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The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Yong Deng
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The pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. Yet in the 1990s, politicians in the West and the U.S. have criticized the Chinese government for its allegedly narrow-minded, backward view, especially on issues concerning human rights and irredentist claims. Many scholarly analyses in North America also point to a “hard-core,” well-entrenched Chinese realpolitik “worldview” with little ingrained liberal thinking. The conclusion seems to be that, in the Chinese worldview, the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interests is under increasing challenge, thanks to unprecedentedly “dense interdependence.” The blunt policy criticisms and subtle scholarly analyses point to a problematic Chinese definition of national interests.

Type
Research Notes
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 154 , June 1998 , pp. 308 - 329
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1998

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References

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58. The earliest book introducing Western (mostly realist) international relations theories is Hanwen, Chen, Zai guoji wutai shang: Xifang guoji guanxi xuejianjie (On the International Stage: A Brief Introduction to Western IR Theory) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1985).Google Scholar Other major introductory books include Shixiong, Ni and Yinzhong, Jin (eds,), Dangdai Meiguo guoji guanxi lilun liupai wenxuan (Selected Readings in Contemporary American International Relations Theory) (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1987)Google Scholar; Yinzhong, Jin and Shixiong, Ni, Comparative Study of International Relations TheoryGoogle Scholar; Xinning, Song, Guoji zhengzhi jingji yu Zhongguo duiwai guanxi (International Political Economy and Chinese Foreign Relations) (Beijing: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997).Google Scholar

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85. For the best treatment of this subject, see Dittmer, and Kim, (ed.), China's Quest for National Identity.Google Scholar

86. Both Western and Chinese scholars agree on China's lack of stable national identity. See Shenzhi, Li, “Globalization and Chinese culture,”Google Scholar in Dittmer, and Kim, (ed.), China's Quest for National IdentityGoogle Scholar; Hughes, , “Globalization and nationalism.”Google Scholar