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Peacetime Attrition in the Army of Frederick William I, 1713–1740

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Willerd R. Fann
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Extract

Often enough to make it worthy of attention, one encounters the assertion that the annual peacetime turnover of enlisted men in the eighteenth-century Prussian army amounted to 20 percent or more of the total. As put by Robert Ergang in his recently reprinted biography of Frederick William I: “The enlistment, it is true, was for life, not for a short period. Frederick William's soldier was a miles perpetuus. … Accordingly the number of those mustered out each year was not overwhelming. Nevertheless, the aged and sick who were dismissed each year amounted to about 20 percent of the standing army.” In addition, “the number of deserters … was large. … The total for the entire reign was 30,216, the lowest number in any one year being 401 in 1739.” The same figures can be found in Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: “In no single year of this reign did fugitives from the army number fewer than 400, and the total number of desertions between 1713 and 1740 was 30,216. More important sources of attrition were age and sickness which led annually to the discharge of 20 per cent, of the effective force.”

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 323 - 334
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1978

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References

1. The Potsdam Führer (New York, 1941; reprint, 1972), pp. 70, 72.Google Scholar

2. New York, 1956, p. 8.

3. War in the Modern World, rev. ed. (Durham, N.C., 1962), p. 54.Google Scholar

4. The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force (Wiesbaden, 1964), 2: 210, 215–16.Google Scholar

5. Zook, David and Higham, Robin, A Short History of Warfare (New York, 1966), p. 103.Google Scholar

6. “Werbung, Wehrpflicht und Beurlaubung unter Friedrich Wilhelm I,” Historische Zeitschrift 67 (1891): 262.Google Scholar

7. Lünig, Johann Christian, ed., Corpus Juris Militaris Des Heil. Röm. Reichs (Leipzig, 1723), 2: 951Google Scholar

8. To be sure, Lehmann's version of the text is not entirely accurate. As quoted by him, the introductory phrase reads: “Die Obristen sollen die Compagnien fleissig bereisen [sic].…” It should read: “Die Obristen sollen sich in Recruitirung der Compagnien fleissig beweisen.…” See “Werbung, Wehrpflicht und Beurlaubung,” p. 284; Lünig, , Corpus Juris Militaris, 2: 951.Google Scholar

9. The source for Tables 1–4 is “Mittheilungen aus dem Archive des Königlichen Kriegsministeriums. III. Statistische Nachrichten über die Armee Friedrich Wilhelms I,” Militär–Wochenblatt 76 (1891): 1031–36. This, in turn, was derived from the monthly Generallisten prepared for the king on the basis of monthly returns submitted by individual regiments. There were some gaps in the material, which have been taken into account in our analysis: data on the king's regiment were not included; the records for 1716, except December, had been lost; garrison units were not fully reported prior to 1719.

Table 5 has been computed on the basis of the actual strength of the army in 1713, 1715, 1720, 1729, 1733, 1738, and 1740. See Jany, Curt, Geschichte der Preussischen Armee (2nd ed.; Osnabrück, 1967), 1: 659–60.Google Scholar The strength of the king's regiment has been deducted, since it was not reported in the Generallisten. Other sources utilized in developing Table 5 were Jany, Curt, “Die alte Armee von 1655–1740 (Formation und Stärke),” Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres (Berlin, 1905), no. 7Google Scholar; and the so-called “Massow List” of 1748, “Die Preussische Armee und ihre Augmentation unter der Regierung Friedrich Wilhelms I, von 1713 bis 1739,” Militair-Wochenblatt 25 (1840): 37–39, 41–48, 50–52.

10. Ergang's statement, “the lowest number [of desertions] in any one year being 401 in 1739,” is only partly correct. The year is right, but the figure is wrong. It should be 459. See “Mittheilungen aus dem Archive des Königlichen Kriegsministeriums,” pp. 1035–36.

11. This figure is slightly inaccurate. It first appeared in the introductory text of the “Mittheilungen aus dem Archive des Königlichen Kriegsministeriums” (p. 1034). It was obviously supposed to be the sum of the figures for desertion given year by year, arm by arm, and rank by rank in the appended tables (pp. 1035–36). Addition of the same figures, however, yields a sum of 28,691 (our Table 1, which is the basis of our calculations, shows a sum of 28,687 because we have disregarded the fragmentary garrison data for 1718). If one takes into account probable desertions in the months Jan. - Nov. 1716 and probable desertions in the king's regiment, the actual total of desertions from 1713 to 1740 was likely somewhat more than 31,000. The totals in Table 1 refer to successful desertions. There were many unsuccessful attempts to desert, but they were not reported in the monthly lists. Not all deserters were lost to the army, since men often deserted in order to secure a new bounty by enlisting in another regiment (where they would reappear, statistically, under the rubric “recruited”). Others returned in response to pardons. It should also be noted that some of the desertions counted in Table 1 took place in the war years of 1713–15 and 1735. Thus real losses and peacetime losses from desertion were somewhat less than is indicated by our figures.

