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Beyond Local Protectionism: China's State–Business Relations in the Last Two Decades

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2016

Yuhua Wang
Yuhua Wang*
Affiliation:
Harvard University. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China. It was conducted by compiling a database of all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002 and 2012 that codes the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. This casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on “local protectionism.” I interpret this as a result of firms' need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.

摘要

本文通过中国上市公司 1993, 2002 和 2012 年全部董事会成员简历的数据考察当代中国政企关系的变化。我发现, 在过去的 20 年中, 与中央政府有关联的企业比例显著增加。这一结果有悖于中国企业主要依靠 “地方保护主义” 的流行说法。我认为这一趋势反应了企业与强势和稳定的政治机构建立关联的需要。对陈良宇撤职后上海上市公司的事件分析对这一看法提供了证据。

Keywords

local protectionismChinapolitical connectionscentral–local relationsevent studycorruption地方保护主义政治关联中央与地方关系事件分析腐败
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 226 , June 2016 , pp. 319 - 341
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Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2016 

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