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Woodrow Wilson and Germany's Membership in the League of Nations, 1918–19
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
Extract
On January 15, 1919, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, recently appointed foreign minister of the German Republic, concluded a press conference with the following appeal:
We demand a policy of reconciliation …, a policy which realizes a genuine … League of Nations. But we will be asked whom we are introducing into this League. Then we must be able to say: “We are introducing a united people that wants peace in the world and is willing to enter the lists for every progress of mankind. …”
With these words the German minister gave expression to an ideal that had inspired many left-wing liberals and pacifists in Germany during the war, and that had been taken up by the spokesmen of the newly proclaimed German Republic immediately after the armistice. To them, as well as to Brockdorff, the future League of Nations, in the way it was going to be constituted, was to become the test of the spirit in which the peace would be concluded. The crucial point was whether, and if so on what terms, it would include the new German Republic. If it admitted Germany on equal terms, it would thus demonstrate that it would be a universal organization, open to all democratic nations and in line with the aspirations of the moderate Left of Europe.
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References
1. Brockdorff-Rantzau, Graf, Dokumente und Gedanken urn Versailles (Berlin, 1925), p. 39;Google ScholarWengst, Udo, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau und die aussenpolitischen Anfänge der Weimarer Republik (Bern, 1973), pp. 17–18.Google Scholar
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5. Cf., e.g., the very brief treatment in Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960), pp. 44, 68,Google ScholarElcock, Howard, Portrait of a Decision: The Council of Four and the Treaty of Versailles (London, 1972), pp. 86–87, 158–59, 243–44,Google Scholar or Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), 1: 10–16;Google Scholar even Levin, N. Gordon in his otherwise admirable study Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (New York, 1968), pp. 169–70,Google Scholar simplifies this problem, although it seems fundamental to his own analysis. Spenz, Jürgen, Die diplomatische Vorgeschkhte des Beitritts Deutschlands zum Völkerbund, 1924–1926 (Göttingen, 1966),Google Scholar does not go as far back as 1919. For Russia and the League see Epstein, Fritz T., “Russia and the League of Nations,” in Germany and the East (Bloomington, Ind., 1973), pp. 127–50.Google Scholar
6. The groundwork for this paper waslaid by my detailed study of German-American relations in the crucial years of 1918 and 1919, which I intended, as far as possible, to base on primary sources from American and German archives (Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden, Düsseldorf, 1971). The discovery of some new material, and the study of newspapers, enabled me in this paper to go beyond the findings of my book. I am indebted to the Freiburger Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, which supported the additional research necessary for this paper, and to the Freiburg University Library for neverfailing assistance.
7. Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (reprint ed., Gloucester, Mass., 1960), 3: 40.Google Scholar The italics, in this as in all subsequent quotations, are mine.
8. E.g., undated Inquiry memorandum, Mezes Papers, Columbia University, New York, no. 108.Google Scholar For the integrationist approach see Levin, p. 85, and, generally, Gelfand, Lawrence E., The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919 (New Haven, 1963).Google Scholar
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14. House to Wilson, July 11, 1918, Int. Papers, 4: 23.
15. Cecil to House, July 22, 1918, ibid., p. 41.
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17. British Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 13, 1918, courtesy of Professor Kurt Wimer, Pennsylvania State College. This is the way Lippmann still understood Wilson: Murray to Wiseman, Aug. 9, 1918, Wiseman Papers, House Collection, Yale University.
18. House to Wilson, July 14, 1918, Int. Papers, 4: 24.
19. See his softened version of the British draft article for the admission of new members, ibid., pp. 36–37.
20. Ibid., pp. 25–26, 29.
21. Ibid., p. 50.
22. Fowler, pp. 213–15.
23. Wiseman to Reading, Aug. 16, 1918, ibid., p. 279.
24. Int. Papers, 4: 52.
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27. E.g., Wiseman to Murray, Aug. 30, 1918, Ibid., p. 283.
28. Especially Lansing to Solf (via Oederlin), Oct. 23, 1918, Wilson, , Public Papers, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 283–85.Google Scholar This note had been influenced by domestic considerations (the elections due in November) at least as much as by the diplomatic situation (cf. Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution, pp. 156–61).
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30. Long, B.Google Scholar, diary, Nov. 7,1918, Long Papers; Lansing, R.Google Scholar, desk diary, Nov. 1, 5, 6, 8, 14, 1918, Lansing Papers, both Library of Congress.
31. Lansing to Hungerford, Nov. 14, 1918, Lansing Papers.
32. Bullitt to Lansing, Nov. 25, 1918, Lansing to Wilson, Nov. 25,1918, both in FR, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference (Washington, 1942), 2: 99–102,Google Scholar hereafter cited as PPC.
33. Lansing to House, Nov. 25,1918, PPC, 2: 102; Jusserand to Lansing, Dec. 1,1918, ibid., p. 107.
34. Sulzer to Lansing, Dec. 2, 1918, PPC, 2: 71; Bliss to Lansing, Nov. 11, 1918, FR, 1918, supplement 1, 1: 493, to cite only two examples.
35. New York Times, Nov. 30,1918. House-Bourgeois interview, Dec. 5,1918, House Papers, Yale University; D. H. Miller, J. B. Scott, draft treaty, Jan. 9,1919, PPC, 1: 317.