12. As mentioned above, there was large-scale desertion in the infantry during the years 1713–19. After 1719, however, desertion tapered off sharply. Thus, despite the abnormal desertion of 1713–19 (6.6 percent per year), the overall desertion in the infantry between 1713 and 1740 averaged only 2.1 percent per year. By comparison, peacetime desertion in the French infantry between 1716 and 1749 is estimated at 4.4 percent per year. See Corvisier, André, L'Armée française de la fin du XVII siècle au ministère de Choiseul: le Soldat (Paris, 1964), 2: 737.Google Scholar

13. Richter, Adolph, Geschichte des Medizinal-Wesens der Königlichen Preussischen Armee bis zur Gegenwart (Erlangen, 1860), p. 315.Google Scholar

14. Acta Borussica: Ergänzungsband, “Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau, 1704–1740” (Berlin, 1905), p. 326.Google Scholar

15. Men transferred to the king's regiment or who were selected as grenadiers within the regiments were also counted as discharged. Since there is no way to determine their numbers, we have made no effort to take them into account in determining the discharge rate.

16. As of 1714 an infantry company included 134 enlisted men. See Lünig, , Corpus Juris Militaris, 2: 951.Google Scholar To have discharged five men per year, as required by regulations, would have meant an annual loss of 3.7 percent. If one excludes N.C.O.s and interprets the wording of the regulations as applying only to privates, it would have meant an annual loss of 4.1 percent of the authorized number of privates. New regulations adopted in 1726 no longer specified a fixed annual number of discharges, but merely stipulated that captains were “to keep their companies in good condition at all times, and if there are inferior men in any company, to see that they are dismissed and that other, more suitable men are recruited to take their places.” Reglement vor die Königl. Preussische Infanterie (Potsdam, 1726), p. 552.Google Scholar

17. A usage eventually codified in the so-called “Recruiting Regulation” of 1732 where the difference between “good” and “bad” companies or regiments was rigorously defined in terms of height: “Disposition und Ordres, wornach die Königl. Preuss. Infanterie Regimenter von dato d. 1. 8br. 1732 wegen der Werbung sich zu verhalten haben sollen,” Militair-Wochenblatt 26 (1841): 82–83. See also Jany, Curt, “Die Kantonverfassung Friedrich Wilhelms I,” Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte 38 (1925): 229.Google Scholar The requirement of the regulations of 1714 that the oldest men should be replaced by “younger” ones does not mean that Frederick William preferred youthful soldiers, but merely that he preferred youthful recruits who could be expected to render many years of service. Old soldiers, being less likely to desert and more habituated to discipline, close-order drill, and the manual of arms than young ones, were the backbone of the Prussian army. See Fann, Willerd, “On the Infantryman's Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia,” Military Affairs 41 (1977): 165–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar By regulations, an old soldier could be discharged only “when he is no longer able to march.” “Disposition und Ordres, … von dato d. 1. 8br. 1732,” p. 87.

18. See von Lossow, Kopka, Geschichte des Grenadier-Regiments König Friedrich I. (4. Ostpreussischen) Nr.5. (Berlin, 1889–1901), 1: 212; 2: 2, 48Google Scholar; [Anton König], Versuch einer historischen Schilderung der Hauptveränderungen, der Religion, Sitten, Gewohnheiten, Künste, Wissenschaften u. der Rezidenzstadt Berlin (Berlin, 1792–1799), 4/1: 101, 103.Google Scholar Similar practices could be found in other countries. See Scouller, R. E., The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), p. 122.Google Scholar

19. Ironically, some years before the appearance of his study of recruiting under Frederick William I, Max Lehmann had noted the characteristically low discharge rate in Frederick the Great's army, less than 1.0 percent per year in the early 1750s. He attributed this, correctly, to the longevity of the soldiers. Scharnhorst (Leipzig, 1886–1987), 2: 72Google Scholar; cf. Jany, Curt, “Der preussische Kavalleriedienst vor 1806,” Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres (Berlin, 1904), no. 6, pp. 13–14Google Scholar; and von Lossow, Kopka, Geschichte des Grenadier-Regiments Nr. 5., 2: 106.Google Scholar The same was true in Frederick's later years and under his successors. See [Lossow, Matthias v.], Denkwürdigkeiten zur Charakteristik der Preussischen Armee unter dem grossen König Friedrich dem Zweiten (Glogau, 1826), p. 125Google Scholar; Wachholtz, Fr. L. v., Aus dem Tagebuche des Generals Fr. L. v. Wachholtz, ed. Vechelde, C. v. (Braunschweig, 1843), p. 60.Google Scholar

