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Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Robert Himmer
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Extract

The Treaty of Rapallo, concluded between Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic on April 16, 1922, has been interpreted by Western historians as a logical result of the process of the reestablishment of the close economic ties which Germany and Russia had shared before the First World War. “A long tradition built on a solid foundation of common interest,” writes Edward Hallett Carr, “favoured the rapid development of commercial relations. … Links so strong and so profitable to both parties were not easily broken.” Strengthened by the limitations imposed on German exports by the Allies after the war, this natural tendency “impelled the whole of German industry to face east.” The revival of a substantial commerce between the two countries was forestalled, however, by the Allied blockade, until it was lifted in January 1920, and by German hopes for the collapse of the Soviet regime and fears of Bolshevism. These last two obstacles, it is claimed, disappeared in early 1921, at the same time that the introduction of the New Economic Policy in Russia was stimulating even greater German interest in the restoration of trade with her. “During the rest of 1921 there took place a steady thickening of the Russo-German link. … At first this took a predominantly economic form,” in which “rapid strides” were made. Opening up “the Russian market became a major preoccupation of German policy” in the latter half of that year. Thus economic goals were an important reason —one historian calls them “the real inducement”—for the Rapallo Treaty.

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , June 1976 , pp. 146 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1976

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References

1. Text in League of Nations, Treaty Series: Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League, 203 vols. (Geneva, 1920–46), 19: 248–52.Google Scholar The treaty was accompanied by a secret exchange of notes which have been published in Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 1957- ; hereafter cited as DVP), 5: 225–26;Google Scholar and in Schieder, Theodor, “Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Rapallo-Vertrags,” Historische Zeitschrift 204 (06 1967): 608.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The original copy of the Soviet note is in the microfilmed archives of the Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter AA), file: Deutsche Delegation Genua, Rapallo Vertrag, Vertag mit Russland, serial L3O9/reel 4255/frame 096163. Henceforth in referring to documents from the AA archives (except those filmed by St. Antony's College, Oxford), the file title will be given in full upon its first usage and each document will be identified by the serial number accorded the file, the microfilm reel number, and the appropriate frame number(s).

2. Carr, E. H., The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, 3 vols. (New York, 1961), 3: 366–67.Google Scholar Other major works which stress the importance of economic factors in the making of the Rapallo Treaty include Carr, , German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars (Baltimore, 1951);Google ScholarKochan, Lionel, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, Eng., 1954);Google ScholarFreund, Gerald, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (New York, 1957);Google ScholarHelbig, Herbert, Die Träger der Rapallo-Politik (Göttingen, 1958);Google Scholar and Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte.” See also Rosenfeld, Günther, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, 1917–1922 (Berlin, 1960),Google Scholar and Shishkin, V. A., Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i strany zapada v 1917–1922gg. Ocherkii istorii stanovleniia ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii (Leningrad, 1969).Google Scholar

3. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, p. 12.

4. Ibid., pp. 39 and 49.

5. Kochan, Russia and Weimar, p. 42.

6. Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 89.

7. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, p. 52.

8. Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 113.

9. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, p. 19.

10. Ibid., pp. 52–55 and 61–63; Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of Relations between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, 2 vols. (London, 1930), 1: 329;Google Scholar Freund, Unholy Alliance, pp. 100–105; Helbig, Träger, p. 64; and Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” pp. 551 and 566.

11. Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 101. A recent work by Graml, Hermann (“Die Rapallo-Politik im Urteil der westdeutschen Forschung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 18 [10 1970]: 383) contends that “realization of the syndicate plan would doubtlessly have made the preservation of secrecy about the activity of Germany in munitions production and in other military areas just then beginning on Russian territory, and thus the activity itself, impossible.”Google Scholar Graml, however, discounts the importance of economic goals to the pro-Russian party because, he says, there were too few industrialists interested in Russia to effect a change in German policy and no “political funding” of German-Russian trade was necessary (pp. 379–80). For a detailed rebuttal of the “military” argument, which is beyond the scope of this article, see my “German-Soviet Economic Relations, 1918–1922” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1972), pp. 510–21.Google Scholar It should be pointed out briefly, however, that there were no military agreements between Russia and Germany prior to Rapallo; that the consortium was never envisioned as a monopoly of foreign enterprises in Russia and that the chief foreign physical presence was to be German; that both Krupp and Stinnes supported the consortium after receiving overtures from the Reichswehr in 1921 (which Krupp is known to have rejected in June); and that there was Western financial involvement in German enterprises concerned with arms production in Russia after Rapallo (the AA even favored such participation). The rather good record of Soviet security agencies in concealing the post-Rapallo collaboration should also be noted.

12. See his “Entstehungsgeschichte.”

13. In addition to the DVP, see the joint Soviet-East German collection Deutschsowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluss des Rapallovertrages: Dokumentensammlung, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1967–1971; hereafter cited as DSB).Google Scholar

14. Felix, David, “Walther Rathenau: German Foreign Minister in 1922,” History Today 20 (09 1970): 639 and 646.Google Scholar

15. About the economic war aims of 1918, see Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), esp. chap. 21;Google ScholarBaumgart, W., Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918: Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna, 1966), pp. 258–302;Google ScholarGatzke, Hans W., “Zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Sommer 1918,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (01 1955): 67–98;Google Scholar and Kollman, Eric C., “Walther Rathenau and German Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Actions,” Journal of Modern History 24 (06 1952): 131–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16. Article 117 specified that Germany agreed to recognize all agreements subsequently concluded between the Allied and Associated powers and the Russian successor states.

