Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T18:49:48.407Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2012

Björn Conrad
Björn Conrad
Affiliation:
Global Public Policy Institute. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The contradiction between the astonishing dynamic of China's domestic climate policy agenda and its seemingly tenacious position in international climate negotiations presents a puzzle that, on closer inspection, reveals much about a nation at the crossroads, undecided which way to turn. The alterations in China's political interests connected to the issue of climate change are clearly evident in the domestic policy changes China introduced during previous years. However, China's leadership thus far has remained hesitant to translate this new set of interests fully into a coherent position in the international arena. China's mounting difficulties in reconciling its rapidly changing role on the international stage with its altered domestic situation, as well as its traditional foreign policy interests and principles, undermine its ability to pursue a consistent and effective strategy in international climate negotiations. China's reluctance to redefine its role in the international arena has led to a number of inconsistencies that particularly plagued its position during the Copenhagen conference, adding to the overall non-constructive dynamic of the proceedings that ultimately left China, as everyone else, with empty hands. The Copenhagen negotiations demonstrated that China's leadership will have to address these inconsistencies resolutely if it wants to realize the benefits that international climate cooperation offers.

Keywords

climate changeUNFCCCclimate negotiationsCopenhagendomestic climate agendainternational stance
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 210 , June 2012 , pp. 435 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Weber, Christopher L. et al. , “The contribution of Chinese exports to climate change,” Energy Policy, Vol. 36. No. 9 (2008), pp. 3572–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lin, Boqiang and Sun, Chuanwang, “Evaluating carbon dioxide emissions in international trade of China,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2010), pp. 613–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Country Dossier China; International Energy Agency (IEA), China Overtakes the United States to Become World's Largest Energy Consumer (20 July 2010); the IEA figures have been contested as “unreliable” by China's National Energy Administration (NEA), see “China dismisses IEA analysis of it being world's top energy user,” Xinhua News Agency, 20 July 2010.

3 See for example IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2009; BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010; EIA, Country Brief China, July 2009. For future emission developments see Maximilian Auffhammer and Carson, Richard T., “Forecasting the path of China's CO2 emissions using province level information,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, No. 55 (2008), pp. 229–47Google Scholar; Jiang, Kejun and Hu, Xiulian, “Energy demand and emission in 2030 in China: scenarios and policy options,” Environment Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2006), pp. 233–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 China's National Climate Change Programme was “prepared under the auspices of the National Development and Reform Commission, People's Republic of China” and published in June 2007.

5 Lynn Price et al., “China's top-1000 energy-consuming enterprises program: reducing energy consumption of the 1000 largest industrial enterprises in China,” Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, June 2008.

6 See China's 2008 Climate Change White Paper “China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change,” issued by the Information Office of the State Council of the PR China.

7 Interviewees included government officials of the climate change departments at the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Science and Technology, among others. In many cases interviewees chose to remain anonymous and requested not to be quoted directly.

8 The author would like to thank all interviewees who candidly shared their knowledge, insights, opinions and time without which this article would not have been possible.

9 For a more detailed analysis of these internal dynamics shaping China's climate policy see Conrad, Björn, “Bureaucratic land rush – China's administrative battles in the arena of climate change policy,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2010), pp. 52–64Google Scholar.

10 Most influentially the IPCC Third Assessment Report of 2001, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 as well as the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 2006. Most recently, the UNDP China Human Development Report 2009/2010 entitled China and a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and Society includes an extensive discussion of China's climate change vulnerability.

