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Desperate Counsel in Vienna in July 1914: Berthold Molden's Unpublished Memorandum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Solomon Wank
Solomon Wank
Affiliation:
Berthold Molden m.p. 6 July 1914
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Extract

We began the war, not the Germans and even less the Entente— that I know.” So begins a recently discovered and published account of the events of July 1914, Der Kriegsbeginn, written in December 1918 by Baron Leopold von Andrian–Werburg, the respected and influential Austro-Hungarian Consul-General in Warsaw (1911–1914). He was in Vienna after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, and belonged to that small circle of diplomats privy to the discussions in the Ballhausplatz that followed that event. Andrian-Werburg's ringing confession of Austro-Hungarian responsibility for the outbreak of World War I is much more direct than one that first came to light more than a decade ago: that of Count Alexander Hoyos, Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold's chef-de-cabinet. Andrian-Werburg's avowal of Austro-Hungarian responsibility is paradoxical in the context of the controversy over German policy in July 1914 sparked by the publication of Fritz Fischer's 1964 book on Germany's war aims. As Fritz Fellner pointed out in an essay on Hoyos's mission to Berlin to garner benützt werden, urn die Rechnung zu prasentieren. Entgegenkornmen so lange wie möglich, aber zurückschlagen beirn nächsten Schlag. Dieser nächste Schiag ist jetzt da—alle Welt sieht, weiche Gesinnungen in Serbien die Führung an sich gerissen haben. Nicht urn Rache handelt es sich, sondern urn Sicherung für die Zukunft. Rache mag das, für das Gefühl der einfachsten Menschen in unserern Volke verständlichste Motiv sein, für viele andere wird es heissen, dass Serbien uns sein böses Trachten jetzt enthüllt hat—die Politik aber hat Bürgschaft oder Unterwerfung zu fordern.

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Central European History , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 281 - 310
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1993

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References

A copy of the document in the original German is appended followed by an English translation. The translation is my own. Univ. Doz. Dr. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Professor Rebecca Boehling made some helpful suggestions regarding the translation, for which I thank both of them. The present article is a partial result of research supported by grants from the American Philosophical Society, Franklin and Marshall College, and the Theodor Körner-Stiftungsfonds zur Forderung von Wissenschaft und Kunst (Vienna).

1. The memorandum is appended to Leslie, John, “Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch: Der Ballhausplatz in Wien im Juli 1914 aus der Sicht eines österreichischungarischen Diplomaten,” in Melville, Ralph et al. , eds., Deutschland und Europa in der Neuzeit: Festschrift für Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1988), 663–84, appendix pp. 675–84.Google Scholar

2. Ibid., 667.

3. Fellner, Fritz, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” in Cubrilovic, Vasa, ed., Les grandes puissances et la serbie à la veille de la premiere guerre mondiale (Belgrade, 1976), 387–419.Google Scholar

4. Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/1918 (Düsseldorf, 1961;Google Scholar English trans., Germany's Aims in the First World War [New York, 1967]).Google Scholar

5. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos.’”

6. Ibid., 387, 388.

7. Berghahn, Volker R., Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York, 1973), 166.Google Scholar

8. Leslie, “Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch,” 677.

9. Fay, Sidney B., The Origins of the World War, 2 vols. (New York, 1928), 2: 550.Google Scholar

10. Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London, 1952–1957), 2: 148Google Scholar. Albertini died before he could write a concluding chapter. See the summary of his main conclusions prepared by Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, in Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, ed., The Origins of a Tragedy, Problems in Civilization (St. Louis, Mo., 1981). 20–23.Google Scholar

11. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 388.

12. Evans, R. J. W., “The Habsburg and the Coming of the War,” in Evans, R. J. W. and von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge, eds., The Coming of the First World War (Oxford, Eng., 1988), 34.Google Scholar

13. Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1991), 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Ibid., 215.

14. Sked, Alan, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918 (London, New York, 1988), 269.Google Scholar

15. Jelavich, Barbara, Modern Austria: Empire and Republic 1800–1986 (Cambridge, Eng., New York, 1987), 134.Google Scholar

16. Ibid.

17. Bridge, F. R., The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers (New York, Oxford, 1990), 340–41.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., 342.

19. Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, “Introduction,” Central European History 21 (09 1988): 205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Williamson's introduction is to a symposium on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Fritz Fischer's book on Germany's war aims (see n. 4 above).

20. See, for example: Redlich, Josef, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs: Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, 1908–1919, ed. Fellner, Fritz, 2 vols. (Graz, Cologne, 1953–1954), 1: 233–39;Google ScholarZweig, Stefan, The World of Yesterday (Lincoln, Nebr., 1963), 221–37.Google Scholar

21. Bittner, Ludwig, et al. , eds., Österreich-Ungams Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, 8 vols. (Vienna, 1930).Google Scholar Hereafter cited as ÖUA.

22. Although not directly involved in policy making, the memoirs of a former Habsburg diplomat and a former Ballhausplatz official are useful in this regard: von Lützow, Heinrich Graf, Im diplomatischen Dienst der k.u.k. Monarchie, ed. Hohenbalken, Peter (Vienna, 1971), 218–28;Google ScholarCormons, Ernest U. (pseud. for Emanuel Urbas), Schicksale und Schatten: Eine österreichische Autobiographie (Salzburg, 1951), 153–66.Google Scholar Lützow, the former Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Italy who retired in 1910, visited the Ballhausplatz several times after the assassination of Francis Ferdinand. Cormons was a junior official in the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry in 1914. Both describe the do-or-die attitude which permeated the foreign ministry after the assassination of Francis Ferdinand. Cormons attributes primary responsibility for the outbreak of the war to the diplomats in the Ballhausplatz.

23. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” and Fellner, Fritz “Zwischen Kriegsbegeisterung und Resignation—Ein Memorandum des Sektionschefs Graf Forgách von Jänner 1915,” Publikationen aus dem Archiv der Universität Graz 4 (1978): 153–62.Google Scholar After the war, Hoyos published a small book which dealt with Anglo-German relations: Hoyos, Alexander, Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungams (Berlin, 1922).Google Scholar It is not very revealing on the subject of his role in and influence on policy decisions in July 1914.

24. Leslie, “Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch,” 675–84.

25. Schroeder, Paul, “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 3 (1972): 336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 337.

27. Ibid., 336.

28. See Mayer, Arno J., The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York, 1981), 109–19 for theGoogle Scholar Habsburg Monarchy. Wehler's thesis is succinctly summarized in Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, The German Empire 1871–1918 (Leamington Spa, Dover N.H., 1985), 170–76, 184–92.Google Scholar

29. On the nature of the imperial structure and its inherent tensions see my earlier paper: Solomon Wank, “The Nationalities Question in the Habsburg Monarchy: Reflections on the Historical Record,” Working Paper, Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota, 1993, 93–3. A copy of the paper may be purchased from the Center for a nominal charge. For a broader, comparative analysis see Motyl, Alexander, “From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective,” in Rudolph, Richard L. and Good, David F., eds., Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union (New York, 1992).Google Scholar

30. See, for example, Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire. 198–99, 264.

31. Leslie, “Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch,” 663.

32. Ibid., 675.

33. Ibid., 680.

34. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 413.

35. Molden, Berthold, Alois Graf Aehrenthal: Sechs Jahre äussere Politik (Stuttgart, 1917).Google Scholar

36. There is no biography of Molden. Information about him may be found in a few biographical sketches: Charmatz, Richard, “Einem Publizisten und Denker zum Gedächtnis,” Die Presse, Vienna, 17 01 1953;Google Scholar“Berthold Molden,” Biographisches Staatshandbuch: Lexikon der Politik, Presse und Publizistik, ed. Kosch, Wilhelm (Berne, Munich, 1963), 2: 868;Google Scholar“Berthold Molden,” Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950 (Vienna, 1975), 6: 350.Google Scholar On his journalistic activity during the war see the brief reference on page 118 of the essay by Helmut Rumpler cited in n. 69 below.

37. Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon, 6:350Google Scholar. On the Belvedere Circle see von Sosnosky, Theodor, Franz Ferdinand der Erzherzog-Thronfolger: Ein Lebensbild (Munich, Berlin, 1929), 116–21.Google Scholar The Belvedere palace was the Vienna residence of the archduke.

38. Kann, Robert, “Count Ottokar Czernin and Archduke Francis Ferdinand,” Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (07, 1956): 143.Google Scholar The article is reprinted in Kann, Robert, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien (Munich, 1976), 157–205.Google ScholarWandruszka, Adam, “Finis Austriae? Reformpläne und Untergangsahnen in der Habsburgermonarchie,” Südostdeutsches Archiv 11 (1968): 112–23.Google Scholar

39. Kann, “Count Ottokar Czernin and Archduke Franz Ferdinand,” 143.

40. The most succinct assessment of the reform plans of the archduke's circles is Kann, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien, 26–40. See also Schmid, Georg E., “Franz Ferdinand,” Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas, 8 vols. (Munich 1974–1981), 1:532–35.Google Scholar

41. Redlich, , Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1:162Google Scholar. On the relations between Aehrenthal and Francis Ferdinand see their correspondence printed in Wank, Solomon, ed., Aus dem Nachlass Aehrenthal: Briefe und Dokumente zur österreichisch-ungarischen Innen- und Aussenpolitik 1885–1912 (Graz, 1993).Google Scholar See also Kiszling, Rudolf, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich Este: Leben, Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalswege der Donaumonarchie (Graz, Cologne, 1953), 94, 113, 133–34, 145, 198.Google Scholar Aehrenthal and Francis Ferdinand were drawn together by a mutual desire for closer relations with Russia. After Aehrenthal became foreign minister in 1906, with the archduke's support, the relations between the two men began to deteriorate as a result of Aehrenthal's alleged complaisance to the wishes of the Hungarian government and his conciliatory attitude toward Italy.

42. Schlitter to Aehrenthal, 4 January 1910. The letter is printed in Wank, ed., Aus dem Nachlass Aehrenthal no. 565, pp. 725–26.

43. Kann, Robert A., The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Empire 1848–1914, 2 vols. (New York, 1950), 1:51–58.Google Scholar

44. In 1909, Redlich wrote in his diary: “The state and the empire have both become so weak that only an energetic recovery of full monarchical power will be able to help.” Redlich, , Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1:24.Google Scholar And again in 1911: “Our people are not ripe for parliament; all would gladly welcome a strong government, a powerful imperial regime.” Ibid., 85.

45. Redlich, Josef, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1920, 1926), 1, Pt. 1:151, 173.Google Scholar

46. See in general von Chlumecky, Leopold, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen (Berlin, 1929), 59–161, esp. 74–76, 92, 104.Google Scholar Franz Ferdinand's power political inclinations were tempered by his awareness of the monarchy's internal weakness. The monarchy must first become more cohesive internally, he wrote to Berchtold in 1913, and “then we will again enjoy respect in the concert of nations and then one can pursue a vigorous foreign policy.” Kann, Frzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien, 220. Not all of the members of the archduke's circle, most prominently Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf the chief of the general staff, shared the former's prudence. Hötzendorf argued unceasingly that only a militarily aggressive policy in the Balkans could save the monarchy from dissolution. See von Hötzendorf, Franz Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906–1918, 5 vols. (Vienna, 1921–1925).Google Scholar

47. Molden, Berthold, “Hungary and the Vatican,” Fortnightly Review (07, 1895), 33–44, 44 for the citation.Google Scholar The same view was expressed by Colonel Alexander von Brosch, the head of Franz Ferdinand's Militärkanzlei and his most trusted adviser, in a letter of 10 October 1913 to fellow Belvedere Circle member, General Moritz von Auffenberg: “Our last hope to compensate for a lack of colonies by a predominant position in the Balkan peninsula is lost forever.” The letter was written after the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 in which the Balkan states defeated Turkey and gained in size and strength. However, not all members of the Belvedere Circle were as resigned as Brosch (see n. 46 above). Brosch's letter is printed in Jedlicka, Ludwig, “Alexander Brosch von Aaerenau und Moritz von Auffenberg: Dokumente einer Freundschaft,” in Franzel, Emil, ed., Virtute Fideque: Festschrft für Otto von Habsburg zum fünfzigsten Geburtstag (Vienna, 1961), 94–96.Google Scholar