17. Rathenau, , speech to the “Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914” on Dec. 18, 1916, published as Probleme der Friedenswirtschaft (Berlin, 1917), p. 18;Google ScholarRathenau, , Die neue Wirtschaft (Berlin, 1918), p. 14;Google Scholar “Arbeit,” written Mar. 24, 1919, in Rathenau, , Gesammelte Schriften, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1925), 5: 334;Google Scholar and a memorandum to the German government from Rathenau and others, Feb. 17, 1920, in AA, Abteilung A, Hauptarchiv, Akten betreffend das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Russland, Deutschland Nr. 131, Band 65, St. Antony's Collection, reel 103, document A2806 (also in DSB, 2: 182–91, but misdated Feb. 18 and indicating only Rathenau and Deutsch as authors). See also Rathenau's letters to: Erich Ludendorff, Mar. 19, 1917; Gottlieb von Jagow, May 31, 1919; Professor Hoffmann and Kurt Fischer-Aram, both Mar. 10, 1920; Baron von Mumm, Apr. 6, 1920 (all in Rathenau, , Ein preussischer Europäer: Briefe, ed. von Eynern, Margarete [Berlin, 1955], pp. 186, 334, and 363–64);Google Scholar and Bergmann, Gustav, Jan. 20, 1920, inGoogle ScholarRathenau, , Briefe, 2 vols. (Dresden, 1927), 2: 219–20.Google Scholar That the Allies sought through the Versailles Treaty to achieve “the complete economic ruin of Germany” was also the judgment of the group of economic experts who advised the German government on the peace treaty. See the text of their final recommendations, June 18, 1919, in Warburg, Max M., Aus meinen Aufzeichnungen (Glückstadt, 1952), pp. 85–86.Google Scholar One of these experts, Krupp director Otto Wiedfeldt, also believed that Germany had to seek “the clarification of relations with Russia” because of the economic war waged by the Entente against Germany's “existence and future.” See Wiedfeldt to Albert, Heinrich, Staatssekretär in the Reich Chancery, Mar. 10, 1921, in Schroder, Ernst, ed., “Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter der Weimarer Republik: Eine Dokumentation,” Beiträge zur Geschichte Stadt und Stift Essen 86 (1971): 173–75.Google Scholar

18. Rathenau, Gesammelte Schriften, 5: 334.

19. AA, Brockdorff-Rantzau Nachlass, Foreign Ministry report to Rantzau of a conversation with Rathenau, May 3, 1919, 9105/3443/235260–261.

20. Rathenau, , letter to Count von Arco, May 2, 1919, Politische Briefe (Dresden, 1929), p. 244.Google Scholar The mission was noted by observers, British (Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series [London, 1947- ; hereafter cited as DBFP], 3: 510–11).Google Scholar In addition to the AEG, the Siemens-Schuckert-Werke, the Deutsche Bank, and the Bankhaus Mendelssohn sponsored the trip.

21. Report of June 13, 1919, AA archives, Bonn, quoted in Horst Günther Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen bis Rapallo (Cologne, 1970), pp. 62–63.Google Scholar

22. AA, St. Antony's Collection, reel 103, document A2806.

23. About concessions see Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations,” pp. 247–51 and 339–52. The seven agreements concerned (1) shipping by Derutra, a mixed company in which the Hamburg-Amerika-Linie and the RSFSR were the stockholders; (2) Derumetal, another mixed company for the export of metal ores and scrap from Russia; (3) the mixed company Deruluft, which established air service between the two countries; (4) Kozhsyr'e, a mixed company for the export of leather from Russia; (5) a mixed company for trade with Persia, Russtransit; (6) a concession for the provisioning of German colonists in southern Russia with planting seed; and (7) the Krupp agricultural concession near Sal'sk, which Krupp refused to execute and which was superseded in 1923 by a new agreement. The claim of Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3: 367; Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 90; and Kochan, Russia and Weimar, p. 42, that the Cologne iron and steel magnate Otto Wolff secured a concession known as Russgertorg in about late 1921 is erroneous. Russgertorg was established on Oct. 9, 1922.

24. In 1920 there were no direct Soviet exports to Germany and but 6,715 tons of German goods entered Russia. There was some improvement in 1921, when German exports to Russia reached 8.3 percent of the 1913 level and the corresponding Russian exports 0.4 percent. Of Soviet imports in 1921, 29.3 percent were British, 25.8 percent German. Trade statistics are from Vinokur, A. P. and Bakulin, S. N., eds., Vneshnaia torgovlia Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik za period 1918–1927/28gg. Statisticheskii obzor (Moscow, 1931), pp. 37–42, 46–47, and 74–78;Google Scholar and Germany, Statistisches Reichsamt, , Statistiches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich: 1921/22 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 254–56.Google Scholar

25. See, e.g., Foreign Minister Walter Simons's Reichstag speech of Jan. 21, 1921, Verhandlungen des Reichstages: Stenographische Berichte, 364: 1988; Deutscher Aussenhandel 21 (June 12, 1921): 559–60; Boujansky, Joseph, “Die wirtschaftliche Lage Russlands und die deutsch-russischen Handelsbeziehungen,” Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 12 (1921): 441–50;Google Scholar and AA, Geheimakten, Akten betreffend wirtschaftliche Beziehungen Russlands zu Deutschland, 1920–1928, Economics Ministry to Foreign Ministry, June 9, 1922, 6701/3046/119527–535.