11 For a discussion of China's vulnerability to climate change see Haibin, Zhang, Qihou bianhua yu Zhongguo guojia anquan (Climate Change and China's National Security) (Beijing: Shishi Publishing, 2010)Google Scholar. See also Yang Zhang and Zheng Yongnian, New Development in China's Climate Change Policy, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, paper no. 73 (2007) as well as Tsang, Stephen and Kolk, Ans, “The evolution of Chinese policies and governance structures on environment, energy and climate,” Environmental Policy and Governance, No. 20 (2010), pp.180–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Commissioned by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the China Meteorological Administration and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

13 Drafting Panel of the National Assessment Report on Climate Change, China's National Assessment Report on Climate Change (Beijing: Science Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

14 Yang and Zheng, New Development in China's Climate Change Policy, p. 4.

15 Dongsheng, Zang, “Green from above: climate change, new developmental strategy, and regulatory choice in China,” Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 45 (2009), p. 209Google Scholar.

16 See e.g. “‘Shier wu' qijian jiakuai zhanbian jingji fazhan fangshi de zhongyao zhaoli dian” (“The 12th Five-Year Plan accelerates the change of important aspects of the economic development pattern”), www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-10/16/content_1723905.htm.

17 For an exploration of China's low-carbon development path see Guiyang, Zhuang, Ditan jingji: qihou bianhua Beijing xia Zhongguo de fazhan zhi lu (Low-carbon Economy – China's Development Path in the Face of Climate Change) (Beijing: China Meteorological Press, 2007)Google Scholar. On low-carbon development see among others Angang, Hu, “How will China build a well-off society for all of its citizens?” China Business Review, No. 50 (2003), pp. 50–55Google Scholar; Yifu, Lin, “Rebalancing equity and efficiency for sustained growth,” in Ligang, Song and Woo, Wing Thye (eds.), China's Dilemma: Economic Growth, the Environment and Climate Change (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 90–93Google Scholar; Shaoguang, Wanget al., “The social instability behind the economic prosperity,” Chinese Economy, No. 5 (2003), pp. 5–10Google Scholar; Gang, Fang (ed.), Toward a Low Carbon Development: China and the World (Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, 2010)Google Scholar; Lin Boqiang, “Low carbon urbanization way forward for China,” 30 November 2009, www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=20848. On the issue of “green” GDP calculation see China State Environmental Protection Agency, China Green National Accounting Study Report 2004, 2006; Yongnian, Zheng and Minjia, Chen, China Promotes Green GDP for More Balanced Development, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 2006Google Scholar.

18 China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) Task Force on China's Pathway Towards a Low Carbon Economy, Research on China's Pathway Towards a Low Carbon Economy, 2009.

19 UNDP China, China and a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and Society, Human Development Report 2009/2010, p. 16.

20 Ibid. p. 5.

21 The issue of China's energy security dilemma represents an important aspect of China's climate-related policy making, but can unfortunately not be presented in adequate depth within the confines of this article. For a comprehensive discussion of the matter see Downs, Erica, “The Chinese energy security debate,” The China Quarterly, No. 177 (2004), pp. 21–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 For the central role of “green” technologies for China's strategy for global competitiveness see Zang Dongsheng, Green from Above, p. 211.

23 Yang and Zheng, New Development in China's Climate Change Policy, p. 8.

24 Jiahua, Pan, “Gebenhagen qihou huiyi de zhengyi jiaodian yu fansi” (“Main points and assessment of the Copenhagen controversy”), Renmin ribao, 19 March 2010Google Scholar.

25 Ibid. See also Francois Godement, “Does China have a real climate change policy?” in Climate Policies after Copenhagen, ECFR China Analysis No. 27, June 2010.

26 “Premier Wen defends China's role at Copenhagen meeting,” Xinhua News Agency, 15 March 2010.

27 See e.g. Ed Miliband, “The road from Copenhagen,” The Guardian, 20 December 2010.

28 Jiahua, Pan, “Gebenhagen zhi hou de qihou zouxiang” (“Climate change after Copenhagen”), Foreign Affairs Review, No. 6 (2009), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

29 See e.g. Mark Lynas, “How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room,” The Guardian, 22 December 2009.

30 National Development and Reform Commission, Position Paper, 20 May 2009.

31 EU Observer, China Pledges 40% Cut in CO2 Ahead of Summit, 26 November 2009.

32 E.g. Zhang Shan, “Genbenhagen xieyi buneng qian” (“Copenhagen Accord should not be ratified”), Greenleaf Blog, 20 January 2010; Xin Benjian, “Ge hui bei fada guojia bi zhi shibai bianyuan” (“Developed countries bring Copenhagen negotiations to the brink of failure”), Renmin ribao, 20 December 2009.

