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Economics, Politics and Labor Protest in the German Inflation: the Tax Strikes of 1920 in the Chemical Industry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Craig D. Patton
Craig D. Patton
Affiliation:
University of Alabama in Huntsville
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Extract

In March 1920 the German Reichstag passed legislation which fundamentally altered the country's tax system. The tax package, known as the Erzberger taxreform after its chief architect, Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger of the Center Party, soughtto stabilize the chaotic financial affairs of the young Weimar Republic. Not unexpectedly, the effort provoked intense opposition from many segments of the population. Resistance to the tax plan was particularly strong among the working class, and when it was implemented in July and August, large-scale protests and strikes occurred in various parts of the country. Although an enormous literature exists on labor problems in the Weimar Republic, the tax protests of 1920 have been largely ignored.

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 1996 , pp. 61 - 91
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1996

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References

1. This is true even in such encyclopedic works as Heinrich August Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik 1918 bis 1924 (Bonn and Berlin, 1984)Google Scholar and Feldman, Gerald D., The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (Oxford, 1993).Google Scholar

2. This study is based on research done for my doctoral dissertation in the early 1980s, and at the time I was not permitted to use material in the archives of the German Democratic Republic.

3. A serious tax protest that occurred at the Knapsack chemical plant, located south of Cologne, in June 1920 may have inspired workers at Bayer in their resistance. On this earlier conflict see report by criminal police Cologne, 6 July 1920 and report of the Regional President Cologne, 8 July 1920, both in Landeshauptarchiv 403/14909 (LHA) Koblenz.

4. This account of the events of 30–31 July is based on a detailed report compiled by the firm at the start of August 1920 and a letter from Dr. Ott to Carl Duisberg, 31 July 1920 both in 216/4 (Bd. I), Bayer Werksarchiv (BWA).

5. See report by Bayer on developments on 2–5 August in 216/4 (Bd. I) BWA.

6. Letter of Dr. Ott to Duisberg, 31 July 1920, BWA 216/4 (Bd. I) and letter of Duisberg to other directors 3 August 1920, 216/4, Bd. 2 BWA.

7. Report by Bayer on developments on 2–4 August in 216/4 BWA (Bd. I) and the announcement of the Cologne chemical employers' association, 4 August 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I) BWA.

8. Report of Bayer directors to English occupation authorities in Opladen, 6 August 1920. 216/4, Bd. 2 BWA.

9. See telegram Regional President Cologne to Oberpräsident Koblenz on these talks, 6 August 1920, 403/14989, LHA Koblenz.

10. In their meeting with local officials the union leaders admitted that their control over their followers was marginal. Ibid.

11. Report of the Bayer directors on the strike 9–10 August 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I) BWA.

12. The movement was particularly strong among skilled craftsmen in the mechanical workshops, indicating once again their special militancy at this time. Ibid.

13. Report of Dr. Weber on the strike, 21 August 1920, 216/49 (Bd. I) BWA.

14. Report of Regional President Düsseldorf 9 August 1920, 403/13402, LHA Koblenz.

15. Report of the Bayer directors on the strike 9–10 August 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I), BWA.

16. On the directors' demands and the negotiations of 9 and 10 August see Ibid., and minutes of the negotiations, 10 August 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I), BWA.

17. According to the comprise, no workers would be dismissed at this time, but a joint commission was to determine who had participated in the protests of 31 July and 7 August, and if these workers ever broke the factory rules again, they were not to be defended by the workers' council. Minutes of meeting, 10 August 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I), BWA.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ferdinand Bertrams,“Sozialberichte” 1918–1929, MS., 10–11, in 221/3, BWA.

21. Hourly wages of adult males were increased an average of 12 percent while those of women and younger workers rose an average of 7 percent. Ibid.