26. Überseepost 28 (July 9, 1921): 2272.

27. See, e.g., ibid.; Deutscher Aussenhandel 21 (June 12, 1921): 559–60, and 21 (July 1, 1921): 624–25; , Ludwig Lehrfreund, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-russischen Handelsbeziehungen (Leipzig, 1921), p. 93;Google Scholar and AA, Abteilung IVa Russland, Politische Beziehungen Russlands zu Deutschland, 1921–1932, Paul Stähler to Maltzan, June 18, 1921, L622/4770/196465–466. For the involvement of Western capital in specific German enterprises see Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations.” p. 357.

28. Deutsch, Felix, quoted in Edgar D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace: Lord D'Abernon's Diary, 3 vols. (London, 1929–30), 1: 91.Google Scholar

29. Quoted in New York Times, June 27, 1921.

30. Text in League of Nations, Treaty Series, 6: 267–83.

31. AA, Büro des Reichsministers, Akten betreffend Russland, 1920–1926, Simons to Gustav Behrendt, Mar. 30, 1921, 2860/1405/552215–216.

32. Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, pp. 140–41.

33. The only known record of this meeting is a report by Krasin in the Central State Archive of the National Economy, Moscow, cited by Shishkin, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i strany zapada, pp. 263–64.

34. Chicherin to Lenin, July 14, 1921, DSB, 2: 418; and Karl Radek, “Ebert v ob'iatiiakh Stinnesa,” Pravda, Oct. 8–9, 1921. For German evidence of Stinnes's involvement, see AA, Geheimakten, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Politik Russlands 1921–1925, Maltzan to Dufour-Feronce, Sept. 20, 1921, K279/3924/095353–356. According to Fischer, Louis (Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 329), Otto Wolff also favored the consortium project.Google Scholar

35. D'Abernon, Ambassador, 1: 176–77; and AA, Abteilung IVa Russland, Handel, Russische Studienkomissionen, 1921–1922, German mission in Stockholm to AA, Aug. 27, 1921, L347/4373/103753.

36. See Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations,” pp. 61–65 and 162–71, for details. Among the businessmen, firms, and associations which supported the 1919 policywere Karl Fehrmann of the Stinnes AG, Friedrich Kind of the Otto Wolff enterprises, Felix Deutsch, Robert Bosch, Hans von Raumer, textile manufacturer Wilhelm Vorwerk, and bankers Franz Urbig, Oscar Wassermann, Franz von Mendelssohn, Gustav Ratjen, Max Warburg, and Carl Melchior; the Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik, the Heinrich Lanz AG (a Krupp agricultural machinery subsidiary), the Stahlwerke Roechling- Buderus AG and the Buderrusschen Eisenwerke, Siemens-Schuckert, and the Possehls-Werke; the Deutscher Industrie- and Handelstag and the Handelsvertragsverein (AA, Abteilung II, Friedensverhandlungen, Allgemeines, Wirtschaftliches, Russland, 1919, memorandum of meeting on Mar. 24, 1919, L156/4061/038684–685).

37. Felix, “Walther Rathenau,” p. 645, observes that “any junior diplomatist” could have predicted that the Soviets would reject the consortium plan.

38. Report of Rathenau's comments to the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Committee, Feb. 21, 1922, DSB, 2: 520–24. About the widely held view that the Bolsheviks would have to restore capitalism see, e.g., Technik und Wirtschaft 14 (07 1921): 438–40;Google ScholarDeutscher Aussenhandel 21 (06 12, 1921): 559–60, and 21 (July 1, 1921): 624;Google Scholarvon Blücher, Wipert, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo: Erinnerungen eines Mannes aus dem zweiten Gliede (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 145;Google ScholarRosen, Friedrich, Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben (Wiesbaden, 1959), pp. 413–14;Google Scholar Rosenfeld, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, pp. 313–14; AA, Schotte (Petrograd) to Gustav Behrendt, Aug. 30, 1921, and Carl Graap (Moscow) to AA, Nov. 27, 1921, 6701/3046/118944–946 and 119013–020, respectively; and Boris Stomoniakov to Lenin, Feb. 28, 1922, DVP, 5: 124.

39. About Rathenau's proposals see AA, memorandum by Löwe, Jan. 21, 1922, 6701/3046/119049–052; and DBFP, 15: 777. For Stinnes's, New York Times, Nov. 21, 1921; The Times (London), Nov. 23 and 25, 1921;Google Scholar and Izvestiia, Dec. 8, 1921, which charged that the sale of European manufacturers in Russia was to be a German monopoly.

