Of all the officers in the German High Command (OHL) during the First World War none played a more active political role than Colonel Max Bauer. Colonel Bauer's papers, which are preserved in the federal archives in Koblenz, contain numerous memoranda on a wide range of topics, which make it possible to present a coherent picture of his views. This paper will analyze Bauer's political thinking during the First World War, but it will not deal with the more complex questions of his political role and influence.

Gustav Stresemann counted on the Locarno accords of October 1925 to pave the way for peaceful revision of the Versailles treaty. Yet just days before these agreements renouncing force as a means of modifying the Rhineland frontier were to come into effect, the German foreign minister spoke of a wake, at which “the hopes which arose in Locarno are laid to rest, under a tombstone bearing the inscription: ‘Here lies the Spirit of Locarno.’” Stresemann's remark to the French chargé d'affaires in Berlin was prompted by France's apparent veto of the restoration of Eupen and Malmédy to the German Reich. As an illustration of the fundamental governmental attitudes of the participating powers, and as a measure of just what each saw in the Locarno treaties, the case of Eupen-Malmédy presents several provocative revelations.

Hitler's takeover of power in January 1933 created a new and dangerous situation for German Jewry. Nazi policy developed gradually, but before the spring of 1933 was well advanced there could be little doubt that serious injury was intended toward the Jewish community. The “wildcat” anti-Semitic actions of undisciplined SA men were followed by the national boycott of Jewish businesses conducted on April 1. Legislative and administrative measures, preceded and accompanied by “unofficial” and “illegal” actions tending in the same direction, began the process that drove Jews from public employment, from medicine, law, and teaching, from cultural, political, and journalistic pursuits, and that severely hampered their economic activity in any form. Long before any sane observer could have glimpsed the outlines of the “final solution,” the leaders of the German Jewish community were faced with a situation demanding the utmost of their political and organizational talents. As a leading Jewish participant put it, the situation provided a classic case of Toynbee's “challenge” and “response.” To one German Jewish leader, Georg Kareski, it was a great and positive political opportunity.