22. As noted earlier, this article is based on research done prior to reunification, and I was not allowed to view the holdings of archives in the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, the following account of events at Leuna is based on East German secondary sources. While these need to be used cautiously, the picture they paint generally corresponds with the findings of those few Western scholars who have had access to the primary sources. For example, see Weitz, Eric, “Archive Report: The Betriebsarchiv der Leuna-Werke ‘Walter Ulbricht,’” German History 9, no. 1 (1991): 75–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. For details on the wage movement at Leuna in the spring of 1920 see Meisel, Gerhard, “Der Kampf der Werktätigen des Leunawerkes in den Jahren 1919–1921,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Berlin, 1961) 324–26.Google Scholar

24. Ibid., 328–29.

25. Ibid., 338. This was hardly surprising for here as elsewhere skilled metalworkers were often the vanguard of organized militancy.See Patton, Craig, “‘Proletarian Protest’?: Skill and Protest in the German Chemical Industry, 1914–1924,” Journal of Social History 25, no. 4 1992): 757–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 339.

27. Ibid., 343 and Kreisleitung der SED VEB Leuna-Werke “Walter-Ulbricht,” ed., Kämpfendes Leuna (1916–1945). Die Geschichte der Kämpfeder Leuna-Arbeiter, vol. 1 Berlin, (1961), 214–15.

28. Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 343–44.

29. Ibid., 344–45.

30. As a result of these talks, workers at Leuna did indeed secure a modest wage increase which helped offset the withholding tax. But, they also had to acknowledge that the tax strike was illegal and reject the threat of violence as a means of securing concessions in the future. Ibid., 345.

31. In early 1920 there was a nearly Constant series of wage movements and small-scale shop floor protests at the factory, some of which ended in violence. For details see reports of the Regional President for the Palatinate, 25 February and 1 March 1920 both in LA Speyer R12/382; Tribüne, 3 March 1920; Pfälzische Post, 10 December 1920; Schiffimann, Dieter, Von der Revolution zum Neunstundentag: Arbeit und Konflikt bei BASF 1918–1924 (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1983), 193–96, 203–6.Google Scholar

32. Report of District Administration Frankenthal, 27 May 1920, H33/414, Landesarchiv (LA) Speyer.

33. The following account on events at BASF relies heavily on Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag which utilizes French occupation records not examined by the present author.

34. Ibid. and Pfälzische Post, 20 August 1920.

35. Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 209.

36. Bimonthly report of Palatinate government, 1 September 1920, R12/382, LA Speyer.

37. Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 210.

38. Ibid.

39. For details on the protest see Höchster Kreisblatt, 25 June 1920.

40. Ibid., 30 and 31 July and 2 and 3 August 1920. Also Volksrecht (Frankfurt am Main), 2 August 1920.

41. Höchster Kreisblatt, 2 August 1920 and Volksrecht, 2 August 1920.

42. At a meeting of IG delegates on 1 August leaders of other IG firms condemned the concessions made by the directors of Hoechst. In light of developments at Bayer at the same time, this probably led the Farbwerke to revoke its commitments. See report by directors of Bayer on events of 2–4 August, 1920, 216/4 (Bd. I), BWA.

43. On the provisions of the Erzberger tax plan see Witt, Peter-Christian, “Tax Policies, Tax Assessment and Inflation: Towards a Sociology of Public Finances in the German Inflation, 1914–1923,” in Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe. The History and Sociology of Public Finance, ed. Peter-Christian, Witt (Lemington Spa, 1987) 137–60.Google Scholar

44. Among these works are those of Kolb, Eberhard, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf, 1962);Google Scholarvon Oertzen, Peter, Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution. Eine politik-wissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Ideengehalt und Struktur der betrieblichen und wirtschaftlichen Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19 (Düsseldorf, 1963);Google ScholarRürup, Reinhard, Probleme der Revolution in Deutschland 1918/19 (Wiesbaden, 1968);Google ScholarKocka, Jürgen, Klassengesellschaft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialgeschichte 1914–1918 (Göttingen, 1973);Google ScholarReinhard, Rürup, ed., Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet (Wuppertal, 1975).Google Scholar

45. Abelshauser, Werner, “Verelendung der Handarbeiter? Zur sozialen Lage der deutschen Arbeiter in der grossen Inflation der frühen zwanziger Jahre” in Vom Elend der Handarbeit. Probleme historischer Unterschichtenforschung, ed. Mommsen, Hans and Schulze, Winfried (Stuttgart, 1981), 445–76.Google Scholar

46. Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig, Die deutsche Inflation 1914–1923: Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive (Berlin and New York, 1980), 218–77. On real wages specifically, see 241–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47. The most thorough critique of the views of Abelshauser and Holtfrerich is Scholz, Robert, “Lohn und Beschäftigung als Indikatoren für die soziale Lage der Arbeiterschaft in der Inflation” in The Adaptation to Inflation, ed. Gerald, D. Feldman et al. (Berlin and New York, 1986), 278–322.Google Scholar For examples of how their ideas have been incorporated into standard works on Weimar social and political history see Winkler, Revolution zur Stabilisierung; Feldman, The Great Disorder; Bessel, Richard, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1993).Google Scholar

48. Report by Hoechst AG Division of Labor Statistics on working conditions 1912–1921 in Hoechst Firmenarchiv (HFA). These figures are based on a standard 48-hour week and do not reflect the possibility of overtime or of special “social bonuses” that may have increased the workers' income. While such bonuses were reintroduced in the fall and winter of 1920, in general the firms did not use much overtime in order to avoid charges of trying to circumvent the eight-hour day.

49. On wage developments in the chemical industry in general see Duisberg, Carl, Die Arbeiterschaft der chemischen Grossindustrie. Darstellung ihrer sozialen Lage (Berlin, 1921)Google Scholar and Patton, Craig D., “Labor Protest in the German Inflation: The Case of the Chemical Industry,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1985).Google Scholar

50. For example see minutes of Bayer's workers' committee meeting, 26 June 1919, 214/11, BWA.

51. The issue about the value or utility of leisure to workers is an important question, but cannot be explored in detail here. For a discussion of this question see Cross, Gary, “Time, Money, and Labor History's Encounter with Consumer Culture,” International Labor History and Working-Class History 43 (Spring 1993): 2–17 with replies by Michael Rutin and Victoria de Grazia.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. Scholz, “Lohn und Beschäftigung,” 291–98.

53. In fact hourly and weekly real wages were often lower at this time than during the wartime trough of 1917. Bry, Gerhard, Wages in Germany, 1871–1945 (Princeton, 1960), 226–31, 438–56Google Scholar and Patton, “Labor Protest,” 75–80, 201–8, 440–44.

54. On the problem of shortages, especially food shortages, during and after the First World War see Feldman, The Great Disorder; Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung, 383–86; Holtfrerich, Deutsche Inflation, 246–60.

55. On agriculture and agricultural productivity in the early Weimar Republic see Moeller, Robert, German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia, (Chapel Hill, 1986), 95–115Google Scholar and Osmond, Jonathan, “Peasant Farming in South and West Germany during War and Inflation 1914 to 1924: Stability or Stagnation?” In Die deutsche Inflation, ed. Feldman, Gerald D. et al. (Berlin, 1982), 289–307.Google Scholar

56. See minutes of Bayer's Committee on Nutrition, 16 April and 19 October 1919, both in 250/8, BWA.

57. Report of Regional President Düsseldorf, 26 March 1920, 403/14800, Landeshauptarchiv (LHA) Koblenz and report of Regional President Cologne, 31 March 1920, 403/14991, LHA Koblenz. On conditions in Ludwigshafen see report of Regional President Palatinate, 25 February 1920, R12/382, (LA) Speyer; Tribüne (Mannheim), 3 March 1920; Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 186.

58. On the situation near Bayer see report of Regional President Cologne, 28 June 1920, LHA Koblenz 403/14991.

59. For a cogent overview of real wage trends during the inflation see Kunz, Andreas, “Verteilungskampf order Interessenkonsensus? Zur Entwicklung der Realeinkommen von Beamten, Arbeiterr und Angestellten in der Inflationszeit 1914–1924”, in Deutsche Inflation, ed. Feldman, et al. 347–84.Google Scholar

60. On the economic condition of industry during the postwar inflation see Feldman, The Great Disorder, 272–305, 840–47 and Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung, 389–91.