36. Swem notes, Dec. 10, 1918, Wilson Papers, Princeton University.
37. Wilson alluded to the legal aspect of the position of the new German government on Nov. 10, 1918, for the first time (PPC, 1: 128). See also Krakau, Knud, “Anerkennungspolitik als Spiegel der interamerikanischen Beziehungen,” Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien 16 (1971): 9, 16.Google Scholar
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41. For the background of Wilson's remarks cf. House to Lansing, Nov. 13, 1918, PPC, 2: 17.
42. Charles Eliot to Wilson, Nov. 17, 1918, and Wilson to Eliot, Nov. 25,1918, both Wilson Papers, Library of Congress. On Eliot see also Kuehl, Warren F., Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization (Nashville, 1969), pp. 153, 173–74.Google Scholar
43. Stone, Ralph, The Irreconcilables (Lexington, 1970), pp. 44–45.Google Scholar
44. Lloyd George interpreted the president somewhat in this way (Cabinet minutes, Dec. 20, and 30, 1918, courtesy of Prof. K. Wimer). For alternatives then discussed see, e.g., New York Times, Nov. 11, 1918. This paper referred to plans for a two-stage conference, which was to consist of preliminary and informal consultations without the enemy, and, afterwards, of formal meetings. Only these formal meetings were to deal with the League and the freedom of the seas and to include enemy and neutral participants. Of course, this arrangement would have placed the League into the second stage.
45. Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution, pp. 317–19; K. Wimer, “Woodrow Wilson's Peace Policies and the League of Nations, 1914–1919,” manuscript courtesy of Professor K. Wimer.
46. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3: 108. Lloyd George had received advance information of Wilson's attitude (Cabinet minutes, Dec. 20 and 30, 1918, courtesy of Professor K. Wimer).
47. Miller, D. H., The Drafting of the Covenant, 1: 164, also 2: 261, 427.Google Scholar
48. Baker, , Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3: 175.Google Scholar For comparison see ibid., pp. 108, 140, 146, 153, 165. See also n. 51, below.
49. Rappard, p. 52.
50. E.g., Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, 2: 294. The earliest public condemnation of Germany after the armistice came in an interview with the French Echo de Paris, according to the New York Times, Dec. 11, 1918.Google Scholar
51. PPC, 3: 1002. In the seventh meeting of the League Commission, on Feb. 10, 1919, Wilson identified the period of Germany's exclusion from the League with the period of the economic reconstruction of Europe (cf. Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, 2: 278).Google Scholar
52. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1919.
53. Miller, David Hunter, My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris (New York, 1925), 7: 103.Google ScholarWimer, K., “Wilson's Plan to Enter the League… by Executive Agreement,” Western Political Quarterly 11 (1958): 803.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
54. Miller, , Diary, 1: 181.Google Scholar With reference to article 4 of the League Covenant (final version) and Germany's possibly joining the permanent members of the League's Executive Council in the future, Wilson remarked “that Germany would be a great Power after a few years except in a military sense but that… it was better not to go further than the proposed amendment…” (to that article).
55. Miller, , The Drafting of the Covenant, 1: 281;Google ScholarMiller, , Diary, 7: 19.Google Scholar
56. PPC, 6: 820–21.
57. PPC, 11: 215.
58. Hoover, Herbert, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1958), p. 245.Google Scholar
59. Dresel to Wilson, June 5,1919, PPC, 12: 122–23; Dresel to Hoover, June 5, 1919, Papers of American Relief Administration, Hoover Institution, Stanford. Wilson had Dresel assured his greatest interest (to House, June 7, 1919, House Papers).
60. Mantoux, Paul, Les délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (Paris, 1955), 2: 346–47, also 286.Google Scholar The New York Times, which at this point was quite well informed on the course of the negotiations (see editions of June 12 and 13), followed Wilson's line of argument when it justified the decision not to admit Germany to the League by pointing out that the former enemy had not changed. This had been demonstrated (June 18) when Germany during the written negotiations in the last weeks had “talked back” (New York Times, June 18, 1919).
61. The final Allied reply to Germany mentioned the possibility of Germany's becoming a member of the League “in the early future.” Both the ideological premises (democratic “stability") and the legal conditions (fulfilment of international obligations by Germany) were stressed as prerequisites to Germany's membership. Against French objections the British had succeeded in having the formula “early future” inserted into the reply (cf. PPC, 6: 940, and Headlam-Morley, James, A Memoir of the Peace Conference 1919, London, 1972, p. 155).Google Scholar
62. Wilson, , Public Papers, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 83, 141, 167, 246.Google ScholarCritics: Helbich, Wolfgang J., “The Liberals in the League of Nations Controversy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967): 580, 585; Soiron, p. 216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
63. Schwabe, Deutsche Revolution, pp. 571–73; Fraenkel, Ernst, “Idee und Realität des Völkerbundes im deutschen politischen Denken,” Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968): 5.Google Scholar
64. Brockdorff-Rantzau, pp. 152–53.
65. To the Democratic Party the insistence on Germany's early admission to the League had become an issue over which they would leave the government (Schulze, ed., Das Kabinett Scheidemann, pp. 496, 502).
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