40. Concerning Rathenau's advocacy of the customs union see F. Fischer, Germany's Aims, pp. 10–11, 28–29, and 101–2; and the articles by Fischer, “World Policy, World Power and German War Aims,” and by Zechlin, Egmont, “Cabinet versus Economic Warfare in Germany: Policy and Strategy during the Early Months of the First World War” (which both appeared originally in the Oct. 1964 issue of the Historische Zeitschrift), in The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims, ed. Koch, H. W. (New York, 1972).Google Scholar About the broad concept of Mitteleuropa see Meyer, H. C., Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815–1945 (The Hague, 1955).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41. Rathenau, letter to D'Abernon, Sept. 23, 1921, Ein preussischer Europäer, p. 402; D'Abernon, , Ambassador, 1: 207–8.Google Scholar See also Rathenau's speech to the German Democratic Party Congress, Nov. 12, 1921, in Rathenau, , Gesammelte Reden (Berlin, 1924), pp. 334–35.Google Scholar In the late summer of 1921, Karl Edler von Braun, chairman of the Reichswirtschaftsrat and a colleague of Stinnes in the German National People's Party, also called publicly for German-Western cooperation in Russia as a way to ease the reparation problem. See Schlösser, Karl, “Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Annäherung Deutschlands an Sowjetrussland 1918–1922” (Ph.D. diss., University of Mainz, 1956), pp. 118–19.Google Scholar Rathenau also promised the Allies greater business profits through cooperation with Germany than by entering the Russian market individually because Germany was “the better suited to participate in the reconstruction because she is intimately aware of the technical and economic conditions and practices of the East.” Rathenau, speech to the Supreme Allied Council at Cannes, Jan. 12, 1922, Gesammelte Reden, pp. 373–74. See also AA, anonymous memorandum of Dec. 18, 1920, 6701/3046/118903–906; Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft 12 (1921): 441–50;Google ScholarÜberseepost 33 (08 6, 1921): 2692;Google ScholarHansa 58 (08 13, 1921): 901–3;Google ScholarSpahn, Martin, “Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft im besonderen Hinblick auf den Osten,” Stahl und Eisen 42 (02. 9, 1922): 212;Google ScholarSteller, Paul, “Deutschrussische Handelsbeziehungen,” Stahl und Eisen 42 (03. 23, 1922): 479–82;Google Scholar and Danckwortt, P. W., Sibirien und seine wirtschaftliche Zukunft: Eine Rückblick und Ausblick auf Handel und Industrie Sibiriens (Leipzig and Berlin, 1921), pp. 270–71.Google Scholar

42. AA, memorandum by Löwe, Jan. 21, 1922, 6701/3046/119049–052; and DBFP, 15: 777.

43. The Times (London), Nov. 24, 1921. The Federation, however, did desire safeguards to prevent total German domination of the Russian market.Google Scholar

44. Krasin to Chicherin, Dec. 17, 1921, DVP, 4: 579–82.

45. Minutes of the discussions, DBFP, 15: 760–805. American involvement was no longer expected. Stinnes and Deutsch reportedly had met with Morgan, J. P. Jr., in Sept. but apparently failed to win American backing.Google Scholar See New York Times, Sept. 7, 1921, and Izvestiia, Sept. 10, 1921.

46. Text in Degras, Jane T., comp. and ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1952–1953), 1: 270–72.Google Scholar

47. DBFP, 15: 771.

48. Texts of the appropriate resolutions and the invitation are in Mills, J. Saxon, The Genoa Conference (New York, 1922), pp. 11–13 aid 315.Google Scholar The Soviet reply, dated Jan. 8, is in Degras, , Soviet Documents, 1: 287–88.Google Scholar

49. Mills, Genoa, pp. 318–19. Allied financial experts had earlier approved conditions which recipients of the consortium's assistance must meet and worked out the basic structure of the CIC. See minutes of meeting, Paris, Dec. 30–31, 1921, DBFP, 15: 806–35. Rathenau was almost certainly involved in these deliberations. See New York Times, Dec. 30, 1921.

50. Lenin, V. I., speech of Mar. 6, 1922, Polnoe sobranie sochineniia (hereafter PSS), 55 vols., 5th ed., (Moscow, 1958–1965), 45: 2–3; comments by Karl Radek in Pravda, Jan. 10, 1922; and AA, report by the German legation in Moscow, Jan. 11, 1922, 2860/1405/552338.Google Scholar

51. Steklov, Yuri, “Priznanie ili udushenie?” Izvestiia, Jan. 5, 1922;Google Scholar Radek, “Genuezskaia konferentsiia i Sovetskaia Rossiia,” Pravda, Jan. 29, 1922; and Chicherin, speech to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on Jan. 27, 1922, in Materialy genuezskoi konferentsii. Polnyi stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1922), p. 19.Google Scholar The contention of Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 107, that the Soviets in Jan. 1922 considered the consortium dead is without substantiation.