61. For an overview of the development of the German chemical firms during and after the war see Haber, L. F. The Chemical Industry 1900–1930: International Growth and Technological Change (Oxford, 1971)Google Scholar, especially chapters 7–10, and Plumpe, Gottfried, Die I. G. Farbenindustrie AG. Wirtschaft, Technik und Politik 1904–1945 (Berlin, 1991)Google Scholar, especially part I.

62. For details on sales from 1914–20 see the financial records of the IG in BWA l5 Dal.1 and BWA l5Ba4.2 and Patton, “Labor Protest,” 59–63, 184–87, 290–94.

63. Ibid.

64. Compare data contained in yearly reports of each firm with list of net profits of the IG 1915–1921, BWA 15/Ba4.2. The extent of this practice before and after the period from 1914–24 is not clear, but it might alter the picture of IG finances presented in Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie, 92–97.

65. For example, while Bayer listed profits of 5.8 and 4.9 million Goldmark in 1919 and 1920 respectively, its internal accounts show these were really 23.7 and 31.5 million. Similarly, BASF cited profits of 5.7 and 4.9 million goldmark for these two years when in fact they were 32.6 and 18.3 million. Ibid.

66. Compare the reported dividends for 1914 and 1919 for each firm, all found in BWA 4B17.

67. On this protest see report of Mayor's Office Ludwigshafen, 25 May 1920, R12/402 LA Speyer; letter of Regional President Palatinate to Gen.DeMetz, 23 May 1920, GSTA MA 107974; report of Regional President Palatinate, 1 June 1920, R12/382, LA Speyer. Also in Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 200–2.

68. The following analysis is based on Witt, “Tax Policies,” 148–60.

69. Ibid.Also Feldman, The Great Disorder, 160–66, 196–98 on the opposition of industrial and conservative circles to the Erzberger tax package.

70. On this phenomenon in general see Maier, Charles, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I, (Princeton, 1975).Google Scholar

71. On this phase of political developments in the Weimar Republic see Feldman, The Great Disorder, 156–65, 188–210, 218–26; Morgan, David, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German Independent Socialist Party, 1917–1922 (Ithaca, 1975), 241–78Google Scholar and Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung, 191–205, 283–94. Also Feuchtwanger, E. J., From Weimar to Hitler: Germany 1918–33, (New York, 1993), 63–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Breitman, Richard, German Socialism and Weimar Democracy, (Chapel Hill, 1988), 59–73.Google Scholar

72. Typical of this approach are Kolb, Arbeiterräte 1918/19; von Oertzen, Betriebsräte; Rürup, Probleme der Revolution.

73. Mommsen, Wolfgang J., “Die deutsche Revolution 1918–1920. Politische Revolution und soziale Protestbewegung” in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 4, no. 3 (1978): 362–91.Google Scholar

74. See also the fine collection of articles in Cronin, James E. and Sirianni, Carmen, eds., Work, Community, and Power: The Experience of Labor in Europe and America, 1900–1925 (Philadelphia, 1983).Google Scholar

75. Winkler, Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung, 175–82 and Wheeler, Robert F., USPD und Internationale: Sozialistischer Internationalismus in der Zeit der Revolution (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1975), especially 132–61, 232–58.Google Scholar

76. On the protests at Leuna see Schultz, Eberhard, “Rolle und Anteil des linken Flügels der USPD im ehemaligen Regierungsbeszirk Halle-Merseburg bei der Herausbildiung und Entwicklung der KPD zur revolutionären Massenpartei (1917–1920),” (Ph.D. diss. University of Halle-Wittenberg, 1969), 145–46.Google Scholar For those at BASF see Pfälzische Post, 25 February 1919.

77. See directors' memo to supervisory personnel, 15 January 1919, 210/5, BWA and minutes of workers' committee meeting, 19 March 1919, 214/11, BWA.

78. On the origins and course of the general strike see Ibid., 166 and von Oertzen, Betriebsräte, 144.

79. Volksstimme, 16 April 1919.

80. See reports on the so-called Scheftlein strike in Pfälzische Post, 5–8 and 17–18 July 1919 and the detailed account in Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 174–81.