48. For further information on the composition of the “Aehrenthal Group” and its influence see Leslie, “Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch,” 663–67; Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 390; Mitrovic, Andrej, “Die Balkanpläne der Ballhausplatz-Bürokratie im Ersten Weltkrieg (1914–1918),” in Glatz, Ferenc and Melville, Ralph, eds., Gesellschaft, Politik und Verwaltung in der Habsburgmonarchie 1830–1918 (Stuttgart, 1987), 344, 352–55;Google ScholarSchmid, Georg, “Der Ballhausplatz 1848–1918,” Österreichische Osthefte 23 (1981): 32–37.Google Scholar The memoirs of Baron Alexander von Musulin, another member of the Aehrenthal Group, are singularly unrevealing with regard to the group's role and influence: Musulin, Das Haus am Ballplatz: Erinnerungen eines österreick-ungarichen Diplomaten (Munich, 1924).Google Scholar Musulin was a foreign office official in 1914 and the prime author of the ultimatum to Serbia. On the other hand, the memoirs of E. U. Cormons (see n. 22 above), a very junior member of the Aehrenthal Group, written long after Musulin's, are much more penetrating. On Musulin and Cormons see the essays of Fellner and Leslie cited at the beginning of this note.

49. See Wank, Solomon, “Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar Railway Project: A Reappraisal,” Slavonic and East European Review 42, no. 99 (1964): 353–69,Google Scholar and idem, “Political versus Military Thinking in Austria-Hungary 1906–1912,” Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research 7, nos. 1 & 2, (1981): 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Feilner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 389–91.

50. On Montlong see Jahrbuch des k.u.k. Auswärtigen Dienstes 1914 (Vienna, 1914), 360Google Scholar, and his file in the personnel records of the foreign ministry: Haus–, Hof-, und Staastsarchiv (hereafter HHStA), Administrative Registratur, Fach 4/Personalia, Carton 224. See also the unflattering sketch of Montlong in Paupie, Kurt, Handbuch der Geschichte der österreichischen Pressegeschichte 1848–1959, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1960), 2:110–11.Google Scholar

51. HHStA, Nachlass Szápáry, Carton 5, Fascicle 12. The memorandum is mentioned in Bridge, F. R., “The British Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary in 1914,” Slavonic and East European Review 47, no. 109 (1969): 405.Google Scholar All translations from the German are my own.

52. HHStA, Politisches Archiv (hereafter PA) I, Carton 811, Fascicle LXX/2. I am indebted to Professor F. R. Bridge of the University of Leeds for his assistance in deciphering Montlong's scrawled signature.

53. HHStA, PA/1, Carton 811, Fascicle LXX/2.

54. Ibid.

55. A communication in Montlong's personnel folder (see n. 50 above) from Count Berchtold, the foreign minister, to Emperor Francis Joseph, no. 27910/2, 28 April 1913, indicates that Montlong shared the strong anti-Serbian and bellicose attitudes of his predecessor, Koloman von Kanya. From the communication it appears that Montlong, along with Kanya, his chief at the time, probably was involved in inflaming Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia in the notorious Prochaska-Affair of November–December 1912. On the affair see Kann, Robert A., Die Prochaska-Affäre vom Herbst 1912: Zwischen kaltem und heissem Krieg (Vienna, 1977), 14Google Scholar, 31 for Kànya's attitudes and role. After the affair ended, Berchtold recommended to the emperor (see above communication) that Kánya and Montlong be decorated to still criticism in the press that the two press department officials had pursued a policy counter to that of the foreign minister.

56. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 389–91, and idem, “Zwischen Kriegsbegeisterung und Resignation,” 153.

57. Hantsch, Hugo, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, 2 vols. (Graz, Vienna), 2:364–65.Google Scholar

58. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 191.