52. DSB, 2: 418. See also Chicherin to Lenin, late Nov. 1921, Lenin, PSS, 54: 570.

53. See also Shishkin, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i strany zapada, pp. 319–20.

54. Lenin, speech on Mar. 6, 1922, PSS, 45: 3.

55. Lenin, note to V. M. Molotov for the Politburo, Jan. 16, 1922, PSS, 54: 117 (emphasis in the original).

56. Lenin, note to Trotsky, Nov. 30, 1921, PSS, 54: 41 (emphasis in the original).

57. Lenin, letters of Jan. 23 and 26, 1922, PSS, 54: 135–36 and 139–40. Krupp's pursuit of the concession should not be taken as a repudiation of the consortium. At least as late as Jan. 21, 1922 (five days after Krupp submitted a concessionary proposal to the Soviet government), Krupp was still involved in planning the CIC (AA, memorandum by Löwe, Jan. 21, 1922, 6701/3046/119049–052). Moreover, according to Krupp director von Wilmowsky, Tilo (Rückblickend möchte ich sagen … An der Schwelle des 150 jährigen Krupp-Jubiläums [Hamburg, 1961], p. 179), only Wiedfeldt among the Krupp directors favored the concession.Google Scholar

58. See Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations,” pp. 324–26 concerning the prospect of purchases, and pp. 390–97 about the cancellation threats.

59. Helbig, Träger, p. 60.

60. Article 116 reserved “the rights of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.”

61. See Radek's articles in Pravda on Oct. 15 and Dec. 27, 1921, and Jan. 3, 1922; and in Izvestiia, Nov. 9, 1921; also his unsigned article “Die Konferenz von Genua und Sowjetrussland,” in Die Rote Fahne, Jan. 22, 1922.

62. “Svoia rubashka blizhe v telu” by “Rossiiskii obyvatel',” Izvestiia, Feb. 4, 1922.

63. AA, Abteilung IIa, Politische Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und Russland, 1920–1924, Müller, Adolf (Bern) to AA, Dec. 5, 1921, K1930/5370/503254–257.Google Scholar

64. AA, Abteilung IVa Russland, Politische Beziehungen Frankreich-Russland, 1920–1927, unsigned memorandum of Dec. 21, 1921, for Maltzan, 1.648/4785/205208.

65. Rosenfeld, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, p. 360.

66. AA, Schmidt-Rolke to Foreign Ministry, Dec. 30, 1921, 6701/3046/119092–097.

67. Maltzan thought the Soviets were certain to reject the plan and moreover suspected that the British were trying to use it to corner the Russian market for themselves. See D'Abernon, diary entry of Dec. 30, 1921, Ambassador, 1: 238–39; AA, memorandum by Maltzan, Nov. 24, 1921, 6701/3046/118997–999, and Maltzan to Dufour-Feronce, Sept. 20, 1921, K279/3924/095353–356.

68. See for Stinnes and Wiedfeldt: Blücher, Deutschlands Weg, pp. 154–55, and AA, Abteilung IV Russland, Deutsch-russische Vertrag vom 16. April 1922, Rapallovertrag, 1922–1923, memorandum by Hauschild, Jan. 27, 1922, L640/4783/203476–479; about Deutsch: Bonn, Moritz, Wandering Scholar (New York, 1948), pp. 268–69;Google Scholar Rosenfeld, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, p. 373; and AA, Sonderreferat Wirtschaft, Wirtschaftskonferenz in Genua, Allgemein, 1922, Maltzan to Deutsch, Apr. 14, 1922, L989/5411/285521–522.

69. It will perhaps never be known with absolute certainty whether Maltzan truly believed the Article 116 threat or simply used it as a bogey to frighten his colleagues into supporting an alignment with Russia which he desired for other reasons, as is argued by Fischer, Louis, Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 339–40.Google Scholar The surviving record of Maltzan'sprivate expressions of his views, however, points to the conclusion that he did consider the threat genuine. See AA, memorandum by Maltzan, Nov. 24, 1921, L622/4770/196608–610; Deutsche Delegation Genua, Rapallo Vertrag, Römer (Radek), memorandum by Maltzan, Jan. 20, 1922, L311/4255/096622–624; comments by Maltzan at a meeting with Stinnes, Rathenau, and other industrialists, Jan. 30, 1922, minutes by Hauschild, L640/4783/203492–496; Laubach, Ernst, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22 (Lübeck, 1968), p. 182,Google Scholar and Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, p. 166, which cite a letter from Maltzan to Baron Werner von Rheinbaben, Nov. 28, 1921; and Blücher, Deutschlands Weg, pp. 153–54. Hermann Graml (“Rapallo-Politik,” pp. 377–79) has recently tried to demonstrate, unconvincingly in my opinion, that Maltzan could not have believed the threat real.

70. AA, Stresemann Nachlass, Politische Akten 1922, Stresemann to Hans von Raumer, Apr. 29, 1922, and to Amtsgerichtrat Schon, May 10, 1922, 7009/3110/143331–332 and 336.

71. See the report of the session by the delegate from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Feb. 21, 1921, DSB, 2: 520–24; Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, pp. 187–88, who cites a Bavarian report in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich; AA, notes of the meeting by Stresemann, Stresemann Nachlass, Politische Akten 1922, 7008/3095/143197–199; and the references to a Saxon report in Anderle, Alfred, Die deutsche Rapallo-Politik: Deutschsowjetische Beziehungen 1922–1929 (Berlin, 1962), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar Rathenau did indicate that, although the Article 116 threat was not real, he considered some form of Franco-Soviet agreement inevitable and that Germany, in order to cushion the impact of such an accord, should resume full diplomatic relations with Russia and create a strong economic presence there.