81. For details on developments at Leuna in late 1919 and early 1920 see Schultz, “Rolle und Anteil,” 146–47, 207; Kämpfendes Leuna, 173, 183–85; Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 279–81; Morgan, Socialist Left, 312–14; Weitz, “Archive Report,” 77–78.

82. The most common form of this “indiscipline” was theft which reached epidemic proportions in the winter of 1919–. Although employers recognized that economic hardship drove many workers to steal, they nonetheless portrayed it as primarily a result of the breakdown of discipline since the revolution. Patton, “Labor Protest,” 118–19, 345–47.

83. On this demonstration and its aftereffects see Morgan, Socialist Left, 311–20.

84. In December 1919 workers at Bayer were forced to accept a new set of work rules which increased the powers of both security personnel and supervisory personnel and also limited the rights of shop stewards and the factory council. See copy of the new regulations, 6 December 1919, BWA 214/11. On developments at BASF see Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 187–93 and Patton, “Labor Protest,” 345–49.

85. Quoted in Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 191.

86. On the course of the Kapp Putsch at Leuna and in the surrounding areas see Kämpfendes Leuna, 203–5; Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 249–57, 270; Morgan, Socialist Left, 334–35; Schultz, “Rolle und Anteil,” 217–18.

87. Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 298–300; Morgan, Socialist Left, 346; Schultz, “Rolle und Anteil,” 237.

88. See Report of Regional President Cologne, 31 March 1920, LHA Koblenz 403/14991 and an unidentified report, no date, 5113.53 Stadtarchiv Leverkusen.

89. Report of Regional President Cologne, 31 March 1920, 403/14991 LHA Koblenz.

90. For details on events in Höchst see Höchster Kreisblatt, 15–18 March 1920. On developments in Ludwigshafen see Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 197–99; report of Regional President Palatinate, 3 April 1920, LA Speyer R12/382; report of Mayor's Office Ludwigshafen, 24 April 1920, R12/402, LA Speyer.

91. This was especially true of leftwing Independents and Communists, but even many moderate USPD leaders often indulged in rhetorical excesses, endorsing militant tactics and radical slogans which they normally avoided. See Höchster Kreisblatt, 25 May 1920.

92. In Wiesdorf and the area around Leuna the USPD received 44 and 45 percent of the total vote respectively, while the SPD polled only 9–11 percent. In Höchst the gap was much smaller with the USPD getting 29 percent compared to 22 percent for the SPD. Only in Ludwigshafen did the SPD outpoll the USPD, roughly 33 percent to 20 percent, indicating that the radicalism of the workers at BASF was not shared by many other workers. For details see Patton, “Labor Protest,” 125, 240, 353–54; Bergische Arbeiterstimme, 7 June 1920; Morgan, Socialist Left, 449; Statistik des deutschen Reichs, vol. 291(11), 55 & 85.

93. Morgan, Socialist Left, 448–49.

94. The employers' preoccupation with indiscipline as the chief source of lower productivity is seen in the constant reappearance of this theme in Bayer's records for 1919–1920. For examples see memo by Carl Duisberg, 15 January 1919, 210/5 BWA; minutes of factory council meeting, 19 March 1919, 214/11, BWA; minutes of Factory Office Committee, 10 November 1919, 214/6, BWA; minutes of factory council meeting, 6 December 1919, 214/11, BWA; minutes of engineers' conference, 30 January 1920, 56/3, BWA.

95. Feldman, The Great Disorder, 165–218 and Feldman, Gerald D., “The Political Economy of Germany's Relative Stabilization during the 1920/21 Depression” in The German Inflation, ed. Feldman, et al. , 180–206.Google Scholar

96. For details see Walter Greiling, “25 Jahre Leuna” (unpub. MS, 1944, BASF Archiv), 34–39, 52–56, 71–73, 93–96; von Oertzen, Betriebsräte, 171; Stein, Eberhard, “Die Entstehung der Leunawerke und die Anfänge der Arbeiterbewegung in den Leunawerken während desersten Weltkrieges und der November Revolution,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Halle-Wittenberg, 1960), 211–12, 250.Google Scholar