59. Fellner, “Zwischen Kriegsbegeisterung und Resignation,” 155. Kann writes that during the Prochaska-Affair (see n. 55 above) Forgách “could be seen as a representative of the war party.” Kann, Die Prochaska-Affäre, 31. As Fellner points out, Forgách's antiSerbian feelings probably stemmed in part from a wish to punish Serbia because of the humiliation he suffered when he had to be recalled from Belgrade in 1910, after it was established in the trial of Heinrich Friedjung that the documents which Forgách sent to the foreign ministry as proof of the anti-Habsburg intrigues of the Serbs were forgeries. Fellner, “Zwischen Kriegsbegeisterung und Resignation”, 155.

60. Leslie, “Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch,” 664.

61. ÖUA, 8:343–351. An English translation is in Geiss, Imanuel, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (New York, 1967) 80–87.Google Scholar

62. Promemoria Dr. Molden, Appendix to this paper, pp. 303–310 [295–303] below (references are to the translation first, and to the original, in brackets).

63. Ibid., p. 304 [297] below.

64. Ibid., p. 304–5 [297] below.

65. Ibid., p. 309 [302] below.

66. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” 392.

67. For a discussion of the concept of cognitive dissonance and its application to German policy making in the July Crisis see Ned Lebow, Richard, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, 1981), 101–47.Google Scholar

68. Bridge, “The British Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary,” 405.

69. Rumpler, Helmut, “Die rechtlichen-organisatorischen und sozialen Rahmenbedingungen für die Aussenpolitik der Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918,” in Wandruzska, Adam and Urbanitsch, Peter, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, vol. 6, pt. 1Google Scholar, Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen (Vienna, 1989), 1–121, 119Google Scholar for the citation. For further reflections by Rumpler on the primacy of domestic politics in the formulation of Habsburg foreign policy see Ibid., 119–21.

70. Kahler, Miles, “Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 2 (1979–1980): 374–96, 395 for the citation.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

71. Ibid., 386.

72. In 1912, a long political impasse over increasing the size of the army and the military budget was finally resolved, which increased the overall strength of the army. even if in relative terms it was still weaker than the armies of the other great powers. Rothenberg, Günther E., The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind., 1976), 163.Google Scholar

73. Promemoria Dr. Molden, Appendix, p. 310 [303] below.

74. Redlich, , Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1:239.Google Scholar

75. Some minor changes have been made in the original orthography in accordance with modern usage. An umlaut has replaced “e” in Oesterreich and Ueberzeugung and “h” has been eliminated in Atem. Other changes are noted in the text.

76. The references are to the battles of Custozza (24 July 1848) and Novara (23 March 1849) in both of which the Austrian armies under Field Marshal Radetzky defeated the forces of the kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont.

77. The reference is to the Battle of Solferino (24 June 1859) in which the Austrian army was defeated by a combined Franco-Piedmontese army.

78. Lombardy (1859) and Venetia (1866).

79. Presumably a reference to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia of 18 October 1913, demanding its evacuation of Albanian territory within eight days, to which the Serbs acceded.

80. A less flattering view of Francis Ferdinand is contained in a letter of Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst to Aehrenthal, 13 November 1907. At the time, Hohenlohe was secretary of the embassy in Berlin; in August 1914, he was appointed Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the German Empire. He conveyed his impression of the archduke after a conversation with him: “[A]lso in this case, I find my view confirmed that this high lord will not change much: preconceived notions, superficial judgments, and a child-like naiveté in the assessment of serious questions. It is a shame that it is precisely the bearers of the monarchical idea who involuntarily reveal to one and all the dark sides of this principle! It is really fortunate that there are only relatively few persons in the different countries who are in a position to enjoy the intimacy of these high and mighty lords.” The letter is printed in Wank, ed., Aus dem Nachlass Aehrenthal no. 404, pp. 545–47.

81. In the original the word is spelled as “verblendster.”

82. Sergei Sazonov, Russian foreign minister 1910–1916.

83. The name by which Trentino was known earlier.

84. In the original the word is spelled as “einzuheimsen.”

85. Venetia was part of the Habsburg empire from 1815 until 1866.