72. Helbig, Träger, pp. 56–57; and Die Kabinette Wirth I and II (hereafter cited as Kabinette Wirth), ed. Schulze-Bidlingmaier, Ingrid, 2 vols. (Boppard, 1973), 1: lxiv.Google Scholar

73. The available evidence concerning these is summarized in Himmer, “German-Soviet Economic Relations,” pp. 407–10.

74. Alte Reichskanzlei, Russland, 1919–1935, Schlesinger to Wirth, July 11, 1921, L617/4765/193472, and AA, Handakten General-Konsul M. Schlesinger, persönliche Korrespondenz, 1920–1928, Schlesinger to Gustav Hilger, Dec. 22, 1921, 4829/2457/ 241477–482. Rathenau's associates Deutsch and Alexander supported Schlesinger's plans as late as Dec. 1921.

75. See Felix, “Walther Rathenau,” p. 643; the same author's Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic: The Politics of Reparations (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 60–66;Google Scholar Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, pp. 37–38; and Köhler, Heinrich, Lebenserinnerungen des Politikers und Staatsmannes 1878–1949 (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 180.Google Scholar

76. See especially AA, memorandum by Maltzan of a meeting with Stepan Bratman-Brodovsky, Nov. 24, 1921, £622/4770/196608–610, and Deutsche Botschaft Moskau, Politische Beziehungen Russlands zu Deutschland, 1921–1922, memorandum by Hauschild of a meeting between Wirth and N. N. Krestinsky (the Soviet political representative in Germany) on Dec. 12, 1921, 1563/785/378301–303.

77. Maltzan made the proposal on Jan. 21 (Krestinsky to M. Litvinov, Jan. 24, 1922, DSB, 2: 512–15) and again on Feb. 16 (Ye. Pashukanis to L. Karakhan, Apr. 8, 1922, DVP, 5: 189). The essence of it was that while Russia would extend to Germany mostfavored- nation status in a public treaty, Germany would agree secretly not to present her claims until after those of all other nations were satisfied. Maltzan's reports (AA, Jan. 22 and mid-Feb. 1922, L311/4255/096626–628 and 685–686) do not mention the proposal.

78. DSB, 2: 520–24.

79. See, for example, the citations from Maltzan's letter to Rheinbaben of Nov. 28, 1921, in Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, p. 182, and Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, p. 116.

80. AA, Maltzan memorandum of Nov. 24, 1921, 6701/3046/118997–999.

81. AA, Maltzan to Dufour-Feronce, Sept. 20, 1921, K279/3924/095353–356.

82. D'Abernon, , Ambassador, 1: 238–39 (diary entry of Dec. 30, 1921).Google Scholar

83. Ibid., p. 255.

84. AA, Schlesinger to Hilger, Feb. 11, 1922, 4829/2457/241570–572. German interest shifted from Schlesinger's projects to these talks in Jan. 1922.

85. Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” pp. 559–60.

86. On the political negotiations in detail see ibid., pp. 560–67; Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, pp. 184–90; Linke, Deutsche-sowjetische Beziehungen, pp. 176–89. These studies have shattered the myth that Rathenau was not informed about the Maltzan-Radek negotiations (as stated, e.g., by Helbig, Träger, p. 87).

87. The only account of this meeting, apparently provided to Krestinsky by informants in the KPD, is in his report to Litvinov, Jan. 24, 1922, DSB, 2: 512–15. Wirth took a similarly indecisive position in the Reichstag on Jan. 26. See Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 352: 5562.

88. On Jan. 18. See AA, unsigned memorandum of a meeting between Radek and Wirth, Jan. 19, 1922, L311/4255/096618–621.

89. AA, memorandum of the meeting by Hauschild, Jan. 27, 1922, L640/4783/203473–480. See also Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, pp. 181–82.

90. AA, Hauschild memorandum, Jan. 27, 1922, L640/4783/203473–480. Wiedfeldt supported Stinnes.

91. AA, memorandum by Hauschild, Jan. 30, 1922, L640/4783/203492–496.

92. Rathenau, Stinnes, and Deutsch concurred about the need for foreign capital at a meeting on Jan. 30. See ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Mitteilungen der Handelskammem Breslau, Görlitz, Hirschberg, Landeshut, Liegnitz, Sagan, Schweidnitz 1 (02 2, 1922), clipping in U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, Records Relating to Internal AflEairs of Russia, file number 861.50/290.Google Scholar

95. About the meeting on Jan. 30, see AA, memorandum by Hauschild, Feb. 2, 1922, L640/4783/203497–501. The draft treaty, apparently composed by Deutsch in consultation with Hermann Bücher, the executive director of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, can be found at L640/4783/203 519–522, with a covering memorandum by Maltzan, Feb. 13, 1922, 203515–518. The existence, but not the importance of the draft has also been noted in Mueller, Gordon H., “The Road to Rapallo: Germany's Relations with Russia, 1919–1922” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1970).Google Scholar

96. Gerschuni, Gerson, Die Konzessionspolitik Sowjetmsslands (Berlin, 1927), p. 95;Google Scholar and The Times (London), Jan. 10, 1922.Google Scholar

97. AA, Hauschild memorandum, Feb. 2, 1922, L640/4783/203498–499.

98. AA, Hauschild memorandum, Feb. 2, 1922, L640/4783/203500. Four billion paper Marks was then equivalent to about 83 million gold Marks, or slightly under $21 million. See also Linke, Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, p. 184.