97. On the multi-faceted role of established urban networks and working-class neighborhoods before and during the war see James E.Cronin, “Labor Insurgency and Class Formation: Comparative Perspectives on the Crisis of 1917–1920 in Europe” and Nolan, Mary, “Workers and Revolution in Germany, 1918–1919: The Urban Dimension,” both in Work, Community, and Power, ed. Cronin, and Sirianni, , 20–48Google Scholar and 117–42 respectively. On urban growth, residency patterns, and forms of sociability in the chemical centers before and during the war see Breunig, Willi, Soziale Verhältnisse der Arbeiterschaft und sozialistische Arbeiterbewegung in Ludwigshafen am Rhein 1869–1919 (Ludwigshafen am Rhein, 1976), 63–75Google Scholar, 510–19; Peetz, Hilla, ed., Nicht ohne uns! Arbeiterbriefe, Berichte und Dokumente zur chemischen Industrialisierung von 1760 bis heute (Frankfurt am Main, 1981);Google ScholarBäumler, Ernst, Die Rotfabriker. Familiengeschichte eines Weltunternehmens (Munich, 1988).Google Scholar

98. During the war, of course, this was used to produce explosives, while after 1918 it was employed to make nitrogenous fertilizer for agriculture.

99. This is presented and analyzed in detail in Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag. Also see Patton, “Labor Protest,” 316–438, especially 316–60 on the period 1914–1920.

100. At BASF approximately one-third of the work force was composed of skilled workers in the early 1920s, compared with 20–25 percent at Bayer and Hoechst. At Oppau itself the percentage was even higher, perhaps as much as 50 percent. See Voigtländer-Tetzner, “Der Mensch in der BASF,” vol. 1 (unpub. MS, 1940, BASF Archiv), 26–28; Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 81; BASF, Die Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik, (Ludwigshafen, 1922), 46.Google Scholar No precise figures are currently available for Leuna in 1917–1923, but at the start of 1924 just over 40 percent of the work force were craftsmen. See Kämpfendes Leuna, 586–87.

101. On the vanguard role of skilled workers, especially metalworkers in the unrest of 1917–20 see Geary, Dick, European Labour Protest 1848–1939, (New York, 1981), 95–98, 137–40;Google ScholarNolan, Mary, Social Democracy and Society: Working Class Radicalism in Düsseldorf, 1890–1920 (Cambridge, 1981), 60, 103;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cronin, “Labor Insurgency,” 32–34; Sirianni, Carmen, “Workers' Control in Europe: A Comparative Sociological Analysis” in Work, Community, and Power, ed. Cronin, and Sirianni, , 254–310Google Scholar, especially 283, 294, 301–2; von Oertzen, Betriebsräte, 280–82.

102. On chemical markets in general at this time see Haber, Chemical Industry 1900–30, 247–58; Plumpe, I. G. Farbenindustrie, 96–130; Roedler, Carl-Ludwig, “Grundzüge der deutschen Konjunkturbewegung 1920–1925 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der chemischen Industrie,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Frankfurt am Main, 1926), 126–34.Google Scholar On the fortunes of Bayer itself and local employment see Patton, “Labor Protest,” 59–68.

103. Patton, “Labor Protest,” 114, 120–24.

104. It is interesting to contrast this pattern with that of nearby Griesheim-Elektron which was deeply involved in war production from the very outset of the war and which, consequently, experienced more labor problems. See Ibid., 216–19.

105. Ibid., 184–87, 191–92, 230–36.

106. On this phenomenon in general see Patton, “‘Proletarian Protest.’”

107. Morgan, Socialist Left, 448–49.

108. On the party's development, leadership, and politics see Ibid., 71–73, 173–75; von Oertzen, Betriebsräte, 171–72; Wheeler, USPD und Internationale, 143–44.

