Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
There has been little systematic research on corruption in China. Analyses so far often only reveal various cases of corruption and conclude by commenting on the retrograde aspect of the Chinese state. Work of this nature also tends to be too static – not considering the historical and cultural dimensions of politics – and too superficial – just concentrating on anecdotal aspects of corruption. As a result, one could quite simply conclude that what is required is a Weberian bureaucracy, which would be both rational and efficient, though without explaining how this should come about.
However, in the light of works dealing with the shifting role of the state in societies which are undergoing change, the causes and nature of the phenomenon of “corruption” in China can be reassessed.
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