99. AA, Maltzan memorandum of Feb. 13, 1922, L640/4783/203 516–518. Radek also objected, citing internal security problems, to the unrestricted nature of the German commercial rights and desired that specific goods and areas in which the Germans could trade be enumerated. Maltzan and Deutsch, who presented the draft, were sympathetic, but preferred a list of excluded products and regions.

100. Ibid., 203518. A further meeting on Feb. 16 failed to produce agreement. See AA, draft minutes (largely illegible) by Hauschild, L640/4783/202 526–531.

101. Radek made clear this relationship to Wirth on Feb. 15 when he told him that the talks had to be broken off because “an acceptable basis for economic negotiations was lacking.” Kobliakov, I. K., “Neue Materialen über den Rapallo-Vertrag,” in Anderle, A., ed., Rapallo und die friedliche Koexistenz (Berlin, 1963), p. 162.Google Scholar

102. Text in Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” pp. 602–3.

103. Ibid., pp. 565–68.

104. Chicherin to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID), Apr. 10, 1922, DVP, 5: 203; and the report of Rathenau's comments at a ministerial meeting, Apr. 5, 1922, Kabinette Wirth, 2: 681. Rathenau's claim, for example at the Feb. 21 session of the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Committee, that the Soviets demanded a veto over German participation in the entire consortium project which would let them dictate German foreign policy (see Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, pp. 187–88) was, at best, disingenuous, and was designed to conceal the coercive and exploitative nature of his policy, which would have been revealed had he been forced to explain why he refused to make delivery of “aid” to Russia dependent upon her voluntary acceptance of it.

105. Acceptance of the Soviet consortium demand would not have endangered the Central European and reparations aspects of the consortium scheme. Rathenau had sought to ensure that the syndicate plan was not incompatible with the CIC when he instructed the German representatives on the Organizing Committee of the CIC in London that “it must be avoided that national corporations receive the character of a monopoly for certain aspects of business, for example, for trade with Russia.” The reply —“there is no hint of monopolies for business in specific countries”—meant that he could continue to pursue a bilateral accord with the Soviets without disrupting the CIC, which was still valuable for his other plans. See AA, Sonderreferat Wirtschaft, Wirtschaftskonferenz in Genua, Allgemein, 1922, Rathenau to German Embassy, London, Feb. 23, and Maximilien Kempner, Gustav Bergmann, and Friedrich Sthamer (London) to Rathenau, Feb. 24, 1922, L991/541.1/285 732 and 734–736.

106. Pashukanis to Karakhan, Apr. 8, 1922, DVP, 5: 189.

107. Erdmann, K. D., “Deutschland, Rapallo und der Westen,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (04 1963): 108–10. Protocols of the sessions on Mar. 24 are in Kabinette Wirth, 1: 627–41.Google Scholar

108. AA, Büro des Reichsministers, Akten betreffend Genua, Rathenau to Lloyd George, Apr. 2, 1922, 3398/1734/738 231–233; and The Times (London), Apr. 4, 1922.Google Scholar

109. AA, reports by Wiedenfeld (Moscow), Feb. 14; Sthamer (London), Feb. 24; and Hoesch (Paris), Mar. 8, 1922 (all in 2860/1405/552385, 388, and 392–393, respectively).

110. The protocols of the sessions of the Cabinet on Mar. 31 and of the Ministerrat on Apr. 5, 1922, are in Kabinette Wirth, 2: 651–58 and 674–89, respectively.Google Scholar Also see a memorandum concerning the Mar. 31 sessions in AA, 3398/1734/738 212–214.

111. For Stresemann's speech, see Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 354: 6647–48; for Rathenau's, 6655–56, reprinted in his Gesammelte Reden, pp. 375–97.Google Scholar

112. Carr, German-Soviet Relations, p. 54; Freund, Unholy Alliance, pp. 101–2; Kochan, Russia and Weimar, p. 49; and Fischer, , Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 339.Google Scholar

113. AA, Stresemann Nachlass, Politische Reden 1921, outline of speech in Stuttgart, Dec. 1921, 6993/3093/140806. See also an interview with Stresemann in the Fränkischer Courier, May 7, 1921 (clipping at 6993/3093/140752).

114. The Soviets had decided that no agreement with Germany was possible before Genoa. See excerpts from a speech by Chicherin (which refers to the views of Lenin and Krestinsky), date and occasion unspecified, cited by Davidovich, D. S., “Die sowjetischdeutschen Beziehungen wahrend der Ruhr-Krise,” in Anderle, Rapallo und die friedliche Koexistenz, p. 128;Google Scholar and three reports from the Soviet Genoa delegation to the NKID, Apr. 4, 8, and 10, 1922, DVP, 5: 181, 189, and 202.