33 Research Report by Chatham House, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Energy Research Institute, Jilin University, E3G, Low Carbon Development: Roadmap for Jilin City, March 2010.

34 On concerns regarding negative economic effects of mitigation costs see e.g. Wenying, Chen, Pengfei, Gao and Jiankun, He, “Impacts of future carbon emission reductions on the Chinese GDP growth,” Science and Technology Journal (Tsinghua University) Vol. 44, No. 6 (2004)Google Scholar.

35 See Oberheitmann, Andreas and Sternfeld, Eva, “Unser Land soll sauberer werden – China setzt für die Zukunft auf erneuerbare Energien,” in Internationale Politik (2009)Google Scholar, concluding “Klimaschutz ja, aber ohne negative Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaft” (“Climate protection yes, but without negative economic effects”).

36 The fact that China might possibly have failed its energy intensity targets for 2010 highlights the fact that setting political targets, however careful, is not always a guarantee for meeting these goals. China's enormous efforts to achieve last-minute energy efficiency improvements despite significant economic costs shows that once a target is set, its achievement becomes a paramount task that overrides “no regrets” restrictions. These short-term fixes however do not constitute a sustained move across the “no regrets” emissions line.

37 On the issue of “G77 solidarity” see Lewis, Joanna I., “China's strategic priorities in international climate change negotiations,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2007), pp. 155–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bo, Wang, “Understanding China's climate change policy – from both international and domestic perspectives,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009)Google Scholar.

38 See Oberheitmann and Sternfeld, “Unser Land soll sauberer werden.”

39 For an overview of current proposals on climate technology transfer see Gerstetter, Christiane and Marcellino, Dominic, The Current Proposals on the Transfer of Climate Technology in the International Climate Negotiations – An Assessment (Washington, DC: Ecologic Institute, 2009)Google Scholar.

40 G. Wacker, “China in den Klimaverhandlungen: zentrale Rolle zwischen den Stühlen,” in Susanne Dröge (ed.), Die Internationale Klimapolitik, SWP Studie, December 2009, p. 56.

41 Xin Benjian, “Developed countries bring Copenhagen negotiations to the brink of failure.”

42 The Clean Development Mechanism represents the centrepiece of north-south climate finance and China's role in it is as important as it is complex. However, this article cannot adequately discuss such questions but instead focuses on direct climate adaptation funding, as this played a more crucial role for the Copenhagen negotiations.

43 Angel Hsu and Christopher Kieran, “China in Copenhagen day 3: Tuvalu raises the bar, China reacts,” www.greenleapforward.com, “China in Copenhagen” series, 10 December 2009.

44 Julian L. Wong, “No money for China – no problem,” www.climateprogress.com, Center for American Progress, 10 December 2009.

45 Ibid.

46 Hsu and Kieran, “China in Copenhagen day 3.”

47 See also Guiyang, Zhuang, “Gebenhagen qihou bo yi yu Zhongguo juese de zai renshi” (“Climate game in Copenhagen and China's role in re-definition”), Foreign Affairs Review, No. 6 (2009), pp. 13–21Google Scholar.

48 Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 17 December 2009.

49 Juliette Eilperin, “MRV-less in Copenhagen,” The Economist online, 16 December 2010.

50 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), para. 1, 18 December 2009.

51 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), para. 11, 18 December 2009.

52 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), para. 8, 18 December 2009.

53 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), para. 5, 18 December 2009.

54 Ibid.

55 Zhang Shan, “Copenhagen Accord should not be ratified.”