is no surprise because Jiang is already 72 years old, and two other top leaders, Premier Zhu Rongji and Head of People's Congress Li Peng, are also in their early 70s. The average ages of members of the Standing Committee, Politburo and Secretariat of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elected in 1997 are 65, 63 and 63 respectively. These three pivotal, hierarchical leadership organizations all consist of similar age groups. When the next Party congress convenes, these political bodies will be occupied by people with an average age of 68 to 70. This narrow age distribution among the top leadership may cause problems for political succession in the future.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 161 , March 2000 , pp. 1 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2000

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References

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