115. A new syndicate proposal was sent to Moscow in Mar., but unfortunately little is known about it or about the economic discussions in early Apr. On the revised proposals see AA, Reinhold Saucken (Moscow) to Maltzan, Mar. 6, 1922; personal letter from Maltzan to Radek, Mar. 10; and Maltzan's report of a meeting with Radek, Mar. 27, 1922, all in L311/4255/096 689–690, 693–696, and 705–708, respectively. On the Apr. talks, AA, memoranda by Maltzan of Apr. 2 and 3, 1922, L311/4255/096 378–379 and 742–744; Pashukanis to Karakhan, Apr. 8, 1922, DVP, 5: 188; Liubimov, N. N. and Erlikh, A. N., Genuezskaia konferentsiia. (Vospominaniia uchastnikov) (Moscow, 1963), p. 24;Google Scholar and Shishkin, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i strany zapada, p. 324.

116. The Soviet and German drafts are conveniently reprinted in Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” pp. 604–9. The suggestion of Schieder (p. 571) and Graml (“Rapallo-Politik,” p. 385) that the Soviets included their demand for prior approval of German participation in the Russian projects of the CIC at Maltzan's urging is unsubstantiated and rather curiously overlooks the fact that the consortium demand was the most elemental and consistently pursued objective of Soviet policy. For example, on Feb. 10 Radek submitted to Maltzan a proposal that, should no general treaty be attainable, notes be exchanged binding Russia not to press Article 116 and Germany “to participate in no international consortium for the reconstruction of Russia without preliminary consultation with the Russian government and only in agreement with the latter” (AA, memorandum by Maltzan, Feb. 10, 1922, L311/4255/096 676–677).

117. Fischer, , Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 340.Google Scholar

118. Text in Mills, Genoa, pp. 333–57. See also Erdmann, “Deutschland, Rapallo und der Westen,” pp. 119–20, and Laubach, Politik der Kabinette Wirth, pp. 201–2.

119. AA, Rathenau to Reichspräsident Friedrich Ebert, Apr. 14, 1922, 3398/1734/738346.

120. AA, Hans von Raumer to Stresemann, Apr. 21, 1922, 7009/3110/143 327–330.

121. AA, Maltzan memorandum of Apr. 17, 1922, 3398/1735/738 895–896, which makes it clear that the decision was Rathenau's. Rathenau's initiative on Apr. 15 raises very serious doubts about the veracity of Maltzan's later self-serving account of the “pajama party” on the morning of Apr. 16, at which he supposedly led the “pro-Rapallo forces” in crushing Rathenau's opposition (see the Maltzan-inspired accounts, given after Rathenau's death, in Fischer, , Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 341;Google ScholarD'Abernon, , Ambassador, 1:321;Google Scholar and Kessler, Harry, Walther Rathenau: His Life and Work [New York, 1930], pp. 322–23).Google Scholar If a “pajama party” did occur after the Soviets agreed to new negotiations, it was more likely concerned with hammering out a new negotiating position than with whether to negotiate.

122. Fischer, , Soviets in World Affairs, 1: 332, agrees that “serious differences of opinion” remained after the Berlin talks, but suggests that the treaty later signed at Rapallo could have been signed in Berlin save for Rathenau's obstinance. Subsequent historians have ignored the “serious differences” and stressed instead the similarity between the Soviet draft of Apr. 4 and the Rapallo Treaty (a similarity more in form than in content).Google Scholar See Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 115; Helbig, Träger, pp. 77–79; Carr, , Bolshevik Revolution, 3: 372;Google Scholar Kochan, Russia and Weimar, p. 50; and Schieder, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” p. 570.

123. In a speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on May 28, 1922, Rathenau admitted that perhaps his earlier assessment of the Article 116 danger was incorrect because of the possibility of revising the reparation bill upward to take into account damage caused by Germany on the Eastern Front (DSB, 2: 660).

124. So Rathenau told Kessler, Harry on Apr. 17 (Kessler, , Tagebücher 1918–1937 [Frankfurt a.M., 1961], p. 298).Google Scholar

125. Rathenau, speech in Stuttgart on June 9, 1922, Gesammelte Reden, p. 411 (emphasis added).

126. See, for example, AA, Abteilung IVa Russland, Ausgestaltung des deutsch-russischen Vertrages vom 16. April 1922 (Rapallo-vertrag), letter of the Ost-Europa-Institut of Breslau to the AA, Sept. 14, 1922, L296/4249/092 308–324, and letter from the Reich Economics Ministry to several German firms and business associations, Aug. 19, 1922, L293/4246/090 363–367; memorandum by Erich Wallroth of the AA's Russian Division about a meeting to prepare for trade negotiations with Russia on Aug. 14, 1922, in AA, Handakten Wallroth, 1921–1926, 5265/2571/318 122–141; the letters of the Chambers of Commerce of Münster, Sept. 27, 1922, and of Magdeburg, Oct. 5, 1922, to the Economics Ministry, quoted in Anderle, Die deutsche Rapallo-Politik, p. 59; and the articles in Deutsche Wirtschafts-Zeitung 19, no. 7 (Aug. 26, 1922): 167, and Farbe und Lacke (1922), p. 301.

127. Contrast the recent views of Dyck, Harvey L. that German-Soviet relations from 1922 to 1924 were essentially free of instability (in his excellent Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability [New York, 1966], pp. 13–14)Google Scholar and of Morgan, R. P. that Rapallo “cemented a German-Soviet partnership” (“The Political Significance of German-Soviet Trade Negotiations, 1922–5,” The Historical Journal 6 [1963]: 253).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

128. Voprosy vneshnei torgovli (Aug. 28, 1922), p. 306.