109. The center of this radical orientation was nearby Solingen, a center of small and medium-sized metalworking firms. On the politics of the Solingen SPD before and during the war see Reulecke, Jürgen, “Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Arbeiterbewegung im rheinischwestfälischen Industriegebiet” in Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Rheinland-Westfalen, ed. Jürgen, Reulecke (Wuppertal, 1974), 205–73.Google Scholar In many ways the situation in the Solingen district resembled that of Remscheid which is analyzed in more detail by Lucas, Eberhard, Arbeiter Radikalismus. Zwei Formen von Radilealismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Frankfurt am Main, 1976).Google Scholar

110. On postwar membership growth see Bergische Arbeiterstimme, 10 January 1919.

111. Although moderates still dominated the top offices in both the USPD and unions in mid–1920, the radicals were well entrenched in the lower rungs of both organizations. See Patton, “Labor Protest,” 106–24.

112. For details on the evolution of the socialist movement in Ludwigshafen before the war see Breunig, Soziale Verhältnisse, 222–357.

113. The best account on the development of the USPD in Ludwigshafen in the months before the tax protests is Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 193–200.

114. On prewar and wartime developments in both Frankfurt and Höchst see Morgan, Socialist Left, 74–75; Neuland, Franz, “Der Weltkrieg, die Frankfurter Arbeiterschaft und ihre Organisationen” in Ein Krieg wird ausgestellt. Die Weltkriegssammlung des Historischen Museums (1914–1918) (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), 28–31, 45–46;Google ScholarSchorske, Carl, German Social Democracy 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism (New York, 1972), 283;Google ScholarWickham, James, “Working-class Movement and Working-class Life: Frankfurt am Main during the Weimar Republic,” Social History, 8, no. 3 (1983): 317–18, 327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

115. For details on the politics of both the SPD and USPD see Patton, “Labor Protest,” 217–18, 225–26, 237–38.

116. See copy of new factory code in BWA 212/2; memoirs of Dr. Sparre, 7 June 1929, 215/7, BWA. Meissner, H., “Ingenieurwesen” in Bayer 1863–1963. Beiträge zur hundertjährigen Firmengeschichte, ed. Jesch, Karl (Leverkusen, 1964), 356.Google Scholar Also Stolle, Uta, Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb. Frauen und Männer, Reformisten und Radikale, Fach- und Massenarbeiter bei Bayer, BASF, Bosch und in Solingen (1900–1933) (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1980), 58.Google Scholar

117. In and around Wiesdorf the vote for affiliation with the Comintern on the basis of the Twenty-One Conditions was 3,533 to 451. Report of Mayor's Office Solingen, 29 October 1920, Hauptstaatsarchiv, 15818, (HStA) Düsseldorf. At Leuna workers voted 830 to 50 in favor of the Twenty-One Conditions. See Meisel, “Kampf der Werktätigen,” 367 and Wheeler, USPD und Internationale, 248.

118. On the strike at Bayer and its consequences see Stolle, Arbeiterpolitik im Betrieb, 60–79; Patton, “Labor Protest,” 138–53. On the March uprising in general see Angress, Werner, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923, (Princeton, 1963), especially 105–66.Google Scholar For details on developments at Leuna see Meisel, “Kampf der Werktatigen,” 428–55.

119. For details on the movements in September and early October, the lockout of October 1920, and subsequent developments at BASF see Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 213–35 and Patton, “Labor Protest,” 360–77.

120. Another reason for the delay of these conflicts, and for their particular ferocity, was the explosion disaster at Oppau in September 1921. On BASF in 1921–24 see Schiffmann, Revolution zum Neunstundentag, 235–367 and Patton, “Labor Unrest,” 378–438.

121. On the background and course of the strike at Hoechst in September–October 1921 see Patton, “Labor Protest,” 250–61.

122. In late August an assembly of factory council delegates voted overwhelmingly for the councils to follow the guidelines of the ADGB and remain independent from political parties. See Volksrecht, 25 August 1920.

123. In elections for the Prussian Landtag in February 1921 the VKPD received 1,400 votes (9.7 percent of the vote) while the USPD got 1,342 (9.3 percent). Their combined total was far less than the approximately 4,300 votes (29.5 percent) won by the USPD in the Reichstag election of June 1920. Ibid., 21 February 1921 and Höchster Kreisblatt, 21 February 1921.