20. By coincidence, in determining the compensation to be paid to the regiments for their losses in the campaign of 1715, Frederick William estimated the average loss at 25 men per company. See König, , Residenzstadt Berlin, 4/1: 372Google Scholar; cf. Jany, , “Die Kantonverfassung Friedrich Wilhelms I,” p. 232.Google Scholar

21. Aside from the examples given above, an illustration of the apparently dazzling effect of the 30,216 figure can be found in a well-known essay on eighteenth-century militarism by Walter Dorn. He says, in connection with Frederick the Great's reign (1740–86): “There was more desertion from the Prussian army than from any other army in Europe.” The quantitative support offered for this dubious generalization is a footnote: “From 1713 to 1740, 30, 216 men deserted from the Prussian army.” Competition for Empire, 1740–1763 (New York, 1940), p. 98.Google Scholar Dorn's source was Losch, Philipp, Soldatenhandel (Kassel, 1933), p. 35.Google Scholar Losch was concerned with rehabilitating the reputation of the much-maligned Hesse-Cassel troops and cited this figure as evidence that, after all, more noted armies suffered from massive desertion. Relevant statistical data for Frederick the Great's army are scanty, but what is available indicates that the peacetime desertion rate during Frederick's reign was even less than that during Frederick William's last years. See Jany, , Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, 2: 248, 3: 61–62Google Scholar; Lehmann, , Scharnhorst, 2: 72.Google Scholar

22. The pay of an infantry private, no matter how experienced or well-trained, was fixed at slightly more than three talers per month by the regulations of 1726. Reglement vor die Königl. Preussische Infanterie, p. 593. By contrast, to secure a desirable, but untrained, foreign recruit could cost “600, 700 talers or more” according to the Recruiting Regulation of 1732. “Disposition und Ordres. … von dato d. 1. 8br. 1732,” p. 86. Even after 1740, when recruiting expenses had been pared, it still cost about 300 talers to acquire a foreign recruit in peacetime. Dette, Erwin, Friedrich der Grosse und sein Heer (Göttingen, 1915), p. 33.Google Scholar Domestic recruiting was cheaper, but meant the withdrawal of valuable elements from the work force of a labor-intensive economy and incited illegal emigration of young men in rough proportion to the volume of recruiting. E.g., see “Renovirtes Edict wegen der aus Furcht der Werbungen ausgetretenen Landes-Kinder,” Feb. 19, 1718, in Lünig, , Corpus Juris Militaris, 2: 970Google Scholar (“The country is being ever more denuded of inhabitants”). These problems, while faced by other eighteenth-century states, may have been more acute in the Prussian kingdom because its relative position among the powers depended primarily on frugal financial management and superior military efficiency. As put by Frederick the Great: “Some of our generals think that one fellow is as good as another and that the loss of an individual soldier can have no effect on the whole. But what in this case may apply in other armies, does not apply in ours. … When a soldier whom one has drilled for two long years, in order to bring him to a certain level of proficiency, deserts and is either inadequately replaced or is not replaced at all, the consequences will in the long run be serious.” Friedrich der Grosse: Militärische Schriften, ed. Taysen, Adalbert v. (Berlin, 1883), p. 3.Google Scholar

23. By way of apologia for the Prussian troops, Curt Jany cites statistics to show that the purportedly more patriotic French experienced greater losses from desertion than the Prussians in the early 1800s. Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, 3: 367. As Peter Paret has noted, although the comparison is accurate, it ignores the most important implication of the facts in question: a Napoleonic army had the resilience to tolerate losses from desertion which would have crippled the armies of the ancien régime. Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1966), pp. 96–97.Google Scholar It is not hard to find other examples of armies which experienced much greater long-term losses from desertion than the Prussian army. For instance, in a twenty-four year period from 1867 to 1891, the United States Army suffered an average annual loss of more than 15 percent of its strength from desertion. See Utley, Robert, Frontier Regulars (New York, 1973), pp. 15–16, 23.Google Scholar Given the situation of the United States in this period, such losses, though annoying, were not critical. Given the situation of Prussia in the eighteenth century, they would have been financially and militarily ruinous.

24. E.g., Macaulay, T. B.: “His feeling about his troops seems to have resembled a miser's feeling about his money. He loved to collect them, to count them, to see them increase; but he could not find it in his heart to break in upon the precious hoard.” Critical, Historical and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems (New York: John W. Lovell, n.d.), 2: 660.Google Scholar

25. Friedrich der Grosse: Militärische Schriften, p. 86; cf. Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand (Berlin, 1846–1857), 8: 217Google Scholar; and Die politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen, ed. Volz, Gustav (Berlin, 1920), p. 140.Google Scholar

26. German historians do not seem to have copied Lehmann's error, perhaps because they have paid more attention to Curt Jany's writings, where the provisions of the regulations of 1714 are accurately reported: “Die Kantonverfassung Friedrich Wilhelms I,” p. 229; and Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, 1: 680. On the other hand, neither Jany nor any other German historian, as far as we know, has pointed out Lehmann's error.